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ABSTRACT
This thesis constitutes an inquiry into the relationship between nationalism and 
democracy in a particular setting - the postcommunist newly independent democracies. 
The purpose is to seek an answer to two related questions about what is the role of 
nationalism in the democratisation process and under which conditions is nationalism 
more or less compatible with democracy.
Nationalism’s capacity to threaten minorities, fragment states and complicate 
interstate relations has been amply demonstrated and documented. This study takes a 
different approach to nationalism. Its starting point is the democratisation process as a 
factor contributing to the importance of nationalism in the political life. It revolves 
around a theoretical and empirical exploration of the relationship between nationalism 
and democracy. The empirical side is underpinned by the investigation into politics of 
Slovakia and Slovenia as two newly independent postcommunist states that emerged as a 
result of democratisation. The comparative aspect of the thesis leads to the conclusion 
that the role of nationalism in the democratisation process cannot be generalised and 
constitutes a complex process in itself, conditioned by the political context of the society 
undergoing the transition. The following factors are explored: the stage of national 
development, the conditions and circumstances surrounding the achievement of 
independent statehood, the previous regime and the period prior to that, the formation of 
transitional elites and the stage in the transition, the ethnic composition and the 
historically predetermined ethnic harmony within the state.
This thesis presents a number of new arguments. Firstly, it proposes that 
nationalism in new postcommunist democracies contains civic and ethnic demands at the 
same time which consequently gives postcommunist nationalism a different character 
from classical nationalism. Secondly, the thesis seeks the correlation between the 
progress of the transition and nationalism in the priority given to either nation-building or 
state-building. Thirdly, it proposes that whilst nationalism might have a positive role at 
the beginning of the democratisation process, its capacity to sustain that process is 
limited.
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1INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between nationalism and democracy in a 
particular setting: the larger framework is postcommunist Eastern and Central Europe, 
the focus is on newly independent democracies, explored through the case studies of 
Slovakia and Slovenia. The purpose o f the thesis is to seek an answer to two related 
questions about what is the role of nationalism in the democratisation process, and under 
what conditions nationalism is less or more compatible with the democratisation process. 
The thesis will argue that the role of nationalism in the democratisation process cannot 
be generalised and constitutes a complex process in itself, conditioned by the political 
context o f the society undergoing the transition to democracy. The political context is 
viewed as an aggregate o f factors contributing to and determining the equilibrium 
between nationalism and democracy, such as the stage of national development, the 
conditions and circumstances surrounding the achievement o f independent statehood, the 
previous regime and the period prior to that, the formation of transitional elites and the 
stage in the transition and the issues o f ethnic composition and harmony within the state. 
The reason for such a broad range of factors to be explored is that this thesis adopts if 
not a sympathetic, but an objective attitude to nationalism which it views, for better or 
worse, as an integral part of the turbulent and all-encompassing changes in new states, 
seeking a direction, for the first time under democratic conditions.
The year 1989 marked a turning point in world history. The rigid division of 
Europe into East and West, the bipolarity and the predictability of the Cold War system 
and the merciless suppression o f political changes in the region which lasted for nearly 
half of the century disintegrated within two years. By 1991 communism as a political 
system was dismantled, the ECE countries have liberated themselves from Soviet 
tutelage and the three multinational communist federations of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have all been dissolved. The subsequent establishment of 
democratic structures in all successor states, for all its modernising and emancipating 
efforts, was accompanied by many ethnic and national conflicts.
2A decade later three things are clear: first, postcommunism became synonymous 
with democratisation, second, postcommunist transitions to democracy produced greatly 
divergent outcomes and third, democratisation was inseparable from the issues of the 
nation. It is the conjunction of those three issues, postcommunism, democratisation and 
the nation which constitutes the realm of the following analysis, whilst the subject of the 
analysis is the link between them. The thesis will argue that the divergent outcomes in the 
success of postcommunist transitions are greatly influenced by the priorities awarded to 
those congruent but not necessarily complementary processes. Whilst it is generally 
acknowledged that nationalism can be detrimental to democracy, the possibility that it 
could be compatible with democracy under certain conditions and that those conditions 
could vary within the same society at different times needs a deeper examination into the 
evolving dynamic between nation-building and state-building processes, as well as the 
reassessment of theories of nationalism and democratic transitions and this is precisely 
the area to which this thesis hopes to contribute.
The present thesis argues that identity and democratisation are intimately linked 
and that the compatibility of nationalism and democracy depends on how compatible 
their objectives are. It is those objectives that change, depending on the politics of the 
time and so does the role o f nationalism in the democratisation process. All findings of 
this thesis suggest that nationalism aided the political change in ex-communist countries, 
it provided the populations of these countries with a sense of purpose and identity, and in 
the newly independent democracies it assisted the state-creation, all conducive to 
democratisation. Hence, this thesis proposes that nationalism’s role at the beginning of 
the democratisation process is more positive than its role in sustaining that process.
Research objectives
The following thesis pursues two main goals. Theoretically, it analyses and explains the 
relationship between nationalism and democracy generally and particularly their 
concurrence in the democratisation process. Empirically it explains nationalism and its 
role in that process, and provides a detailed exploration of the two case studies in order 
to provide the evidence for the main hypothesis, which is that the role o f nationalism in 
the democratisation process cannot be generalised and depends on specific historical and 
political developments. On the basis of the theoretical discussion and the empirical
3investigation of Slovakia and Slovenia, the thesis seeks to generate an explanation of the 
democratisation processes in the newly independent states that could be applicable to 
other countries in a similar situation.
Definitions
The study of nationalism inhabits an area of individual and collective identities and their 
psychological and cultural interpretations. As such the concepts used in studies of 
nationalism are often contested. In order to avoid conceptual misunderstandings, it is 
necessary to define some of the terms that facilitate the study below.
Nationalism throughout this thesis is viewed as a form of politics which focuses 
on the articulation and the promotion of political aims in the name of and on behalf of a 
nation, or national group. In this study nationalism is not limited to actions or policies of 
a nation whose name the state carries, but could be policies and actions of other national 
groups living within the territory of the state. ‘The nation’ stands for a large social group 
integrated by a combination of objective relationships, such as territory, politics, 
economy, language, history and culture, and their subjective reflection in collective 
consciousness. By national identity is meant the identity that derives from the 
membership in a nation.
Ethnicity refers to a social bond based on the belonging to an ethnic group, 
defined as a particular collectivity based on real or putative common ancestry and 
memories of shared historical past and cultural focus on one or more elements defined as 
the epitome of their peoplehood. The distinction between the nation and the ethnic group 
is in the fact that ethnicity is strictly a cultural trait in which binding issue is primarily the 
common ancestry and not loyalty to a legal structure o f the state (at least not necessarily 
the state of citizenship).
The state is a legal concept, it describes a definite territory and denotes the 
aggregation of political and administrative institution. The term ‘nation-state’ should thus 
mean a state populated by one national group. As is apparent most states comprise of 
more than one national group, hence the distinction between the dominant nation and 
minority is maintained throughout this thesis. Neither term denotes numerical dominance 
or territorial extension. The dominant nation signifies a national group who has the 
preeminent authority to distribute rewards and values in the state; in contrast, a minority
4is a national/ethnic group which defines itself (or is defined) as a separate cultural entity 
from the assumed official culture o f the state.
Related to these working definitions and very importantly for this thesis is the 
distinction between ‘nation-building’ and ‘state -building’. Nation-building stresses 
cultural homogeneity; its policies are rooted in a deliberate effort to construct an 
overarching collective identity based on a putative common national sentiment, mostly 
ethnic sentiment. State-building stands for a complementary project, but aims at social 
solidarity rooted in loyalty to the state, its institutions and its interests.
Research Questions
The first set o f empirical questions involves postcommunism and nationalism. These are 
the following:
- what is the difference between postcommunist transitions to democracy and transitions 
from other authoritarian regimes ?
- what are the conditions under which contemporary nationalism spreads in new 
postcommunist states?
- why has there been an intensification of nationalism in postcommunist societies and 
which factors contributed most significantly to this situation?
The second set of questions concerns the theoretical relationship between democracy and 
nationalism. The main question is:
- how compatible is nationalism and democracy? To what extent and under which 
conditions?
Following the clarification of the principal concepts - nationalism and democracy, the 
implicit questions are:
- what are the opportunities and challenges that nationalism and democracy pose to each 
other?
- what is the logic o f nation-building and state-building?
This theoretical discussion leads to a set of propositions about nationalism and 
democratisation which center on nationalism as an important element of the 
democratisation process and its ability to affect the direction and the pace of the 
transition. These propositions constitute the theoretical framework of the empirical 
investigation into Slovakia and Slovenia. Assuming that a necessary foundation for the 
continuation of a common multiethnic state is the establishment of a political nation with
5a  shared sen se  o f  p o litica l d estin y , each  ca se  study starts w ith  the p o litica l and national 
d ev elo p m en t prior to  the d isin tegration  o f  the federal state. T h e  m ain q u estio n s in b oth  
c a ses  are co n cern ed  w ith  the fo llow in g:
- why did the federal state fail to satisfy national aspirations of its constituent units?
- who were the main political actors who initiated the transition to independence and 
democracy?
- to what extent was independence a result o f democratisation?
- how did the disintegration of the state affect further democratisation and nationalism?
T h e com p arative  a sp ect o f  the p resen t stu d y  and its m ain q u estio n  as to  the ro le o f  
nationalism  in the d em ocratisa tion  p r o c e sse s  fo llo w s  a  certa in  line o f  inquiry into each  
country. T h e  fo llo w in g  n eed s to  b e  exp lored :
- the p o litica l structure and th e  form ation  o f  e lite s  fo llo w in g  in d ep en d en ce
- stability of democratic institutions
- the political tradition prior to communism and the extent to which this tradition affects 
the current politics
- the communist period and its influence on the perception of national identity
- political and ethnic cleavages
- national constitution and ethnic policy
T h e last set o f  q u estio n s  co n cern s the international environm ent, and h o w  it shapes  
d em ocracy  and n ationalism  in the n ew ly  independent d em ocrac ies. I he q u estio n s are:
- what is the role o f the nation and the state in the era of globalisation?
- how does European integration influence nationalism and democracy in ECE countries?
- what is the relationship between national identity and foreign policy generally, and in 
Slovakia and Slovenia in particular?
Research Methodology
The Choice of Case Studies
T h e c h o ic e  o f  tw o  re latively  sm all n ew ly  independent sta tes, S lo v a k ia  and S lo v en ia , w a s  
inspired m ainly by the fo llo w in g  factors:
•  the recent h istory  o f  se c e ss io n  from  a m ultinational com m u n ist fed eration , as a result o f  
dem ocratisation;
6• the pre-communist past shared in the Austro-Hungarian empire, albeit with the 
difference that Slovenia enjoyed a degree of cultural autonomy as a recognised ethnic 
group, whilst Slovakia was devoid of any status, cultural or political, and subjected to 
the strong assimilation policies of Hungary;
• both countries are multi-ethnic societies in which the issue of minorities constitutes an 
important element o f the democratisation process;
• the geo-political position of these countries and their cultural heritage (being ‘almost’ in 
Western Europe), made ‘return’ to Europe one of the most determining factors in 
domestic and foreign politics;
• first-time independence meant that nation-building and state-building assumed a visibly 
parallel quality, whilst neither country has a political tradition of independent statehood 
to rely on;
• a different outcome of the transition process, certainly at the beginning of the writing of 
this thesis;
• a considerable difference in constitutional provisions for minorities, which was at the 
heart o f the international community’s evaluation of the degree of democracy.
This thesis takes the different dynamics between nation-building, state-building and the 
transition to democracy as the starting point for further exploration and comparison of 
the otherwise similar cases.
Written Materials
The written materials used in this study consist o f various kinds o f publications. The 
most important kinds are the following:
• Literature dealing with the theories o f nationalism and democratic transitions published 
in Western and in Eastern/Central Europe;
• Literature on the selected countries in general and publications from the countries 
themselves;
• Literature relating to ethnic conflicts and minority issues generally;
• Academic publications dealing with domestic politics, political structures and public 
administration in the countries under research;
• Academic publications relating directly to nationalism and the transition processes in the 
corresponding countries;
7• Academic publications dealing with constitutional issues relating to minorities;
• Public opinions polls and statistical data;
• Respective constitutions and other legal documents;
• Party programmes and election manifestoes;
• Articles published in newspapers, magazines and journals.
All written materials, where necessary, have been translated by myself.
Literature Review
The first two chapters provide a literature review. Academic publications which are not 
reviewed in the main text itself are mentioned or commented upon in the extensive 
footnotes. The position o f the present thesis according to standard literature on 
nationalism and democracy can be found in the second chapter.
Interviews
In addition to the above I have conducted a number o f interviews with academics, 
journalists and politicians in Slovakia and Slovenia. The purpose of these interviews was 
to gain an initial background knowledge, which in both cases proved a good strategy as 
most o f those interviewed were indirectly, and some directly, involved in the initiation of 
democracy and independence. All interviews were conducted in Slovak in Slovakia and 
in Slovene or English (with some help of German and Serbo-Croat) in Slovenia. No 
interpreters have been used. Some interviews have been recorded, but generally those 
interviewed preferred a notebook method.
The Time Framework of the Thesis
The study in this thesis covers the period from 1989 to 1998. Due to the specificity of 
the Yugoslav politics, in the case o f Slovenia the period prior to independence (1991) is 
not precisely determined. The changes were ongoing from the beginning of the 1980’s 
with Slovenia adopting amendments to the Federal Constitution from about 1988. The 
last general election in Slovenia was in 1996 and no serious changes in the political 
structure have taken place since. Hence, the analysis of the Slovene transition starts with 
the period of liberalisation within the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and is preceded 
by an account o f Slovenia and Yugoslavia prior to the disintegration of the federation. In
8the case o f Slovakia, the exploration of Slovak political and historical development in 
Czechoslovakia ends with the break up of the common state. The analysis of the 
transition process in independent Slovakia ends with the last general election in 
September 1998. These elections constitute a turning point in the Slovak transition 
process so far, and hence it was important to conclude the study of Slovakia at that 
point. The thesis has been updated to November 1999, only in footnotes and only 
relating to the European Union’s rulings as these are considered important factors in the 
assessment o f the transition processes of both countries.
Outline of this Thesis
The present thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter establishes the 
parameters o f the thesis. It focuses on contemporary nationalism in Eastern and Central 
Europe at this specific historical conjuncture - the end of communist rule. The chapter 
explores politics inspired by democratisation and what appeared to be its concomitant - 
nationalism, and the evolving dynamics between them. It advances various propositions 
as to the salience o f nationalism and concludes that nationalism is inspired by a 
multiplicity of factors, ranging from historically predetermined conditions to factors 
deriving from politics o f the transitions to democracy. Historical legacy and the 
transitional project form a consistent theme throughout this thesis and thus the case 
studies of Slovakia and Slovenia are divided in the same way. The second chapter 
provides the theoretical justification of the thesis. It consists of two main sections: a) 
critical examination of the relationship between nationalism and democracy, which deals 
with the clarification of the concepts nationalism and democracy and their compatibilities 
and contradictions; b) introduces the case studies and illustrates the use of theoretical 
arguments. The core theme here is the clash between two overlapping, but conceptually 
different processes: the culturally pre-occupied nation-building and administratively and 
politically orientated state-building. The chapter draws a clear distinction between ethnic 
solidarity, national identity and the identity of a political community. It also draws 
attention to a political unit as the precondition of democracy and the role o f national self- 
determination in the formation of such a unit. The thesis then proceeds with its main 
body, the case studies o f Slovakia and Slovenia which take up chapters three, four, five 
and six.
9Each case study is divided chronologically into two sequential chapters. In both 
cases the first chapter explores: a) the national and political development within the 
former multiethnic states; b) the politics of transition to independence and democracy. 
This is then followed by the subsequent chapter dealing with an analysis o f socio-political 
and cultural conditions in independent Slovakia and Slovenia. Those chapters both 
contain: an analysis o f the political structure, the exploration of the political tradition and 
importantly the evaluation of respective constitutions and ethnic policies. Thus, the third 
chapter follows the Slovak development within Czechoslovakia. It focuses on the failure 
of the common Czechoslovak state to establish a united political nation, which it is 
argued here, was the main reason for the break-up of the state. Another reason was the 
divergent levels o f political and national development between the Czechs and Slovaks. 
The disintegration of Czechoslovakia, with hindsight rather inevitable, was not really 
desired by the populations of the Czech and Slovak republics which had serious 
consequences for the formation of political elites in independent Slovakia. The fourth 
chapter finds independent Slovakia, politically and ethnically divided, the new 
nationhood and democracy both suffering from the lack of conviction and direction. The 
lack of consensus among the elites and the population about the conception of their new 
nationhood and democracy in the period 1993-1998 led to a considerable rise in 
nationalist mobilisation, particularly towards the Hungarian minority, and the stagnation 
of the democratisation process. The last general election in Slovakia changed this 
situation and the case study of Slovakia ends there. The negative role of nationalism in 
the democratisation process in Slovakia is contrasted with the situation in Slovenia. The 
fifth chapter provides a detailed account of the Yugoslav system and Slovenia’s 
development within the Yugoslav federation. The question of the rising national 
awareness in combination with the divergent levels o f economic, political and cultural 
developments within a federal state, comparable to Czechoslovakia, is also at the heart of 
this chapter. This is done in order to evaluate how the previous regime affected the 
democratisation process in Slovenia. The sixth chapter, after a closer examination of the 
actual process of Slovene independence concentrates on its central theme, consensus on 
the issues o f national interest and the legitimacy of the democratisation process.
The seventh chapter addresses the international environment post- Cold War. It 
centers on European integration and the role of the nation in the era of globalisation. 
Subsequently, it offers theoretical and empirical discussion about the interrelationship
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between national identity and foreign policy-making: a) generally and b) in Slovakia and 
Slovenia. The eighth chapter is the conclusion. It consists o f concluding thoughts about 
postcommunism, nationalism, democracy and integration. In order to assess the findings 
o f this thesis within a wider perspective o f theories of democracy and nationalism, the 
following points are stressed. First, the nationalist challenge to democracy comes from 
ethnic politics which are a result of (re)assertion of ethnic or national identity in order to 
readjust or strengthen the position of its group. Second, the classical theories of 
nationalism do not account adequately for nationalism in the new postcommunist 
democracies. The new element of contemporary nationalism is the synchronisation of 
nation-building, state-building and international integration compressed into one process
- the democratisation process. Third, the relationship between democracy and 
nationalism vacillates between a partnership and challenge. As much as nationalism can 




EXPLAINING NATIONALISM IN POSTCOMMUNISM
1.1. INTRODUCTION
The beginning of the 1990s enters history as the end of communism1, but also as a period 
o f an intense ethnic and national reawakening, often with dramatic consequences. Ten 
years o f postcommunism have made it clear that the transition to democracy was 
inseparable from the issues o f the nation and that political pluralism entailed an upsurge 
of ethnically based politics. The map of Eastern/Central Europe (henceforth ECE)2 was 
profoundly changed by a number of new states, whilst domestic politics of nearly all 
states in the region involve seeking a solution to demands from minorities. The essay on 
nationalism and democracy by Ghia Nodia3 states boldly that “nationalism is the 
historical force that has provided the political units for democratic governments”. It 
further argues that if Ernest Gellner says that “nationalism engenders nations”4, then it is 
equally true that “democratic transitions engender nations”5. It cannot be denied that 27
1 In this thesis by the end o f communism I refer to the end o f communism in the Eastern and Central 
Europe only. I describe the state o f affairs in ECE countries as postcommunism. J.J.Linz & A.Stepan in 
Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1996, refer to them as post-totalitarian (p.44), which according to their definitions of 
totalitarianism is a convincing distinction, however in my opinion post-totalitarianism only denotes the 
communist system, which has become less ‘revolutionary’, but has not changed its ideology and the 
main characteristics o f the communist regime remained.
2 In this thesis by Eastern/Central Europe are meant the following countries: Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Slovenia. This distinction is not strictly geographical, for Central 
Europe should include Austria and if  one was to conceive of Central Europe strictly as a region between 
Russia and Germany, then Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States would fit the north-south parameters 
as much as one could include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and even Greece. ECE therefore denotes 
a geographical-historical region with certain cultural traits, such as the common tradition o f the 
Habsburg Empire, a more advanced political and economic development and closer links with the West 
prior to 1945. For a more in-depth discussion see A.Hyde-Pryce The international Politics o f  
East/Central Europe Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press 1996 and A.Xgh The 
Politics o f  Central Europe London, Sage 1998
3 G.Nodia ‘Nationalism and Democracy’ in L.Diamond and M.F.Plattner ed. Nationalism, Ethnic 
Conflict, and Democracy Baltimore, London The Johns Hopkins University Press 1994
4 G.Nodia p.7 and 9 respectively. The latter statement is from E.Gellner’s influential work on 
‘modernity’ o f nation Nations and Nationalism  Oxford, Blackwell 1983 p.55
5 Nodia p.9 Here I agree with Fukuyama’s comment on Nodia’s article in L.Diamond and M.Plattner 
Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy p.23 concerning the logic of this statement. E.Gellner’s 
argument is that industrialisation created the conditions conducive to nationalist ideas, moreover the 
breakdown o f traditional society and the new age o f industrialization required ‘national’ culture upon
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new states6 bom out of the disintegration of the ex-Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia, give credibility to Nodia’s view that “democracy never exists without 
nationalism”7. The degree to which this is true prompted this thesis.
There is no doubting a link between nationalism and democracy, but that link is 
not teleological - not all nationalism leads to emancipation, not all national emancipation 
ends in democracy, and not all transitions to democracy will end as democracies. The 
‘revolutions’ of 1989 in ECE were ‘nationalist’ only in the sense that they sought 
national sovereignty out o f the Soviet Empire, but it cannot be argued that newly 
independent ECE states emerging as a consequence of the postcommunist 
democratisation ever developed any authentic separatist movement prior to their 
independence8. It also pays to remember that we do not know whether the earlier 
attempts at liberalisation (e.g. the Prague Spring 1968 and the Hungarian uprising of 
1956), might have possibly led to further democratisation without nationalist 
mobilisation4 if they had happened in another geopolitical space and not under the 
conditions o f the Cold War with interventions by the Soviet Union. National solidarity 
energized the 1989 revolutions and it created the context within which these transitions 
became so euphoric, but it was also nationalism that eliminated much of that euphoria 
and finally killed it in the Balkans.
All that can be asked is why was it democratisation that engendered nationalism 
of the ‘old’ kind, the ethnically based nationalism of blood-language-religion-culture
which ‘national’ economy could be built. Interestingly, Gellner himself, certainly in Nations and 
Nationalism’ never mentions democracy (as pointed out in a different context by J.J.Linz & A.Stepan 
Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation note 21 p.24). This suggests that his 
preoccupation was not with nationalism as a movement for liberation, but as a corollary of 
industrialisation, which o f course does not exclude the fact that democracy was born during the same 
historical process, but so were liberalism and socialism. For more in-depth exploration of Gellner’s 
theory o f nationalism and its connection to democracy see J.Hall The State o f  the Nation Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 1998 (henceforth The State o f  the Nation ), particularly B.O’Leary’s 
chapter ’Ernest Gellner’s diagnosis o f nationalism s critical overview, or, what is living and what is 
dead in Ernest Gellner’s philosophy o f nationalism?’.
6 M. Mandelbaum ed. Postcommunism Council on Foreign Relations Books 1996 p. 13
7 G.Nodia p.4
8 For example the SNS (Slovenskd Ndrodna Strana-Slovak National Party), the first party to advocate 
full Slovak independence was formed in 1990. V.Meciar who negotiated Slovak independence and 
became its first Prime Minister was never a member o f any separatist movement.
9 Point also stressed by J.J.Linz & A.Stepan Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
p.237 note 7. For speculation what might have happened in Czechoslovakia, see H.Gordon Skilling 
Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution Princeton, Princeton University Press 1976 and for more 
‘nationalist’ explanation o f the ‘Prague Spring’, as set in motion by the Slovak efforts to decentralise the 
Communist Party (an account explored below) see G.Golan The Czechoslovak Reform Movement
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mixture, which paradoxically is often referred to as ‘new’10. The ‘new’ context of this 
latest wave of nationalism in ECE - the integration into transnational structures, the 
requirements of the international community for the provisions for the protection of 
minorities and the possibility of democracy itself are precisely the ones that make its 
resurgence seem so anachronistic.
While recognising the strength of Nodia’s argument, the fact is that only a few of 
the new states in ECE are true nation-states, that is that only very few consist largely of 
one national group (and that is indeed where the transition seems to have progressed 
faster)12, and that democratizing and nation-building simultaneously are fraught with 
contradictions13. What is clear is that nationalism, certainly for the first few years of the 
transition process, was central to politics in the new states o f the region. Neither the 
glorification o f its effects on democracy, nor the more traditional dismissal and 
underestimation of the nationalist phenomenon, are helpful in solving this question.
The task of this chapter is to examine more closely the conditions under which 
contemporary nationalism spreads in the new states and to seek an answer to two 
questions: one, why has there been an intensification of nationalism in postcommunist 
societies and two, is nationalism an “indispensable element” of democracy in general'4, or 
is it merely a necessary and logical concomitant of democratic transitions in 
postcommunist states? In order to do so, the discussion is divided into three parts: the 
first part focuses on the particular features of the 1989 revolutions which inaugurated 
democracy in the region and how these processes differed from other transitions from 
other authoritarian regimes. The second part explains what is meant by nationalism in the 
context o f this chapter, whilst the main, third part deals with the analysis of the various
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1971 and V.Kusin The Intellectual Origins o f  the Prague 
Spring Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1971
10 R.Brubaker ‘National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New  
Europe’ in Daedalus 121 Summer 1991 p.p. 107-132 p. 107 talks o f nationalism being recast in a new 
form. Also in an emotive account o f the Yugoslavian crisis, when “democracy was possible, but the only 
language that existed to mobilize was ethnic difference” M.Ignatieff Blood and Belonging London, 
Vintage 1994 p.3
11 For the exploration o f  contemporary ‘internationalism’ see Chapter 8
12 E.g. Poland 97.8% homogenous, Hungary 91.35%, Czech Republic 94.5% J.Bugajski Ethnic Politics 
in Eastern Europe Armonk, London, M.E.Sharpe 1995
13 For the discussion o f the difference between sovereign state, which is a prerequisite to democracy and 
national state, which is not necessarily so see J.J.Linz &A.Stepan Problems o f  Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation p. 24-25.
14 F.Fukuyama ‘Comments on Nationalism and Democracy’ in L.Diamond and M.Plattner Nationalism, 
Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy p.28
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factors, often mutually reinforcing, that contribute to the salience of nationalism in the 
region.
The underlying theme throughout this chapter and the whole thesis is that 
democratisation itself has contributed to nationalist mobilisation. However, the intensity 
o f nationalism varies in line with the particular histories of those countries, including the 
very recent history of the end of the communist regime and where applicable, the 
extrication from the former communist federations. In answer to the second question, the 
conclusion argues that nationalism is the logical concomitant of transition to democracy 
in postcommunist societies, not because democracy has to go hand in hand with 
nationalism, but because the weakness of these states and their democratic institutions 
allows nationalism to take up a position of the great unifier, mobilizer and legitimizer in 
all tasks that a newly independent democracy needs to perform.
1.2. REVOLUTIONS OF 1989
In the first years o f post-1989 revolutions in ECE many comparisons were made 
between the French Revolution (1789)15 and the 1989 revolutions, which started with the 
toppling of the Berlin Wall and led to the end of communist rule in the whole region. To 
compare the inglorious end of the communist parties’ monopoly of state power to the 
execution of Louis XVI might appear farfetched. However, the comparison is relevant, 
for we must agree that there are certain events whose consequences have profound 
implications for human existence and therefore merit to be called historic - the French 
Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and the 1989 revolutions were such events.
If the great revolutions o f the past claimed to be a beginning of a new era and 
indeed carried history forward, regardless o f what we might think a better alternative 
would have been, the 1989 revolutions position in history is not so clear. Depending on 
one’s point of view, the year 1989 marks either the conclusion of the era which started 
with the Bolshevik Revolution'6, or the extension of democracy, heralded by the French 
Revolution, to Eastern Europe, therefore a final stage in the European revolutionary
15 R.Blackbum ed. After the Fall Loudon, Verso 1991, particularly essays by J.Habermas and 
E.Hobsbawm; Jeffrey C.Isaac ‘The Meanings o f 1989’ Social Research 63:2 Summer 1996 p.p.291- 
344; P.Pithart ‘Intellectuals in Politics: Double Dissent in the Past, Double Disappointment Today’ 
Social Research 60:4 Winter 1993 p.p.752-761; A.Smolar ‘From Opposition to Atomization’ Journal o f  
Democracy 7:1 January 1996 p.p.24-38
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tradition. Somehow the year 1989 is associated rather with ‘the end’17, than with ‘the 
beginning’. The reason for this perceived lack o f novelty18 is occasioned by the often 
expressed idea o f ‘return’, to either independence, common European home 
(Gorbachev), or democracy - all of which claims are open to questioning. Firstly, 
because many newly independent states that came into being as the result of these 
revolutions had never been independent, such as Slovenia or Slovakia (if one is justly 
doubtful about Slovakia’s brief independence under Hitler’s tutelage) and secondly, prior 
to the Second World War and the subsequent imposition of the Soviet rule, 
Czechoslovakia was the only parliamentary democracy left in that region.
Moreover, there was nothing new about the values or ideas that these 
revolutions brought; the new order was even older than socialism. A plural political 
system, market economy and open society'9 were already established values in the West. 
So, where does this leave the comparison with the French Revolution? The analogy can 
be made with the end of apathy, spontaneous mass action, the refusal to carry on in the 
same old undignified way and indeed the inauguration of a new social order, even if the 
values and norms were not new. These were “political revolutions’-20 and they 
transformed the existing order decisively and it would appear irreversibly. There is 
reason to doubt whether all new democracies will become stable functioning liberal 
democracies, but at the same time there is also enough evidence to be certain that the 
Leninist system based on ideological uniformity, coercion and suppression has been 
dismantled for a long time to come, if not for ever. The fact that 
these revolutions have been followed by ethnic strife, nationalist upsurge, rampant 
corruption, the rise o f illiberal parties and a degree of nostalgia for the old regime does
16 E.Hobsbawm ‘Goodbye to all that’ p.l 15 in R.Blackbum After the fa ll
17 in this instance I am not referring to the article by F.Fukuyama ‘The End o f History? in National 
Interest Summer 1989 p.p.3-18 (also the book by the same author The End o f  History and the Last Man 
New York, Free Press 1992) - it is unfortunate that the term ‘the end’ in the context of the post-1989 era 
has been appropriated by that famous article, so that it is necessary to comment every time one uses the 
term.
18 Best expressed by: “theirs was not a revolution o f total innovation, but rather the shuckling off o f  a 
failed experiment in favour o f  an already existing model” G.Stokes The Walls Came Tumbling Down: 
The Collapse o f  Communism in Eastern Europe Oxford, Oxford University Press 1993, cited in
J.C.Isaac ‘The meanings o f 1989’ p.302 and 295
19 N.Ascherson ‘1989 in Eastern Europe’ chpt. 12 p.223 in J.Dunn Democracy the Unfinished Journey 
Oxford, Oxford University Press 1992
20 V.Tismaneanu ‘Reassessing the revolutions o f  1989’ Journal o f  Democracy 10:1 January 1999 
p.p.69-73 p.72
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not take away the most important message of these revolutions - freedom of choice for 
all people.
1.2.1. The End of Communism and Democracy
The bankruptcy of state socialism seems to have given an almost undisputed credibility 
to liberal-democracy, to the point o f its most famous adherent Francis Fukuyama’s claim 
o f ‘the end of history’. A disproportionate amount of attention has been given to 
Fukuyama’s thesis possibly because it reflects, without any regard for the lessons learned 
by history and other similar claims of the ’’end point of mankind’s ideological 
evolution”21, what could be called a general assessment of the revolutions of 1989.
There are several implications to this ‘end of history’ interpretation of the end of 
communism which bear directly on the transition to democracy. 1) It neglects the 
historical evidence that the attempt to establish liberal democracy in conjunction with the 
formation of new states is also not new in the region - a similar situation arose after 
1918. Yet none of the new states emerging from the Paris peace treaties remained 
democratic for longer than a decade with the exception of Czechoslovakia.
2) Jeffrey C. Isaac argues that whilst he believes that “there is much merit to this 
liberal interpretation”22, it is politically and morally flawed. Politically because it ignores 
important forms of politics practiced by democratic oppositions that are not adequately 
covered by liberalism; morally because it marginalises the importance of nonelectoral, 
antiparliamentary forms of political activity (‘forum’ politics"3) that played an important 
role in the ending of communism and at the same time constitute a more grass-roots type 
of participatory democracy.
The strategy for political action was more rooted in the resistance to the system 
than in direct achievement o f political power. Secondly, and very importantly to this 
thesis was the appeal to internationalism. To Eastern European dissidents national 
independence was a condition for social reform and social decency, but this was clearly 
distinguishable from nationalism that elevates the importance of belonging to one
21 F.Fukuyama in ‘The end o f History?’ His thesis can be summed up by: “What we may be witnessing is 
not just the end o f the Cold War...., but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalization o f Western liberal democracy as the final form o f human 
government” National Interest as above p.4
22 J.C.Isaac ‘The Meanings o f 1989’ p. 293
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particular nation and brings the pursuit o f maximal conditions for that particular nation 
into politics. The initial anti-Communist struggle in Czechoslovakia did not seek self- 
determination for either the Czech or Slovak nation - that came later. Equally, the 
democratisation of Slovenia was followed by independence, but independence was not 
the intended goal behind the tentative democratising reforms sparked off by civic 
movements throughout the 1980s. Finally, the alliances formed were extremely broad, 
embracing liberals and the Orthodox Church, democrats and nationalists, socialists and 
conservatives, as well as workers and intelligentsia. They aimed at a new type of society, 
a self-managing civil society, or rather a civilized society, based on active citizenship, 
human rights and non-violence (the major Slovak civic opposition movement was called 
Public Against Violence). One of the reasons for the quick end o f ‘forum politics' was 
that it was an idealistic vision at a time when the end of communism seemed too remote 
to contemplate, thus the actual government under these policies and with such unlikely 
alliances did not need to be scrutinised for its feasibility.
As much as ‘living in truth’24 was an admirable aspiration and struggle, it was not 
a daily practice o f politics - this was democracy that could not be criticised or blamed, 
devoid of competition, ambitious politicians and decisions about mundane issues of 
allocation and taxes. C.S.Maier warns against the “feeling of anticlimax”, that succeeded 
the initial euphoria of 1989, a collective sense of disillusion which leads to “heightened 
xenophobia and a surly distrust of institutions”, characterized by appeals to ethnic 
exclusiveness, the “desire to reinvigorate the national unit” and the contempt for the 
existing parliamentary class25. A few years into the ‘really existing democracy’ in ECE 
and we have seen what Adam Michnik described as the other (than liberal democracy) 
future of Eastern Europe - “the descent into xenophobia and fractious tribalism”"6.
The Yugoslavian tragedy certainly warrants such pessimism. On the other hand it 
appears that the situation of the early 1990s, when the transition in ECE countries 
seemed to be completely overshadowed by the dangers of ethnic nationalism, has 
changed recently and nationalist pressures seem to be waning. Nevertheless it is clear 
that one of the forces that can divert democracy into more extremist path of politics is
23 N.Ascherson in J.Dunn Democracy the Unfinished Journey p. 245
24 V.Havel Living in Truth J.Vladislav ed. London, Faber and Faber 1989
25 C.S.Maier ‘Democracy and Its Discontent’ Foreign Affairs 73:4 July/August 1994 p.p.48-65 p.54, 56,
62 and 55 respectively.
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nationalism. The answer to the question how the best intentions of 1989 politics, once 
transferred out o f opposition into parties, governments and parliaments, joined forces 
with nationalist ideologues and ended up, in many cases, in opposition to all that 
democratic reforms stood for, serves as one purpose of this thesis.
3) Notwithstanding the above, the fact is that no matter how troubled the 
transitions to democracy in ex-communist countries are, and however legitimate the 
doubts about the sustainability o f that project may be, we must concede that they all are 
or at least wish to be transitions to democracy27. The populations and political leaders 
declare their countries to be liberal democracies, they wish to be accepted as such, their 
potential admission into the European Union is based on the assessment of their 
democratic credentials. Moreover, even the less democratically inclined political 
leaderships claim the devotion to democracy and recognize that it is possibly the only 
system capable of giving legitimacy to the effort of an often difficult and always
tumultuous transition.
Chapter 4 will guide us through all pitfalls of postcommunism in Slovakia, but 
will end with the general elections of 1998 which were a confirmation that even the 
troubled transition in Slovakia was ultimately a transition to democracy. The government 
of Vladimir Meciar, the leader o f the HzDS (Hnutie za Demokraticke Slovensko/ 
Movement for Democratic Slovakia), aided by the right-wing nationalist party and a 
populist leftist movement, marked by nationalism and authoritarian tendencies and the 
main political force since (and behind) the independence in 1993, was defeated by the 
combination of democratic forces. The most meaningful factor about these elections in 
the present context, was the difference from 1989. If 1989 can be assessed as a victory of 
anticommunism rather than a victory of democracy (as the subsequent evolution of 
Slovak politics demonstrated), after nearly a decade of political turmoil, the elections 
showed that the society itself had enough resources to bring about the changes29, without 
any external influences and against many obstacles created by Meciar’s administration. 
Moreover, the cause o f ‘the nation’ shifted its emphasis, from the justification and
26 A.Michnik cited J.C.Isaac ‘The Meanings o f 1989’ p.297 See also A.Michnik ‘Nationalism’ Social 
Research 58:4 Winter 1991 an issue which is dedicated to Eastern Europe and postcommunism.
27 G.Nodia ‘How Different are Postcommunist Transitions’ Journal o f  Democracy 7:4 October 1996 
p.p. 15-30 p. 15
28 M.Butora and Z.Butorova ‘Slovakia’s Democratic Awakening’ Journal o f  Democracy 10:1 January 
1999 p.p.80- 94 p.81
29 M.Butora Z.Butorov& ‘Slovakia’s Democratic Awakening’ p. 83
19
establishment of the new found state, to its future. The suspicions that freedom and 
democracy were forces that could harm ‘the nation’ in some way found less resonance 
with the public.
1.2.2. Postcommunist Transitions and Nationalism
As a consequence of this last point, there is a burgeoning literature30 which argues about 
the relevance of comparison between postcommunist transitions and other transitions to 
democracy, mainly in Southern Europe and Latin America. Due to the fact that this 
thesis deals with the relationship between nationalism and democracy in postcommunist 
setting, I shall not review this literature, but for a few comments which I consider
relevant to this thesis.
The main point is not whether there are differences between transitions from 
communism and other authoritarian regimes; o f course there are, but that does not make 
the comparison irrelevant, on the contrary, comparison sharpens the discussion about the 
problems transitions encounter. The point is that the differences might be too great, 
which begs the question of how useful and meaningful such comparisons can be. When it 
comes to democratisation, all comparisons are valid and do not have to be confined to 
democratisation since the 1970s, amounting to what S .Huntington called a third 
wave”31. One must consider the differences in the international environment after the end 
of the Cold War, when the integration o f new postcommunist democracies into the 
existing Western political, economic and security structures is, at the end of bipolar 
competition, perceived to be less urgent, and is thus much slower than was the 
integration of the Southern European states (i.e.Spain and Portugal) in the 1980’s. A 
more detailed analysis of the international context of postcommunist transitions will be 
the subject o f Chapter 7.
30 Against comparison see mainly V.Bunce ‘Should Transitologists Be Grounded Slavic Review 
54: lp.p. 111-127 and ‘Comparing East and South’ Journal o f  Democracy 6:3 July 1995 p.p.87-99; 
G.Nodia ‘How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions’ as above; S.Meiklejohn Terry ‘Thinking 
About Postcommunist Transitions: How Different Are They?’ Slavic Review  52:2 Summer 1992 
p.p.333-337. For comparing mainly Philipp C.Schmitter and Terry L.Karl ‘The Conceptual Travels of 
Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far To The East Should They Attempt to Go? Slavic Review 
53:1 Spring 1994 p.p. 173-185; Juan J.Linz and A.Stepan Problems o f  Democractic Transition and 
Consolidation
31 S.Huntington The Third Wave Norman OK,University o f Oklahoma Press 1993
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Based on the supposition that communism was a unique type of authoritarianism 
and that postcommunist transitions are therefore a specific type of transitions, there are 
two main differences compared with transitions from other authoritarian regimes.
1) The obvious claim that the communist transitions mean the dual track transition to 
pluralist democracy and a market economy has further implications. The transition is not 
merely a change of regime, but the creation of a whole new social order, including the 
formation of new middle classes and a transition from a relatively socially equal society 
to a system of an increased social inequality32. The communist parties’ political 
monopoly and the complete penetration into the private sphere affected society in the 
very core o f its understanding of itself, in the way individuals perceived others, 
relationships were constructed and political interests defined. Democracy means in this 
case a redefinition of society, that is its identity and interests at individual and group 
levels and the re-definition of the possibilities o f attaining their redefined identity and 
interests. To some political analysts this particular feature of postcommunist transitions, 
when people were uncertain about their place in the new society and about who was to 
represent their interests and even about how those interests were to be defined can 
partly be “held responsible for the prevalence and strength of ethnic cleavages” in the 
postcommunist countries33.
2) Related to this point is the increased significance of nationalism when 
compared to earlier transitions, particularly the Latin American ones. In contrast, nearly 
all Eastern European transitions were at the same time movements for national 
liberation34 - either from an oppressive regime, or from Soviet tutelage, and mostly from 
both. In this sense the inauguration of democracy in the region amounts to the creation 
of new sovereign states, a fact that has many implications for democracy and its 
consolidation.
32 For the relevance o f economic factors in transition see:C.Offe ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design?’ 
Social Research 58:4 Winter 1991p.p.865-892 and A.Przeworski, M.Alvarez, J.A.Cheibub, L.Limongi 
‘What Makes Democracies Endure’ Journal o f  Democracy 7:1 January 1996 p.p.39-55
33 J.Elster, C.Offe, U.Preuss Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 1998. The authors argue that people prior to the breakdown and immediately following 
it, “had no cue as to what their place within the emerging relations o f  production and distribution was 
likely to be, and which party would best serve their individual and collective interests”, and moreover 
that this “amorphous nature o f socioeconomic conflict lines” in post-communist countries provides the 
strongest argument for expecting very different trajectories and outcomes in this region compared with 
the Latin American and Southern European transitions, p.248
34 V.Bunce ‘Comparing East and South’ p.91
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The most distinguishing characteristic of postcommunist transitions is the fact 
that popular sovereignty and national sovereignty merged into one process35, similar to 
1848 and 1918, reaffirming the idea that the nation-state is the best framework for 
democracy. If we accept that democracy is the most valuable form of government, then 
national self-determination became one of the consequences of postcommunism. The 
disintegration of all multinational states in the region meant that a number of new states 
are involved in nation- and state-building at the same time. There is a considerable 
difference in transition processes between well-established states (i.e. Poland, Hungary) 
and new states (i.e. Slovakia and Slovenia). In the latter ‘democratisation’ does not fully 
describe the political situation, because not only the character of the state was changing, 
but its very boundaries, its position in the international community and the decisions 
about who are ‘the people’ who constitute the state were all undergoing redefinition.
The preoccupation with building the nation-state in the region where most states 
are not ethnically homogenous can work against democracy, as we have seen in the 
interwar period and recently in Yugoslavia and less dramatically in Slovakia. The fact 
that the least successful transitions are in the ethnically less homogenous countries 
suggests that there is an obvious correlation between the success of transition and 
ethnic/national homogeneity. Such a conclusion leads to an absurd claim that ethnic 
“homogeneity is a prerequisite for democracy"36. Morally, such a suggestion is 
inappropriate, for we know that ethnic homogeneity in the region is attainable only 
through unacceptable methods, such as population transfer, an imposed assimilation (or 
engineered integration ) and ethnic cleansing - all these methods have been employed at 
some point and the results do not need to be repeated here. This argument is further 
politically flawed because it ignores strategies, such as consociationalism, federation, 
collective rights and regional autonomy as a way of establishing multicultural politics. 
The exemplary protection of minorities in Slovenia, the progress concerning the 
Hungarian minority in Romania, the inclusion of the Hungarian ethnic parties in the new 
Slovak government illustrate that a political solution might be difficult, but not 
impossible.
Post-1989 development in ECE is a complex and at times a dramatic 
transformation to the new capitalist society which combines new elements o f political
35 J.Rupnik ‘The Postcommunist Divide’ Journal o f  Democracy 10:1 January 1999 p.p.57-63 p.61
36 J.Rupnik ‘The Postcommunist Divide’ p. 61
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change with the acceptance of old principles o f Western societies. It was in this rapidly 
changing environment that liberal democracy was if not overwhelmed, then at best had to 
compete with nationalism. Adam Michnik had observed that “nationalism is the last word 
of communism”37.
1.2.3. Ethnic Politics - the Main Argument
Postcommunist transition is a particular type of democratisation, more than “a 
transitional stage”, rather a condition “showing its own dynamic”38. The argument that 
runs throughout this thesis is that two main characteristics of that condition are the 
position of nationalism at the centre of the political stage, and the fact that the very 
process of democratisation has itself contributed to the increased role of nationalism. As 
became apparent fairly soon after the collapse of communism, the transition to 
democracy would involve more than the transition in political, social and economic 
spheres. This triple transition39 needs to be supplemented by a fourth one40, nation- 
building. This was not only because the end of the Soviet external empire meant the 
restoration of national sovereignty, but also because in many cases it led to the actual 
establishment of new national states, with new borders and new international status - 
often the culmination of delayed national development, due to historical factors. It can be 
argued that national revival and the subsequent conflicts between majorities and 
minorities involved a self-perpetuating dynamic leading to an increase in nationalist 
mobilisation. As argued above, this revealed fully the unique and unprecedented nature 
o f postcommunist transitions, whilst the surprise at the vehemence of these conflictual 
processes uncovered gaps in the understanding of these particular types of democratic 
transitions.
The newly expanded political arena, newly acquired political resources (i.e. the 
right to form political parties, free elections and the freedom of the media) and the 
competition emerging from it provided a fertile ground for ethnic-nationalist mobilisation 
on two important levels. Firstly, the collapse of the existing state power left a vacuum
37 A. Michnik ‘Nationalism’ Social Research 58:4 Winter 1991 p.759
38 G.SchOpflin ‘The Problems o f Democratic Construction’ in Daedalus 123:3 Summer 1994 p.p. 127- 
141 p.127
39 C.Offe ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design? in Social Research 58:4 Winter 1991 p.p.865-892
40 A.Agh The Politics o f  Central Europe London, Sage 1998 (henceforth A.Aagh) p.77
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which was most easUy filled by one identity, which appears more fixed and coherent - 
national identity.
Secondly, nationalism functions as an effective instrument for old and new elites 
to retain or gain power by offering the ‘nation’ as a refuge for those who seek 
scapegoats for the injustices of the past and/or uncertainties o f the present. Such 
mobilisation rests on a certain rhetoric steeped in emphasis on insecurities and fear based 
on historical injustice perpetrated against ‘the nation’ and projected to the future. In the 
ECE region it is often a neighbouring state whose ethnic kin is usually a minority in the 
new state. Consequent distrust and possible hostility among various ethic groups are in 
turn an impediment to liberal democracy and its basic principle of equal political status of 
all citizens. This paradox is well summed up in the statement that “democracy is good for 
ethnic mobilisation, but not so vice versa”41. On a more positive side, there is of course 
the question of the promotion of loyalty towards the national project connected to 
cultural, economic and political developments, which new governments have to pursue. 
The use of nationalist ideology for cementing popular support, either for the new state or 
for competing elites, is not unique to postcommunism.
Politicisation of Ethnicity
Nationalism throughout this thesis is viewed as a form of politics and thus limited to 
“articulating and promoting political aims in the name of and on behalf of a nation, or 
national group”42. When such promotion takes a form of the politicisation of ethnicity for 
the purposes of political gain of one ethnic group over others, we are talking of ethnic 
politics and that is where the challenge to democracy in connection with nationalism lies.
By ethnic politics is meant a form of nationalism which mobilizes an ethnic group 
into a movement, striving for the autonomy and identity of the group. Such a movement 
generally relies on kin relations, collective memories, language or culture. It is therefore 
not restricted to nationalism of the state and its sovereignty, but could be that of minority 
or a national group within a state, e.g. the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the Slovak 
national movement within Czechoslovakia, Slovenes in Yugoslavia. Ethnic politics then 
refers to the conflictual claims of different ethnic groups, either vis-a-vis each other, or
41 J.Elster, C.Offe and U.Preuss Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies p.254
42 I.Bernik B.Molnar ‘Ethism, Nationalism and State-Building:The case of Slovenia’ Paper presented at 
the Congress o f  the International Political Association, Seoul, August 1997 p.3
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vis-a-vis the state, which can take the form of politics of irreconcilable ends, but more 
often involves a struggle to maximise the influence and conditions for one’s own national 
group. Throughout the following discussion nationalizing and homogenizing policies of 
the new nation-state (i.e. new constitution, language laws, state education, citizenship 
laws, immigration policies, the provision for minorities, land reforms etc.), are seen also 
in the light of ethnic politics, for invariably they entail the promotion of interests by one 
ethnic group, which has acquired nationhood - the dominant nationality.
When the focus of identity becomes ethnic identity and when the definition of 
group interests becomes dominated by ethnic affiliation, invariably it leads to an 
exaggerated preference of one group over another, often to the point of belittling (or 
even hostility) of others. The policies o f the state or minority inspired by such a 
preference of one group over another lead to ethnic politics, a precondition of which is 
ethnic nationalism. The distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism informs many 
theories of nationalism and the question of its compatibility with democracy, and will be 
discussed at length in the second chapter. Here it is sufficient to say that this binary 
classification rests on the assumption that ethnic nationalism poses a considerable 
challenge to democracy by its inherently collectivist, thus illiberal, definition of the nation 
as a community of descent. Civic nationalism then is antithetical in character, inclined 
towards an inclusive definition of the nation as a community of equal citizens .
Obviously such a strict distinction does not reflect the complexities of nationalism 
and its historical and political processes nor does it mean that ethnic or civic nationalisms 
are unchanging in their character as if written in stone. In the nineteenth century when 
some nations (e.g. Slovaks, Croats, Czechs, Slovenes, Serbs) tried to liberate themselves 
from the autocratic empires, the overwhelming group identity was the ethnic identity, but 
nationalism which drove that revolutionary struggle did not carry the same negative 
notion of oppression that we now associate with ethnic nationalism.
The difference is that what we are now witnessing in ECE is the establishment of 
political pluralism, but accompanied by an upsurge of ethnically based politics, which 
leads to unrest among majorities and minorities, whilst civic identities are dissolving into 
ethnic ones, often to the detriment of the democratisation process. It is not denied that
43 For the review o f literature about civic/ethnic distinction see D.Brown ‘Are there Good and Bad 
Nationalisms?’ Nations and Nationalism  5:2 April 1999 p.p.281-302. Also J.Schwarzmantel Socialism
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ethnicity might have a legitimate role to play in defining identity and contributing to the 
formation of communities, but when it comes to the establishment of democratic rules 
and political mechanisms in order to ensure the equality o f all citizens before the law, 
ethnicity offers little contribution. Furthermore, the crucial difference from the past is 
that the contemporary international environment has high expectations of new states and 
their democratic credentials, including their policies with respect to minorities.
1.3. SALIENCE OF NATIONALISM IN POSTCOMMUNISM
1.3.1. Historical Legacy
It is a truism to say that the present and the future are determined by the past. However, 
when it comes to postcommunist societies the past encompasses at least three different 
pasts exercising a different influence on the present: the pre-communist past, which could 
be that of an independent state, a federation or a multinational kingdom; the communist 
period which varied in the intensity of the regimes; and the very immediate past of the 
extrication from the communist regime, followed in many cases by the dissolution of the 
existing states. The task o f the following section then is to draw out a number of factors 
that derive from those various national pasts and that can be generalised, and also to 
show how and to what extent they have shaped the role of nationalism and identity based 
politics in the region.
In the answer to the first question the pages to follow concentrate on five factors, 
considered here as contributory to the salience of nationalism in postcommunism: 
historical animosities, communist nationality policies and ideology, the elite competition 
and the issue of minorities in new democracies. These are not mutually exclusive, on the 
contrary they are compatible and emphasise the causal influence of the past, remote and 
very recent, on the transition from communism to democracy in ECE region.
1.3.2. From ‘ancient hatred’ to Contemporary Nationalism
The most common explanation of the rise of nationalism in ECE countries became
and the Idea o f  the Nation Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991 and L.Greenfeld Nationalism: 
Five roads to Modernity Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1992 p.7-11
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the story of ‘ancient hatreds’44, long suppressed by communist party rule, which were 
released by the collapse o f the Soviet empire and the end of communism and given free 
rein.
There are many reasons why the ‘ancient hatred’ view43 should be contested as a 
wholesale assessment o f the rise o f nationalism in ECE countries. Let us take the 
Yugoslav conflict first. Contrary to the popular and often even scholarly claim the Serb- 
Croat dispute is not ’ancient’ - Serbs and Croats had not fought until the beginning of the 
twentieth century46, which hardly even at the beginning of this new century justifies the 
term ’ancient’. We do not need more indication than the words of the late Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman:
“Just as in the earlier centuries the ideas of Croato-Serbian national unity and 
Yugoslavianism grew from common interests in the face of foreign threats... 
so too did this century’s Croato-Serbian conflicts emerge because of different 
conceptions of Yugoslavianism ...”47.
Secondly, such views are too reminiscent of Cold War rhetoric, when the whole region 
was treated as a monolith, always slightly suspect and backward, which having first fallen 
under the aberration of communism, is now returning to its backward attitudes. That is 
equally untrue. The historical animosity between Slovaks and Hungarians never resulted 
in violence, the expectations of wide-spread violence in Russia were not realised, the 
traditionally difficult relationship between Turks and Bulgarians in Bulgaria actually 
improved after 1989 and Poles and Lithuanians have also avoided conflicts despite 
historical animosities.
Thirdly, even if it were true that the region is a victim of history, the historical 
fact ignored by this view is that the local and regional differences always escalated at 
moments of vast systemic breakdowns. The end of Communism affected society in many
44 K.Verdery ‘Nationalism and National Sentiments in Post-Socialist Romania’ in Slavic Review  52:2 
Summer 1993 pp.179-203 p.179; J.Snyder ‘Nationalism and the Crisis o f  the Post-Soviet State’ in 
Survival 35:1 Spring 1993 p.p.5-27 p.5; I.Banac ‘The Fearful Asymetry of War: The Causes and 
Consequences o f  Yugoslavia’s Demise’ in Daedalus 121 Spring 1992 p.pl41-173 p. 142; S.Holmes 
‘Cultural Legacies or State Collapse’ in M.Mandelbaum Postcommunism p.28
45 also often referred to as ‘deep-freezer’ thesis, hatreds defrosted by the end o f  communism, the pressure 
cooker etc.all invoking the same image - that of potential suppressed violence waiting to happen.
46 J.Snyder ‘Nationalism and the Crisis o f  the Post-Soviet State’, I.Banac ‘The Fearful Asymetry of 
War’. There are a plethora o f books on history of ex- Yugoslavia. See L.J.Cohen Broken Bonds 
Westview Press 1993, but particularly Ch.Bennett Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse Causes, Course and  
Consequences London, Hurst&Company 1995, for a detailed and dispassionate account o f  the war and 
M.Glenny The Balkans 1804-1999 London, Granta Books 1999 for the history of the Balkan 
nationalism and Serbo-Croat relationship in particular.
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important ways. We are now presented with the consequences of its dismantling and 
therefore over-simplifications do not add to our understanding of the contemporary 
situation in those societies. The question is about conditions in the region and why 
postcommunism provides a fertile ground for the exploitation of historical and cultural
legacies.
The exploration of ethnic resurgence would benefit more from an alternative 
view of history and its connection to contemporary nationalism rather than from the 
‘ancient hatreds’ thesis. My concern here is not to neglect the historical causes of 
nationalist mobilisation and separatism in the region, but to show the link between 
historical developments and nationalism, the exploitation of history, and the effects of 
recent developments, all of which add to a mobilising potential that ‘ancient animosities’
can generate in modem politics.
The first consideration is the relationship between the state and nationalism. The
state is seen as an indispensable provider of economic and physical security, and it 
appears that contemporary nationalism has flared up when and where the old states 
collapsed and new ones are deficient in providing the security the populations are 
seeking. Despite the often propagated view that the nation-state has sacrificed its 
predominance to global economic interdependence, electronic revolution and 
transnational networks48, the recent developments in ECE do not bear this notion out; on 
the contrary they “confirm the centrality o f the state and its link with nationalism”49.
Both the state and the population seek reassurance, the former appeals to loyalty, 
the latter to privileges of the nation the state is supposed to protect in return for political 
loyalty. Legitimacy of the state depends on much more than its performance. All aspects 
of government, how the state is governed and by whom, are in flux and exacerbated by 
an extra dimension - who is governed is also open to challenge. Political entrepreneurs 
enter a political stage where there is a lot to gain (or maintain) and where the rules are 
not established. The extent to which the elites are willing to manipulate ‘ancient’ history 
in order to fill the legitimacy gap, is exemplified by the extreme case of the Serbia-
47 L.J.Cohen Broken Bonds p.7 n S7
48 P Hassner ‘Beyond nationalism and Internationalism’ in Survival 35:2 Summer 1993 pp.49-65 p.5 
Also J.Habermas ‘The European Nation-State and the Pressures o f Globalisation’ New Left Review’ 
May/June 1999 p.p 46-59
49 J.Snyder ‘Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State p .l 1
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Kosovo conflict in which Serbian nationalist elites used events from 600 years ago to 
legitimise the oppression o f ethnic Albanians in Kosovo .
There are three further points, linking the state, society, history and nationalism, 
involving a significant distinction between Eastern and Western Europe . Firstly, is the 
matter o f ‘sequence’52- what comes first, the state or nationalism. When at the beginning 
of the 19th century, under the impact o f the French Revolution and industrialisation, 
nationhood became a paramount basis for political organisation and group identification, 
Eastern Europe did not comprise one indigenous state, but was divided between the 
Romanov, Ottoman and Habsburg empires. In contrast, some West European state 
structures were already in place and state-building continued, reinforced by nationalism. 
The statehood aspirations of Eastern Europeans were crushed time after time by the 
hostile empires, who often responded with more oppression (e.g.Hungary towards 
Slovaks after 1848). The emergence of nation-states in the East was and remains a long, 
belated and painful process, associated with conflicts between national communities.
The late-comers to nation-building seek historical justification for their 
independent statehood, as the constitutions o f newly independent democracies 
illustrate53. Hungary or Poland do not need to emphasize their historical identity, but it 
appears that the shorter the tradition of independence the bolder the historical 
invocations; the Czech Republic perceives itself as the continuation o f ‘the lands of 
Bohemian crown’, Slovenia mentions centuries of struggle for independent statehood, 
Lithuania equally stresses its foundations from ‘centuries ago’ and Slovakia is returning 
to the ‘Great Moravian Empire’ (8th century) to find the precursor of its independence. 
Built into this representation of the nation and depictions of the great past, is the 
message that the injustice has been finally redressed and the insinuation about who was 
responsible (Germany, Austria, Poland, Russia, Hungary etc.) for the repression of these 
nations and the warning that this is not going to happen again.
50 It is important to add that Serbia is a special case and that as much as the disintegration of former 
Yugoslavia fits the postcommunist correlation, the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo is different. 
Serbia under Milosevic’s rule is hardly a democracy, its conduct is that o f a repressive undemocratic 
state trying to maintain the regime and as such should not be compared to developments in other
postcommunist states. . . , n . .
51 See also M.Mann ‘The Dark Side o f Democracy:The modem Tradition of Ethnic and Political
Cleansing’ New Left Review 235 May/June 1999 p.p. 18-45
52 A.Leibich ‘Nations, States, Minorities: Why is Eastern Europe different’? in Dissent Summer 
1995p.p.307-313 p.313
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The problem with this newly reestablished national identity, reinforced by 
independent statehood and further legitimised as a restoration of historical justice, is that 
its definition is more ethnically determined, for the states that previously inspired civic 
identity (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union) are broken up along ethnic 
lines. The process of the creation of new states requires redefinition of identity by 
minorities who often find themselves in a new state without having wished for it, and 
thus reach deeper into their histories in order to adjust to a new situation.
Secondly and related to the belated nation-building process were the conflicts 
between imperial power and local elites, which were often translated into national 
conflicts54. The local and nation-building elites o f non-ruling nationalities (in the absence 
of indigenous bourgeoisie, mostly intelligentsia, and clergy), fighting for representative 
rights, sought the support in ‘the nation’ and the preservation o 1 its interests against the 
imperial enemy and thus had to present their own demands in more ‘national’ terms, 
rather than in political terms (i.e.liberal). Social progress in ECE is thus traditionally
associated with ‘national’ struggle.
M.Hroch argues that in contrast to the superficiality o f ‘ancient hatreds’ 
explanation of the ‘new nationalism’ in ECE, it is much more plausible to see this 
nationalism as analogous with 19lh century national movements. Considerable similarity 
lies mostly in the rapid change in the ruling elite (even it in some cases the elite remains 
the same, the form in which it competes for a constituency is different), and the 
formation of the nation-state simultaneously with the new capitalist order. Adding 
democratisation to this process these national movements resemble the kind of 
accelerated 1848 revolutions. Also striking are the demands of a linguistic and cultural 
nature as in all national demands. Language has once again become the expression of 
independence (Croat as folly independent from Serb, Slovak guarded by language law, 
Moldavia has reclaimed the Latin alphabet, the Baltic Republics have made the issue of 
language the pre-condition of citizenship etc.), which clashes considerably with similar 
developments by minorities who are equally demanding of their cultural and linguistic
rights.
53 K.von Beyme Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe London, New York, Macmillan Press 1996 
p.49
54 For this discussion see the illuminating article of M.Hroch ‘From National Movement to the Fully- 
Formed Nation’ New Left Review  198, March/April 1993 p.p.3-20. Also by the same author The Social 
Preconditions o f  National Revival in Europe Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1985
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Thirdly, national identity is “situational”55. People in their daily lives, under 
normal circumstances identify themselves by their occupation, their religion, their gender, 
their locality or by their membership of an association, or any other combination of 
identities which they consider to be a relevant and meaningful reflection of their 
existence. At different times a different identity may come to the fore, but generally 
people go about their business juggling the multiplicity of allegiances and identities with 
or without much conflict and usually without many considerations about the ’nation’. 
There is nothing about national identity that should be in conflict with one’s profession, 
one’s gender, one’s religion or political orientation - under normal circumstances.
As soon as national identity includes elements that require allegiance and 
commitment that are in conflict with other loyalties, conflict is inevitable. We must 
concede that there are situations when the focus on identity is altered and the collective 
identity overrides all other identities. Such situation can be a war, or some other 
collective trauma. R.Pearson considers wars (lost or won) a great stimulus to solidarity 
and collective sentiment and as such favourable for the development of a national state56. 
That is true of Western Europe too, but the difference with the ECE is that particularly 
in this century the wars, due to the specific geopolitical and historical developments, 
were not only frequent, but accompanied by major shifts in borders and populations57.
Individuals and collectives were often not given the opportunity to be in charge 
of their destiny, nor their identity. This led to nearly permanent feelings o f insecurity, 
increased the perception of threats and so radicalised politics. It does not take much 
imagination to see why in ECE freedom and national independence are often considered
55 A.D.Smith ‘The Ethnic Sources o f Nationalism’ in Survival 35:1 Spring 1993 p.p.48-63 p.48
56R Pearson ‘Empire, War, and the Nation-State in Eastern/Central Europe’ chpt.3 p.27 in P.Latawski 
ed. Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe London, Macmillan 1995. Also see Ch.Tilly: 
’’war made state, and the state made war, and together they made nationalism” from Formation o f  
National States in Western Europe Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press 1975, cited in J.Snyder 
p. 13
57The Versailles treaty ‘rewarded’ the victors and the dynastic empires were replaced by ‘successor’ 
states, which were actually smaller versions o f the empires they seceded from, incorporating 
‘beneficiaries’ o f the new order (i.e.Czechs), somewhat reluctant nationalities (i.e. Slovaks, Croats), and 
other apprehensive minorities o f  the ‘disadvantaged’(i.e. Hungarians and Germans). Hungary lost 2/3 of 
its territory to Czechoslovakia, Croatia and Romania, which led to an attempt for a territorial recovery 
during the Second World War and the annexation o f the Subcarpathian region of Czechoslovakia. 
Stalin’s and Hitler’s rule meant another major geopolitical shift accompanied by the brutal methods of 
genocide and expulsions. Czechoslovakia lost Subcarpathia to the USSR (80 000 people), 140 000 Jews 
were killed and 3 million Germans and Hungarians expelled. Poland lost nearly all o f its Jewish 
population and approximately 3 million people were involved in repatriations between the USSR and 
Germany.
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one, and seen to be best secured in an independent state. Thus, history matters, however 
it is not necessarily ‘ancient’ history, but rather the recent one. When the change in 
political circumstances makes the exploitation of history feasible, in order to increase 
nationalist mobilisation, all history merges into one “living history”58 and ‘ancient 
hatreds’ remain a part of political discourse.
1.3.3. Communist Nationality Policies
It can be argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, testify to the prevalence of nationalist sentiments and 
tendency toward separatism in all multiethnic Soviet-type societies59. The question here 
is whether this evident fact can be seen as a logical outcome of communist nationality 
policies.
The sudden and largely unexpected disintegration of all multiethnic/national ex- 
communist states is ironic in at least three aspects. According to Marxist - Leninist 
ideology the solution to ‘the national question’ was supposed to be the most “important 
and enduring contribution of the establishment o f a socialist order”60. Nationalism seen 
as intrinsically attached to capitalism was considered as a passing phenomenon, therefore 
the replacement of capitalism by socialism logically meant that national identification 
(overcome by the class-based identification) together with the nation-state would 
eventually ‘wither away’. When the communist system collapsed under the weight of its 
own contradictions the clash o f ‘isms’ which followed did not bear out the original 
assumptions. Nationalism had not disappeared, on the contrary it returned with a new 
lease o f life.
Secondly, when the crisis of the regime became obvious, renegotiation of all 
hitherto unifying principles was required. Negotiation is at the heart of politics, but 
politics was not at the heart of communism; another of its assumptions was that the
58 L.Deak Hungary’s Game fo r  Slovakia Bratislava, Veda 1996 introduction
59 V.Zaslavsky ‘Nationalism and democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies’ in Daedalus\2\ 
Spring 1992 p.p.97-121 p. 98 Also see A.Motyl ed. The Post-Soviet Nations New York, Columbia 
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content of ideology and the goals of communist society were not concepts open to 
negotiation, for they were clear and moreover the property of the Communist Party.
When the new policy of ‘glasnost’ offered an open discussion and inadvertently put the 
Party to the ultimate test of legitimacy, it allowed critique of its very concept of the truth 
and lost out to the plurality o f opinions. One of the truths held in Communist systems 
was that all national particularism was counter to the “integrity of the system”61. Thus, 
when the integrity of the system itself became the subject of questioning, national
particularism became legitimate.
Thirdly, the system designed to withstand the national cleavages and dedicated to
internationalism seems to have again inadvertently created and fostered policies which 
made an independent nation the obvious option after communism. Yet it cannot be said 
that communism intensified nationalist passions; the majority of dissidents during ‘party 
rule were protesting against the practices of the party, not against its national policies.
They wanted liberation, but not necessarily a national one, and if they were labeled as 
nationalists it was for another reason altogether. For example, when Tito(1971) removed 
the Croat reformist leadership, who sought to loosen the command system in politics and 
economy, he justified the action by accusing them of divisive nationalism62 and 
counterrevolution against the Party, without which, he claimed, Yugoslavia would fall 
apart. The point is that everything that failed to fall within the framework of the party
dictate was seen as divisive, therefore nationalistic.
If it was the national banner that replaced the banner o f ‘brotherhood and unity’, 
the question is why and what were the theoretical assumptions, institutional 
arrangements and practices which regulated national policies in multiethnic communist 
states. Their assumptions originated in the Soviet Union but were later applied with some 
modifications to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It can be argued that not national 
policies, but the system to which these policies were subordinated and which they were 
meant to support was responsible for the subsequent break-down of these states, with
disastrous consequences in the case of Yugoslavia.
The communist federations (Czechoslovakia became a federation only after 1968) 
were built on the principle of national-territorial autonomy. It is not an exaggeration to
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say that Soviet Russia under Lenin became “the first modem state to place the national 
principle at the base of its federal structure”63. However, it was not national-territorial 
autonomy as such that was at the heart of federal arrangement, but the internal stability 
o f an omnipotent unitary state and later its outer empire (the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia). Yugoslavia on the other hand, claimed that a strong unitary state was a 
necessity against the threat of inclusion into the Soviet empire. One could question the 
validity of a federation without democracy and all three cases, regardless of the 
motivation, demonstrate that such a federation is unsustainable in the long term and that
it provides the basis for nationalism.
The theoretical assumptions behind Soviet national policy are to be found in 
Marxist theory which, it must be contended, had never been put into practice by Marx, 
but by Lenin who faced a much more complex set of circumstances than the 19th century 
author could possibly envisage. The communist revolution did not happen as a result of 
capitalism’s collapse under the weight o f the inner contradictions, as predicted by Marx, 
but through an imposition of a Marxist ideal onto a pre-capitalist Russia. Marx s 
assumptions became the foundations of that new system which in reality became a 
Leninist project. I shall briefly sketch some of these assumptions that are relevant to the
forthcoming discussion.
Firstly, is the notion, following its founding fathers (Marx and Engels) that 
Marxism is an ideology rooted in science - a true theory of “evolution in human 
history”64- which gave Marxism an added relevance as the science of society whose 
application would lead to lasting well-being and peace. Any measures taken by the 
leadership, however counter to peace and well-being, were justified in the name of the 
scientifically assumed final goal. The principal point concerning the nationality question 
in Marxism-Leninism is that nationhood was of incidental importance. Contrary to 
nationalist claims that nations are a natural phenomenon and were the source of loyalty 
and inspiration, scientific socialism put the emphasis on a different type of grouping - a 
class. It considered economics as the basis of society and consequently defined the group 
as being class-based; hence, it followed that nations, having been constructed by 
capitalism for its own benefit remain the source of antagonism between people, who
63 R.Pipes The Formation o f  the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism  cited in V.Zaslavsky 
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under the conditions o f capitalism are denied their true interests and self-realisation. It 
‘^ workers have no country” (Marx and Engels), then there is logic in slogans such as 
“workers of all countries unite” , propagated by all communist parties as late as the late
1980s.
Lenin’s solution to the tension between the importance of the national 
allegiances o f people and the Marxist-Leninist belief that the bourgeoisie exploit such 
allegiances became the lasting legacy of Soviet national policies. Faced with the choice 
between the Bolshevik victory, or fidelity to the Marxist denial of people’s identification 
with the nation, he combined the two. The continuing rhetoric of communist ideology 
aimed at the elimination of national antagonisms, even if the reality throughout Soviet 
history showed that in practice running a country of such an enormous ethnic, cultural, 
economic and social diversity would have to compromise to some extent the ideology 
based on such a grandiose ambition. Consequently, the Party had to adapt the ideology 
and find practical solutions to the national question .
Stalin’s and subsequent communist leaders’ solution was ‘equality’66: economic 
equality, which meant often rapid and forced modernization; political equality, expressed 
in the federal structure, whereby the status of the republic was the highest administrative 
unit and republics had the right to secede (in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia after 
the 1974 Constitution); cultural equality, which was the most successful element of 
communist national policies, and meant the right of every nation and minority recognized 
as official to preserve its culture - most notably its language.
The fundamental principle of federalism under communist rule was the 
“linkage”67 of ethnicity, territory and political administration. Immediately it is obvious 
that such an arrangement misses political autonomy only, in order to fulfill the 
characteristic o f a sovereign state. Ethnicity was institutionalized on a group level by the 
federal governments, which were governed by indigenous elites and on a personal level 
by passports which stated the citizenship and nationality separately. The institutionalizing 
of ethnicity on both individual and group levels was implemented with very few 
modifications in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (e.g. in Czechoslovakia: citizenship -
65 For a comprehensive treatment o f national question and Marxist theory see W.Connor The National 
Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy Princeton, Princeton University Press ?
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67 V.Zaslavsky ‘Nationalism and Democratic Transition’ p.99
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Czechoslovak, nationality - Slovak, or Magyar etc.). In sum, nations under communism 
were given the chance to enhance their national consciousness through education and the 
development of indigenous elites (of which more below). In fact one could hardly forget 
one’s nationality having been reminded of it through the extensive bureaucracy with
every minor document.
It adds to the ironies o f the end of communism that the highly centralized states 
relied on indigenous elites to contain any national grievances and so to maintain the 
integrity of their rule, yet when the rule weakened it was these national elites which were 
able to seize power. In the system of permanent shortages, relentless competition for 
dwindling resources in the centre and the resulting corruption (which communism 
increasingly had become), the role of elites must be seen as highly instrumental in ethnic 
mobilization. The case of Slovenia and Croatia which directly affected the break-up of 
Yugoslavia suggests that in the course of development of the communist system elites 
became powerful, less reliant on the centre and confident about the support of their 
populations (see chapters 5&6). What made the break-up of these federations easier was 
that for administrative purposes, the successor states effectively already existed as federal
units under the previous regime.
It is essential to all considerations about nationality policies in communist Eastern 
Europe that behind federalism hid a totalitarian state (in the case of Yugoslavia an 
authoritarian state with private ownership, but still centralized rule by the communist 
party), employing various methods, mainly ‘divide and rule’ in order to maintain its grip. 
The case of Slovakia is an interesting one in this context. The 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was justified by that ultimate doctrine of the Soviet hegemony and the 
disregard for the sovereignty o f nations under its command - the Brezhnev doctrine which 
asserts that: “the sovereignty o f independent socialist countries can not be set against the 
interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement
Yet, after the invasion, when the new period ironically called normalisation , 
brought the new constitution o f Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and her post-Dubcek 
leadership, seen as a more trustworthy partner in ‘the world revolutionary movement , 
was rewarded with the status o f an equal national state. Article 2 states that.
’’the basis of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is the voluntary union of equal
68 quotation from M.Kramer note 4 p.236 in J.J.Linz and A.Stepan The Problems o f  Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation
36
nations, the Czech nation and the Slovak nation, based on the right of
5 >69self-determination for each” .
This was the answer to the ‘Slovak question’ that Slovak national communists, led by
G.Husak were striving for as he expressed in 1967: “all experience leads to the
conclusion that the co-existence of peoples in one state unavoidably creates the desire for
a situation of equality of these peoples
The 1968 invasion interrupted the liberalisation and enabled the conservative
forces to regain power under the leadership o f Husak. The Federation Law was based on
divided sovereignty, which would suggest power from below, but the system remained
pyramidal71, called ‘democratic centralism’ and had all to do with centralism and nothing
with democracy. However, even under those conditions the federal government in
Bratislava contributed to the formation of more confident and experienced national elites
and thus strengthened the chances for independent statehood later. When the federation
came under pressure, under the strained conditions of post-communism and transition, it
was those already existing institutional and administrative structures which enabled the
break-up of Czechoslovakia to take place so quickly and effortlessly (the break-up of
Czechoslovakia is dealt with in Chapter 3)
It is not the case that communist national policies - the institutionalisation of
ethnonational principle - led inevitably to the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Those policies were designed originally to assist the
Bolshevik victory and maintained later in order to serve the Party in its control of the
unitary state. Thus, the outcome could be seen as paradoxical in view of the aim those
policies were to serve, but logical in view of what they entailed - namely territorial
federal organisational units, thus ‘ready made republics’72 to take over once the rule
finished. When the centres weakened due to the economic pressures and ideological
crisis, the logical beneficiaries o f the new democratizing order were the national
constituencies. Democracy needs a constituency and it is hard to imagine how a state
discredited as those communist states had become could carry out far-reaching reforms
69 V. Zak ‘The Velvet Divorce - Institutional Foundations’ in J.Musil ed. The e n d  o f  Czechoslovakia
B u d ap est, C e n t r a l  E u ro p ean  University Press 1995 i Tnivprsitv P ress  1971d  197
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which were only undermining their legitimacy further. How otherwise was the new order 
to be crafted, if not in those national units? Having nurtured their cultural autonomy, 
having grown their own elites, having been industrialized, educated and modernized, the 
political autonomy unachievable under communism, for good and ill, became the logical 
conclusion to democratization.
1.3.4. Nationalism as a ‘Replacement’ Ideology After Communism
Whilst exploring the communist period and its influence on postcommunist nationalism, 
this section focuses on the socio-psychological developments in postcommunist societies. 
It argues that the homogenizing elements contained in communism and nationalism make
these societies more susceptible to ethnic mobilisation.
Because the communist experience affected society in the very core of its 
understanding of itself and in the ways in which identities were defined and relationships 
constructed73, the postcommunist ‘condition’ has specific manifestations in two main 
aspects. Firstly, it involves the search for a ‘moral community’, which results in either 
idealized discourses of nation or democracy, or both. This leads to a situation con d u cive  
to demagoguery, thus impeding the democratic resolution of everyday problems, which 
contrary to simplistic idealized notions of politics requires a complex set of rules, values 
and procedures. The second point, bearing directly on the issues of minorities, concerns 
the earlier communist definition of society as an homogenous whole, always in relation 
to ‘others’(i.e. non-communist etc.), which created a society preconditioned to identify
itself in relation to something else.
Communist parties pursued policies o f social and economic equality. However,
political equality was not an issue open to discussion for two reasons: firstly, what
political equality entailed would have undermined the system, which had evolved into a
coercive apparatus, penetrating every aspect of people’s private and public life.
Secondly, the sy ste m ’s justification was a guarantee of social equality. Thus, equality had
to be achieved by measures which were visible and tangible such as negligible differences
in official income, forced collectivisation of the land (with exception of Yugoslavia and
Poland), uniform housing and education, no gender discrimination and attempted
73 G.Schopflin ‘The problems o f democratic Construction’ in Daedalus 123:3 Summer 1994 p.pl27-141
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assimilation o f groups such as the Romany. This is not to say that all of these policies are 
to be criticised74, but the main purpose was to create ‘social homogeneity , in order to 
minimize the differentiation and articulation of social and political interests and a society
where everyone was dependent on the state.
Moreover, these policies were presented as ‘moral imperatives’76, which brought
morality as a replacement for political interests into the political arena and made it the 
basis o f political community. The Party as the guardian of that morality was then justified 
in its claim to represent the society as a whole, a notable difference to liberal-democracy, 
where a political party is meant to represent the interests of a specific group subscribing 
to its manifesto. The main consequence of presenting society as ‘one’ is that, similar to 
ethnic politics, it is claimed that “there could not be other divisions than that between 
people and its enemies”77. Enemies were class enemies, revanchist Germany, the
capitalist West, the dissidents, to name but a few examples.
Society became dichotomized along moral lines o f ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Children 
were taught that “everyone who is not with us is against us”78; the ‘good us being the 
workers, the proletariat, the Party members, the ‘bad’ were kulaks and capitalists and, of 
course everyone who resisted the party dictate, abroad or at home. Obviously, to keep 
society free of enemies, it became easier to expel them - from work or university, or even 
to labour camps. Whilst communism and nationalism are not thought o f as the same in 
this discussion, there are similarities. They both involve a tendency to define community 
by ‘sameness’ - a particular collective identity founded on ideologically inscribed values, 
always in relation to others who are often by implication seen as less worthy. Both 
ideologies engage in presenting a belief or an idea as a reality and an absolute truth. The 
step to populist rhetoric of simple solutions on behalf of the populace as a whole, as we 
have seen it in some ECE countries (i.e.Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia, Slobodan Milosevic 
in Serbia, nationalist opposition nearly everywhere) is a small one, particularly in
74 On the contrary the equal opportunity in education, the elimination o f illiteracy and unemployment 
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societies where the tolerance of differences was often seen as lacking in conviction and 
principles, thus morally unacceptable. It is suggested here that the collectivist and 
ideological character o f communism has left its mark on public consciousness and 
discourse and survived its fall79 by migrating into another form of collective
consciousness - the nation, or ethnic group.
The dichotomisation of society under communism influenced other areas of
society, which bear directly on democratic transition: 1) the role of dissidents and the
idealized vision of politics they brought with their struggle, 2) the role of the ‘nation’ in
go
communism and 3) social independence .
Vaclav Havel, the epitome of a dissident, describes in his essay ‘The power of the
powerless’ the communist system and its ideology as based on the principle that the
centre of power is identical with the centre of truth”81. In such an ideologically structured
system, dissidents represented the other side of the coin, if society was living a lie
(Havel), they represented the truth. Their struggle was also in the name of morality, and
the interests of society as a whole against the betrayal of the Party. Again there is an
issue of morality as a basis of the community, defined in relation to the ‘other and a
discourse full of abstract, inteUectualized arguments, which do not provide solutions to
the daily struggle in the new insecure environment o f democratisation. The ideal version
of democracy, presented as freedom (in ex-communist countries freedom was often
synonymous with the West and an immediate access to Western prosperity) does not
resemble the situation now.
Petr Pithart, one of the founding members o f the Czech Civic Forum, which
disintegrated soon after the object o f their opposition did, wrote:
“I admit that w e did not have enough imagination and political experience to  
find a sym bolic solution which would result in catharsis, a feeling o f^  
purification, and a loss o f  the need to look for objects o f  aggression .
Pithart’s article, at the heart of which is disappointment - disappointment o f  ex-dissidents 
with the “sluggishness o f  transformation”83 and disillusion in the public - concludes with
79 For a similar argument see N.Dimitrijevic ‘Words and Death: Serbian Nationalist Intellectuals’ in 
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the warning that mass disappointment results in mass movements and that today s new
nationalism is one o f those movements”84.
This might appear too dramatic a statement, but there is an explanation for the 
elevation of the nation in ex-communist countries. Nations are undergoing a re­
identification, through two mutually reinforcing processes. On one hand there is a 
process o f ‘rebirth’85, a recovery of national myths, symbols, history, literature, all of 
which was either suspended, suppressed or lost during the communist era. On the other 
hand there is the process of “purging the nation” 86 of that past, a period now considered 
alien. The Russian population can not fully enjoy such luxury, but in the rest o f the 
communist bloc, communist regimes are associated with the Soviet Union s imposition 
o f their rule (even if post-1945 communists enjoyed large support, for example in the 
1946 free elections in Czechoslovakia). The question how such regimes could survive for 
such a long time is a painful one, with which the public has to reconcile itself. One of the 
ways of doing it is again a search for something ‘morally pure , an unrealistic desire for a 
clear cut disengagement from that past, when everyone knows that communism was an 
integral part of their past. If communism was an imposition of foreign rule, an 
occupation aided by corruption and terror, then the nation “remained uncontaminated , 
it eventually resisted and appears now as a new heroic myth.
The last point is the identity o f ‘se lf, which is also undergoing a redefinition on 
various levels. Everyone who has lived under the Soviet-type of communism recognizes 
the ‘social schizophrenia’88 that went hand in hand with the regime and became a way of 
life - the acceptance that there was a difference in public and private discourse, a gap 
between reality and rhetoric. There was a public self, one that attended meetings and 
generally was careful about expressing opinions in public, and private ‘self, reserved for 
home and friends one could trust, where one discussed what they were doing. They , 
even if one worked with them and often was on friendly terms with them and agreed with
84 P.Pithart p.761 _  . .
85 M.Urban ‘The Politics of Identity in Russia’s Postcommunist transition: The nation against Itself in
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them whenever necessary (and all East Europeans became adept in this, with the 
exception of a few), were the enemy.
The definition of one’s self was based on an enemy, which stopped one doing as 
one pleased, achieving, traveling, whatever image one had of one’s self was always 
blurred; either there really was an obstacle, or one could imagine one - in any case there 
was always someone to blame. Personal responsibility and initiative, those two integral 
elements of freedom, were not encouraged and people got too used to the comfort of 
having an enemy. This phenomenon (described in various permutations by numerous, 
mostly East European authors, o f which only a few are mentioned here) is the most 
damaging legacy bequeathed by communism to those societies. In the words of 
J.Siklova:
“For so many years w e have nurtured illusions concerning our abilities and denied
possibilities. N ow , the time has com e to prove our valour.......What if  w e fail?
Should w e expose ourselves to possible injury”?89
The question that follows from this is whether the new individual, in charge of his/her
actions, now without the protection of a collective identity (as ‘we’, under communism)
will search for another enemy. The general sense of insecurity during the transition does
lead to anti-democratic rhetoric of passing the blame to other groups, being ex-
communists, Jews, gypsies, minorities, foreigners, new entrepreneurs etc.
In conclusion, the above suggests that communism as practised in the Soviet-type 
o f societies, where the interests of the people were expressed in moral terms, but at the 
same time the very pursuit of their real interests was blocked by an oppressive regime, 
created a society of individuals in search o f a new identity. In the absence of unifying 
values, such as tolerance, trust and cooperation and in the face o f cynicism created by the 
system’s chasm between reality and rhetoric, the identification with institutions and law 
is weak. If  as a consequence the emphasis on identity becomes overtly national or ethnic, 
one of the explanations can be sought firstly in the lack of civic values, and secondly, in 
the absence of other possible identification markers (i.e. political parties). 
Postcommunism is not necessarily a democracy, it is an interim period in which civic 
institutions have to be created and civic values taught. In the new and insecure 
environment, when all other identities (i.e. political, personal, professional, etc.) are in
_____________________________  )
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flux, ethnic identity is easily invoked and seems to function as a replacement for all other 
identities, which have temporarily lost their meaning.
1.3.5. Elite Competition and the Intensification of Ethnic Politics
So far the discussion has focused on the reasons for the salience of nationalism in ECE at
the end of communist rule and the possible obstacles it thus poses to democratisation
through examining the past and the communist period. The remainder of this chapter
focuses on the present and emphasizes how the transition project has become a stimulus
to the evident increase in the relevance of nationalism. R.Brubaker tells us th a t.
“far from solving the region’s national question the most recent nationalizing 
reconfiguration o f  political space has only reframed the national question, recast 
it in a new form”90.
Nationalism will now be looked at not only as a result of historical processes and the 
previous regime, not merely as state-seeking politics, but as politics within and between 
already existing states - nationalizing policies o f nationalizing states. These new states 
are nation-states of and for particular ethnocultural nations, whose elites conceive of 
them as such, but in reality they are ‘incomplete’ , in the sense that many of their 
populations belong to another ethnocultural group, or nation often across the border. 
This is a situation which can lead to attempts by elites to remedy this deficiency in 
‘national’ composition, or to rectify the past or present real and perceived discrimination 
by promoting their ‘nation’. Such remedy takes the form of politics seeking linguistic, 
economic, cultural, demographic and political benefits for their national group - all that
here stands for ethnic politics.
In the newly independent states, where (the) nationhood is a new experience and
democracy is still only an aspiration, but an aspiration that at the same time offers an
opportunity to articulate many new national demands, previously beyond the possibility
of achievement, the two can find themselves pulling in opposite directions. The logic of
experiencing nationhood and all its manifestations is quite different from the lo^ic of
democratic politics, the former appealing to collective identity by descent, the latter to
individual choice and free association. Ideally, both individual choice and descent should
90 R.Brubaker Nationalism Reframed p.4
91 R.Brubaker Nationalism Reframed p.9
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not be exclusive of each other, but for the moment the pages to follow concentrate on 
the novelty of democracy and nationhood and how this experience affects competition 
among elites and thus, intensifies ethnic politics.
By elites I mean political decision makers, making decisions about action and 
allocation of resources, human or material, on behalf o f a group, here defined as an 
ethnic group - in short, who rules, who decides and who gets what. Democratizing 
politics o f the region can be characterized by the dominance of elites for three reasons. 1) 
The end of communist rule produced a political vacuum and at the same time created a 
possibility for very swift careers, as the new ruling class started taking shape. The new 
elites came from three main sources: ex-dissidents and other individuals who were not 
directly linked to the communist regime (e.g. in Poland, the Czech Republic and in 
Slovakia 1989-1992); new entrepreneurs; the third group were veterans, by which I 
mean the communists, who recast themselves under different political names, mostly with 
a more left-centre slant. In this group could also be included the managers of large 
former state enterprises and/or political managers and leaders of previous trade unions, in 
short the ex-nomenklatura.
It is important to realize that these were the only elites with actual experience in 
politics and with the necessary networks at home and abroad, either in a commercial or 
political sense. As such they were instrumental in the initial stages of democratisation. 
When these ex-communist elites formed new political parties, they counted on their 
already existing membership, which they could successfully put into use in a new political 
system. This could account for their success, particularly in Slovenia (see chapter 5&6), 
where there was practically no change in elite structure and in Hungary, where the 
regime was ‘transformed’, meaning that elites in power initiated democratisation. In the
9 92
Czech Republic and Slovakia, where democracy was brought about by a replacement 
o f old elites by the opposition, initially it appeared that communists had been totally 
discredited, but not for long. Meciar and his political supporters domination of 
Slovakia’s political scene between 1992-1998 illustrates clearly the successful recasting 
of some ex-communists into the new leadership.
2) The point to emphasize when discussing the role of elites in post-communist 
transitions is the lack of a blueprint for such transition. The fact remains that however
92 For ‘transplacement’, ‘transformation’ and ‘replacement’ see S.Huntington Third Wave Norman OK, 
University o f Oklahoma Press 1993 p. 113-114
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impressive the record of dissident ‘civil society’ prior to 1989 was, the end of communist 
rule came with reforms in the ex-Soviet Union. The communist regime became a spent 
force when it started reforming itself. Gorbachev is synonymous with the revolution 
from the top”93, which created the conditions necessary for reforms to succeed and for 
‘revolutions’ from the bottom to take place, on its heels, in the rest of the region. The 
result was revolutions which set these countries off on the path of transition without an 
agreement about the final destination - o f course it was to be democracy, for it is hard to 
think of any reforms of the last 200 years which did not claim to be in the name of 
democracy. There were exceptions such as Slovenia and Croatia where a considerable 
liberalisation (Poland and Hungary to a lesser extent) took place under the previous 
regime and further democratisation and independence became inevitable. In Croatia the 
transition process has been hijacked by the national question to a much greater degree, 
similarly to Slovakia, which emphasizes the specificity of the Slovene case among the 
newly independent democracies in the region.
3)The most conspicuous characteristic of these recent revolutions is the lack of 
premeditation and the speed with which decisions had to be taken, with the consequence 
that it was never clear who was to carry out which actions and what the consequent 
results would be. The very simultaneity o f transition processes affecting nationhood, 
political constitution and the allocation of economic resources generated the atmosphere 
o f mobilisation because everything, including political and economic power was within 
grasp.
Elites were more than representatives of state authority, they were the true 
shapers of societal consciousness in these transitions. Generally, it can be stated fairly 
convincingly that in postcommunist countries the change of system did not bring a 
radical change in elites94. One of the paradoxes of postcommunism is the continuity of 
elites in a discontinued system and the perpetuity of old values and outdated methods 
which seem to have survived the radical change of the system. Much of the nationalist 
rhetoric comes precisely from these ‘recycled’ elites who use it in order to bridge the 
credibility and legitimacy gap between themselves and the population. Meciar s 
administration proved that such a strategy can be successful - certainly for a while.
93 C.Offe ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East 
Central Europe’ in Social Research 58:4 Winter 1991 p.p.865 -892 p.866
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Any exercise o f democracy needs a popular base. Politicians need a constituency 
for two reasons: to attain power in order to fulfill other goals and to maximize their 
power in order to secure the fulfillment of those goals95. No elite can rule without 
support, and the existence of ethnic diversity means that ethnic identity is an easy way to 
find a politician’s constituency. In ECE, where constituency is often a new nation, or a 
minority group, ethnicity is a successful glue to bind support and identify interests. 
However, the increased political competition by itself is not a sufficient reason for the 
identification of parties on ethnic lines.
The added dimension in the region lies in the fact that once the opposition to the 
communist regime ceased to be a mobilizing factor for the whole society, the other 
interests were not clear. Definition of interests was clearer whilst society defined itself 
against a totalizing power, but once that disappeared the re-definition of interests was 
difficult in politically inexperienced societies. The political vacuum created by the end of 
communism is often mentioned in connection with the rise of nationalism (replacement 
o f one collective identity by another, see above) and even if one would be well advised 
not to explain all o f nationalism by this ‘vacuum’ hypothesis, it remains a valid 
consideration when it comes to political identification. The Left-Right spectrum - the 
usual political identification o f parties in the West - made little sense in societies that 
considered themselves to be classless, therefore economic and other interests were often 
voiced more in national than individual terms.
When discussing postcommunist elite politics, the inherited issue of ‘centralism’ 
cannot be ignored. New post-communist parties are highly centralized and hierarchical in 
structure96. Similar to their communist predecessors, elites and populations alike, it could 
be argued, see the parties as instruments to preserve power rather than provide a 
platform for ideas and debates. Thus the tendency to extend party control to other areas 
o f social life, such as the media, universities and the newly privatized enterprises remains.
The implications o f this for democratic transition are numerous. In the first place, 
fast changes mean that decisions are taken short term with little regard for their impact in 
the future. Secondly, the political debate is narrow - it is either too market-orientated
94 See I.Szelenyi S.Szelenyi ‘Circulation or Reproduction o f Elites During the Postcommunist 
Transformation o f Eastern Europe’ in Theory and Practice 24:5 1995 p.p.615-638
95 S.Saideman ‘The Dual Dynamics o f  Disintegration: Ethnic Politics and Security Dilemma in Eastern 
Europe’ in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 2:1 Spring 1996 p.p. 18-43 p.20
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(e.g. Civic Democratic Party/V.Klaus in Czech Republic), or accentuates attachment to 
national values (HzDS /V.Meciar in Slovakia, Hungarian Democratic Forum/J.Antall). 
Thirdly, the political debate is overshadowed either by personalities (e.g. Meciar and 
Kovac in Slovakia, Klaus and Havel in Czech Republic, Walesa and Kwasniewski in 
Poland, Kucan and Jansa in Slovenia), or communism against anti-communism (Poland 
and Slovenia), a political discourse which leaves little room for criticism and challenge.
The break-up of Czechoslovakia could be counted as an example of the extreme 
role of elites in postcommunism; the populations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
even given the increasingly acrimonious atmosphere in the state, were not given the 
chance to decide on the separation, nor the continuation of the common state in a 
referendum, and the state was dissolved mainly through the efforts of V. Klaus and 
V.Meciar as the winners o f the 1992 elections, for which they did not have a mandate.
The ruling elites, Czech and Slovak, could not count on enough support to allow a 
referendum and it must be argued that the creation of independent Czech and Slovak 
states was more a result of the post-communist confusion, exploited by ambitious 
politicians, than the reflection of inherent Slovak nationalism97 (see chapter 3). If the 
break-up of Czechoslovakia is offered as an example of the important role elites play in 
postcommunist transitions, it is also necessary to note that ‘separatists’ had material to 
work with, by which I mean that elites cannot manipulate in a vacuum and that their 
rhetoric relies on the assumed consent of their population. The dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia will be argued precisely on those two points, the role of political elites 
and the exploitation of the existing national grievances in the federal state which became
translated into a national question.
Two considerations arise from the above. Elites, competing for influence,
particularly in the transitional stage where democratic focus lies more in procedures than 
in values, are not always scrupulous in the methods they employ. Secondly, in order for 
elites to succeed, there must be at least some ground to their claims and promises.
Meciar emphasized the rights, but mainly insecurities of Slovaks, seeking to gain votes 
only from that one ethnic group, which in turn alienated Czechs and caused fears among
96 M.Kaldor and I.Vejvoda ‘Democratization in Central and East European Countries’ International
at self-assertion there was a by
Western journalists to depict the break-up ofthe state as a result o f Slovak SeJ also
C Skalnik Leff The Czech and Slovak Republics Boulder, Westview Press 1997 p. 126-144
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the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. What we see is the exploitation of ethnicity for the 
purpose of securing a large popular base, which can lead to the alienation of other ethnic 
groups, whose elites then engage in the same strategy leading to potential demands for
autonomy, or secession.
1.3.6. The New State, the Minority and the ‘External’ Homeland.
The latest geographical reconfiguration of ECE along ostensibly national lines has failed 
to assuage all nationalist tensions; in fact the creation of new nation-states brought to the 
fore different national questions. This section addresses these newly restructured national 
questions. It argues that the disintegration of multinational states intensifies the insecurity 
among various ethnic groups and that this situation is further exacerbated by triple 
nationalism, that of nationalizing states, minorities and their ‘external' homelands9*.
The break-up o f Czechoslovakia seemed baffling because there appeared to be no 
support for independence and no violence whatsoever; the initiative came from the 
obviously weaker partner, Slovakia and at a time when one could have assumed that the 
defeat o f totalitarianism would have brought the two nations closer together. At the 
same time it is reasonable to argue that if there was no popular demand for 
independence, there was also a considerable lack of support for the continuation of the 
federation. It is obvious that despite the high degree of uncertainty and insecurity in
Slovakia, elite mobilization is only a part of the story.
One approach could be to view the split o f Czechoslovakia as the culmination of 
the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the process which started before the 
First World War and was interrupted by the Cold War division. From this perspective the 
disintegration was inevitable and desirable, giving Slovakia, now educationally, 
economically and technologically more advanced, an equal chance to participate in 
European integration. This, however, would not explain the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, nor the extreme violence of the Yugoslav conflict, and leaves the issues of
“  Tliis section draws on the work o f R.Bnibaker Nationalism Reframed Cambridge, Cambridge
==sss:rr--s:s
London, Pinter Publishers Ltd. 1993
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minorities unanswered. Another approach is to seek an answer to the Czecho-Slovak 
split in ethnic politics in conditions of extreme uncertainty, which is a more convincing 
line of inquiry and explains the disintegration of the remaining multinational states in 
ECE better. This approach is maintained throughout this thesis and its empirical validity 
will be tested in the following chapters 3 and 4.
Would constitutional arrangements, which would have recognized Slovak 
insecurities pre-1991, have prevented the split? An answer in either direction remains a 
speculation for at least three practical reasons without even considering the 
contingencies that cannot be accounted for during radical changes. Firstly, the 
advantages and disadvantages o f the post-1989 federation discussed between Meciar and 
Klaus would need to have been explored fully and presented to the population on both 
sides, which did not happen. Secondly, the already complex issues of democratisation 
and marketisation would have been made more complex if the coexistence continued and 
the willingness to pursue the continuation of the federation was not present in the 
leadership. The third point is weightier. If the main motive for the Slovak secession was 
the economic hardship, then more autonomy had not resolved the issues of 
unemployment and the lack of foreign investment which, the Slovak leadership claimed, 
were directly affected by the purported Czech domination of Slovakia in the existing 
federation.
Another question begs to be asked. Why did the Czechs let Slovakia go so 
easily" and what are the dynamics of the difficult relationship between Slovaks and the 
substantial (11%) Hungarian minority? The explanation for the peaceful dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia is rooted in the Czech acquiescence to and even encouragement of 
Slovakia’s secession, in contrast to, for example, the Serbo-Croat conflict. One of the 
answers could be that the number o f Czechs living in Slovakia was small, thus the Czech 
politicians were not pressured into protecting their ethnic kin100. The same can be argued 
about the less peaceful, but relatively quick separation of Slovenia from the Yugoslav 
federation. However it is a simplistic answer in the Czech case. The Czech view of 
Slovakia as an obstacle to a quick problemless integration into Western Europe was
99 S.Saideman ‘The Dual Dynamics o f  Disintegration ...’ p.36
100 S.Saideman ‘The Dual Dynamics o f Disintegration...’ p.36. The argument about the protection of 
ethnic kin can be questioned. Slovak politicians did not appear to be concerned about a considerably 
larger number o f ethnic kin living in the Czech lands (500 000, as opposed to 40 000 Czechs living in 
Slovakia, RFE/RL 3:27 8 July 1994 ‘Czech - Slovak Relations’ p.p. 9-17 p. 17).
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more relevant as was the Slovak resentment of not being in full control of their situation
- a resentment easily invoked in Slovak national consciousness.
The situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is different. The intolerance 
claimed by both sides is a result o f a dynamic, which Brubaker calls a “triadic nexus 
involving three distinct and mutually antagonistic nationalisms” - that of a minority and 
the newly nationalizing state where they live and the external national homeland to which 
they belong101. Although Brubaker does not deal with the Hungarian minorities in this 
context, it seems to me that the role of the external homeland is well exemplified by 
Hungary, which has some 3 million of their ethnic kin spread all over the neighbouring 
territories, namely Slovakia (600 000) and Romania (2 million) as a result of the 
disintegration o f the Austro-Hungarian empire after the First World War102. The issue to 
explore is that of dual affiliations103, civic and ethnic and the situation when they conflict; 
when a minority feels more loyalty to the ‘external’ homeland, or is perceived not to 
attach enough loyalty to the state o f residence and citizenship.
The issue of dual affiliations is particularly sensitive and potentially explosive in 
newly independent nationalizing states. The new state has to undergo certain processes 
such as writing a new constitution, establishing criteria for citizenship, recasting some 
institutions and filling them with new personnel104 (often as rewards for the support of 
new nationalizing elites), carving out a new position in the international community and 
seeking to homogenize around the ideal of this new state. All of these processes, as much 
as they are a necessary concomitant o f nation-building and state-formation, can be 
perceived as threatening by minorities, particularly when the dominant nationality treats 
the new state as if owned by them without enough consideration given to issues which 
are important to minorities and constitutional provisions for them.
101 Brubaker(1996) p.4
102 Slovak nationalists claim 1000 years of Hungarian oppression and Hungarians in Slovakia have 
celebrated (Summer 1996) the 1100 years anniversary of coming to live in the Carpathian valley, which 
both sides see as a reason good enough to expect assimilation and tolerance, depending on which side is 
talking. DennikSme 8.7.1996
103 R.J00 ‘Slovenes in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovenia:Ethnic and State Identity in Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 14:1 January 1991 p.p.100-106. The article paints a very positive picture of the resolution 
of ethnic and civic affiliations between Hungary and Slovenia. In the case of Slovakia, the relationship 
between the two groups has historically been more problematic. See also M.Walzer ‘The New Tribalism 
in Dissent 39 Spring 1992 p.p. 164-171 and S.Holmes ‘Liberalism for a World of Ethnic Passions and 
Decaying States’ in Social Research 61:3 Fall 1994 p.p.600-601.
104 Verdery (1996) p.80
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Minority and ‘External Homeland’ as Political Actors
When do we speak o f a minority? This is a political issue, not simply an issue of a 
different language and the adherence to different customs from that of dominant 
nationality. Ruthenians and ethnic Germans in Slovakia also speak a different language, 
have an external homeland105, but neither, so far, have entered this particular triadic 
nexus between minorities, their external homelands and nationalizing state, as described 
by Brubaker. A minority, which enters a political arena is characterised by three 
elements: 1) the public claim to membership of an ethnocultural nation, different from the 
dominant one; 2) the demand for state recognition as a minority group; 3) the assertion 
of rights based on such recognition, which involves certain collective rights, cultural 
and/or political106. In sum, a minority is not a given by virtue o f existing, but by virtue of 
a decision to represent itself as such and this is where dual affiliation comes to be viewed 
as a threat to a nationalising state or vice versa. Minority nationalism then works on two 
levels; it has to adopt a political agenda vis-a-vis the nationalising state, in order to 
formulate its demands, but at the same time it has to sustain a certain vision of that state 
as a threatening one - otherwise the rationale behind the mobilisation is less credible107.
This is not to say that all is in perception. Slovakia’s Language Law (1990,
1995, changed 1999, see chapter 4), required the safeguarding of the purity of the 
Slovak language used in all spheres, which could in theory have jeopardised a whole 
range of job opportunities for Hungarians - an example of a nationalizing project which is 
more than a perception and hence becomes a serious political issue. It is also an example 
o f nationalising rather than democratising, a short-sighted policy using state power 
against a national minority, which has a strong affiliation with an historically oppressive 
nation, in order to demonstrate the intention to remedy the past.
The challenge already existing between a nationalizing state and a minority is 
exacerbated by the “external national homeland”108, also to be seen in political, not 
geographic terms. A state becomes an external homeland, when political and cultural 
elites chose to define ethnic kin in another state as members of their nation, thus monitor 
and protect their interests. Such a stance is well exemplified by the speaker o f the
105 Ruthenians themselves are divided on this issue, depending upon whether they subscribe to 
Ukrainian descent, or see themselves as a separate ethnic group.
106 Brubaker(1995) p.l 12
107 Brubaker(1995)p.l 15
108 Brubaker(1996) p. 5
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Hungarian parliament: “we feel inevitable responsibility for our compatriots whose places 
o f birth were carried by the storms of history to within the borders of other countries’ u 
and by even more aggressive earlier rhetoric from the Hungarian Defence Secretary 
E.Raffay, who said that: “dispersed entity of Hungarians does influence Hungarian 
foreign policy”. If  it is easy to see the nationalizing projects of new states, it is also easy 
to see how a minority gets accused of disloyalty and the external homeland of illegitimate 
interference. Interwar Europe provided many examples of homeland politics, resulting in 
‘revision’ of the Hungarian borders into Eastern Czechoslovakia (Ruthenia) and the 
annexation of Bohemia by Germany who claimed to protect their ethnic kin.
The approach to contemporary nationalism in the region through the interplay of 
a minority, the nationalising state and an external homeland by emphasizing the relational 
character of those three actors gives a more realistic picture of conflicts than the 
traditional studies o f state-seeking nationalism. Whilst Slovenia’s secession was more in 
line with the traditional view of secession in the face o f Serbia’s aggressive push for 
hegemonic control of Yugoslavia, Croatia’s secession was a result of a more complex 
dynamic which fitted the ‘triadic’ model. Leaving out the Croatian Serbs as an active 
actor, the Croatian conflict looks similar to that of Slovenia: a threat from Serbia, the 
inevitable insecurity and subsequent response from Croatia in the form of a secessionist 
movement, followed by a war o f aggression against the independent Croatia. Of course 
Milosevic’s mobilisation of the Serbs and the resulting control over Kosovo (in addition 
to votes from Montenegro and Vojvodina) changed the institutional structure of the 
federation, giving Serbia the ability to block any decisions within the federation (the final 
straw was the obstruction of the presidency’s normal rotation to a Croatian politician) 
and gave Croatia and Slovenia no option but to seek secession (chapter 5 deals with the 
disintegration o f Yugoslavia at length). However, the story is more complex.
The all-Yugoslav election of 1990 was a triumph for nationalists, among them 
Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman, who began to employ every symbol of Croatian nationalism, 
including those from the fascist Ustashe regime and embarked on a series of nationalising 
policies. These included the removal o f Croat Serbs from the key cultural and political 
positions in favour o f Croats and the new constitution which claimed Croatia to be the
109 Z.G61 Summary of world broadcasts BBC EE/2388 22.8.1995
52
“historical right o f Croatian nation”110, so removing the Croat Serbs from the co-
ownership of the country.
The situation was made worse by the exaggerated and often fabricated rhetoric of 
Serbian politicians in Croatia, which portrayed Croatia as a physically threatening 
nationalising state. It was the Serb minority that was equally politically irresponsible and 
participated actively in creating a situation where the present and the future was seen in 
the sinister light o f the Croatian fascist past. The increasingly more mobilized and fearful 
Serb minority in an increasingly nationalising and independent Croatia was very 
destabilizing and further exacerbated by Serbian homeland nationalism. The Serbian 
minority in Croatia was encouraged to be an intransigent opposition to the new regime 
by an openly propagated alteration of Serbian territory from Belgrade, which led to the 
more uncompromising politics of Croatia and eventually war.
This sketchy account of the Serbo-Croat conflict was to demonstrate mainly 
how fears, memories, resentments and aspirations, existing among nearly all national 
groups locked in the politics of geographic and political reconfiguration, when stimulated 
from all sides involved can lead to a war. The prevention of such conflicts might even 
involve the questioning whether the institutionalizing of ethnicity through an excessive 
rhetoric of self-determination, so characteristic of the world since the First World War is 
always a way toward a more peaceful world.
There is however another point, possibly more compelling in the context of this 
thesis, which Brubaker does not approach - the political system and its absolute 
importance for the relationship between minorities (their external homelands) and 
nationalising states, which Brubaker excludes from his deliberations. The creation of a 
nation-state based on the ownership of that state by one particular ethnic nation has been 
a part of the democratisation processes in ECE, but a deliberate exclusion of minority 
from the affairs of the state is not compatible with democracy. Viewing the above 
relationship as an interplay o f participating political actors adds to the relevance of 
democracy and its relationship to nationalism in multinational states. The ethnic 
affiliation of the minority can move towards a more civic affiliation and vice-versa, all 
depending on the politics within the state - minority and majority relationship is not 
unchanging in its ethnic meaning, but that depends on the degree of priority given to
1,0 Brubaker (1995) p. 122
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either nationalism or democracy in the politics o f the state. The coexistence of 
nationalism and democratisation does not mean that there is an inevitable parallelism 
between them - if certain policies and rhetoric can mobilise nationalism, it means that a 
different rhetoric and different policies can reduce nationalism, or even eradicate it, just 
as democracy can stagnate, reverse or progress.
1.4. CONCLUSION
One might ask whether the tenth year o f new regimes in ECE is too soon to make any 
meaningful assertions about the state of democracy in these countries"1; however, it is 
not too soon to say something about the state of transition. An inescapable observation 
seems to be the spread of national sentiments throughout the region and the prominence 
of ethnic politics as an integral part of the transition process in the newly independent 
states. An argument advanced in this chapter was that democratisation itself contributed 
to this salience of identity-based politics, which at the same time can pose significant 
obstacles to further democratisation.
Five complex factors were identified as the most obvious reasons for the salience 
of nationalism throughout the region: ‘ancient hatreds’ thesis; communist nationality 
policies; the communist ideology itself; the elite competition and the mutually reinforcing 
nationalisms of the nationalising state, minorities and their ‘external homeland’. When 
one considers these factors three points worth noting emerge:
1) One common feature between all postcommunist countries is that democratisation 
projects have to contend with various legacies of the past, whether the remote past or as 
recent as the actual fall of the communist regime and the immediate period after. These 
varied histories affect the contemporary project o f transition in different ways. It is the 
differentiation rather than the commonalities between these countries that define the 
course o f their postcommunist transitions. For that reason the case studies of Slovakia 
and Slovenia will be divided into two parts, the first part in both cases dealing with the 
pre-independence legacy and the second part with the transitional project itself.
111 According to A.Lijphart, “a political system can be called democratic” when it is reasonably 
responsive to the citizens’ wishes “over a long period of time” - this criterion was defined as “at least 
thirty or thirty-five years”. Cited in M.Kaldor and I. Vejvoda ‘Democratization in East and Central 
European countries’ in International Affairs 73:1 January 1997 p.61
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2) Related to the first point is that all factors or a combination of them are contributory 
to the rise o f nationalism, but they do not apply in all countries and do not possess the 
same intensity, and therefore leave varied consequences. As the case studies will 
demonstrate, the accumulation of factors conducive to nationalist mobilisation was 
higher in Slovakia than in Slovenia. Slovakia also counts among “difficult” " 2 cases of 
postcommunist transitions, particularly in connection to nationalism. A further 
consideration arises from this. If nationalism is inspired by the multiplicity of factors 
which derive from countries’ varied histories, it would indicate that the nationalist 
phenomenon at this particular point in history should be a subject of a much more 
sophisticated “multifactorial theory”113, than theories of nationalism or transition to 
democracy provide at the moment.
3) The last point concerns the relationship between state, nationalism and democracy - a 
theme that lies at the basis o f this thesis. The remaining question to be answered in this 
chapter is whether nationalism is a logical concomitant o f democratic transitions in 
postcommunist countries.
There are at least three issues in need of clarification here. Firstly, transition to 
democracy is not merely a challenge to the non-democratic regime, which would suggest 
that with democracy a “new legitimate system is established”" 4. In the case o f some 
countries the transition challenged the very boundaries o f political community, or simply 
who should constitute the state, thus the very legitimacy of the state - it was the answer 
to this challenge that resulted in the break-down of multinational states.
Secondly, is the issue of a sovereign state as a prerequisite for a modem 
democracy. There can not be a democracy without a sovereign state - no amount of 
democratic developments can substitute for the lack of sovereignty. Hence, going back 
to the introduction of this chapter and Nodia’s statement that “democratic transitions 
engender nations”, I would say that post-communist transitions to democracy 
engendered new sovereign states. ‘Engendering nations” is not the same as engendering 
sovereign states - the building of a nation is a different process to the building of a
112 J.Elster, K.Offe and U.Preuss in “Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies", whilst 
comparing Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria, called the first two ‘easy’ and the latter 
two ‘difficult’ p.268
113 the expression is borrowed from J.Musil in The End o f Czechoslovakia Budapest, Central European 
University Press 1995 p.92 used in context of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.
114 J.J.Linz and A.Stepan Problems o f Democratic Transitions and Consolidation p. 16
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democratic state, which is at the heart o f democratic transition. What we are observing 
are those two processes happening simultaneously.
Thirdly and very importantly, is the legitimacy o f the state. Nationalism in a way 
is also a movement for the ‘ownership’ of a new state by one particular national or ethnic 
group (or the dominance), which is in direct contrast to democratic politics, but a part of 
the transition process. The question of the legitimacy of the state is central to democracy; 
however, in new states, often multiethnic states, still in the process o f consolidating the 
new nationhood and statehood, the legitimacy of that state is also at the centre of 
nationalist mobilisation. Thus, nationalism is perhaps an indispensable element of 
postcommunist democratisation processes, certainly at their beginning, which is not the 
same as the claim that democracy cannot exist without nationalism.
Postcommunist politics produced an overwhelming manifestation of the ‘nation’ 
and a strongly ‘nationally’ orientated democratisation process. The aim of the above 
discussion was to provide the explanation for nationalism as one of the dominant features 
of postcommunist political landscape. This political reality of postcommunism gives rise 
to certain problems for democracy. These are the subject of the following chapter which 
explores the relationship between nationalism and democracy.
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Chapter 2
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM: AMBIGUOUS 
RELATIONSHIP
2.1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical justification for this thesis and its 
main question as to the role of nationalism in the democratisation process. The implicit 
question behind this main theme, hence is, whether nationalism is compatible with 
democracy and to what extent and under which conditions. To these ends the present 
chapter pursues two main objectives. First, on a theoretical level and following the 
clarification of its principal concepts - nationalism and democracy, it endeavours to 
contribute to the ongoing debate about the opportunities and challenges that nationalism 
and democracy pose to each other, by discussing compatibilities and contradictions 
inherent in their relationship from the time of their historical inception in the French 
Revolution to the current wave of postcommunist transitions. Secondly, on an empirical 
level, it illustrates the theoretical arguments by introducing the case studies of Slovakia 
and Slovenia and the framework within which these will be explored in the following 
chapters.
The heart o f the argument is that democracy presupposes a political unit (state), 
whilst the unit is usually a nation-state which came into existence as a result of national 
self-determination o f one dominant culturally determined ‘nation’. Nevertheless, most 
states include minorities within their territories. The democratisation process in the newly 
independent multinational democracies faces the clash between two overlapping, but 
conceptually different processes: the culturally preoccupied nation-building on one hand 
and administratively and politically orientated state-building on the other.
Nationalism’s role in the democratisation process is complex and cannot be 
generalised - it depends on the extent to which it can contribute towards democratic 
state-building. The proposition here is that such a contribution requires nationalism to 
shift its emphasis from cultural and ethnic affiliation to the unity o f political community. 
Nationalism’s capacity to do so depends on many variables as the introduction to case
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studies in this chapter already suggests, with Slovenia succeeding better than Slovakia. 
The reasons and conditions for the difference in the role nationalism has played in those 
two democratisation processes will be explored in detail in the chapters 3-6.
2.2. DEMOCRACY AND NATIONALISM: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
One cannot get away from the fact that nationalism is in a state of constant tension with 
democracy, and their compatibility remains a subject of continuing debate. It is my 
intention to argue that the paradox is less severe than it is often claimed. Both ideologies 
share their historical and ideological origins in the French Revolution. Both are 
associated with popular sovereignty and participation from below meaning rights, beliefs, 
expectations and interests, in short both are rooted in the idea that all political authority 
stems from the people. The most obvious manifestation of the link between people 
(nation) and political power is Article 3 of the French Revolution’s Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen: ‘The principle o f sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation. 
No body, no individual can exercise any authority which does not explicitly emanate 
from it”115.
There is however a crucial difference. Democracy is a system of rule whose 
legitimacy relies on explicitly defined political principles about participation, inclusion 
and political equality, in order to achieve a just rule. Nationalism on the other hand bases 
its legitimacy on one principle - the rule o f ‘the nation’, and it seeks justice in the rule of 
‘the people’ who constitute its nation. Vesting political legitimacy in ‘the people’ is the 
basic premise of nationalism and democracy, but the definition o f ‘the people’ is precisely 
where nationalism and democracy can challenge each other. Thus, the focus of the 
analysis below is on the rudiments of democracy - its forms and norms - and on the ideas 
o f nationalism in order to highlight the contradictions and ambiguities between those two 
ideas.
115 The word Nation was later substituted with ‘people’, which in this context meant the same. For a 
good account of the nationalism-democracy and the French Revolution relationship see J.Schwarzmantel 
Socialism and the Idea o f  the Nation particularly chpt.2 ‘Nationalism and Democracy’ Hemel 
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991 and L.Greenfeld Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity , in 
particular the chapter on France London, Cambridge Harvard University Press 1992 See also B.Fontana 
‘Democracy and the French Revolution’ in J.Dunn Democracy the Unfinished Journey Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 1992
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2.2.1. Democracy: Attainment and Progress116
Democracy, in some form or another, says Philippe Schmitter, “may well be the only 
legitimate and stable form of government in the contemporary world”117, yet despite the 
high legitimacy that democracy enjoys, sustaining it seems at least as problematic as 
establishing it. The experience o f the most recent wave of transitions to democracy 
suggests that the preservation of a democratic regime is arguably more difficult than its 
establishment, precisely because the premise of a just rule means different things to 
different people who all expect their interests to be served adequately by democratic rule. 
The body of this thesis explores the trajectory of democratic transitions in two countries: 
in Slovenia, a linear gradual process of democratisation from the establishment of 
pluralism towards increasingly more democratic order; in Slovakia on the other hand, a 
somewhat circular transition, from the establishment of democratic structures through 
various ‘derailments’ to a new (it will be argued a third attempt) beginning of the 
transition to democracy. Clearly, the term democracy is used very loosely, yet the 
principles of democracy are specific and definite and that is where the next section turns 
to.
From Rules to Substance
First, we need to defend the use of the word ‘transition’ from the accusation of 
teleology. The term is used throughout this thesis with a view that the aim of the process 
o f the transition to democracy is a progress towards more democracy, that is more 
freedom, equality, growth in individual opportunity and autonomy of institutions, 
security and accountability. The new ECE democracies and their political systems are 
judged (for the purposes o f the European integration or by their own electorates) on how 
far that process has progressed whilst the end point is assumed to be a reasonably stable 
democratic regime (usually compared to Western European model). However, such an 
outcome, whilst aspired to, is not an assumption that transition will necessarily mean a 
progress in that direction. Thus, the word ‘transition’ means exactly that, a process of
116 General texts are mainly: J.Dunn Democracy the Unfinished Journey as above, D.Held Prospects 
for Democracy Cambridge Polity Press 1993 ; G.Sartori The Theory o f  Democracy Revisited New 
Jersey, Chatham House 1987; D.Beetham K.Boyle Introducing Democracy:80 Questions and Answers 
Cambridge, Polity Press 1995
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change that is heading towards a goal - in the distance and sometimes vaguely outlined - 
but a process that can be sidelined or reversed and ultimately fail to reach the goal it set 
out for itself. That does not mean that there is a preexisting programme for the transition 
and that every country has to complete each stage of this programme, but as long as 
these transition processes claim to be towards democracy they are assessed by certain 
preexisting criteria. If it is said that Slovakia’s transition was troubled and in danger of 
regression, the question under the examination should be why it followed a different 
route to its neighbours and what kind of regime would emerge from that different route. 
Similar consideration apply to the term democratic consolidation, o f which more 
below118.
In its core meaning democracy is the implementation of the idea of popular 
sovereignty, that is the notion that the will of the people should prevail. This is done 
through certain procedures, that is, a system is deemed democratic, when “most 
powerful decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in 
which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population 
is eligible to vote”119. Thus, the democratic principle o f legitimacy is that of consent and 
participation, which means that all laws and obligations are considered legitimate only 
when people have consented to them, in our times through their representatives. 
Democracy here is used as a “shorthand” for liberal democracy, which consists of two 
distinct components: 1) the protection of a people from tyranny, that is liberal 
constitutionalism, which concerns itself with legal and structural mechanisms against the 
arbitrary exercise o f power; 2) the implementation of popular rule, which is democracy 
per se. As Sartori explains, if constitutional mechanisms are about ‘how’ decisions are 
taken, then the popular will is about ‘what’ is decided 120. Whilst mechanisms can be 
imposed and structures erected nearly anywhere, ‘the people’ and their decisions are less
117 P.Schmitter ‘Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy’ Journal o f  Democracy 5:2 April 1994 p.p.57- 74 
p.58
1,8 A.Schedler ‘What is Democratic Consolidation’ Journal o f Democracy 9:2 April 1998 p.p.91-105 
p.95. The author agrees that democratic consolidation is an “intrinsically teleological concept”, but 
defends it if  three conditions are met; a) we have to avoid obscuring it; b) dissociate it from any belief in 
inevitable progress; c) acknowledge that there is a plurality of consolidations.
119 S.Huntington cited in D.Beetham ‘Conditions for Democratic Consolidation’ Review o f  African 
Political Economy 60 1994 p.p. 157-172 p. 158
120 G.Sartori ‘How Far Can Free Government Travel?’ Journal o f  Democracy 6:3 July 1995 p.p. 101-111 
p. 102
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predictable and influenced by socio-economic and cultural factors, and nationalism 
constitutes one such very important factor.
For democracy to be assessed there must be some objective criteria. So, when it 
is said that in ECE democratic structures are sufficiently in place to call them 
democracies, that means that nearly all formal qualifications necessary for a regime to be 
cafled democratic are functioning, obviously with varying degrees o f success. Those are: 
1) inclusive citizenship for all people living in the territory of the state; 2) rule of law, 
whereby the government must respect the law, with individuals and minorities protected 
from the ‘tyranny of the majority’; 3) legislature, executive and judiciary must be 
separate and the judiciary sufficiently independent to be able to uphold the law; 4) power 
holders must be elected in free elections; 5) freedom of expression, sources of 
information and associational autonomy must exist and be protected by law; 6) the armed 
forces and police should be politically neutral and independent12'.
On a moment’s reflection it is obvious that the above criteria should be regarded 
as minimal, or rather formal122 conditions o f democracy - procedures are necessary 
conditions for democracy, but never sufficient. Clear cut definitions and formally fulfilled 
procedures still raise considerable questions about the actual performance of democracy. 
For the ‘rule o f law’ to be upheld, the state must be strong and autonomous enough not 
to be captive to the interests o f one dominant group, either an ethnic one, or dominated 
by a concentration of political and economic interests. On the other hand the power of 
the state needs to be counterbalanced by the strength of civil society so as not to 
overpower the society itself and thus avoid accountability. Unless the relationship 
between the state and society is balanced, formal democracy cannot be maintained. 
Another example is freedom of expression and alternative sources o f information which 
are protected by law, for example in Slovakia. Yet, after the 1994 elections most media 
executives who were not members o f the leading HzDS party were dismissed and the 
government regularly challenged and defied its own Constitutional Court, ff we now 
consider that this is a country that emerged from a system which employed secret police 
as an arm of government control, it is open to debate whether the population in the initial
Compiled from M.Kaldor and I.Vejvoda ‘Democratization in Central and East European Countries’ 
International Affairs 73:1 January 1997 p.p.59-82. See also R.Dahl Dilemmas o f  Pluralist Democracy 
New Haven Yale University Press 1982 and D.Beetham in D.Held ed. Prospects for Democracy
E.Huber, D.Rueschemeyer. J.Stephens ‘The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy’ Comparative 
Politics 29:3 April 1997 p.p. 323-341 p.323
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stage o f democratisation trusts the rights provided by the constitution, when there is 
evidence that such authoritarian practices are still in operation123.
There is a more substantive component to democracy, concerned less with 
institutional practices and more with the substance, that is the degree to which 
democratic institutions can be implemented and yet, undemocratic practices persist, or a 
problem of new democracies whereby old embedded practices function within the newly 
emergent system. This substantive element o f the democratic process remains 
‘unfinished’124 and should be continuously reexamined, so that individuals are always in 
position to influence the conditions in which they live and decisions that affect their lives. 
Democracy is a “mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies 
over which the people exercise control”, hence the most democratic arrangement is that 
“where all members o f the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such 
decision-making directly - one that is to say which realizes to the greatest conceivable 
degree the principles o f popular control and political equality in its exercise”125.
In that respect, democracy is not a static state o f affairs, “there are no ‘final’ 
democracies”126, only more or less established ones, nearer or further away from the 
‘ideal’, which remains elusive. All democracies, including the long established ones must 
renew and restructure according to the changing socio-economic developments, thus all 
democracies must be engaged in the continuous process of democratisation. The 
dichotomy of democracy and authoritarianism might have always been too simplistic, but 
the latest ‘third wave’ o f transitions, including those of Eastern Europe and Asia, 
illustrate the shortcomings o f such a distinction. There are many forms of democracies 
on the continuum between the minimal-formalist (free and fair elections and inclusive 
citizenship are the two conditions beyond any discussion, for in the absence of those 
principles one cannot talk o f even minimal democracy) and more substantive
123 In order to make a clear break with the previous administration, one of the first measures taken by 
the post-1998 government in Slovakia was to charge the Head of the Slovak Information Service (secret 
police) I.Lexa for his role in the kidnapping of the president’s son M.Kovac Jr. and Minister Krajcf for 
thwarting of the referendum in May 1997.
^D.Beetham ‘Conditions for Democratic Consolidation’ Review o f  African Political Economy 60 p.
125 D.Beetham ‘Liberal Democracy and the Limits o f Democratization’ chpt.2 in D.Held ed. Prospects 
for Democracy p.p.55. Surprisingly, this book about democracy does not have one reference to 
nationalism in its index.
126 A.Agh The Politics o f Central Europe p.9
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democracies, whereby all the above criteria would be in place to such an extent that 
economic and societal cleavages are minimal.
So what about democratic consolidation? The first thing to mention is that this 
discussion concentrates on liberal democracy, thus a regime such as Slovakia in the 
period 1992-1998, described as a ‘semi-democracy127’ is somewhere between an 
authoritarian regime and liberal democracy, which is what some scholars call 
‘electoral’128 democracy. Even among these ‘electoral’ democracies there are 
differences129. Slovakia for all its semi-democratic characteristics was hardly Serbia 
which could, at a stretch, count as an electoral democracy, or Russia, where democracy 
has been reduced to a series of rituals. In Slovakia an elected parliamentary majority 
party proceeded to remove the opposition not only from parliamentary procedures, but 
reduce all competition in political (and social) life, thus the legitimately elected leadership 
descended into a kind o f ‘tyranny’, with Meciar assuming the role of ‘saviour’ of the 
Slovak nation. A similar type of politics could be observed in Croatia and Belarus and in 
attempts of the nationalist-conservative coalition in Hungary between 1990-1994, an 
observation which brings to the fore one of the problems faced by nascent democracies - 
what is often being consolidated is not a liberal-democracy, but a regime with fewer or 
more democratic features.
The next question then is whether the change of government in such 
democracies means democratic consolidation and the answer is, no. In the first place, the 
assessment o f democracy depends largely on the point from which one observes the 
length of route traveled between the point of departure and the aims one wants to reach 
on the continuum between non-democratic and democratic regime. As has been said 
before, the latter is a normative concept, each fulfilled aim is not beyond improvement, 
therefore consolidation is difficult to quantify. Secondly, if a semi-democratic type of 
regime is defeated by a more democratic one, the change constitutes a progress towards 
the establishment of a fully democratic regime, not its consolidation. So, there are only
127 S.Szomolanyi Slovensko:Problemy Konsolidacie Demokracie Bratislava, Nadacia Friedricha Eberta 
1997 p .ll
128 A.Schedler ‘What is Democratic Consolidation’. The author uses the term as a “convenient 
shorthand for any kind of “diminished subtype” of democracy, p.93
129 A.Agh identifies four types of distorted democracies, particularly important to postcommunist states: 
1) formalist (e.g.Serbia, Russia); b) elitist (in the early 1990s Romania, Albania, Bulgaria); c) partyist, 
whereby parties are the only actors and try to exclude all other political and social actors from the 
policy-making. All ECE democracies were and it is suggested by the author will remain in this form of 
democracy; d) tyrannical majorities (e.g.Slovakia, Croatia) p.p. 11-15
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more or less ‘consolidated’ transitions. Slovenia is further on the way towards 
consolidation than Slovakia, because the system has been functioning for a much longer 
period of time under relatively democratic conditions and because the continuation of its 
liberal-democratic structures is under less pressure. Thus, by the term ‘consolidated 
democracy’ should be meant a regime whose demise is less likely and that is expected to 
continue without challenges to its basic principles and norms.
2.2.2. Democracy and National Self-determination
There are many challenges to democracy130 and this thesis is concerned with one major 
challenge - nationalism - which derives from democracy’s most fundamental 
prerequisite, namely the existence of clear boundaries to state territory and its political 
community. Any exercise o f democracy requires a prior legitimate political unit, because 
no competition nor cooperation can take place without a clear definition of who is in the 
game and where the physical boundaries o f the “playing field’ 131 are. The predominant 
principle for defining those boundaries in modern times is ‘nationality’, which provides
•  •  •  * 132the criteria for who ‘the players’(people) are who determine their political destiny , 
thus the decision about who and what constitutes the ‘nation’ is an integral part of 
democratisation, hence the crucial role of nationalism in transition. Where the issue of 
boundaries and identities were either not settled properly before, or have changed as the 
result of the transition, nationalism is as much a challenge to democracy as it is its 
precondition.
Whilst democracy comes in a variety of forms, but with determined principles, 
the principle for determining ‘nationality’ is open to many interpretations - herein lies one 
significant point of ambiguity between nationalism and democracy (see below). 
Democratic theory makes clear that political rights are vested in the ‘nation , but there 
are at least two interpretations to how the national unit is defined. As remarked before,
130 P.Schmitter ‘Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy’ Journal o f  Democracy 5:2 April 1994 p.p.57-74 
and the same author ‘Transitology: The Science of the Art of Democratisation’ in J.Tulchin B.Romero 
ed. The Consolidation o f  Democracy in Latin America London, Boulder, Lynne Rienner 1995
131 P.Schmitter p.p.57-74 and the same author ‘Transitology: The Science of the Art of Democratisation’ 
in J.Tulchin B.Romero The Consolidation o f  Democracy in Latin America
131 P.Schmitter‘Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy’ Journal o f  Democracy 5:2 April 1994 p.p.57-74 
p.65
132 L.Diamond and M.Pattner Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy London, Baltimore, The 
Johns Hopkins University 1994 Introduction xi
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the ‘nation’ can be an aggregation of citizens in the state, united by the attachment to 
that state and the legitimacy of their regime (in this case a democratic one), or the 
‘nation’ can claim to be a political expression of an ethnic group. In the latter case the 
ethnic group can be the dominant nationality of the state, or it may be a minority. Despite 
the clarity o f such a classification, it is worth reiterating that these are ideal types and 
that the majority of nation-states are a combination of the two principles (ethnic and 
civic) and moreover, a combination of various ethnic groups with varying degrees of 
political consciousness at different times. The establishment o f states, the prevalence of 
either ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ principles for the definition of the ‘nation’, is characterized by a 
degree of historical contingency and open to interpretation, to which democratic theory 
offers no solution.
National self-determination is a principle that holds that any self-differentiating 
people has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself133 and thus can make ethnicity the 
ultimate measure of political legitimacy. If the essential meaning of democracy is popular 
control and the key to democracy is the autonomy and self-determination of people, the 
overlap between ‘demos’ (the polity) and ‘ethnos’, the self-determining people can 
leave, and usually does, some residual people who are left out of what is considered the 
nation’. Fundamental to democracy are equal political rights, that in principle are 
guaranteed by citizenship, yet the organizing principle of ethnicity can prevent some 
members o f the polity from inclusion (e.g. ethnic Russians in Estonia, Arabs from 
occupied territories in Israel, the ‘guest’ workers in Germany) in the decision-making 
processes by being denied the citizenship of the country of residence.
Immediately it is important to note that awarding citizenship is one of the 
essential democratic criteria, yet citizenship is not a guarantee of full inclusion and 
participation. When Slovakia under Meciar’s government (1992-98) was viewed as a 
state with ethnic conflict, the problems faced by the Hungarian minority and the Romany 
were not about being denied citizenship. The former felt that they were denied an equal 
political status and a share in the governance of the state of which they were citizens, 
whilst the problems faced by the Romany population continue to be about exclusion, 
social conditions and the lack of protection from discrimination by the state authorities. 
The fact that the congruence of the principles of popular sovereignty and national self­
133 W.Connor ‘Nation-Building or Nation -Destroying?’ World Politics 24:3 April 1972 p.p.319-355 
p.331
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determination couples nationalism intimately with the formation of political community 
which is a home to democratic government and that this is the usual situation at the 
beginning of democratic transition, justifies further the subject of this thesis - the role of 
nationalism in the democratisation process.
2.2.3. Nationalism: Defining the Nation, the State, Ethnic Group and Minority
“Nations are formed and are kept alive by the fact that they have a programme for 
tomorrow”, said Jose Ortega y Gasset'34 and nationalism should be viewed as such a 
programme. The idea o f nationalism is as follows: the principal object is the nation, the 
objective is the future o f the nation, the strategy is the promotion and protection of the 
nation and its interests. Under interests are understood: the identity, the unity, the 
recognition and dignity o f the members of the nation, best safeguarded through the 
attainment and maintenance of a sovereign rule, or a degree of autonomy, the lack of 
which carries a permanent threat of national demise. The basic message o f nationalism is 
the conviction that belonging to a national group, its existence and survival, are of 
supreme importance to its members and the right they all share as members o f humanity. 
Another point to stress is that all nationalisms, whether the state-seeking nationalism, the 
hegemony-pursuing nationalism of a majority, an autonomy-seeking minority 
nationalism, the homogenising nationalism of a newly independent state, nationalist 
movements for devolution or other reorganisation within a multinational state, all share 
these basic ideas and pursue them with a varying degree of intensity. Thus, depending on 
circumstances, nationalism takes on various forms - a sentiment, a principle, a political 
movement, a state policy, but always with the maximisation of conditions for a 
corresponding national group in mind.
The all-encompassing object o f nationalist endeavour - the nation - can be defined 
as a large social group integrated by a combination of objective relationships (economic, 
territorial, political, linguistic, historical and cultural) and their subjective reflection in 
collective consciousness135.
The idea o f ‘the nation’ however stands for more then just a large social group 
integrated by many subjective and objective relationships; ‘the nation’ and the
134 cited in Daedalus 121 Spring 1992 p. 140
135 M.Hroch ‘From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation’ p.4
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membership in it are infused with sentiments of dignity and recognition, with historical 
memories, with the politics o f the present and expectations for the future, all of which 
add to one’s identity and thus national identity constitutes a potent force in an 
individual’s identity. The political and historical evaluation of the national group is best 
observed in the way in which it is generally referred to by its members. Scots are called a 
nation, the Hungarians in Slovakia a minority, Russians in the Baltic states a minority, 
the Asian population in Britain ethnic groups, the Kurds a nation, Slovaks within 
Czechoslovakia were a nation, Yugoslavs were a nation, but now they are different 
nations, whilst Kosovars are still ethnic Albanians. It appears that there is an inadvertent 
value judgment attached to these distinctions depending on how big the group, how 
serious their plight, how far into the past their history reaches, how well defined their 
territory is, how realistic their chances for independence are etc.
The inconsistency in terminology reflects the general haziness that surrounds the 
terms nation, ethnic group, the state, the nation-state and minority. All are social groups 
and the differences between them are o f crucial importance for the politics of democracy 
and nationalism, yet the perpetual interchangeability o f their usage denotes the 
complexity o f that relationship. Ethnicity refers strictly to the belonging to an ethnic 
group, a particular collectivity based on “real or putative common ancestry and 
memories of shared historical past and cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements 
defined as the epitome of their peoplehood”136. Ethnicity stresses the importance of 
subjective perception of identity137, thus the distinction between the nation and the ethnic 
group can be summed up by saying that the latter is a similar concept, but narrower in 
that the binding issue is common ancestry and not the loyalty to a legal structure of the 
state (that means not necessarily to the state of citizenship).
Ethnicity is a cultural trait, it is not defined by state borders, but can transcend 
them, which explains the strength o f ethnic affiliation in migrant communities and among 
minorities across borders and continents. Usually, ethnicity is associated with a specific 
territory138 - ethnic homeland - around which ethnic identity is framed and reproduced
136 R.Schermerhorn ‘Ethnicity and Minority Groups’ J.Hutchinson & A.Smith Ethnicity Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 1996 p. 17
137 T.Fry ‘Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transitions from Non-Democratic Rule’ Journal o f International 
Affairs 45:2 Winter 1992 p.p.599-623 p. 602
138 For a discussion about ‘homeland’ nationalism see O.Yiftachel ‘Nationalism and Homeland’ in yet 
unpublished Encyclopedia o f  Nationalism (Academic Press ) and ‘Nation-building and the Social
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throughout time and which is seen as a ‘cradle’ of the ethnic/national group. Without the 
symbolic value given to ‘land’ we could not explain Milosevic s success in mobilizing 
Serbian nationalism against Kosovo, considered by Serbs to be the cradle of their 
nation. Without the notion o f ‘homeland’ there would not be the Zionist movement and 
its culmination the state of Israel, as there would not be that powerful concept
‘motherland’ (fatherland).
Notwithstanding the fact that it is ethnic solidarity which sets in motion a more 
political process of nation-formation, thus nationalism, ethnic identity in itself does not 
make a nation. Equating ethnic solidarity with national identity and that with the state is 
precisely where the problem of nationalism and democracy in a multicultural state lies, 
for the state is even less an expression of ethnicity than is nationalism. The state is a legal 
concept, it describes a definite territory (occupied by one or more ethnic groups/nations), 
political institutions and an official government, whilst the nation describes a cultural 
heritage which may or may not be institutionalised in the common state institutions and a 
group with a sense of homogeneity. Thus, the loyalty to the state is not necessarily Ihe 
same as the loyalty to the nation, which is nationalism per se and could also mean the
•  139loyalty to the ethnic group .
It can be argued that the legal concept o f the state which emerged from the Peace 
of Westphalia (1648) predates nations as political entities. This Westphalian state and its 
legitimacy has only later been enhanced by the principle o f popular sovereignty and by 
the doctrine o f national self-determination, both of which have provided as it were the 
moral principles for a political state, thus creating the nation-state. To some political 
thinkers, such as John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the nation-state and its cultural 
homogeneity were a precondition for democracy, well demonstrated by the claim that 
members of the same nationality (e.g. language, literature) should be united under the 
same government, “and a government to themselves apart” and more resolutely by the 
well-known dictum “that free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of 
different nationalities”140. Thus, it must be noted that the legitimacy of the nation-state 
has always been entangled with two contradictory principles: civic (democracy) and
Division of Space: Ashkenazi Dominance in the Israeli ‘Ethnocracy’ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 
4:3 1998 p.p.33-58
139 W.Connor Ethnonationalism Princeton N.J. Princeton University Press 1994 p.41
140 J.S.Mill ‘Representative Govemment’in On Liberty and Other Essays Oxford, Oxford University
Press 1991 p. 428
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ethnic/national (self-determination). This fact gives nationalism a different character 
depending on which of the two principles it pursues more actively; nationalism has an 
integrative quality, which can contribute towards a more civic (democratic) character of 
its state, or it limits its integrational effort to only one ethnic group, in which case its 
democratic potential and that of its state remains limited too.
The nation-state is not the universal reality, quite on the contrary, most states are 
multinational, hence the pursuit of state-culture congruence (nation-building) is not the 
same as seeking to establish an united political community (state-building) . The 
sentiment of belonging to a culture transcends borders and does not have to be attached 
to a nation-state, as the conflicts between minorities and majorities in the world today 
amply illustrate. Ethnic groups, which define themselves as a separate cultural entity 
from the assumed official culture of the state, are minorities, particularly when across the 
border is a nation-state whose dominant culture has been erected out of the same ethnic 
origin.
In studies of ethnicity one of the problems is the confusion over whether ethnic 
groups are, as is widely assumed, always minorities within nation-states14', or whether 
there is a more complex relationship between nations and ethnic groups, meaning sub­
national status o f some ethnic groups, the issue of dispersed ethnic groups (i.e. the 
Romany), the issues of regionalism etc.143. This thesis distinguishes between an ethnic 
group as a minority and dominant nation144, to avoid the confusion between the often 
conflictual demands of each vis-a-vis each other. There is a tendency to call ethnic 
groups with specific claims a minority, as there is a tendency to call large ethnic groups 
with already established territorial boundaries within multinational states nations (Scots; 
Welsh; Czechs and Slovaks within Czechoslovakia; Serbs, Croats, Slovenes within 
Yugoslavia; and all republics within the Soviet Union).
141 A. Stepan ‘Multinational democracies’ The State o f  the Nation p.226, refers to the former as nation­
state building and to the latter as democracy building, which is how these processes are viewed in this 
thesis too
l42see J.Hutchinson & A.D.Smith ed. Ethnicity Oxford, Oxford University Press 1996 p. 15 “altogether 
this remains an under-explored area of research”
143 see G.Herb D.Kaplan Nested Identities Boulder, New York, Oxford, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers
1998 . . • • , u144 Dominant in this discussion does not stand for numerical dominance, nor territorial extension, but
signifies the collectivity, which has the preeminent “authority to function as the guardians of the 
controlling value system and as the prime allocators of rewards in society”. See R.Schermerhorn 
‘Ethnicity and Minority Groups’ p. 17
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Therefore, multiethnic, multinational and multicultural state, all describe a state 
with different cultures, which strictly speaking would mean that all states are 
multicultural, but not all states declare themselves as such, as not all ethnic groups seek a 
political arrangement to reflect their separate status - a multinational state is not one that 
comprises different nations, but one that declares itself as such. Ethnic groups may or 
may not feel a great sense of cultural differentiation, or nationalism, but that does not 
always translate into the need to create a nation-state that corresponds with a given 
territory, or seek autonomy over the territory they inhabit. For the purpose of this thesis, 
nationalism refers to aspirations to political sovereignty, or a degree of it, within a given
territory.
National movements are not restricted to one ethnic group; they can be 
multiethnic as was the movement for the creation o f Czechoslovakia in 1918, 
decolonizing national liberation movements post-1945, attached to the territory of a 
former colony not to ethnicity, and indeed the nationally orientated liberations of 1989. 
The decoupling of nationalism from democratisation processes reduces the understanding 
of postcommunist transitions and all current revivals of ethnic self-determination round 
the world. Nationalism belongs to modernity and to politics; its glorification of national 
independence does not necessarily spell inequality, on the contrary the principle of 
national self-determination recognizes the equality of people and nations. The descent of 
nationalism from defence of liberty and culture to oppression of others (and often its own 
people), belongs to the study of nationalism, but is not a definition of it.
2.2.4. Explaining the Position of the Present Thesis According to Standard 
Theories of Nationalism
In conclusion to these introductory clarifications o f concepts that monopolise studies of 
nationalism, I want to stress the position of this thesis on two important issues: the well 
established distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism and the debate about the 
modernity versus ‘ancientness’ of the nation .
145 See also E.Harris-Grossbergerova ‘Nacionalizmus a demokraticny proces’ OS-Forum Obciamkej 
Spolocnosti 11 November 1999 (Kalligram Bratislava) p.p.42-47 and ‘Assessing the compatibility
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Civic/Ethnic Distinction
The literature on nationalism is replete with the distinction between ethnic and civic 
nationalisms, and suggestions that ethnic nationalism by defining its nation as a 
community of descent is inherently collectivist, illiberal and contradictory to inclusive 
citizenship, thus a considerable challenge to democracy. Civic nationalism then is 
antithetical in character, inclined towards an inclusive definition of the nation as a 
community of equal citizens, hence its benign character, providing it maintains this 
inclusive quality it can be complementary to democracy. In other words, whatever the 
objectives of ethnic nationalism may be (improvement of political or cultural conditions, 
or dominance in the state), their achievement seeks to accommodate only one particular 
group, whose membership is defined by their ethnicity and not open to ‘others’, whereas 
civic nationalism can extend the membership of the group to all people inhabiting a given 
territory.
This binary classification informs many theories of nationalism and its 
compatibility with democracy, and takes on different forms of description, always with a 
more positive evaluation given to civic nationalism rather than ethnic146. Leah 
Greenfeld147 makes the distinction clear by saying that the idea of the nation, which 
originally implied sovereignty of the people, originally emerged as individualistic, but 
later emphasized the people’s uniqueness. She suggests that “these two dissimilar 
interpretations of popular sovereignty” (individualistic - libertarian versus collectivistic - 
authoritarian) underlie the basic types of nationalism, which may be either ‘civic 
(voluntaristic), that is identical with citizenship, or ‘ethnic’, which implies particularism 
and is necessarily collectivistic and collectivistic ideologies are inherently authoritarian.
It is important to stress that this is a hypothetical discussion because awarding 
citizenship to foreigners is subject to strict laws in all countries of the world and mostly
between nationalism and democracy in postcommunist societies’ Slovak Sociological Review 31:6 Fall 
‘99 (SAV, Bratislava) p.p.587-602
146 P.Alter Nationalism 2nd ed. London, Edward Arnold 1994 contrasts the ‘voluntarist’ 
(Risorgimento), liberal-democratic concept of nation with a ‘deterministic’(integral) that can be 
undemocratic; R.Brubaker Citizenship and Nationhood Cambridge (Massachusetts) Harvard University 
Press 1992 distinguishes between the ‘French’ (republican) understanding of nationhood as 
‘universalist’ and ‘secular’ and the German idea of the nation as differentialist, thus in line with a often 
used distinction o f ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ nationalisms as synonymous with ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ 
definition. For this debate see also D.Brown ‘Are There Good and Bad Nationalisms?’ Nations and 
Nationalism 5:2 April 1999 p.p.281-302
147 L.Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity Cambridge, Harward University Press 1992 
p .ll
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based on the exclusion from the country of application rather than inclusion. In this thesis 
the above distinction is viewed as an ‘ideal type’ and referred to because of its well 
established meaning. By ‘civic’ I mean an attachment to the state of citizenship, by ‘civic 
tradition’ a tradition of stateness and political institutions, whilst ‘ethnic refers strictly to 
cultural traits. As the following chapters will show, the ‘civic’ affiliations in the former 
Czechoslovakia have been transformed into ethnic preferences o f two component units, 
the Czech and Slovak, whilst the ethnically based nationalism of Slovenes did not prevent 
them from regarding themselves as the champions of minority rights within the former 
Yugoslavia.
In the contemporary world, where so many ethnic communities fight for 
recognition, ethnic nationalism can no longer be portrayed merely as the oppression of 
majority over minority148. Equally, in ECE post-1989 nationalism and democracy 
stimulated and inspired each other and demands were ethnic and civic at the same time. 
The problem with such confusion is that democratisation requires civic values, whilst 
they are not available, because being rather a result of democracy, it is difficult to be a
prerequisite at the same time.
In connection to the international community and the state’s functioning in it, 
ethnic values are o f little advantage: they invariably lead to conflicts with international 
law and neighbouring states. The strength of ethnic values lies precisely in the fact that 
whilst the lack of international recognition persists, and the tangible advantages of new 
democratic system are not yet available, where the new state is lacking in legitimacy, the 
loyalty and the inspiration necessary for the state’s existence cannot be provided 
sufficiently by civic values which in the absence of tradition have to derive from this 
insecure new state. Moreover, civic affiliation must be inspired by the state it is attached 
to, but what have the states previously given the people so far, in order to inspire their 
civic affiliation, have not the states been a disappointment (e.g. Slovenes in Yugoslavia, 
the Baltic states in the Soviet Union)? Has it not been also the strength of their ethnic 
identity that achieved independence, as in the case of Slovenia and has it harmed the 
nascent civic culture? The ethnic/civic distinction might be useful as an academic tool to
148 For discussion of ethnic/civic antithesis see also R.Brubaker in The State o f the Nation An example 
of the misuse of the ethnic/civic division was the 1998 election campaign of the Slovak National Party 
that promoted nation-building on the principle o f ‘highest rights for Slovaks’, but proposed to solve 
minority problem (see Hungarian minority in the South) on civic principles - equal rights of all citizens,
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distinguish between different forms of nationalisms, but we must concede that it is not an 
adequate tool for assessment of nationalism in the new states of ECE, which 
encompasses both ethnic and civic elements at the same time.
Modernists and Primordialists
Nearly all writing on nationalism touches upon the discussion about the modernity versus 
‘ancientness’149 of the nation. Here I shall provide only a brief review of the main 
literature of the last two decades. The main proponent of the modernist/functionalist 
school is Ernest Gellner who views nationalism as a thoroughly modem phenomenon, a 
mechanism to sustain industrialisation and modernisation150, a child of industrialisation 
that “invents nations where they do not exist”151. On the other hand, the opposing view is 
led by A.D.Smith whose primordialist approach accepts that modem nations have a 
distinctive feature - citizenship, but argues that the formation of nations needs to be 
examined long term, through the ethnicity that shaped them and thus nationalism is an
• 152
expression of national identity rooted in ethnohistory .
There are various strands in the modernist/functionalist school: the economically
determined approach, whereby nationalism is a “by- product of the material side of 
history of the last two centuries” that uses highly subjective methods to “invite the 
masses into history”153; nationalism driven by modem communication (print capitalism) 
to ‘fabricate’ (in reference to Gellner’s ‘invention’) nations as “imagined communities 
of comradeship154 in the modem era; a statist approach to nationalism as an active and 
powerful actor in the politics of the state, whose fundamental characteristic is that it is
thus no minority rights A.Duleba ‘Program Slovenskej Narodnej Strany 1998: Politicka Oblast’ Verejny
Audit Predvolebnych Programov Politickych Stran 1998
149 For the account ofthis debate see J.Hutchinson Modem Nationahm London, Fontana Press 1994
with a slant towards th e ‘ancientness’ of the nation. n las'!. Thnuoht and
150 Mainly E.Gellner: Nations and Nationalism Oxford, Cambridge MA, B,ai“kwe , g
Change L o n d o n ,  Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1964; introduction to S.Penwal Notions o f Natwnahs 
Budapest, Central European University Press 1995 ,  ^ , •
151 E.Gellner Nations and Nationalism p.55 For a different view of nationalism and modern ty,a  
that not industrialisation “lies at the basis of modem society, but nationahsm see L Gr“ nt"ld 
‘Nationalism and Modernity’ Social Research 63:1 Spring 1996 p.p.3-40 p.8. Also see L.Greenfeld m
Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity . . „ r
152 A.D.Smith: Theories o f  Nationalism London, Duckworth 1971; The Ethnic Origins ° f * at 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1986. For the survey of the diverse theories of nationalism from the author 
point of view see Nationalism and Modernism London, New York R o u tin e  199 _ -nted in 
*53 T .Nairn The Break-up o f Britain London, NLB 1981 chapter 9 ‘The modem Janus also reprinted m
New Left Review 94 November/ December 1975 p.p 3-31 p.8 and 12 
154 B.Anderson Imagined Communities L o n d o n ,  Verso 1983 p. 15
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about politics and “that politics is about power”15 (much of the case study of Slovak 
nationalism is informed by this approach); and finally an ideological approach that sees 
nationalism as a religion, a doctrine that by some terrible mistake has entered history
with disastrous consequences156.
In conclusion to this very brief review I wish to clarify the position of this thesis. 
All the above approaches are important in explaining how nationalism came about and in 
that sense all are valid in different degrees at different times. For the rest of this thesis 
nationalism is viewed as a modern political force, that uses its easily invoked connection 
to the ‘ancientness’ o f the nation. It creates a modem national identity which 
nevertheless defines itself through symbols of historical defeats and victories (perceived 
or real is irrelevant) and by its strongly ideological basis it regularly rivals all other 
ideologies. What the above approaches to nationalism do not adequately account for is 
the supreme mobilising potential o f nationalism in today’s world - a world tom by its 
excesses, where the force declared regularly to be waning revives with such regularity 
and vigour and whose myths are longer lasting than other myths of collective identity 
(e.g. the myth of the proletariat).
It is my contention that the reason for this is not the lack of understanding of 
nationalism, but the underestimation of its role as an integral part of any 
democratisation157 process. The preoccupation with the identity that nationalism creates 
overshadows the very identity o f nationalism itself which cannot be reduced to any one 
aspect of socio-political development. In fact the one single factor that characterizes 
nationalism is the multiplicity of appeals through which it addresses its potential 
constituency and as such nationalism is a potent form of collective allegiance. 
Nationalism’s goals vary - it could be the creation of the state, the reconstruction of the 
nation, or the encouragement and achievement o f cultural demands. The political 
strategies (i.e. parties or intellectual movements) through which nationalism pursues 
these goals can vary too (they can be conservative, but also social-democratic, liberal or 
Marxist)158, even the intensity of nationalism’s importance alters according to economic, 
social and political developments.
155 J.Breuilly Nationalism and the State 2nd ed. Manchester, Manchester University Press 1993 and 
P.Alter Nationalism 2nd ed. London, Edward Arnold 1994 for history and politics of nationalism.
156 E.Kedourie Nationalism 4th ed. Oxford, Blackwell 1993
157 For this see B.O’Leary in The State o f  the Nation
158 M.Guibernau Nationalisms C a m b r i d g e ,  Polity Press 1996 p.64
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This last point is very important and as the following case studies will illustrate, 
when it comes to the question of compatibility between nationalism and democracy the 
political developments in the state constitute a major variable. Nevertheless, 
nationalism’s significance remains rooted in its capacity to represent the people and their 
collective will. As the previous chapter indicated the competition with other ideologies 
can be considerable and nowhere is it as evident as in new states in transition to 
democracy - a process which demands a great collective effort.
2.3. HOW COMPATIBLE ARE NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY ?
The task of this section of the current chapter is to provide an answer as to the 
compatibility o f nationalism and democracy. From the outset I would like to stress what 
has already been signaled thus far - the relationship between nationalism and democracy 
is inherently ambiguous. This ambiguity is rooted in the fact that politics instigated by 
nationalism and democracy both claim to answer to ‘the will of the people’. The 
undesirable consequences o f nationalism have been amply demonstrated over the course 
o f this century159, nevertheless democracy is linked to a sovereign political unit and that 
to a modem state. The creation of that state has most likely been preceded by a struggle 
for national self-determination in an attempt to secure rights for its national group. Each 
national struggle carries within itself two ideas: more rights and recognition of a given 
territory and a distinctive group sharing certain ethnic and /or political characteristics. In 
each case the idea is simultaneously democratic and prone to an undemocratic practice, 
because the definition of a territory, its group and its corresponding rights can and 
usually does generate a definition o f ‘the other’ who may then be excluded, politically or 
even physically from the unit that has thus acquired a new political status. Hence, the 
compatibility o f nationalism and democracy travels a very thin line, for every positive 
side there is a glimmer of the negative side, which does not mean to say that the 
relationship must fail, merely that it is a difficult one to manage. In the next few pages I 
shall focus on the positive elements o f national identity and national self-determination
159 For the opposite view, linking much of the twentieth century genocide to ‘the dark side of 
democracy’, see M.Mann ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modem Tradition of Ethnic and Political 
Cleansing’ New Left Review 235 May/June 1999 p.p. 18-45
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whilst pointing out their potential negative characteristics and discuss the contradictory 
logic o f nation-building and state-building.
2.3.1. ‘The people’, their Identity and their Self-determination
It is argued here that three main pillars on which nationalism rests are national self- 
determination principle, its ontological key element - national identity and the interests of 
the national group. This section explores the close interrelationship among them (how 
international relations and in this context the European integration shape nationalism and 
its relation to democracy is the subject o f the Chapter 7). The idea of national self- 
determination stands for the establishment o f the preferred form of government, whether 
it is a component o f a multinational state, a federation or as an independent state160. Let 
us first explore the main arguments for national self-determination, that is for the 
boundaries of political units (states or federal units) to coincide with national (cultural) 
boundaries.
The underlying assumption is that the nation is an important source of personal 
identity161, which provides one with a place in the world and hence exercises a 
considerable influence over one’s opportunities and choices in life. Obviously, one’s life 
is largely influenced by more immediate groupings and relationships than ‘the nation’, but 
national culture provides an important moral and practical resource in an individual’s 
existence. The main reason for favouring national self-determination derives from the 
above assumption that national cultures are worth protecting. Moreover, each 
community feels that the distribution and management of their resources and decisions 
about the future o f their community are best served by more autonomy.
Why it is a national state that is considered best equipped to protect a group’s 
culture and autonomy has to be sought in real or imagined national experiences. 
Historically there are many instances when a multinational state has tried to assimilate 
weaker groups by force (e.g. Magyarisation in the nineteenth century), or economically 
exploit a more successful national group (e.g. the Yugoslav federation versus Slovenia), 
or simply dominate the state’s policy by numerical preponderance (e.g. the Czechs in 
Czechoslovakia), so that empirically there is enough evidence to assume that the best
160 B.O’Leary as above p.69
161 D.Miller On Nationality Oxford, Clarendon Press 1995p.82
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protection against the erosion o f one’s culture and resources is to share decisions with 
like-minded people, thus keep it within one’s own state. That however does not stop a 
particular political or economic grouping from the exploitation of its co-nationals, so 
strictly speaking national self-determination implies the correspondence of the popular 
will and state borders162. Herein lies the connection between democracy and national 
self-determination. In principle only a democratic state would be able to ensure that the 
national self-determination truly reflects the will o f “the people” and therefore, in theory, 
national self-determination is linked to democratic consent and citizenship and the 
development o f a modem state, itself the guarantor of the nation.
In the context o f postcommunist transitions nationalism must be viewed, at least 
partially, as a positive force. The idea of the nation provided the populations of the ECE 
countries with an identity and self-esteem when both were rendered hollow by 
communist regimes. Moreover, the greatest achievement o f nationalism is the right to 
national self-determination which in the East European context contributed to the 
legitimacy and coherence of the new-born states163 and helped their citizens to endure the 
initial hardship of the transition. The problem however is that the idea of the national 
self-determination, which can be interpreted as the right to democratic government, does 
not necessarily guarantee the existence of a democratic regime.
One reason is the above mentioned fact that under democracy we understand 
liberal-democracy and that the logics of liberalism and democracy, even if now merged, 
are quite different. Liberalism focuses on individual and human rights, democracy locates 
the power in the people; liberalism places limits on the power o f governments, even 
democratic ones, whilst democracy grants power to the people, whether the result is 
democratic or not. So, it would be stretching the concept o f national self-determination 
too far to claim that it requires or guarantees democracy.
It is clear that national self-determination has lost its good name due to the 
violence with which it is often pursued and because national self-determination once 
achieved does not guarantee a democratic regime in the name of which the process 
legitimised itself in the first place. The problem is magnified in a multinational setting - a 
priority given to compatriots o f the dominant nationality, thus overriding obligations to
162 On Nationality p.89
S.R.Bollerup Ch.D.Christensen Nationalism in Eastern Europe London, Macmillan Press 1997 
p.280
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minorities and the use o f state apparatus to these ends means that aggrieved minorities 
have little choice, but to make appeals to their own self-determination (which might 
include secession) and so the process of societal fragmentation is set in motion.
The individual’s relation to his or her nation can be compared to the individual’s 
relation to any other group of which he or she is a member - that means that identity is 
linked to recognition, to dignity and self-esteem, status, safety and prestige164. It is 
important to stress that generating an identity is a psychological necessity and a part of 
human nature. How this necessity has come to be associated with national identity has to 
be sought in the role of the nation-state. Our social reality is inconceivable without 
nations (therefore states) and the specificity o f national identity is that it distinguishes 
national from any other types o f identity. Hence, “national identity derives from a 
membership in ‘a people’ defined as a nation, which implies that national population is 
perceived as homogenous”165 - in this context any other types of stratification, such as 
status, gender or class are secondary. A more cynical view would be that it is one 
identity, among the many an individual has, that is awarded without a personal effort; it 
is attached to the membership rather than an achievement and allows for an individual to 
play a part in history which in most cases would not otherwise happen. Humiliation of 
the nation, its defence and future are in a similar way all entangled with one’s identity.
Nationalism’s emotive power rests on that fundamental human need for 
identity166, recognition and dignity in the world which divides people into nations. Daily 
we are confronted with the plight of refugees round the world and what makes their 
situation so problematic is not just the lack o f shelter and food, but because we all 
instinctively understand the humiliation that denial o f one’s identity carries. To claim that 
nationalism is therefore politics of identity only, would be to rescue the primordialist 
argument through the back door, which is not the intention here. Identity being such an 
important facet of human existence, is open to manipulation and misinterpretation, to 
exploitation and the pursuit of self-interest and hence to politics. These are facets of 
nationalism’s own identity and the main reason behind its political success.
164 Drawn from an article by D. Druckner ‘Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty’ in Mershon 
International Studies Review 38 1994 p.p.43-68
165 L.Greenfeld Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity p.7
166 For nationalism as politics of identity see C.Taylor ‘Nationalism and Modernity’ in The State o f the 
Nation
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2.3.2. The Contradictory Logic of Nation-building and State-building.
Nationalism is a political movement - it has to engender action and political solidarity 
among a significant proportion of the population and imbue them with a common goal. 
As has been stressed above national self-determination is not limited to the establishment 
o f independent statehood. Nationalist mobilisation o f the political will continues 
whenever grievances, real or putative, are belittled and no political or administrative 
solution has been found, or when nationalist elites create a sense of dissatisfaction in 
order to seek a remedy for their waning legitimation. In Slovakia nationalist mobilisation 
gathered momentum after independence; the political elite in order to camouflage the 
growing political cleavages concentrated on the ethnic ones. One could identify this kind 
o f nationalism as ‘post-independence’, so nationalism of the newly independent states is 
the type of nationalism that affects the transition to democracy directly and is the subject 
o f this study.
If nationalism was only about intellectuals writing stories about ancient heroes 
and states declaring citizenship and language laws, without encountering opposition from 
other national groups, we would not be considering the impact of nationalism on 
democracy and there would be nothing controversial about nationalism. The emphasis 
upon culture and identity is possibly useful in understanding a type of nationalist 
development or the mechanisms it uses in a particular country. However, too much focus 
on the particularity o f nationalism is to neglect the fact that the controversy comes from 
nationalism’s innate tendency towards the appropriation of the state’s authority and the 
exercise o f power. Power, despite the much propagated view that the state has sacrificed 
its predominance to global economic interdependence (see chapter 7), is still about 
significant control of the national state.
Here we face a major dilemma of the nationalism-democracy relationship. 
Nation-building and state-building are overlapping, but two conceptually (and 
historically) different processes. The well-established idea o f seeing a nation as ‘a people’ 
in possession o f a state might be the ideal o f nationalism, but a nation, seen as a cultural 
community, can exist without a state as much as a state does not need one such ‘people’ 
to exist; what a democratizing state needs is a unified nation in a political, not a cultural 
sense. In other words, democracies require a sense of identification with the political 
community which in terms of identity means that being a citizen should rate as an
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important component of who they are. To Dunkwart Rustow one single background 
condition for transition to democracy is national unity, meaning “that the vast majority 
o f citizens in a democracy to be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which 
political community they belong to”167.The point to underscore is that a political 
community is not determined by culture or common heritage, membership is not a given, 
but can be acquired or chosen, so that strictly speaking nation-building should mean the 
integration and harmonisation of the whole society and all citizens in it.
It is the state, however, that controls the territory and has the supreme authority 
to impose rules and forms of behaviour and demand taxes; in short, a nation and its 
leaders cannot impose any desired rules or behaviour without the significant control of 
the state. In the process of nation-state consolidation, state power plays a fundamental 
role, also because it holds the key to the major element of cultural homogenisation of 
state’s population: the education system. The state in order to increase, or maintain its 
legitimacy has a vested interest in creating and reinforcing the nation - it must justify the 
purpose of its existence, which besides the physical protection of its citizens and their 
welfare, is also the guardianship of the national culture.
In newly independent states, both the state and the nation are engaged in the 
process o f strengthening their position. The main resource that the nation has for 
acquiring political power stems from the unity provided by the psychological 
identification of its members. Nationalism is thus conducive to nation-building process, 
which is rooted in a deliberate effort to construct an overarching collective identity, 
which is usually based on a “putative common national (ethnic) sentiment, culture and 
heritage”168 in an effort to create a sense of purpose that a state needs in order to 
function effectively. State-building then is in principle a complementary project, aiming at 
the establishment o f a political community of citizens and at forging social solidarity and 
loyalty to state institutions. The compatibility of those two processes is however 
dependent on whether the state and its leaders who pursue nation-building policies 
perceive the state to be o f and for the dominant nation. The clash between the 
administrative and the political emphasis of democratising policies on the one hand and 
the culturally preoccupied nation-building process on the other hand aiming at the
167 D.Rustow ‘Transitions to Democracy’ in Comparative Politics 2:3 April 1970 p.p.337-363 p.350
168 O.Yiftachel ‘Nation-building or Ethnic Fragmentation?’ Space and Polity 1:2 November 1997 
p.p. 149-171 p. 150
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consolidation o f the nation is less relevant if there is a congruence between the polity 
(demos) and culturally conscious nation (ethnos), which is not the reality o f most states 
in ECE.
In multinational (multiethnic or multicultural) states those two processes can be 
conflicting, mostly due to the assumption by the dominant nation and its nation-building 
elites that the state is their own nation-state which implies the exclusion of other ethnic 
groups from the ownership of the state. In the case of newly independent multinational 
states the problem is further magnified by the tension about the order of preference given 
to either state-building or nation-building.
When it comes to democratisation, the legitimacy of the democratisation 
process, as will be argued throughout, is central to politics, but in new multinational 
democracies that are still in the process of consolidating the nation which the state 
embodies, legitimacy o f that state is also at the heart o f nationalist mobilisation. The 
disintegration of the postcommunist Czechoslovakia is a good example. The legitimacy 
o f  transition and the common state was challenged by the Slovak claim that the state 
consisted of two peoples, each of which had the right to decide the fate o f its nation (the 
pace and type of transition), thus, the building of a common state lost to the challenge of 
nation-building from one of its constituent parts169.
The reasons why some states give a considerable preference to nation-building 
over state-building was the subject of the first chapter, but for the moment I want to 
stress that states, particularly the new states, need the energy and loyalty that ‘the nation’ 
is capable o f providing and that often it is easier to achieve by an appeal to national 
(ethnic) identity than to the newly acquired citizenship.
Paradoxically, civic identity tends to lose out as soon as there is a disagreement 
about state-building policies. Ethnic nationalism is as much a consequence of 
unsuccessful state-building as it is its cause, for the disintegration o f the state, the loss of 
its legitimacy, diminishes civic affiliation and leaves the field open to ethnic mobilisation. 
The disintegration o f Czechoslovakia changed the civic identity o f the Hungarian 
minority, who found themselves citizens o f a new state they did not want. Consequently, 
the Hungarian minority was faced with strong nationalising policies of new Slovakia, 
inspired by historical animosity against Hungary and the minority’s lack of enthusiasm
169 See C.Skalnik Leff The Czech and Slovak Republics Boulder, Oxford, Westview Press 1997
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for independent Slovakia. Therefore their identity became narrower, in the sense that 
they became defined as ‘the Hungarians’ and without the protection o f more neutral and 
historically less hostile Prague. Similarly, the mobilisation of Slovaks within 
Czechoslovakia could not be done on the basis of civic identity, for the state that should 
have inspired that identity was being questioned - in both cases state-building failed to 
create a political nation and lost to an ethnic one.
2.3.3. The Limits of Nationalism
Within the above pages my concern has been to point out dilemmas that arise from the 
theory and practice of nationalism and democracy generally. This thus sets out the 
theoretical foundations on which the exploration of nationalism and democracy rests for 
the remainder of this thesis. It can be reduced to the following three points: 1) the 
intrinsic link between nationalism and the formation of the political unit, from which 
derives the significance o f nationalism in the transition to democracy; 2) the compatibility 
o f the self-determination principle with democratisation, but the contradictory logic of 
their extension to nation-building and state-building; 3) nationalism’s evident capacity to 
offer a group identity, allegiance, representation and recognition, which accounts for 
nationalism’s capacity to mobilise and legitimise - the reverse side o f this capacity is 
nationalism’s proneness to the appropriation of political power.
In order to conclude this question of the compatibility between nationalism and 
democracy which is crucial in deciding the role o f nationalism in the democratisation 
process o f a particular state, the last link to explore is whether whatever national/ethnic 
identity has to offer is conducive to democracy, and how it is different from nationalism.
The political importance national identity carries can be summed up as a feeling 
o f cohesion and purpose in achieving a common goal which despite many divisions inside 
the state can be surmounted, in return for safety and belonging. In short, national identity 
makes the complexities o f life and politics simpler, by offering a clearer definition of 
interests and choices and some guidelines in the formation o f relationships with others.
Democracy does not offer this comfort. It is a system of certain principles and 
procedures and uncertain outcomes170. It arrives at collective decisions through
170 C.Offe Modernity and the State Blackwell, Polity Press 1996 p.257
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controversies and many compromises - at best it is a decision which is perceived as 
‘good enough’ by the majority o f people. One of the many sources of making sure that 
there is a general sense of satisfaction with the outcome is national identity. At the 
beginning of the transition process, when open state institutions already function, but the 
nascent democracy suffers from not yet clearly established rules o f competition for 
power, when not enough time has passed for the population to settle into the new regime 
and experience its benefits, in such an environment the claims of nationalist demagogues 
can become very persuasive for obvious reasons.
First, the very quality o f democracy - choice, uncertainty and complexity - makes 
nationalism appealing, because by defining national community in less political and more 
ethnic, therefore homogenous terms, it makes the definition of interests easier to grasp 
and thus appears to simplify the political landscape that has become too complex. 
Secondly, democracy allows for nationalist politicians to promote their ideas. But, let us 
not forget what those ideas can be. Nationalism’s strength lies in the elevation of one 
national group’s identity and solidarity, therefore by implication in the exclusion of 
others from all advantages that belonging brings. This is not the kind of solidarity that 
democracy seeks. Hence, national identity in a democratic nation should mean the loyalty 
to a political community of the whole citizenry, held together by common efforts to 
realize the common project - democracy and justice.
But, as has been pointed out by Dimitrije Djordjevic, “it is easier to be an 
emotional nationalist than a rational democrat”171, so the question is whether nationalism 
and democracy can be reconciled, in order to decrease nationalism’s challenge to 
democracy, particularly in multiethnic states. Can nationalism facilitate democracy, can it 
be a source of cohesion, solidarity and identity in the state? It would appear that every 
positive element nationalism has to offer to democracy is matched by its negative side, 
thus reducing the chances for compatibility.
Nevertheless, the contention o f this thesis is that the reconciliation between 
nationalism and democracy is possible and depends on the compatibility of their 
objectives. The following case studies will provide the empirical evidence for this claim. 
Democracy presupposes a political unit and the implicit suggestion in the work of many 
democratic theorists (e.g. Mill, Rustow, Linz and Stepan) is that democratisation is
171 cited in A.Agh The politics o f  Central Europe p.78
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easier in a state with largely one culture, because there is less tension between nation- 
building and state-building policies. The clue to a successful transition to democracy then 
must lie in the establishment o f a political community with corresponding identity and 
loyalty attached to that community. This does not presuppose the removal of cultural 
identities, which evidently is not so easy, but the forging of an overarching identity that 
corresponds with the boundaries of the state and envelops all ethnic communities.
People’s identity may draw on cultural roots, but it is also changeable and 
adaptable according to social and political conditions. It is precisely that human capacity 
to accept multiple identities, alongside with or over their ethnic identity, that makes 
democracy possible172 in multinational states.
The recent history of nationalism does not offer much faith in nationalism’s 
capacity to promote such an identity, yet the beginnings of ‘the nation’ endowed with the 
status o f a sovereign political body are to be sought in the revolutionary origins of 
nationalism. By the same token, the sheer magnitude of postcommunist changes was 
partially delivered by nationalist endeavour, hence there is no denying nationalism’s 
capacity to facilitate democratic changes. Whether nationalism can sustain democracy 
longer term is doubtful. It depends on whether it is willing to promote the loyalty to the 
political rather than ethnic community, thus shift its inherent ethnic emphasis from ‘one’ 
nation to ‘more’ nations in order to contribute to democratic state-building. Such a shift 
cannot be just called into action, but depends on the socio-political conditions in the 
state, as the following will argue.
2.4. INTRODUCING THE CASE STUDIES: NATIONALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA AND SLOVENIA
The discussion so far has concentrated on the prevalence of nationalism in 
postcommunist societies, and on the fundamental contradictions between nationalism and 
democracy as well as suggesting a possible compatibility. The purpose o f the concluding 
section of the current chapter is: first, to sum up this theoretical discussion, in order to 
draw out the main arguments and thus introduce the theoretical framework within which
172 A.Stepan in The State o f the Nation p.232
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the case studies will be conducted; second, to introduce the main lines o f inquiry on 
which the following case studies are based.
2.4.1. Theoretical Framework for the Case Studies
It appears that the postcommunist world has witnessed the predominance of ethnic 
nationalism over a more civic dimension o f nationhood. The reasons were discussed at 
length in the first chapter, but can be summed up by saying that history and the more 
recent communist past help to explain the strongly ethnic character attached to the 
matters o f nationhood and state legitimation in the region173. The absence of civic 
tradition, historically determined political inexperience, exacerbated further by the 
communist experience has made the advent of democracy even more tightly coupled with 
nationalism than it would have been otherwise. The proposition of the present thesis is 
that nationalism is an integral part of the democratisation process and that the 
compatibility of nationalism and democracy depends largely on the political development 
of the society undergoing the transition. It is not certain that nationalism is by definition 
detrimental to democracy, but it is noted here with fair conviction that the ethnicisation 
o f politics opens the stage to nationalist demagoguery and generally slows down the 
democratisation process. Whilst it is claimed that all nationalisms combine ethnic and 
civic elements, the prevalence of the former necessarily impairs the latter.
Nationalism, despite having been a liberating force that contributed to the end of 
communism and allowed the peoples o f ECE to actively achieve greater control over 
their political destinies, can be a regressive force; its capacity to threaten minorities, 
fragment states and complicate interethnic and interstate relations has been amply 
demonstrated over the last decade of postcommunism. There is no denying the 
democratic potential of nationalism and the positive elements o f national identity - all 
discussed above. Nationalism’s greatest historical achievement is self-determination, yet 
self-determination conceals the tendency towards the appropriation o f state power by the 
dominant majority and thus attempts to dominate the parts of the population that do not 
belong to ‘the nation’. It has also been argued that in this thesis nationalism is viewed as 
a political force which tries to distribute power relations in the state, but its fundamental
173 G.Schopflin ‘Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities in Post-communist Europe’ in R.Caplan and J.Feffer 
ed. Europe’s New Nationalism Oxford, Oxford university Press 1996 p. 153
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reliance on an ethnic community stresses the competing logic o f nation-building and the 
state-building processes.
Still retracing the steps o f the above discussion, the last proposition here is that 
nationalism undermines state-building, a fact gaining in relevance in multinational states 
and that since it is democratisation itself that facilitates the increase in nationalist 
mobilisation, democracy is better served by a weaker emphasis on national identity. This 
last point is even more pertinent in the newly independent states engaged simultaneously 
in nation- and state-building. Assuming that national identity is an important facet of 
peoples’ existence and therefore relevant to democratic politics, the resolution of the 
tension between nationalism and democracy depends greatly on how anti-democratic 
elements of nationalism can be reduced to such an extent that the transition to democracy 
does not get overshadowed by the consolidation of the national rather than political 
community. It seems that the overarching problem is not nationalism, whose presence in 
the newly independent democracies in the region can hardly be avoided, but the lack of 
political understanding of democracy and its values174. As with any major historical 
development, there is a considerable disagreement about the significance of nationalism 
in this process, generally vacillating between its positive and negative character, as the 
discussion above indicated. The proposition of this thesis, put to test in the forthcoming 
case studies, is that the role of nationalism in the democratisation process cannot be 
generalised and that under certain conditions nationalism can be conducive to 
democracy. Those ‘certain conditions’ however are in themselves a process which is 
contingent on many variables, ranging from historical determinants, the national 
development and the ethnic composition and consonance, through the recent past, to the 
formation of national elites in the transition, all o f which are determining factors in the 
role nationalism will play in the democratisation process.
2.4.2. Slovakia and Slovenia
It would seem unrealistic to assume that the relationship between democracy and 
nationalism is so one-sided that nationalism would be the sole driving force o f the 
transition to democracy. The contention here is that democracy’s capacity to contain
174 G.Nodia ‘Nationalism and the Crisis of Liberalism’ in R.Caplan J.FefFer Europe’s New Nationalism 
p. 117
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nationalism within the limits o f loyalty to the democratisation project has at least as much 
influence on the transition process as nationalism’s capacity to endanger it. The case 
studies o f Slovakia and Slovenia explore this dynamic, the key elements of which are the 
following: the communist past, the mode of attainment of independence, the legitimacy 
o f the new state and the democratisation process and the ensuing elite formation175.
The main difference between the Slovak and Slovene transition processes lies 
precisely in that Slovenia was able to use nationalism positively. It constitutes an 
example o f the positive role nationalism can play in the democratisation process. The 
political reforms in Slovakia, particularly in the period between independence and the last 
general elections (1993-1998) exemplify rather the opposite case, whilst it will be 
suggested that the current configuration of the political elite and their commitment to 
democracy has reduced the relevance of nationalism in political life.
Democratisation in Slovenia started long before independence, but due to the 
increasingly centralising policies o f Serbia it could not continue further within the given 
constitutional arrangement. Thus independence became the culmination of that process, 
and moreover its guarantor - national emancipation in Slovenia did not start in the name 
o f ‘the nation’, but in the name of democracy. In contrast, democracy in Slovakia 
became subordinated to the ‘national question’ which, given the historical trajectory of 
Slovakia’s national existence, assumed priority. The birth o f independent Slovakia and 
the initiation of democracy were shrouded in disagreements; about the secession, about 
the conception of democracy and the role o f the ‘nation’ in it, and about the identity and 
the purpose of the new state. The population, but mainly elites were divided mostly on 
political issues, but in order to camouflage the political disagreements, ethnic polarisation 
became instrumentalised into the main political cleavage. The actual conflict was 
between a populist-nationalist leadership, trying to halt the democratisation process and 
all elements o f the political opposition who had entertained any reasonable doubts about 
Slovakia’s independence and its democratic future.
175 rpl .
The importance of the economy is omitted here, but not because I wish to ignore its importance. The 
role of economy in the postcommunist transitions is a separate issue, deserving a longer discussion than 
can be awarded to it here, whilst at the same time I feel that such a discussion would not change the 
above propositions. Moreover, the issue of the economy as a contributory factor in seeking independence 
in both countries, even if for contrary reasons (Slovenia the most advanced republic within Yugoslavia, 
Slovakia the less developed partner within Czechoslovakia) will be dealt with in the case studies; in 
addition I would argue that economy is not the most determining factor in nationalist mobilisation, but 
adds to the general unease about the political situation.
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The opposition indeed included the Hungarian minority, who were very opposed 
to Slovak independence. Nationalism, after achieving its final goal - the sovereign state, 
entered political life as the legitimizing instrument of the new state and its elites, and 
democracy became its victim, not its successor, or even its partner. Slovakia also 
provides evidence for the above claim that the relationship between nationalism and 
democracy depends on political conditions and the nature o f elites. Since the defeat of 
the last Meciar administration in 1998 Slovakia seems to have entered a new stage in the 
transition in which nationalism appears a much diminished feature of political life.
In both Slovakia and Slovenia the economic and political inheritance were 
determined by communism. However, the recent history of Slovenia, whether a 
democratic or communist one, was substantially different from that o f Slovakia. Thus the 
nature of the previous regime plays an important part. Whilst the communist regime in 
Czechoslovakia was tightly controlled by Moscow and isolated the country from the 
Western world, Slovenes enjoyed open borders to the West and a guaranteed access to 
the Yugoslav market in which they assumed a leading position. In Slovenia communism 
did not leave behind a devastated country, but one which was economically relatively 
advanced with a strong national consciousness and the self-confidence of the politically 
and economically most developed republic within the Yugoslav federation. In contrast 
Slovakia was a weaker partner in the Czechoslovak federation and its national 
consciousness was based on negative comparisons with its larger and more developed 
and cultivated federal partner, and historically oppressive neighbouring Hungary.
The main difference with Slovakia is twofold: firstly, Slovak independence did 
not rest on the legitimacy of a national consensus and secondly, it was the slowing-down 
of the transition process which secured the victory of a pro-independence political 
leadership. In Slovenia national mobilisation speeded up the democratisation process, 
impeded by Belgrade, whilst the new nationhood rested on the wide consensus o f the 
referendum. It can be argued that in both cases the federal state failed to continue the 
democratisation process in the tempo which would be satisfactory to all its constituent 
units - whether for economic, cultural, historical or political reasons and usually due to 
the combination of all those factors. Whilst Slovenia was politically ahead of its federal 
partners, Slovakia was less prepared for the ever increasing intensity of political and 
economic reforms advocated by the Czech side. Secession is often the last option by 
which to emphasize political differences in a common state and Slovenia decided that its
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future was best secured by independence. Slovakia on the other hand, was not given the 
opportunity to decide - the most important decision in the history of Slovakia happened 
without a referendum (the reasons and the consequences of this very important moment 
in the Slovak history will be dealt with in detail in the following chapter). Neither Slovak 
independence, nor democracy could rely on a strong legitimacy that would give them a 
healthy start, and the years that followed confirmed one of the claims of this thesis that 
insecure democracy and insecure nationhood feed off each other and create a dynamic 
detrimental to further democratisation.
The specificity o f the Slovene transition is that its roots go back as far as the 
1960s and that this evolutionary process o f transition was endorsed and eventually led by 
the self-reformed communist leadership who responded to the gradually increased 
pressures of the opposition organisations and civil movements. This point is absolutely 
crucial, because the graduality of Slovene transition meant that all issues of national 
identity, political development and the polarisation o f elites had a sufficient time to 
mature and be neutralised before they could harm the transition process or cause a 
serious deviation from the path to democracy, which is what happened in Slovakia.
The Slovene democratisation process from the beginning was an attempt to 
guarantee human rights, participation, popular control and pluralism. Independence 
became the guarantor of its continuation and nationalism was thus given a more positive 
role in the whole affair, because the original national project - a further democratisation - 
could continue undisturbed after the attainment of independence (25.6.1991). In 
Slovakia not only were people not quite prepared for the consequences of 
democratisation, but since actual independence was not a result o f a democratic 
plebiscite, this significantly impaired the legitimacy o f the new state and reduced faith in 
the democratic process. The consequence for the transition was that the gaps in 
legitimacy were filled by nationalism trying to justify the fact after the event. Thus the 
political arena instead of being harmonised became increasingly radicalised on all issues 
involving the nation and democracy. Thus, the basis of the comparison between the two 
transition processes lies in the legitimacy of democratisation and independent statehood 
which in Slovenia, unlike in Slovakia, formed a mutually compatible dynamic.
Ethnically driven nationalism thrives in a society, where national and political 
insecurity can be exploited for political aims. In Slovenia, nationalism was not given that 
opportunity, not because Slovenes are less nationally conscious, but because the
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politicians and the public were given more time to neutralise the more extreme trends in 
politics, equally present there. There are moments in history when the interests of 
individuals coincide with national interests, therefore the difference nationalism has 
played in the democratisation processes in Slovenia and Slovakia can be summarised by 
the words o f Ivan Bernik that in Slovenia “nationalism was instrumental in creating a 
relatively broad consensus on vital national interests”176. In Slovakia on the other hand, 
the political developments became overshadowed by nationalism which was instrumental 
in widening political and ethnic cleavages, thus impeding the democratisation process.
2.5. CONCLUSION
The point of the last two chapters was to argue the reasons why nationalism proved to 
be an integral part o f postcommunist democratisation processes. The above introduction 
o f the two case studies to follow demonstrates that the evaluation o f the role nationalism 
plays in these processes, despite its evident capacity to distract the process, is 
nevertheless variable. Nationalism can be positive, if and when it contributes to the 
formation of an unified political community with aims for the future concurrent with the 
goal o f democratisation as the case study o f Slovenia will show. On the other hand the 
Slovak transition process in its first stage (1993-98), will be an illustration that 
democratisation needs to rest on a political community, whose unity is not best achieved 
by nationalism; nationalism’s inherent concern for the unity o f its ethnic community tends 
to base political unity on ethnic solidarity, instead of political solidarity. In other words, 
the excessive priority given to nation-building becomes a detriment to democratic state- 
building.
In conclusion, the above leads to four assertions about nationalism and its role in 
the democratisation process on which the following case studies rest:
1) Communist multinational states disintegrated not as a consequence o f nationalism, but 
as a consequence of the unraveling of state power, which was a result o f a systemic 
change. The overwhelming presence of nationalism in postcommunist transitions derives 
partly from the fact that the existing states lost legitimacy which signaled the 
reassessment and readjustment o f identities, by majorities and minorities.
1761.Bemik B.Malnar ‘Ethism, Nationalism and State-Building:the Case of Slovenia’ Paper presented at 
the Congress of the International Political Association, Seoul, August 1997 p.l 1
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2) The fundamental problem of newly independent democracies is the tension between 
the formation of a political community as the basic condition for democracy and the 
establishment o f the state based on self-determination of the national community, which 
means the coexistence o f the two historically simultaneous, but ideologically different 
processes, nation-building and state-building. Nationalism and democracy are thus tied 
together, whilst they seek different and often contradictory objectives.
3) Nationalism is an important element o f the democratisation process and as such it 
affects the direction and the pace of transition, but does not wholly determine it. The 
level (intensity) o f nationalism is an issue of mobilisation - there are no intrinsically 
nationalistic nations. However, there are conditions under which nationalism finds more 
or less resonance with the public and those conditions constitute in themselves a complex 
process contingent on the past and present socio-political developments.
4) The democratisation process relies on the legitimacy of the state and the unity o f its 
political community. In short, the capacity of democracy to contain nationalism within 
the reasonable boundaries in order to move the democratization process forward is one 
o f the pre-conditions for the continuation of that process.
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Chapter 3
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SLOVAK POLITICAL AND 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Political analysis o f Slovakia’s transition to democracy has generally become 
synonymous with questions about what has gone wrong and what type of regime has 
emerged in Slovakia, which till recently was mostly described as ‘fragile’ or ‘semi’ 
democratic177. The last general elections (September 1998), the fourth since the end of 
communism and the second in independent Slovakia were still critical as to the direction 
o f the transition. These elections raised questions o f the observance o f constitutional 
order and the rule o f law, the treatment o f minorities, the European integration and the 
relations with the West, and the general commitment to democracy, all o f which put 
Slovakia into sharp contrast with other neighbouring countries in Eastern/Central 
Europe. The contrast is even more striking in comparison to the considerably more 
successful transition of the Czech Republic, the ex-partner in Czechoslovakia, within 
which Slovakia began its transition to democracy. Therefore, Slovakia’s status as the 
only country among the Visegrad Group178 which was initially excluded from the first 
wave o f entrants to NATO and applicants to the EU is even more surprising179.
The last parliamentary elections brought political defeat to Meciar’s Movement 
for Democratic Slovakia (henceforth HzDS/ Hnutie za Demokraticke Slovensko) which 
had dominated the Slovak political scene since its foundation in 1991, and victory for 
parties committed to democracy and closer ties with the West. Whether their victory will
'77 S.Szomolanyi Slovensko :Problemy Konsoliddcie Demokracie Bratislava, Slovenske Zdruzenie pre
Politicke Vedy 1997 p. 11. (henceforth S.Szomolanyi Slovensko...)
179 a secunty organization, other countries: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
At the EU Vienna December 1998 summit Slovakia’s entry in the first group of Eastern European 
associate countries was rejected as was Slovakia’s membership of the NATO (Madrid July 1997). 
However the EU has recently advised the member states (SME 14/10 1999) to start the negotiations with 
Slovakia and other countries o f the so-called second wave (Latvia. Lithuania, Malta, Romania and 
Bulgaria) about the admission. The Commission was particularly complimentary about the political 
progress in Slovakia seen now as the most successful of the second wave. Interesting about this latest 
decision is the individual approach to the candidate states (now totaling 10 ECE countries, including the
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reverse this process o f exclusion and secure a new phase in Slovakia’s transition remains 
to be seen, but prospects seem favourable.
Even if Meciar’s government, which was marked by nationalism, corruption, a 
disregard for constitutional and legal propriety and the ambivalence towards Western 
institutions, is generally viewed as the obstacle to democracy in Slovakia, the following 
two chapters will argue that the ‘derailment’ o f Slovakia’s transition has deeper roots 
than Meciar s administration. Slovakia constitutes a complex case o f a postcommunist 
transition in the context of a politically and ethnically divided society, exacerbated by 
complexities of nation-building and minority issues. Nationalism played an important role 
in the first decade of the transition process, hence the task of this chapter is to examine 
Slovakia s national and political development prior to independence in order to explain 
the relevance of nationalism in Slovakia’s transition process.
The ‘Slovak question ’
Slovakia came into existence in 1993 as a result o f an understandable anxiety about the 
pace of economic transformation and what appeared to be an irreconcilable difference in 
cultural and historical understanding of the common Czechoslovak state. The split 
happened because the populations on both sides, in the midst o f postcommunist 
struggles, saw it as an answer to the old ‘Slovak question’180. This term has existed since 
the formation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 to describe the always uncomfortable position 
o f Slovaks within that common state, a position that has too often been simplistically 
reduced to an inherent Slovak nationalism. However, the ‘Slovak question’ is broader. It 
concerns problems of national, political, economic, social and cultural relations toward 
the common state and the relationship between Slovaks and the larger, mightier, more 
cultivated neighbours. The ‘Slovak question’ thus involves all the elements which this 
thesis argues national identity is composed of, and (as I will argue), these elements 
cannot be adequately solved by the bare fact o f independence. Slovakia might be 
unfortunate, but it is by no means an anomalous case where insecurity about national 
identity, particularly in a new state, leads to a nationalist mobilisation, which in turn
first wave and Malta and Cyprus), whereby all countries will be assessed individually, which means that 
Slovakia could join the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Poland in the first wave.
R.Chmel P.Pithart C.Kiss V.Bosakova Slovenska Otazkav 20.storoci Bratislava Kalligram 1997
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hinders the resolution of the most important issues that the state is facing - democracy, 
relations with minorities and a good international reputation.
The purpose of this chapter is to build a foundation on which the analysis of 
politics in independent Slovakia can rest. This is done because the assumption here is 
that without at least a brief account o f Slovak historical, political and national 
development, it is difficult to explain folly the peaceful disintegration of Czechoslovakia, 
the reasons for which directly influenced the ensuing political process in Slovakia. 
Equally, it is important to realise at the outset that Slovak national development, the 
conception o f democracy and the role the nation plays in it are all bound up with the 
history of Czechoslovakia. It will be argued that the end of Czechoslovakia was a result 
o f different levels in political, cultural and national development between the two nations 
at the time of Czechoslovakia’s birth. The common state failed to narrow the gap 
between national aspirations and levels o f development. These divisions were further 
exacerbated by communism and its demise. It is argued here that the politics o f 
independent Slovakia were significantly shaped by its national consciousness, the main 
points o f reference of which were the Czechs and Hungarians181.
It seems appropriate to mention at the outset that despite regular appearances of 
dissatisfaction with the functioning of the common state from both sides (including their 
wartime separation 1939-45), the ultimate collapse o f Czechoslovakia was a surprise, not 
only to the international community, but to its own population as well. As late as April 
1992 77% of respondents in Slovakia agreed with the statement that despite all 
disagreements the ties between the two nations should not be broken, whilst roughly half 
o f  the population claimed to want to maintain the common state (CR 53%, SR 42%).
Yet the constitutional confrontation continued, the Czech and Slovak voters aligned 
behind parties that were critical of the common state182 and it must be concluded that 
even if the result was not desired by the majority of the population, it reflected the fact 
that the common state failed to create the commitment to a common destiny.
1 The strained relationship between Slovakia and her geographically and historically closest 
neighbours, is illustrated by the fact that when in August 1998 the then Premier V.Meciar invited 18 
international observers (as the member state of the OSCE) for the parliamentary elections, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary were not among them. See M.Kusy ‘Ludske a MenSinove Prava’ G.Meseznikov 
Slovensko 1998-1999 Bratislava, IVO 1999 p. 188
That despite constitutional arrangements coming well behind unemployment, social insecurity and 
criminality as the issues of the greatest concern to Slovak voters. Z. Butorova ‘Premyslene “Ano” zaniku 
CSFR’ Sociologicky Casopis XXIX: 1 1993 p.p.88-103 p.91 and S.Wolchik ‘The Politics of Transition 
and the break-up of Czechoslovakia’ in J.Musil ed. p.233
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The main theme of this chapter is thus the importance of the establishment o f a 
political nation as a foundation for a common multiethnic state. Without a sense of 
shared political destiny among all citizens there is no unity or solidarity. Under such 
conditions the common state is deprived of its full legitimacy and the democratisation 
project becomes unsustainable long term.
The structure of this chapter derives from the above and it proceeds in two main 
parts. The first part charts the troubled history of Czechoslovakia from its democratic 
beginnings in 1918 through the temporary separation of Czechs and Slovaks during the 
Second World War to their coexistence during the communist period. It ends with the 
end of communism and the opportunity to re-establish democracy. The second part deals 
with post-1989 Czechoslovakia and the failure to resolve the accumulation of political, 
economic and cultural differences. The chapter ends with the disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia and introduces independent Slovakia and its major political actors. The 
conclusion argues that in Slovakia, democratisation in the post-1989 period was largely 
viewed as a resolution of the national question.
3.2. THE SLOVAK NATIONAL QUESTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA:
1918-1989183
3.2.1. Czech and Slovak Relations in an Historical Perspective
Czechoslovakia’s creation in 1918 was a result of many factors, o f which national 
struggle within the Austro-Hungarian empire was possibly the least influential. More 
than a culmination of national emancipation, the creation of Czechoslovakia was rather a
183 The history of Czechoslovakia is based on the following literature:I.Kamenec Tragedia Politika, 
Knaza a Cloveka Bratislava, Archa 1998; D.Kovac Slovaci&Cesi Bratislava, AEP 1997; L.Liptak 
Slovensko v 20. storoci Bratislava, Kalligram 1998; E.Mannova ed. Mestianstvo a Obcianska 
Spoloenost na Slovensku 1900-1989 Bratislava, AEP 1998; J.Musil The End o f Czechoslovakia 
Budapest, Central European University Press 1995 (Henceforth J.Musil p....); L.Sorensen L.Eliason ed. 
Forward to the Past? Aarhus, Aarhus University Press 1997, particularly esseys by T.Pichler and
C.Brenner; J.Rychlik Cesi a Slovaci ve 20. stoleti Bratislava,AEP 1997; P.Pithart ’The Division of 
Czechoslovakia: the preliminary balance sheet for the end of a respectable country’ Canadian Slavonic 
Papers 37:3-4 September/December 1995 p.p.321-338; H. Gordon Skilling ‘Czechs and Slovaks’ 
International Journal LIII: 1 Winter 1997-8 p.p.73-94; C.Skalnik Leff ‘Czech and Slovak Nationalism in 
the Twentieth Century’ in P.Sugar Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century 
Washington University Press 1995( henceforth C.Skalnik Leff 1995) and C.Skalnik Leff The Czech and 
Slovak Republics Boulder, Westview Press 1997 (henceforth C.Skalnik Leff 1997). In the view of the
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result o f the endorsement of the principle o f national self-determination at the Versailles 
Peace Conference, a great diplomatic success o f Czechoslovakia’s founding president 
T.G.Masaryk and mostly a result of the policies of the Western Powers, who faced with 
crumbling empires and the Bolshevik Revolution sought a solution to stability in ECE. It 
is fair to say that the majority of the Slovak population was slightly contused by then- 
new status as Czechoslovak citizens and even by their new, for the first time officially 
recognised, Slovak nationality184.
The Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) were incorporated in the Austrian half 
o f the monarchy (after the defeat o f the independent Czech kingdom at Bfla Hora in 
1620), whilst Slovaks from around the year 1000 were absorbed into Hungary. Despite 
both being under the Habsburg monarchy, the two nations historically defined their 
identities differently - Slovaks in terms of Hungarian absolute rule, the Czechs in relation 
to the Germans. The implications o f this different historical experience will become 
apparent later; it is sufficient at present to say that the two nations could not rely on any 
historical experience in which they shared a common political existence, unless one 
looked back to the 8th century and the Great Moravian empire.
As such Czechoslovakia was a new state and to some extent an artificial 
construction. This ‘artificiality’, in order for the state to survive, had to be converted into 
something natural - this meant creating a political nation whose identity would transcend 
the differences between the numerous ethnic groups and make ethnicity secondary to the 
identity of their new citizenship. The new states that emerged from the Versailles treaty 
remained multinational; large number o f minorities, particularly the German (over 3.3 
million in the new Czechoslovakia) and the Hungarian minority (1 million) became 
separated from their ethnic kin on the other side of the borders, the situation which in the 
Second World War served as an invitation for the Nazi intervention in the case of the 
German minority and led to the annexation o f parts o f Slovakia by Hungary.
Nevertheless Czechoslovakia in 1918 set out to be a multinational democracy, a 
home to Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians, Jews and Ruthenians. The new state 
was more ethnically diverse than any other Eastern European state with the exception of 
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia). Whatever the
fact that under communism the history was often distorted and important archives were not available to 
historians the latest Slovak analysis used here are new in more than one sense.
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complaints - and it became apparent that in the first two decades of the new state’s 
existence nearly everyone, except the Czechs, was dissatisfied with the unitary state, the 
fact remains that on the eve of the Second World War Czechoslovakia was the only 
functioning parliamentary democracy in the region.
The new state from its inception faced the problems of conflicting approaches to 
national questions, particularly from the Slovak side, but it must be conceded that all 
good intentions to sustain this civic democracy were regularly obstructed by the events 
taking place elsewhere, and the state was never given enough time to solve its internal 
problems. In 1938 after the appeasement of Hitler by the Western powers at Munich the 
state was dismembered, in 1939 the independent Slovak State was established and the 
Czech lands occupied. The next attempt to re-establish democratic Czechoslovakia after 
the war were quashed by the communist coup d’etat in February 1948. In 1968 the 
Prague spring was crushed by Soviet intervention, only to be followed by more 
repression for another twenty years. The first real opportunity to establish democracy 
presented itself after the fall of communism, but as the pages to follow will show 
democratisation became a victim to the accumulation of historical, political and national 
grievances rather than a victory over them and the state was peacefully dismembered.
The past and the geography do not determine the future of states, but they do collude in 
the shaping of that future. Hence, the following chronological section turns to the 
Czecho-Slovak relations in which unification and disintegration met in equal measures 
from the very beginning of their coexistence.
3.2.2. The First Czechoslovak Republic and the Interwar Period
In the second half of the 19th century Slovaks began to see themselves as a separate 
ethnic group185, a realisation that was substantiated by the codification of the Slovak 
language in 1843 by Ludovlt Stur, who became and remains the personification of 
Slovak national consciousness. The revolutionary year 1848 shifted the emphasis from 
language to politics, and at the Slav Congress in Prague adherents of L. Stur (Sturovci)
184 In the 1919 census many Slovaks defined their nationality as ‘Hungarian-Slovak , thus reflecting that 
Slovak national identity hardly existed divorced from reference to Hungary. C.Skalnik Left (1997) p.7
185 In the first half o f 19th century the Czecho-Slovak relations were mostly limited to literature and 
language (Slovak Protestants to this day use the old biblical Czech) and that is where the first awareness 
of commonality between them stems from - linguistic similarity.
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joined the Czechs in the first attempts for a political recognition o f Slovaks, by 
demanding the federalisation of Austria, based on the historical-national principle. Since 
Slovakia could not provide a reasonable claim to be a historical entity the first idea of 
Czecho-Slovak coexistence was abandoned.
The next steps in the Slovak national revival aimed at political and cultural 
recognition also failed. The first rather ambitious programme186 was wholly incompatible 
with the Hungarian revolutionary programme seeking to create a modem Hungarian 
nation and was rejected. This nevertheless led to the establishment o f the Slovak 
National Council (SNR/ Slovenska Narodna Rada). A misconceived anti-Hungarian 
uprising was led by L.Stur, in the hope that Vienna would comply, but this failed to 
secure any political gains. By contrast the next less ambitious attempt (Memorandum 
Naroda Slovenskeho 1861 in Martin) was ignored by Budapest, and Slovak cultural and 
political life came to a near cessation.
The Czech and Slovak political and cultural life bifurcated completely after the 
Austro-Hungarian compromise (1867), when the monarchy changed into two nearly 
sovereign states with different nationality policies. The equality and the cultural 
autonomy o f the nations under the Austrian constitution became law, which meant that 
the cultural and to a certain degree the political life o f the Czechs could continue. The 
same applied for the Slovenes, the subject of the next chapter. However the Slovaks 
were subjected to the modernisation policies o f Hungary, which degenerated into 
increasingly intensified Magyarisation. In the words o f a Hungarian politician of that 
time:
“We want a legal state, but we will build it after we have secured the national state....
The interests o f  the Hungarian nation demand that the national state be built on 
extremely chauvinistic principle”187.
In practice that meant an attempt to annihilate the Slovak nation - eventually all Slovak
secondary schools and cultural organisations were closed and prohibited.
The Slovak national movement o f the 19th century displayed certain 
characteristics which influenced Slovak nationalism well into the twentieth century. First, 
Slovak nationalism emerged totally divorced from any attempt at state-building. It
186 ’Demands of the Slovak nation’(Ziadosti Slovenskeho Naroda, Liptovsky Mikulas 10.5.1848): 
autonomy, national assembly, official use of the Slovak language, national symbols, army under the 
Slovak command, representation in the parliament
187 L.Liptak p.44
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involved an ethnic population devoid of legal status188 or a tradition of such, and is an 
example of purely ethnic nationalism. Second, the national consciousness, sentiment and 
ideology are usually created and promoted by elites, but the Slovak case is extreme in 
this respect. The mostly peasant population and the nation-building elites lived in 
different worlds and contact between them was minimal189. Third, Slovak nationalism of 
that time was fueled by Romanticism not only in its ideology, but also in political action, 
meaning that the lack o f political strategy was substituted by revolutionary zeal. Stur 
wrote that: “what has been expected in 20, 30, 40 years is already here... the time has 
caught us unprepared”190. As will be shown below, it would not be the first time that 
Slovak attempts at nation-building would take a similar radical route. Fourth, this period 
in Slovak history marked not only the future anti-Hungarian orientation o f Slovak 
nationalism, but crucially influenced Czecho - Slovak relations, demonstrating a different 
perception of their national history and by a considerable backwardness in political, 
cultural and consequently economic development of Slovakia when compared to the 
Czechs.
T.G.Masaryk, who was a half Slovak and in close contact with some Slovak 
national revivalists, realized that the Czech lands, being geographically in close proximity 
to Germany and with a substantial German population, would not be able to sustain an 
independent existence. He realized that the needed corridor to other Slavs, the Russians 
and Poles, led through Slovakia. His conception was of a Czechoslovak nation, 
consisting of two ethnic nations, whereby in practice the Slovaks would keep their own 
language and would have a separate cultural life, but would be united with the Czechs in 
one political and national unit191.
The idea found resonance in Slovakia and not only by a group round Masaryk192, 
but initially also by the SNR (Slovak National Council), even though the Slovak side was 
always more inclined towards a purely political arrangement for possible Czecho-Slovak 
unity. Around this time a strongly Catholic stream crystallised among the Slovak nation-
T.Pichler p.208
189 The Slovak philosopher T.Pichler suggests that the interaction between the two groups, thus the 




192 Congregated round a journal ‘Hlasy’[Voices], called ‘hlasisti’
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building elites under the leadership o f a Catholic priest, Andrej Hlinka193, which came to 
dominate Slovak nationalism for decades to come. Hlinka was in close contact with 
Czechs, but already then there was a wide spread feeling in Slovak Catholic circles that 
the Czechs were ‘godless’, Hussites (after Jan Hus, the medieval Protestant reformer) 
and ‘pokrokari’ (progressive in a negative sense). Very soon Masaryk’s ‘hlasisti’ were 
accused of being under Czech influence and the idea o f ‘Czechoslovakism’(the claim that 
the Czechs and Slovaks were actually one ethnic group) was rejected.
Masaryk’s conception of the relationship between the two nations was moving 
increasingly towards one nation, in which the historical and cultural differences were of a 
temporary nature, therefore unimportant and would fade away with time. The rift 
between this notion and the Slovak apprehension about losing their authenticity was 
already detectable and would remain an integral part of the Czecho-Slovak relationship 
for the duration o f its existence. Nevertheless, the uneasy beginnings shifted into another 
gear with the outbreak of the First World War, which is not however discussed at 
present.
The First Czechoslovak Republic became a possibility, initially with an emigre 
Czech and Slovak intelligentsia and later at home. It is vital to restate the total lack of 
participation by the population of the future Czechoslovakia in the inception of their 
state, particularly on the Slovak side (due to its having a largely peasant population, the 
general absence of communication during the war, and the totalitarian nature of the 
Hungarian state). The project rested on the support o f various Slavic organisations, 
namely the Slovak League in the USA, which already before the war took a keen interest 
in Slovak affairs. The idea in emigrant circles was for a loose federation (a constant 
feature o f the Slovak national programme within Czechoslovakia and at the end of it in 
1992), eventually formalised in Pittsburgh in May 1918 between the Slovak and Czech 
emigre organisations and Masaryk. The document was vague about the issue of the 
Slovaks ‘own parliament’ which for years fueled disappointment often expressed by the 
Slovak side that Masaryk had never fulfilled the promise of Pittsburgh194. The 
importance of that document lies however somewhere else: in its text it refers to Czecho­
slovakia (the importance of that hyphen will become apparent below, for it is far from
193 The founder of the Slovak People’s Party (SLS- Slovenska Ludova Strana, the predecessor of the
HSLS (Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party, also called ‘ludaci’, after lud-people. Strongly nationalist views 
are still described by this term, the Slovak fascist paramilitary groups carried the name of Hlinka
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trivial to Slovak nationalism) and in its vagueness it laid the basis for the later interwar 
demands o f ‘autonomists’, led by Hlinka’s party and thus, became the antipode to the 
conception o f the unitary state based on one political nation.
The First Czechoslovak Republic was declared on 28 October 1918 in Prague, 
amidst more recrimination about the text of the declaration (the Slovak delegation was 
not present) which supposedly did not contain the right text securing a degree of Slovak 
independence, by again referring to the ‘Czechoslovak nation’. However, the ‘Slovak 
question’ was put on hold and according to the Slovak historian D.Kovac the 
atmosphere o f that time was one o f mutual compromise195, to the point of the Slovak 
side conceding that in the interest o f international recognition and the liberation of 
Slovakia from Hungary, the centralised unitary state was the most desired solution, 
certainly in the beginning.
For Slovakia the early years of the First Republic meant a monumental growth in
the field of education and culture. The official language was Czechoslovak (Constitution
1920), however in practice both versions - Czech and Slovak - were official in both parts
of the country. The end of Slovak national repression was evident and amounted to the
Slovakisation of Slovakia’1 6 with the help o f the Czechs. The near absence of Slovak
e^es was less problematic than the total lack o f ‘middle cadres’; thousands of Czech
teachers, administrators, lawyers, policemen, doctors and technicians came to Slovakia
to assist with schools, transport, the local government, hospitals and the general running
of the new Slovakia, a fact which later (and even to this day) fueled accusations o f Czech 
domination.
The new state brought a considerable change in status for Hungarians and 
Germans who unexpectedly became a minority, after centuries o f being members o f the 
dominant nations. The nationality policies in Czechoslovakia were based on the Austrian 
model which guaranteed cultural autonomy for all minorities (i.e. schools, cultural 
organisations, the use o f minority languages in official contact etc.). Ironically, the 




196 J.Liptak p. 101
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The unification of Czechs and Slovaks was a unification o f two entities at 
divergent levels of development in all spheres o f life, especially in the field o f centrally 
controlled economy, which resulted in a large number o f bankruptcies in Slovakia and a 
social tension which soon assumed a national interpretation. Despite the importance of 
the economy, the real issue, called the ‘Slovak question’ was always political and rooted 
in a different understanding o f the common state and its conception o f democracy. Seven 
decades later the state still troubled by the same problem, yielded to its weight.
For Masaryk the ‘Slovak question’ was a mere facet of the much larger issue of
humanity, democracy and open society, in which national emancipation was a question of
freedom and therefore would lose its relevance with more democracy. In crucial contrast
to the Czech lands, Slovakia’s preoccupation was not with the position of minorities, but
with the position of Slovakia itself. Whether the ‘autonomists’ vision, of a loose
federation with some overarching political roof, or a more ‘centralist’ vision similar to
Masaryk s (held mainly by social-democrats and initially agrarian parties), its basis was
always Slovakia as a nation separate from the Czechs. This was contrary to the Czech
notion (often shared by the world outside) that viewed the state as theirs and Slovakia as
its region, separated by history. In Slovakia, the official doctrine o f ‘Czechoslovakism’
instead of uniting the state, seemed to have strengthened the Slovak resolve for political 
and cultural autonomy.
3.2.3. From the Second World War to Communist Czechoslovakia
In 1925 the government in Prague in an effort to promote civic attachments and decrease 
the relevance o f ethnic ones, changed the administrative districts in the Republic, 
practically abolishing the existence of Slovakia as a separate national and administrative 
umt. Considering the growing discontent with the unitary government and the increasing 
influence o f Hlinka’s People’s Party, the policy had contrary consequences. The 
complexity o f the Slovak issue was exacerbated by diverging interests from various 
directions; the Slovaks in the Prague administration considered Hlinka’s party an enemy 
while Hungary and Germany campaigned for Slovak autonomy, the motivation for which 
would become obvious only a few years later. Hence, all political demands from Slovakia 
came to be associated with irredentism and antagonism towards the central state.
Another important facet o f the conflict between the Slovak demand for autonomy and
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the Prague government was that there could not be autonomy for Slovakia without 
considerable concessions to the German minority supported by Germany which by 1933 
threatened the integrity o f the state. The problem of the First Republic was that it 
equated an internally strong state with centralism and unitarism197, but it must be noted 
that all recent research concurs in the view that the intention was not to harm Slovakia; 
rather the problems were due to the lack of mechanisms and time with which to solve 
them.
The Slovak autonomy declared after the Munich agreement (September 1938) in 
which Czechoslovakia was partitioned and in which the Western powers acquiesced (and 
Czechoslovakia was not invited to share in this decision) was seen as a betrayal in the 
Czech lands, which were subsequently occupied by the Nazis. This marks the beginning 
o f the stereotypical depiction o f Slovaks and their nationalism as opportunistic and 
ungrateful, seeking to triumph at any cost, mostly at the Czechs’ expense. 
Czechoslovakia’s precarious geographic position, the dependence on a favourable 
balance o f power in Europe and the fragility of the state were manifestly obvious. The 
only alternative to capitulation would have been armed resistance, which would have 
perhaps ‘saved the soul o f the nation’, but “would not have changed the outcome”198.
Nazi rule was catastrophic for the Czech territory, called the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia, with its authoritarian police, the complete subjugation of industry 
to German needs, population transfers and mass deportations o f Jews and Romany. The 
fate o f Slovakia was very different. Initially the declaration of autonomy was seen as a 
kind of achievement, admittedly with a bitter taste, but generally the bitterness was not 
felt as acutely in Slovakia as in the Czech lands. Hlinka’s party, after his death (1938) 
renamed as HSLS (Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party) and led by the cleric Dr. Jozef Tiso, 
prohibited all other parties, but the naive hope that Slovakia could somehow hold its 
affairs in its own hands prevailed. The combination of the Slovaks push for autonomy, 
intensified by Hlinka’s party propaganda and Hitler’s aggression resulted in the 
declaration o f an independent Slovak State, declared by Tiso on 14 March 19391" .
D.Kovac p.71
198 H.Gordon Skilling p.77
For the biography of Tiso and detailed exploration of his motives and politics of the Slovak State see 
I.Kamenec Tragedia Politika, Knaza a Cloveka Bratislava, Archa 1998
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Tiso’s decision was probably not the cause of the Czech national disaster200 that 
followed, but Slovakia’s independence was later201 interpreted by the Czechs as being 
‘knifed in the back’. The truth is that the very different situations in which the two 
nations found themselves left a significant gulf in their relationship. Slovakia’s 
sovereignty was short-lived: four days later the Slovak government was forced to sign an 
agreement about the German ‘protection’ o f Slovakia (Schutzvertrag). This signified a 
formal surrender o f Slovak foreign policy, currency exchange and economy to the 
interests of the German Reich (Vienna 18.3.1939). When at the same time Hungary 
occupied Ruthenia and Slovakia turned to its ‘protector’, Germany refused and the result 
was a territorial loss and a further and a lasting complication in Slovak-Hungarian 
relations.
The Slovak State 1939-45 declared itself as national and Christian. The former 
involved the elevation of the ethnic principle in all matters of citizenship and education, 
the latter stood for Catholicism. The Protestants became second-class citizens, atheism 
was officially denounced, religious education was compulsory, the sale of contraception 
prohibited and coeducation in schools forbidden. Whilst open terror reigned in the Czech 
lands, Slovakia established its own form of national socialism, the economy grew 
(armaments) and generally some features o f normality prevailed. This did not apply to 
the Jews who lost the right to property, were forbidden to frequent public places and 
eventually were deported to concentration camps where the majority vanished202.
The nature of the clerico-fascist regime which suspended elections and relied on 
the paramilitary Hlinkova Garda for the deportations o f its own citizens remains to this 
day a controversial episode in Slovak history and a blight on its nationalism203. Slovakia
According to the Czech historian J.Rychlik, independent Slovakia was in Hitler’s interest and had 
Tiso not conceded Hitler would have found another Slovak leader p. 171
The Czech radio announcing Slovak independence was apparently very tolerant and spoke of two 
brotherly nations’ and wished Slovakia good fortune in their state, at long last independent (D.Kovac
2o74>
The majority of 130 000 Slovak Jews (90 0000) remained in the Slovak State and 40 000 came under 
the jurisdiction of Hungary. Approximately 12 000 returned from the concentration camps. Zbornik 
Kosice a Deportdcie Zidov v Roku 1944 Kosice, SAV 1994
In an interview with V.Palko (26.9.1997), the then vice-chairman of the KDH (Christian Democratic 
Movement), the largest party after the HzDS in Slovakia, I asked about the connection between the 
wartime state, nationalism and the Church, because the rehabilitation of J.Tiso is very much at the heart 
of the Catholic Church and the Church is at the heart of the KDH. His views illustrated the ambivalence 
surrounding this period. He said that the state had discredited itself by the deportation of Jews, but not 
the Church. He said that the president J.Tiso was executed for wartime crimes by communist 
propaganda in 1945, that the national question is closely tied to the Catholic Church and that to the 
democratisation, which sadly has been hijacked by the ex-communists after 1989, thus taking the
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entered the war on the side o f Germany, and Slovaks were expected to fight Poles and 
Russians, which they had very little reason of their own to do. War was deeply unpopular 
among Slovaks whilst it was becoming obvious that the existence of the Slovak state 
depended on a Nazi victory and by 1943 the Slovak regime was in crisis. Increased 
resistance to the totalitarian regime by more democratic forces, combined with moderate 
nationalists, international resistance, partisans and Communists, culminated in the Slovak 
National Uprising (SNP/Slovenske Narodne Povstanie August 1944)204.
The abortive insurrection against German rule and the Slovak State was 
politically a significant event. Firstly, it was in favour of the restoration of 
Czechoslovakia; secondly, a part o f the nation revolted against its own state and thirdly, 
Slovakia despite its wartime regime was no longer viewed as an enemy by London, 
where Benes’s exiled government acquired recognition and planned the re-establishment 
o f Czechoslovakia. The negotiations about the restoration of the common state, joined 
by the Moscow leadership o f the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC/ Komunisticka 
Strana Ceskoslovenska) led to a compromise (Kosice 1945, KVP/ Kosicky Vladny 
Program), in which the constitutional position of Slovakia in the future Czechoslovakia 
was again postponed and not resolved205.
After 1945 a form of democracy was restored, but proved short-lived. On the 
whole the Communists and Democrats agreed that Slovakia should be governed by its 
National Council in Bratislava, but in the 1946 elections the Communists lost in Slovakia 
(Democratic Party 62%,). This shifted Slovak Communists towards the Prague centre 
relying on strong support among the Czech population206 and thus the constellation of
platform away from its rightful Christian values. That the most important anchors in the Slovak national 
development were priests, Matica Slovenska (the national cultural organisation that openly defends the 
wartime state), Hlinka’s Party in the 1920’s and the Catholic dissidents. As for Hlinka, he has been 
unjustly treated by history, because o f the paramilitary groups that had taken his name and conspired in 
the deportations, but he remains with L.Stur the most important man of the Slovak national revival, but 
added that Hlinka however was lucky to have died in 1938, before his name could have been tarnished 
further. In another interview with J.Sivak, an academic concentrating on the Slovak national philosophy 
and a distinguished member of the SNS (Slovak National Party, the only party openly defending the 
1939-45 state) I was told that the Slovak State was a just predecessor of the current Slovakia and that the 
type of regime is irrelevant to the rcognition of the state whose existence was internationally recognised. 
It is important to note though that such views are generally considered extreme in Slovakia. However, 
the issue has so far not been dealt with properly and remains shrouded in embarassement and excuses 
and causes unnecessary divisions among politicians and the population alike.
204 L.Liptak p.241
205 D.Kovacp.85
206 The post-war success of the Communist party in the Czech lands was understandable when 
considering the oppression and cruelty o f the previous fascist regime and a longer history of
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power changed. The chain o f events and power struggles that followed led to a 
Communist takeover in February 1948 and the final confirmation that Czechoslovakia’s 
geo-political position was firmly within the Soviet sphere of influence. As in 1938, the 
government surrendered and Benes personally signed the transfer o f power.
The inauguration of the communist regime manifested what communists in all 
fairness never concealed, that to a Stalinist type of communism, the national question is 
merely a partner in the revolution and that once power is consolidated it must remain in 
the centre. Slovakia (and the Catholic Church) was closely observed for any rise of 
national demands, always labeled as the rise o f separatism, which given Slovak history 
was a convincing and successful strategy. A series o f fabricated court cases and a 
crusade against the Slovak ‘bourgeois’ nationalists (ironically Gustav Husak who was 
later to preside over the ‘normalisation’ after the Soviet invasion in 1968 was among 
those arrested) preceded the 1960 Constitution which changed the name of the country 
to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and reduced the already impotent Slovak rule in 
Bratislava practically to nothing.
3.2.4. From 1968 to the End of Communism
The general dissatisfaction with the regime unleashed at the beginning of 1968 a reform 
process and inevitably renewed the national question. The fact that it was A.Dubcek, a 
Slovak, who spearheaded the reform movement was not an accident. As a leader o f the 
Slovak Communist Party he was used to protecting Slovak interests in Prague and it was 
his struggle with the strongly repressive regime of A. Novotny that won him the overall 
popularity which eventually led to him gaining the statewide leadership o f the Party. The 
Party’s Action Programme (April 1968) contained among other issues a pledge to 
resolve the Slovak question definitely, by federalizing Czechoslovakia207. Federation 
would mean the establishment of parallel legislative and executive organs in two 
republics, and a governmental framework to limit the fact that Czechs could always 
outvote the smaller Slovakia (majorizacia). The committees were still working on the 
constitutional mechanisms when the Warsaw Pact armies occupied Czechoslovakia in
industrialisation, thus labour movement. On the other hand in Slovakia, the victory of Democratic party 
is partially due to the abolition o f Hlinka’s party whose many members joined the Democratic party 
C.Skalnik Leff(1997) p.65
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August 1968. The Slovaks demanded that at least the federalisation should go ahead and 
Czechoslovakia became a federation on 1.1.1969.
There are various reasons why the federation proved to be less than a solution to
the national question. In fact it revived the friction and widened the gulf between the two
nations, with hindsight irreparably. The law on federation came into being after the
invasion, when the reform process was long buried and the era of ‘normalisation’ set in.
Thus not only was the federation associated with Soviet tanks, but it could not function
in its intended form: it was a federation in which all competencies rested with the Party
(called democratic centralism’) not the federal government - a mere tool in the hands of
the new neo-stabninst regime. Already in 1970 a new constitutional law was adopted in
order to curtail the federal institutions and Gustav Husak, who originally enforced the
federal idea, now in the process o f consolidating his power did not tolerate any dispersal 
of it.
The most damaging facet of this federation for national harmony was that it 
created a false consciousness on both sides. In Slovakia it became obvious that despite 
the federal mstitutions nothing had really changed and all decisions were still taken in 
Prague, even if the leadership was in Slovak hands (the second important figure o f the 
‘normalisation’ regime, after G.Husak, was V.Bilak, a great ally o f Moscow). Two 
illusions stemmed from this situation. Czechs considered the state to be run by Slovaks 
and Slovaks resented the federal idea without having actually experienced it. Moreover, 
to the Czechs this was a repetition of the old Slovak betrayal - every time the country 
was in deep crisis (see the analogy with 1938), Slovakia tried to gain more independence. 
The relationship deteriorated and reached its lowest levels during the period 1968-89.
The added dimension was the general feeling of powerlessness and the moral 
crisis in the society, exacerbated by the actions of a narrow political elite lacking wide 
support, thus proceeding to purge the party and the state o f all reform-minded 
individuals and to suppress any form of open dissent208. These measures led to the 
decimation o f the intellectual elite and a massive emigration to the West, but persecution 
was again less severe in Slovakia. Slovaks were seen as less dangerous to the regime 
since they produced a smaller number o f dissidents. Hence Slovakia benefited and
208 H.Gordon Skilling p. 83
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reaped the economic rewards. Hence, the resistance to ‘normalisation’ was limited and 
generally Slovakia fared well, whereas the Czechs felt that they had lost everything.
The ‘normalisation’ period carried great consequences for the future of 
Czechoslovakia and Slovakia itself. P.Pithart who became the first Prime Minister of 
postcommunist Czechoslovakia and was a great opponent of the break-up of the state 
has poignantly remarked that it was Slovakia that paid a high price for the relative 
comfort of the ‘normalisation’ period. Slovaks, obviously more implicitly than explicitly, 
chose in favour o f the preservation o f their jobs, their families, the region and ultimately 
the nation. Whilst the Czech intelligentsia was reduced to hard manual labour, in 
Slovakia when people lost their positions, usually they remained within the same 
enterprise, the collaborators were tolerated, people retreated to their country cottages 
and nurtured their networks and generally adapted well. They accepted that democracy 
after all had proved to be a fiction and an unattainable goal. To some political analysts 
the continuing clientelism in Slovak politics, inherited from that period, and the 
corruption generally throughout Slovak society was the main obstacle to the 
establishment o f democracy in Slovakia209. At the end of twenty years of this abnormal 
situation, Slovakia, despite the visible signs of environmental and moral decline and the 
growing technological and economical gap between it and the rest o f Europe, showed 
little awareness of the unfeasibility o f the continuation of this regime. The price was 
indeed high - the lack of conviction and commitment that democratisation requires left 
Slovakia behind its neighbours210.
It would be wrong to conclude that there was no dissent in Slovakia, but it was 
small, mostly confined to intellectual, Catholic2" and environmentalist circles in 
Bratislava, whilst hundreds of people in the Czech lands were engaged in a coherent, 
robust and well recognized dissident movement initiated by Charter 77, in which only 
few Slovaks participated212. The Czechs and Slovaks entered the post-communist period
209 See chapters dealing with economy and privatisation in G. Meseznikov I.Ivantysyn Slovensko 1998- 
99 Bratislava, IVO 1999, further I.Miklos ‘Prepojenie politickej a ekonomickej moci’ S. Szomolanyi 
Slovensko.... In 1998 Corruption Perception Index for Slovakia was 47-8 (together with Belarus, 
Hungary 33, the Czech Republic 37, Italy and Poland 40) ‘Korupcia medzi kriminalitou a folklorom OS 
August 1999/8 p.9-12
210 P.Pithart ‘Towards a Shared Freedom’ in J.Musil The End o f Czechoslovakia (as above) p.212
211 Deserving of mention are the Catholic pilgrimages in which thousands of people participated, not 
always out of piety, particularly the brave ‘candle manifestation’ in March 1988
212 In the Czech Republic over thousand people signed the Charta 77 of which few hundred were well 
known dissidents and activists, in Slovakia there were 10 cultural personalities known as dissidents and
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having had very different experiences in the immediately preceding years. It would 
appear that their relationship suffered from cultural, social and political differences which 
instead of being removed by their coexistence in one state has been exacerbated by it. 
Particularly in the time o f crisis this manifested itself by the pursuit of different goals and 
interests, which in Slovakia were regularly defined in ethno-national terms. Hence, the 
next section turns to the final stage of their common history and the definite resolution of 
the national question - the division of Czechoslovakia.
3.3. THE POLITICS OF DISINTEGRATION: 1989-1993
Slovakia simply speaks in other ways, and we must finally take that calmly 
into account. We in the Czech lands should long since have followed Slovak 
publicists and Slovak culture more closely, and tried to understand other 
things than dissident speech because we otherwise do not hear that Slovakia is 
simply Slovakia and not the Czech lands, and we thus only vaguely apprehend 
what it all means! Interest in Slovakia is insubstantial and a tone o f resignation 
about a common future resonates213
In the first days after the ‘velvet revolution’ (November 1989), the Czechs and Slovaks 
found themselves united in a struggle against totalitarianism, similar to 1968. The unity 
however did not last long and all the problems hidden by the Husak regime came out in 
the open, with the national question leading the agenda in Slovakia. When the old 
question of federation appeared again the Czechs and the new post-communist 
government of Vaclav Havel were taken by surprise. The misunderstandings that plagued 
the Czecho - Slovak relations were well illustrated by ‘the hyphen’ conflict.
President Havel suggested (January 1990) that all symbols of the communist era 
should be replaced by new symbols in tune with the new developments, obviously 
including the omission of the word ’socialist’ from the name of the country - from the 
‘Czechoslovak Socialist Republic’ to the ‘Czechoslovak Republic’. There was nothing 
ominous about that, except that no-one realized that in some Slovak circles there was 
always something wrong with the name of the country, namely that Slovaks felt
signatories of that document. S.Szomolanyi in introduction to Verejnost Proti Nasiliu 1989-91 a 
collection of recorded testimonies and documents by the members of the VPN Bratislava, Nadacia 
M.Simecku 1998 p. 15 (henceforth Verejnost Proti Nasiliu)
213 Published in exile periodical Listy (9:1 January 1981), cited in P.Sugar Eastern European 
Nationalism in the Twentieth century Wasington, The American University Press 1995 p. 107
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‘invisible’ and would chose the most innocent of occasions to press for more ‘visibility’.
The hyphen, the ‘Czecho-Slovak Republic’ was to make clear that there were actually
two republics, thus indirectly invoking the Munich agreements when the hyphen first
appeared in the name of the country.
The apparent triviality of the hyphen affair had deeper roots and should have
signaled the difficulties the common state was to face.
“It is not about the hyphen, but about the name, a symbol of the nation that 
does not want to remain nameless, without identity”214
wrote a Slovak journalist at that time. In the Czech lands this evoked an indignation:
“if today we are offended by Slovak politics, then we are offended as humans 
and not as a nation! In some respects we do not care about Czech statehood.
Rather than feeling something for that question, we are more tired of it....After 
Slovakia breaks away no one will prevent us from calling our state 
Czechoslovakia”215,
wrote the Czech writer L.Vaculfk. At the end after what appeared endless bickering, the 
agreed name, the ‘Czech and Slovak Federal Republic’(CSFR) was less important than 
the fact that the national card was on the table and that the state, however named, lost its 
legitimacy, because its basic premise, the unity of Czechs and Slovaks, would eventually 
not withstand the pressure that the reassertion of the national question brought upon it.
3.3.1. The Federal Question Post-1989
The friction and historically accumulated latent conflicts between the two nations have 
conditioned future developments, but as important as those factors were, the final break­
up was a result of the political system and the decisions of the leadership, all shaped in 
critical ways by the postcommunist situation. Let us therefore take a closer look at the 
suggested institutional arrangements216 that nevertheless failed to save Czechoslovakia 
and the actual developments that led to the final break-up.
The 1968 Constitution was still in operation after November 1989, when after the 
huge demonstrations in Prague (and smaller ones in Bratislava 16-18 November 1989) 
the communist leadership gave in and the new leadership led by V. Havel was installed
214 cited in S.Mihalikova ‘Narodne Symboly Slovenskej Statnosti’ Politicka Revue 2 October 1996 
p.p.53-70 p.59
215 • •cited in V.Zak ‘The Velvet Divorce - Institutional Foundation’ in J.Musil p.257 
mostly based on V.Zak, as above
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(Havel became the President 29 December 1989). The two-member federation and its 
two-chamber federal parliament had a complicated structure, in order to counteract the 
numerical preponderance of the Czech deputies (150 proportionally elected into the 
House of the People) and a provision which required that important laws be passed by 
both the majority in the House of the People and also by a majority in each of the 
national sections in the House o f the Nations (75 in each of the Czech and Slovak 
section), thus in the final accounting 30 deputies from one section could block any 
constitutional law. Moreover, the right to veto was accorded to national sections and 
both republics had the right to secession - which gave the mandate to the deputies from 
the Slovak National Party (formed prior to the first free post-communist June 1990 
elections) whose platform was the division o f the state. The republics presided over 
healthcare, education and culture, all other areas (transport, post, state security, social 
security etc.) were shared between the republics and the federation, whilst foreign policy, 
defence, currency and federal legislation was under the federal government’s authority.
•  •  •  •  217The Slovak political scene in the post-1989 days was dominated by VPN 
(Verejnost Proti Nasiliu/ Public Against Violence 29.3% in the 1990 elections in 
Slovakia), a civic movement and the Slovak counterpart to the Czech Civic Forum, led 
by Fedor Gal and a group of liberal intellectuals who were pro-federalist and closely 
connected to Prague from the days of Charter 77. Nevertheless even this most pro­
federalist Slovak party in its first programme, declared a few days after its foundation in 
response to the demonstrations in Prague (16-7 November 1989), stated the demand for 
a “consistent democratic federation”, based on the principle of the “factual equality” of 
the two nations218. In its pre-election campaign, called ‘A Chance for Slovakia’, it 
suggested that the goal o f their “federative model is strong republics and competent 
republic governments”219.
Clearly, the national/federal question dominated ‘post-revolutionary’ politics in 
Czechoslovakia and the problem became the various types o f federation advocated by 
different points o f view. The basic contrast was between the Slovak version of the ‘dual
217 See Verejnost Proti Nasiliu 1989-91 for the detailed documentation by the members
218 A few months later in a joint declaration with its Czech partner it called for a speedy resolution to the 
division of powers between the republics and the federation in the “new understanding” as that of the 
“two sovereign national stateformming republics”, for there was only one way to Europe - together . See 
The VPN Programme Declaration, Bratislava 26.11.1989 as above p.311 and ‘ What we are and what we 
are not’ Declaration VPN 28.5.1990 p.325
219 V.Zak in Musil p.247
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federation’, in which the constituent republics saw themselves as sovereign states, whilst 
the federation performed certain service functions for both of them (currency, defence 
and partially foreign policy), and the Czech ‘tripartite model’, whereby the federation 
was sovereign and the republics were subordinated to it in certain matters.
In the whole o f this constitutional issue, money must not be forgotten - the 
money withdrawn by Slovakia from the federal budget bore no resemblance to its 
contribution throughout the 1980s and the Czechs thought they were paying for Slovakia 
and the Slovaks believed that reforms were harming their national interest220. Pithart 
argues that this destructive debate about ‘who pays for whom’, well illustrated by his 
successor the Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in his words “money counts first”, is a 
symptom of the loosening of ties o f solidarity when the parties concerned cease to think 
about themselves as one entity2"1. On the other hand, Slovakia was already suffering 
from higher unemployment, not least due to the ill-considered decision to stop the 
country s armaments production based mainly in Slovakia. Slovaks thus felt that foreign 
investors preferred the Czech lands, because Czechs monopolized foreign relations and 
Slovakia had no opportunity to press its own case.
The third suggestion made in order to resolve the constitutional conflict was 
Havel s authentic federation’ - a compromise between the two previous models that 
divested considerable powers to the republics, including separate reserve banks and the 
eventual sovereignty of both republics in international law. This was to the satisfaction of 
the Czech side, for it allowed the economic transition to continue at a pace suitable to 
each republic’s situation without the consequences o f different outcomes being 
interpreted as national injustice. The model was legally so complex that it would have 
required “clinically precise” policies, which considering the tense period of 
postcommumst transition were practically unachievable222.
Here it is important to remember what has been written in the second chapter 
about the role of dissidents and elites in postcommunist transitions. Political parties were 
very young and the affiliation o f the public with them limited, whilst the shortness of time 
did not allow for lengthy pre-negotiations. Moreover, the dissidents now in
The opinion poll in Slovakia: 1991 57 % expected the Slovak economy to fall behind the Czech 
economy and by 1992 81% believed that the Czechs did not consider Slovaks equal partners Z Butorova 
‘Premyslene “ano” zaniku CSFR’ as above p.92
221 P.Pithart (1995) p.327
222 V.Zak p.249
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governmental positions were as unused to negotiations and formal relations between 
various institutions as the communists were. Dissident activity had taken place 
clandestinely, had often been felt as an individual responsibility and decisions had usually 
been taken by a small group of trusted friends. The personification of politics is a 
postcommunist trait, shared by ex-dissidents and ex-communists alike, and translates into 
politics mostly in two respects - politics is often conducted without consideration for the 
wider consequences and in the context o f general mistrust between politicians223, based 
mostly on personal experiences o f the past. The Slovak political scene in particular was 
splitting into various factions, including the VPN, whose split influenced the structure of 
politics in Slovakia for years to come, and considering that Meciar’s HzDS sprung from 
that split, it indirectly influenced the break-up of the state.
3.3.2. Slovakia in Transition to Independence
Citizens o f the Slovak Republic, your government has returned to you”224
V. Meciar, already the Minister of the Interior in the first post-communist pre-election 
government o f ‘national adjustment’ (vlada porozumenia) and a member o f the VPN, the 
leading party of the 1990 elections in Slovakia, became the Premier225. Meciar was not 
an intellectual, he was a reformist ex-communist, but did not belong to the small 
dissident circle. He was not a separatist, but was nationally orientated and his ambitions 
for the nation matched his own political ambitions. He became admired for the enormous 
energy and toughness he displayed and these characteristics made his popularity rise 
beyond expectation. The public viewed him as a man who was personally changing the 
position of Slovakia within the federation, not by weakening it, “but by strengthening the 
federation through the process o f elimination o f its old structures, centralism and 
bureaucracy”226.
From personal conversations with ex- members of the VPN, see also S.Szomolanyi in the 
introduction to Verejnost Proti Nasiliu (about the lack of knowledge how to transform a movement into
a political party) p.20
225 ^ ' ^ ec'ar (December 1990) M.Lesko Meciar a Meciarizmus Bratislava, VMV 1996 p.51
In an incredible twist of irony his candidature was supported by the most liberal wing of the VPN, 
particularly personally by its leader Fedor Gal, who had to emigrate from Slovakia after being physically 
threatened by the opponents of Meciar for bringing him into politics and by his supporters for ousting 
him a year later.
V. Meciar cited in M.LeSko p.37
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In the months between the summer of 1990 and the spring of 1991, endless 
meetings and negotiations between the republics, parties and federal government took 
place, with only one result - the radicalisation of the mood in both republics. The 
growing conflict between Meciar and the leadership of the VPN became acute and the 
Slovak National Council recalled Meciar from his post and replaced him with 
J.Camogursky, the leader of the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement, the second 
largest party in Slovakia), a well-respected Catholic dissident and the first politician to 
flirt with the idea o f separation. However he very soon retreated from this position to 
offer a proposal that only the federation will be recognised by international law and the 
federal Constitution should precede the agreement between the republics. Meciar’s party 
HzDS was thus bom as a splinter group from the VPN.
In summer 1991 the negotiations intensified around the major issue - the 
character of the agreements between the federation and the National Councils, in other 
words about the fundamental question whether the federation or the republics were to 
carry more sovereignty. With hindsight it is obvious that any remaining good will had 
deserted all, the Czech side became dominated by the more right-wing politicians taking 
an uncompromising stance, invoking an aggressive reaction in Slovakia and thus 
confirming the growing Czech suspicion “that it was impossible with Slovaks”227. Havel 
in desperation tried to put the pressure on the government by pushing for a referendum 
in order to find out public opinion, but parliament could not agree on the question and 
the referendum was not declared.
By February 1992 all negotiations about an agreement on the basis o f which it 
would be possible to ratify the federal constitution failed. Everything was suspended in 
expectation of the general elections planned for June 1992. If one was to look for a 
sequence of errors leading to the dissolution o f the state, this must be considered one of 
them. From the election there emerged two clear winners with parliamentary majorities 
in each republic, both with a hard and uncompromising stance towards each other and 
both clear on the constitutional issues. On the Czech side, the Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS/Obcanska Demokraticka Strana), led by Vaclav Klaus in support of a firmer 
‘functional federation’ (no international recognition for the republics and clear 
sovereignty of the federal government). On the Slovak side was Meciar’s HzDS in
227 V.Zak p.260
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support of a confederation, a loose association, a constitutionally dubious proposal, 
which stated in populist language appealed to Slovakia. The former unacceptable to 
Meciar, the latter to Klaus, which left only a third option, the division of the state228.
There was only one dilemma - how to make it legitimate without holding a 
referendum, which would be too risky for both leaders who were seemingly intent on 
dividing the state without having a mandate to do so, because it was not at all certain 
that the population wanted to break up the state. On 17 July 1992 the Declaration of 
Sovereignty of the Slovak Nation was passed by the National Council. In August the 
HzDS and ODS agreed on the constitutionality o f the break-up, involving three laws; on 
the end of the federation, on the division of property and on the successor rights of the 
republics. The Federal Assembly was still holding out and rejected the law on the end of 
the federation. The big question was how deputies who swore fidelity to the state could 
actually end it. Eventually, the government presented the Federal Assembly with a new 
law on the end of the federation, which was passed by the parliamentary parties to which 
National Councils adopted recommending resolutions. On 25 November 1992 the law on 
the break-up was approved on the second reading. On 1 January 1993 Czechoslovakia 
ceased to exist and Slovakia’s first stage of democratisation was completed by its 
independence. The question of the legitimacy o f Slovakia’s statehood will be dealt with 
later for it had grave consequences for its nascent democracy, which lost some of its 
credibility in the whole process by being denied its fundamental feature - the consent of 
the citizens.
3.4. CONCLUSION
The demise o f the Czechoslovak federation highlights the complexity of processes which 
contribute to the conditions in which ethnicity can be mobilised to such an extent that it 
forms the most significant cleavage in society. The case of Czechoslovakia serves as a 
reflection on at least two points relevant to this thesis. First, it reflects negatively on the 
well established idea that high economic interdependence, similar levels o f technological
" 8 Pithart who was party to these negotiations, claims that Klaus asked Meciar once more whether he 
really wanted Slovakia to be a sovereign state, to which he answered positively and was further not given 
the chance to explain how this could be done. Whether Meciar really believed in this confederation, or 
simply remained faithful to his election promises is unimportant - the general assessment in the Czech 
lands was that the Slovaks asked for independence and they got it P.Pithart (1995) p.332
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and economic development and a high degree of social interaction229 lead to political 
integration. The Czechs and Slovaks had more in common in that respect at the end o f 
their coexistence than at the beginning, yet the differences in their political objectives 
increased rather than decreased. The point to stress is that the common state does not 
necessarily create a sense of common identity and that the establishment of a political 
nation under multiethnic conditions requires ultimately constitutional arrangements that 
reflect the belief in a common purpose by all its ethnic and national groups. Without a 
sense o f common purpose there is no national unity and without national unity the major 
project of democratisation can hardly be sustained. Second, if it is true that the 
population was faced with a result it did not expect (and all opinion polls point towards 
this conclusion), the above case says something significant about the decisive role of 
political elites230 in postcommunist transitions.
The following chapter, building on the above treatment of the Slovak pre­
independence history, will concentrate solely on Slovakia. As the emphasis will be on the 
current political development and the role of nationalism in that process, I would like to 
stress a few points relevant in this context. Slovakia emerged from the communist period 
relatively more developed economically than politically, by which I mean that the 
political development of Slovakia stagnated behind the level of industrialisation, 
urbanisation and education. In 1918 Slovakia had only one party, the Slovak National 
Party; the interwar period did not last long enough for parties other than the strongly 
nationalist Hlinka’s Party to develop; and this period was followed by the communist 
regime. Thus Slovak experience with pluralist politics is historically limited. The early 
postcommunist period and the first stage of the transition to democracy marked also the 
beginning of political development in conditions of democracy. It would appear that in 
that period democratisation was largely viewed as a resolution of the national question. 
We will see in chapter 5 on Slovenia that the democratisation of Slovenia also culminated 
in independence, but as signaled before nationalist mobilisation in Slovakia continued 
after its independence, the reasons for which will be explored below.
Hence, I would like to make a few concluding comments about the nature of 
Slovak nationalism. Slovak nationalism has never divested itself o f its wartime image of
229 A sociological survey conducted in 1990 by the Komenius University in Bratislava revealed that in 
Slovakia 57% of the population had Czech friends and 31% had Czech relatives; in the Czech republic 
23% and 45% respectively. Kulturny Zivot 10 December 1991
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authoritarianism as is apparent often with good reason. Second, Slovak nationalism has 
indeed always viewed democracy as inseparable from the nation and its interests, with 
emphasis on ethnicity and history, whether it was Hlinka or Meciar (by which I do not 
wish to draw any comparison between the two personalities, even if the comparison of 
their electoral support will be drawn below). Thirdly, the central legacy of Slovak 
nationalism is the fear o f being engulfed either by Hungary, or by the more advanced 
Czech lands - Slovak national identity is defined against its neighbours and carries a 
sense o f historical resentment. This gave Slovak nationalism an often dissatisfied and 
indignant character, easily seduced by demagoguery which is possibly its most negative 
trait as regards democratisation.
230 C.Skalnik Leff (1995) p. 153
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Chapter 4
NATION-BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA
4.1. INTRODUCTION
the Commission concludes that Slovakia does not fulfill in a satisfying 
manner the political conditions set out by the European Council in Copenhagen, 
because o f the instability o f Slovakia’s institutions, their lack o f rootedness in 
political life and the shortcomings in the functioning o f its democracy. This 
situation is so much more regrettable since Slovakia could satisfy the economic 
criteria....”231
This chapter seeks to address Slovakia’s democratisation process and nation-building in 
the period 1993-98. The underlying argument is that postcommunist development 
depends largely on the legacy o f communism and the period before communism, whilst 
the success o f democratisation depends on the construction of a political community 
whose unity is rooted in commitment to a democratisation project rather than in ethnic 
identity. This chapter fully endorses D.Rustow’s dictum that a “single background 
condition to democracy is - national unity”, which implies “that the vast majority of 
citizens in a democracy to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which 
political community they belong to”232.
The modem nation-state is characterized not only by the “monopoly of what it 
claims to be the legitimate use o f force”233, but also its attempt to unite the people under 
its rule by means of homogenisation, by creating a common culture, usually based on the 
dominant national culture. Such attempts, particularly in a multinational state, are bound 
to lead to insecurity and the redefinition of national identity by minorities, which raise the 
level o f conflictual politics, thus impeding the process o f democratisation. The Slovak 
nation-building process, historically marked by many obstacles, seems to have gathered 
momentum at the cost of democracy, which has even less o f a stable background to rely 
on.
231 Agenda 2000 The opinuions of the European Commission on the Applications for Accession 
Strasbourg/Brussels 15, July 1997
232 D.Rustow ‘Transitions to Democracy’ in Comparative Politics 2:3 April 1970 p.p.337-363 p.350
233 M.Guibernau Nationalisms Cambridge Polity Press 1996 p.31
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Hungarian Minority
One of the dominant features o f the Slovak political landscape and the main criterion by 
which democratic progress in Slovakia can be measured is the level of tension between 
the substantial Hungarian minority (11%) and the Slovak majority, a tension that cannot 
be explained by a cultural clash234 only. Both ethnic groups share the same customs and 
mostly the same religion (Catholic), there is no significant economic division, nor any 
difference in their way of life, and generally the relations between people are good on the 
personal level. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia is a very close language community, 
and its political agenda is mostly concerned with the sufficient provision for the use of 
their language and the protection of it235. The ethnic tension which marked the first years 
o f the transition process was only partially due to demands considered excessive by the 
respective sides. It stems more from the Slovak search for a conception of their new 
nationhood. Moreover, there is a further issue at hand, Slovak resentment, historically 
inspired by the Hungarian repression of Slovak lands during the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, and now fueled by the success o f Hungary in securing her place among what are 
considered civilized European countries.236
The general thesis o f this chapter is that insecure nationhood and insecure 
democracy feed off each other, therefore securing democracy means broadening of the 
nation-building agenda to include political identity as well as the narrow national one. 
From the evidence and arguments that support this thesis it follows that the stagnation in 
the Slovak democratisation process stemmed mostly from political immaturity which 
allowed the democratisation process to become overwhelmed by the pursuit of national 
identity and unity, which due to historical developments have not been sufficiently 
resolved before.
34 This is contrary to the argument advanced by J.Batt in New Slovakia Discussion Paper London The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs 1996 p.vi “the paper argues that the tension between Slovaks and 
Hungarians today can best be explained in terms of cultural clash”. Moreover, it appears that the most 
anti-Hungarian rhetoric and action comes from middle Slovakia, where there are practically no 
Hungarians. For this particular phenomenon whereby the strongest nationalist rhetoric comes from the 
least ethnically mixed region see V.Krivy Slovensko a jeho regiony Bratislava, Nadacia Media 1996 
94% communicate exclusively in Hungarian with their parents, 73% with their colleagues at the
work place. See P.Fric F.Gal P.Huncik C.Lord Madarskd mensina na Slovensku p. 14
236 In March 1993 53% Slovaks assumed that Slovakia would join the EU countries at the same time as 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; in November 1996 54% did not believe that Meciar’s 
government will lead Slovakia into the EU. Statistics from Z.Butorova ‘Public Opinion’ in M.Butora ed. 
Slovakia 1996 Bratislava, Institut pre verejne otazky 1997 p.344
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Following the above thesis this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part 
deals with politics in independent Slovakia up to the last general election in 1998, the 
period dominated by Meciar’s leadership. It examines the political structure and seeks an 
answer to the political and ethnic cleavages in Slovak politics through the exploration of 
the Slovak political tradition. The second part focuses on the issues o f nationalism and its 
most important manifestation, the minorities and the constitutional provisions for them. 
This is done through the examination of the Constitution and the State Language Law. 
The third part is a short analysis o f the last general elections, where the account of 
Slovakia comes to an end. The assessment o f the future prospects for Slovakia are 
positive with some qualifications, of which the containment o f nationalism within the 
democratic system is the most important.
The Slovak case illustrates that nationalism’s compatibility with democracy 
depends on certain conditions which are contingent on various processes, such as 
historical, political and national development, the mode of attainment of independence 
and the resultant elite formation and ethnic composition. However, the relationship 
between democracy and nationalism is not static, it is not one-sided, the strength of 
nationalism depends on the strength o f democracy and vice-versa. The conclusion will 
argue that a more democratic political system can produce a less polarised society, thus 
reducing the relevance of nationalism in political life.
4.2. POLITICS IN INDEPENDENT SLOVAKIA
In theory, the second free elections in 1992 could have marked the beginning of the 
institutionalisation of a democratic regime in Czechoslovakia. ‘Regime’ here is taken to 
mean the combination of generally applied formal-legal and institutional norms and forms 
(Constitution), their socio-cultural adaptation in the political society and the adherence 
to those by important actors of political, economic and social life, as well as mechanisms 
for the reinstatement o f constitutionality in case o f a temporary disturbance. As the 
above indicates, this period was marked by a prolonged constitutional crisis between 
political elites in two republics which resulted in the break up of the state. The 
subsequent formation of an independent Slovakia meant a considerable break in the 
continuity o f the democratisation process which thus embarked on its ‘second transition’
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under the conditions o f simultaneous, and as discussed in the second chapter, often 
competing processes o f nation-building and state-building. In this period the “instability 
o f institutions” that has proved so damaging to Slovakia’s application to join the EU, 
could be attributed to a combination o f factors (see below), but mainly to the extreme 
polarisation o f elites on nearly all issues concerning democracy and nationhood. 
Independence, instead of uniting the society behind a common project, proved divisive: 
all political issues became interwoven with questions o f loyalty to the state. The third 
victory of V. Meciar’s coalition in the 1994 early elections meant the beginning of a 
particularly difficult period for Slovak democratic development, in which the ‘politics of 
revenge’237 that followed removed all opposition from key governmental, economic and 
media positions, despite the previously established rules which guaranteed the 
participation o f the opposition in the government. This situation lasted till Meciar’s 
defeat in the 1998 elections, the subject of the section below.
4.2.1. Political Party System and Slovak Democracy
The following attempts to outline developments in the formation of parties and the party 
structure in Slovakia in the period 1990-1998. To assist this account see below the list of 
the parties and their abbreviations relevant to this period, in alphabetical order:
DS - Demokraticka strana/ Democratic party
DU - Demokraticka Unia/Democratic union (breakaway factions from HzDS and SNS)
Egyiittelles (Hung.) - Spoluzitie/Coexistence
HZDS - Hnutie za demokraticke Slovensko/ Movement for Democratic Slovakia (splinter 
group of the VPN)
KDH - Krestanskodemokraticke hnutie/ Christian Democratic Movement 
KSS - Komunisticka strana Slovenska/ Communist Party 
MK - Madarska koalicia/ Hungarian Coalition
MKDH -Madarske krestansko demokraticke hnutie/Hungarian Christian democratic movement
MNI - Madarska nezavisla iniciativa/ Hungarian Independent Initiative
MOS - Madarska obcianska strana/Hungarian Civic party
SDL- Strana demokratickej lavice/ Party o f the Democratic Left
SNS - Slovenska narodna strana/ Sloval National party
237 K.Henderson ‘Slovakia and the democratic criteria for EU accession’ K.Henderson ed. Back to
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SV- Spolocna volba/Common Choice
SZS -Strana zelenych na Slovensku/ Green Party
VPN - Verejnost proti nasiliu/ Public against violence (splinter group forms the HzDS)
ZRS- Zdruzenie robotnikov Slovenska/ Association of Workers of Slovakia
Table 1.
Parties in Slovak Parliament 1990-1994 (seats; asterisk denotes the governing coalition)238
Party 1990
. ■
,■ v . v  ■ . - •» ;
1992
\ \ O' : •
1994: 1
VPN/MNI 00 *
KDH 31* 18 17
SNS 22 15*
SV (SDL+KSS) 22 29 18
MK (Coex. + MKDH + MOS) 14 14 17
DS 7 * _ _
SZ 6 _
HzDS (breakaway from VPN) - 74* 61*
DU (breakaway from SNS and H/HS) - _ 15
ZRS (breakaway from SDL) - - 13*
Narodna Rada Slovenskej Republiky/NR SR - the National Council has 150 deputies















KSS/ ZRS/ SZ/SDL HzDS
economic liberalism
VPN/DS/MKDH/Coex./KDH/SNS
Looking at the tables above some facets o f the Slovak postcommunist politics are 
immediately striking: the pivotal role o f the HzDS and its leader Meciar, the formation of
Europe London, UCL 1999 p.226
Compiled by myself from various sources, mainly M.Butora P.Huncik Slovensko 1995 Bratislava 
Sandor Marai 1996 p.l 1
239 i-m .
The table is put together by myself based on electoral programmes of all mentioned parties from 
1994. Further ‘Verejny Audit Volebnych programov Politickych Strdn’ Bratislava, 21.9.1998 and 
G.Meseznikov ’Struktura Systemu Politickych Stran’ S.SzomoIanyi Slovensko:...
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the new parties as a result o f the conflict in the existing parties, the discontinuity of the 
broad civic movement VPN, which initiated the democratisation process, the relevance 
o f nationally-orientated parties, the strong ethnic division of the political parties along 
the Slovak/Hungarian lines and the general incoherence of the coalition formations 
viewed through the adherence to economic policies.
Conflict and the HzDS
HzDS was formed by Vladimir Meciar, the Prime Minister of the first post-communist 
government and member o f the VPN in spring 1991, after the protracted disputes within 
that movement - as became obvious in the 1992 elections, the victorious HzDS attracted 
the majority o f VPN’s electoral support"40 and the second government of V.Meciar was 
established. The primary causes o f the international community’s concerns about the 
state of Slovakia’s democracy (see below) all resulted from the continued animosity 
between Meciar, his supporters and the opposition.
During the 1990-92 period, the party system could be divided into two major 
blocks, the pro-reform and ambiguous-towards reform orientation. The first group 
consisted of VPN, KDH and DS (government coalition) and the Hungarian parties. The 
division along ethnic lines, in fact two party systems, the Slovak and the Hungarian was 
divisive as far minority issues were concerned and obviously did not contribute to 
national unity (KDH and Coexistence were ethnically more inspired than the rest), but 
both ethnic formations agreed on pro-transformation and pro-federal policies. The 
second bloc (KSS, SDL, SNS, SZS and the new HzDS) either rejected or severely 
criticised the federal model and the pace of economic reforms, with SNS openly 
campaigning against the federation and the HzDS presenting themselves as the champion 
of the ‘Slovak national interest’, defined in legally dubious terms o f a ‘co-state’ with the 
Czechs"41. The VPN, despite being a movement, which appealed to a broad social base 
was ideologically fairly clearly defined, particularly in its lack of support for nationalist 
sentiments and socialist nostalgia. The movement proved unable to address the prevailing 
mood in the country after initiating the change o f regime and many of its members left in 
preference to the more specific political interests.
240 K.Henderson as above p.226
G.Meseznikov in S.Szomolanyi Slovensko:... p.27-47
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In contrast with neighbouring countries (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland), where transformation continued on the intended path, despite the formation of 
more clearly profiled political parties, in Slovakia the reconfiguration o f political forces 
and particularly the appearance o f the HzDS meant a challenge to the direction of the 
transition. The HzDS retained the broad spectrum character o f its parent movement 
VPN, but concentrated on the negative facets o f economic transition, with a strong 
emphasis on the national question, thus enabling it to appeal to large sections o f the 
population ( centre with popular character” according to its vice-chairman) and form 
alliances with everyone, particularly with nationalists, who were previously unable to find 
a partner. Interestingly, despite this ideological ability, in practice the HzDS and Meciar 
have found it difficult to collaborate in coalitions. This conflictual approach to opponents 
and allies alike created a further proliferation o f parties and regularly increased the 
instability of the parliament.
In 1993 the issue of Czecho-Slovak relations became less compelling to the 
public, and HzDS and the nationalist SNS coalition found it difficult to maintain 
legitimacy. An internal conflict within the HzDS led to a defection of deputies, whilst the 
further conflicts contributed to the failure to reestablish the coalition and further 
defections from both parties followed. Deprived of its parliamentary majority, the 
government fell to a vote of no confidence (March 1994), after a condemnatory speech 
by the then President M.Kovac, also in fact a defector from the HzDS (no party 
affiliation after his election by the parliament in 1993 which lasted till February 1998).
The new government led by the ex- foreign minister J. Moravcik (March 1994-October
1994) consisted of the new DU (formed by the defectors from the HzDS and SNS) aided 
by SDL and KDH. In the early elections (October 1994), Meciar and his HzDS emerged 
victorious again (Meciar’s third government) and after the new parliament’s legendary 
all- night sitting (3-4 November 1994), the new government was formed: HzDS, the 
newly formed worker s party ZRS and the right-wing SNS presided over the most 
controversial period in postcommunist Slovakia so far.
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4.2.2. ‘Fragile’ Democracy’242
After the 1994 elections the authoritarian tendencies of the HzDS, both inside and 
outside the party, led some observers to question the extent to which Slovakia could still 
be described as a democracy, whilst the regular defiance of the Constitutional Court was 
described by the opposition as “the beginning of constitutional crisis”243. Following their 
victory in 1994, HzDS completely excluded opposition parties from any participation in 
bodies overseeing state functions, e.g. broadcasting, privatisation244, the scrutiny of 
Slovak Intelligence Service, and it denied the opposition parties representation on 
parliamentary committees. HzDS started the new election period by an attempt to 
remove the new DU from the parliament by disputing the signatures the party had to 
collect in order to stand in elections. In the face of the Constitutional Court’s rejection of 
this charge, the motivation must be seen as a revenge for the fall of Meciar’s government 
precipitated by their defection.
The use o f authoritarian methods also characterised the HzDS’ internal policy. 
The most obvious case was another defection from the party, this time deputy 
F.Gaudlieder who left (November 1996) to sit as an independent in the parliament which 
is in agreement with the constitutional stipulation that MPs are guaranteed to exercise 
their own mandate. Nevertheless, the parliamentary majority stripped him of his mandate
i42 S.Szomolanyi Slovensko:... p. 11
“43 L.FogaS MP(SDL) in SME 2.10.1997 In the interview with him (29.10.1997) Mr.Fogas, who was one 
of the writers of the Constitution, said that Slovakia ceased to be a formal democracy (even if it is a 
democracy) because there is no popular control and the lack of political will to regain it.
To this end the voucher privatisation has been terminated in favour o f ‘direct sales’ of the state 
property, regulated by FNM (National Property Fund), all top executives of which had direct links to the 
government, a body beyond the direct control of government. The sales were often to unknown 
companies, or could be traced to government (i.e. the largest steel works VSZ to the Minister of 
Telecommunications A.RezeS in the government till 1997). Noteworthy is the influence of ex-managers 
of the ex-communist large state-owned enterprises, now organised in AZZZ(Association of Employers 
Unions and Alliances) who have also become enterprise owners and the President of which has 
confirmed that “the government’s privatisation philosophy has been formulated jointly with 
AZZZ“(SIovenska Republika 21.6.1995). The government has revoked the licence of the largest 
investment corporation Sporofond, with some 40 000 investors in the second wave of privatisation 
despite the Supreme Court ruling. The case of Nafta Gbely, whose 49 % of shares has been sold to an 
unknown company at the estimated loss to the Slovak government 100 million USD), despite higher 
offers from other investors. The list of proved and suspected clientalism at the government level is long, 
as are the connections to organised economic crime. However, the question of clientalist structures in 
Slovakia is beyond the brief of this thesis. For further information see I.Miklos ‘Prepojenie Politickej a 
Ekonomickej moci’ in S.Szomolanyi Slovensko:., and the same author in M.Butora P.Hundk ed. 
Slovensko 1995 as before and M.Butora Slovensko 1996 Bratislava, IVO 1997. In the sociological 
survey Current Problems o f  Slovakia on the verge o f 1995-96, published by FOCUS 65% of the 
respondents answered negatively to the question whether the privatisation is heading the right direction.
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and refused to reinstate him even after the Constitutional ruling required them to do so. 
Gaudlieder’s case provoked a sharp criticism from the EU and OSCE245.
Another issue that seriously damaged Slovakia’s reputation was the deteriorating 
relationship between the President Kovac and Prime Minister Meciar. In an extraordinary 
example o f the length to which ‘revenge’ in Slovak politics could go, the president’s son 
was abducted in August 1995 in Bratislava and taken to the nearest police station across 
the border in Austria. Since the German authorities wanted him for questioning regarding 
a matter o f fraud they were investigating, he was held there for six months before the 
Austrian authorities decided not to extradite him because of the criminal manner in which 
he found himself in their custody. During this time the Slovak government made no 
attempts to have him returned. From the very beginning the Slovak Information Service 
was implicated in the case, which became more sinister by the removal of the police 
officers who investigated the case and the death o f a person involved in the case246(in an 
unexplained and uninvestigated explosion).
Possibly the worst case o f overstepping the line between the acceptable and 
unacceptable is the thwarted referendum of 23-24 May in 1997. The case is legally too 
convoluted to explain fully here247, but in short the events were as follows. The 
opposition parties in December 1996 (with the exception of the SDL, a party of 
independent opposition policies) put forward a proposal for the direct election of the 
President by referendum. The expectation was that after the end of Mr.Kovac’s term in 
March 1998 and given the then configuration of the parliament it would be difficult to 
find a candidate who could secure a degree of balance against the ruling coalition in this 
important election year. Although the President did not enjoy great executive power, 
he/she could (and M.Kovac regularly did) veto the laws considered unconstitutional. The 
veto could be overturned by a parliamentary majority upon its return to the parliament,
“Meciar and his supporters have made a historic decision. They chose power over the law and 
reduced the Constitution to a mere recommendation”, said A.D’Amato the Chairman of the American 
Commission OSCE Narodna Obroda 6.10.1997 in connection to the Gaudlieder case.
L.Pittner, the shadow Minister of Interior in an interview Domino Forum 30.7.1998 said that I.Lexa, 
the then head of the SIS was behind the kidnapping and expressed no doubts that Meciar must had been 
‘^ formed. Lexa since has been arrested and charged, but released due to ill health.
For the detailed study of the referendum see G.Meseznikov M.Butora Slovenske Referendum ‘97 
Bratislava, IVO 1997
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but nevertheless it was a measure o f democratic control very important to the opposition. 
Their fears proved justified248.
The necessary signatures (350 000 were required, in actual fact nearly 500 000) 
were collected and presented in a petition to the President who is entitled to declare a 
referendum (Constitution article 95). At the same time the government presented a new 
question for the referendum, relating to entry into NATO. At his monthly rally Meciar 
presented his supporters with a set of questions about whether they wished for nuclear 
arms to be stationed on Slovak territory and whether they agreed with the Slovak army 
being deployed elsewhere - the audience reacted angrily and negatively. The thus 
initiated ‘democratic discussion’ seemed unnecessary since Slovakia had not yet been 
invited to join NATO and moreover NATO had no plans to station nuclear weapons on 
the territory of the new member states. The parliament nevertheless proceeded to request 
a referendum on NATO membership, an issue which de facto did not exist249.
The President called for the referendum for both issues to be held on the same 
day, consisting of four questions, the first three relating to NATO, the fourth, its legality 
disputed by the government, relating to the direct election of the president. Wrangling 
about whether all four questions should be on the same ballot followed, with the 
government arguing against it (by now the government had submitted the fourth question 
to the Constitutional Court), whilst the date o f the declared referendum was approaching 
rapidly. Eventually the Court produced a somewhat ambiguous verdict and rejected the 
government’s application, for it claimed that the referendum did not fall within the 
government’s competence. The referendum ended in a complete fiasco, when the Interior 
Minister Krajci, an HzDS member, took it upon himself to block the distribution of 
ballots with four questions printed claiming it was illegal to change the Constitution by 
referendum. In the ensuing chaos only 10% of the population voted and the referendum
248 Kovac’s term in office finished in March 1998 and it took till May 1999 and the new government’s 
law on the direct election of the President before Slovakia had a new President. Due to the animosity 
between the government and the opposition the election by the Parliament became an impossibility and 
each candidate failed to secure the majority of votes. In the direct election in May 1999 R.Schuster won 
over V.Meciar, who after losing in the general elections on September 1998 stood as presidential 
candidate, with a great success till the last moment of the elections, it must be added.
“49 It was evident that with the other two coalition partners, the ZRS and SNS campaigning openly 
against NATO, it was unlikely that NATO would invite Slovakia to join the first group of Eastern 
enlargement at its Madrid July 1997summit.On the other hand, the almost certain rejection of Slovakia 
could then be justified either way by referendum, either NATO refused a country eager to join, or the 
country did not want to join anyway.
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was declared invalid250. The point about the thwarted referendum and other cases 
mentioned above is that it manifested the fundamental problem in Slovak politics, the 
instability and the ruling coalition’s desire to consolidate its control by any means.
4.2.3. Ideological and Ethnic Cleavages in Party Formation 1993-1998
There is a strong ethnic dimension to Slovakia’s party system. The main purpose of the
Hungarian parties’ political activities is the protection o f the Hungarian minority, which
considering the fairly anti-Hungarian slant of Meciar’s government means that MK
supported the opposition, despite the difficult relationship with DU (unambiguously
opposed to collective rights and regional self-government) and SDL. It would however
be misleading to divide the political scene into nationalist government and democratic
opposition, because nationalists are in both camps. KDH does not shy away from
‘national idea’ and on questions o f minority rights its position is unclear. The whole
parliamentary group abstained from the vote which passed the 1995 Language Law,
whilst KDH was involved in a highly publicised affair blocking the completion of a
Hungarian monument. It would be equally wrong to assume that the existence of
Hungarian parties has been prompted by Slovak nationalism since they all were formed
prior to the first postcommunist elections in 1990 and reflect a deep ethnic cleavage in
Slovak society, the elimination of which would take more than a change o f government.
The MKDH’s manifesto from the 1994 elections offers a kind of explanation:
“ ...the Hungarian population, attached to the homeland, has the right to express 
the linguistic and cultural attachment to the united Hungarian nation. The new 
state borders did not mean the creation o f a new nation, but a branch was torn off, 
a branch from the same nation, which as a citizen is an inhabitant o f Slovakia, 
but as a person is a Hungarian...”(p.20)
Nevertheless, the earlier radicalism (Coexistence in particular) has subsided and the MK,
after having transformed itself into one party Slovak Hungarian Coalition for the 1998
elections, has joined the current government.
Another striking facet o f the political scene in 1993-98 is what appears to be at
first glance the ideological incoherence of the political parties. The governing coalition
led by the HzDS on one hand and rather a standard collection of parties on the other,
covering practically the whole political spectrum from left to right with the two extremes
250 K.Henderson Back to Europe p.230
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from both ends of the spectrum in the government. Economic policies do not offer an 
answer to the formation of these blocks. The HzDS came to power because it promised a 
gradual transition of the economy, slower privatization and a more ‘statist’ approach to 
democratization, which appealed to the population frightened by the rush to a market 
economy and confused by the sheer plurality o f possibilities, offered by the end of 
communism. In that sense the HzDS is nearer to the SDL, with a nearly indistinguishable 
ideology as far as economics are concerned, than it is to its partner the ZRS with the 
explicitly workers orientated, state-centric, socialist policies. The ZRS, in the 
postcommunist ECE region an anachronistically left-wing party, was joined in this ruling 
coalition by the extreme right-wing SNS, subscribing to pro-market economic policies, 
more comparable to the rightist parties o f the opposition, such as KDH. Clearly, the 
answer to the formation of coalitions is not in the economy, at least not in the official 
economic policies proclaimed by party manifestoes.
4.2.4. Political Elites and Democracy
The answer to the configuration o f political parties in Slovakia in the period under 
discussion can be sought on two levels. Traditionalism still plays an important role in the
251party system , partly because all parties are new and thus seek to build on some 
historical tradition. SNS in particular expresses the affinity to the war-time Slovak State, 
ZRS and SDL make extensive use of communist stereotypical rhetoric with emphasis on 
egalitarian and anti-capitalist sentiments. Similarly, the HzDS builds on the communist 
period, with a black and white depiction of reality, formulated in populist language laden 
with enemies and praise for the ‘ordinary man’ and some residues o f inter-war national 
conservatism, whilst KDH is inclined also towards the inter-war conservatism in the 
terms of religion and tradition (family, morality and confession).
Another level o f the configuration o f party system concerns the conception of 
democracy, often viewed as a zero-sum game in which winner takes all. To Meciar 
democratic election meant the legitimation of his political style as he expressed after the 
1994 victory:
“the others (opposition) must learn how to exist with me, because I am legitimate,
again. So let them stop the non-sensical competition and let them think how to live
251 G.Meseznikov in Slovensko... p.37
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with me, not fight against me”252.
In Sona Szomolanyi’s view, the instability o f Slovak democracy was rooted in the lack 
o f consensual unity among elites about the parameters of democratic conduct, which 
meant that the “struggle for the rules o f the game”253 continued; instead of a ‘normal’ 
competition for power between the government and the opposition, there was a struggle 
about the rules by which the political actors should regulate their competition.
The role o f political and economic elites, their power, thus the responsibility they 
bear for the direction of Slovak transition was one of the main points (the other being the 
role of nationalism) conveyed to me in interviews with academics and political analysts in 
Slovakia, conducted in the period August - October 1997254. The following is a summary 
of answers to the question about the specificity of Slovakia’s troubled transition: the 
extreme level of conflicts among elites (Zemko); the lack of a political elite which feels a 
sense of responsibility for the future o f the state (Pichler); personal ambition under the 
condition of moral crisis in the postcommunist society (Palko); clientelist networks and 
the incapacity o f elites to unite the society which has no identification with the state 
(Weiss); no ‘national’ elite, no patriotism and the state unprepared for independence 
(Duleba); provincialism (Gal); communist socialisation from which most elites have 
emerged (Podoba); confusing nationalism with the legitimacy o f the state (Zajac). This 
indicates that the main problem seemed to be the combination of inexperienced and 
irresponsible elites and a passive population, both lacking in the identification with a state 
and the responsibility for it. In words of Frantisek Novosad: ”we are observing an 
abstract fight for democracy, people have no faith in politics”.
4.2.5. Slovak Political Tradition: Socio-Cultural Analysis of Electoral Behaviour255
Whilst it may be true that the configuration of political parties has an independent and 
possibly final impact on the regime formation, the population itself does carry a certain 
responsibility for the decision how and by whom the country is governed. If political
252 M.Le§ko Meciar a Meciarizmus Bratislava, VMV 1996 p. 192
253 S.Szomolanyi Slovensko: Problemy Konsolidacie Demokracie Spor o ‘pravidla hry’ pokracuje title 
itself translates as: “Slovakia: problems of democratic consolidation the struggle for the rules of the 
game continues”
254 For the political or academic affiliations of the following personalities see the list of interviews p.266
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parties are representative o f public interests and aspirations for the future, even allowing 
for manipulation by elites, then we must explore which interests and what kind of vision 
o f society inspires that choice. That is usually referred to as political culture, the term 
which “in keeping with the democratisation of post-communist societies is undergoing a 
spectacular revival”256. There is a danger in this ‘political culture’ interpretation, mostly 
that it is suggestive and that there is little data available from the communist and pre­
communist period, therefore no continuity in comparing the surveys about values and 
orientations. Moreover, relying on surveys as a way of explaining the political system 
cannot do more than offer some cautious suggestions as to the possible outcomes.
Nevertheless there is some relevance in exploring the political behaviour/culture, 
or political tradition as a way of exploring to what extent the past shapes the present and 
seeking an answer to how people perceive the world, what they consider important, how 
they formulate their desires, what they fear and whom, or what they trust257. In Slovakia, 
the political system is new and unstable and therefore the political culture relies mainly 
on historical developments258, some of which have been dealt with in the first section of 
this chapter and will be explored here through the comparative analysis o f electoral 
behaviour.
What we have seen so far is a political tradition that includes a range of elements: 
anti-liberal tendencies; collectivism, manifested in strong national orientation; toleration 
of lawlessness by state authorities; high expectations from the state combined with 
egalitarianism and a general misunderstanding about how these tendencies affect long­
term prospects. So, where do we look for the basis o f these elements o f political 
behaviour? The obvious answer is, firstly, in presocialist development; secondly, in the 
communist period and lastly in the end of communism itself.
The oldest polarisation of society was along the religious lines, between Catholics 
and Protestants. According to political analysts Catholicism (60% o f the population) 
rests on an irrational understanding o f the world reflected in the hierarchical -
The following analysis is based on V.Krivy, V.Feglova D.Balko Slovensko a Jeho Regiony which is 
the most comprehensive and detailed study of the Slovak political behaviour since the end of the 19th 
century. All references to this book will be marked only by Slovensko a Jeho regiony...
2J7 F.Plasser A.Pribersky Political Culture in East Central Europe Aldershot, Avebury 1996 p.4
See also ...’’democracy requires a distinctive set of political values and orientations from its citizens: 
moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, participation.” L.Diamond ed. Political Culure and 
Democracy in Developing Countries Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1993 Introduction p. 1
Slovensko a Jeho Regiony p. 11
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authoritarian structure o f the Church, as opposed to individualism and the rationality o f 
Protestants259. The influence of the Catholic Church on political development was most 
visible in the interwar period, when Christian nationalism was the ideology of the leading 
Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party. The rehabilitation of the wartime Slovak State and J.
Tiso remains an important issue with some segments o f the Church, but on the whole it 
cannot be argued that in the present situation Catholicism has a strong influence on the 
politics of Slovakia. The KDH counting on the catholic vote expected260 a clear overall 
majority in the 1990 elections, but came second with 19.2% of votes, after the purely
civic movement Public Against Violence (29.3%).
More of a concern is the remaining division between ‘Europeanism’, a Western 
orientation, and ‘traditionalism’, whereby the latter stands for nationalism combined with 
anti-democratic tendencies. From 1925 the anti-liberal sympathies and the pressure for 
national identity and unity brought consistent victories to the traditionalist, even 
isolationist catholic party HSLS (Hlinka’s Slovak People s Party). This movement was 
not only anti-liberal, anti-European, anti-Czechs, but also subscribed to national 
socialism and degenerated into a fascist state during the war.
The results o f elections during the interwar period show that with the exception of the 
1920 elections, until the end of the war, the most successful parties in Slovakia were 
conservative, anti-democratic and directed against the unitary state. The anti-unitarian 
state parties do not have to be necessarily anti-democratic, but in the Slovak case they 
incorporated a strong nationalist element. The dominant feature o f these elections was 
conservatism (the decreasing support for socialists, unlike in the Czech lands, can be 
explained by the anti-capitalist orientation of Catholic parties, as well as internationalist 
and Czechoslovakist orientation of socialists, thus their underestimation of national
demands).
1920
Czechoslovak Social Democrats 
Slovak National and Agrarian party 




259 Slovensko a Jeho Regiony p. 12
260 M.Kusy ‘Slovak Exceptionalism’ in J.Musil The End o f  Czechoslovakia p. 148
132
1925





34.5 Mostly in the ethnically Slovak regions
17.4 Eastern Slovakia and Protestant enclaves 
13.9 Regions with mixed Hungarian population whilst 
border regions voted Hungarian National Party + 
German Parties 7.7%
1929
Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party 28.2
Agrarian Party 19.5
National Christian Social Democrats 15.9 
1935
Bloc Hlinka’s Party + Slovak national 30.1
Agrarian party 17.6
National Christian Democrats 14.2
1946
Democratic Party 62% This is a marked difference to the Czechs where
the Communists won with a large majority. This 
however does not signal democracy, but rather the 
exclusion o f Hlinka’s Party from the political life, 
thus includes his supporters, and a strong 
anticommunist sentiment in mostly rural Slovakia
Communist Party 30%
Source: V.Krivy “Slovensko a jeho regiony” p. 19-22
The first experience of Slovaks with parliamentary democracy shows a preference for 
social equality, the role o f the state and nationalism. However, Slovaks could not 
actually experience the consequences, nor advantages, of their political preferences, 
because Czechoslovakia was a centralized state that followed the policies of majority
133
parties where Slovakia counted for a significantly smaller number of votes compared to 
the Czechs (including Moravians). Czechoslovakia, preoccupied with the idea of a 
unitary state, in the presence of many minorities (35%  in total), treated all regional 
demands as a threat and eventually removed the already well established system of 
regional governments in Slovakia. Ironically, Slovakia now behaves in the same way 
towards the Hungarian minority, demonstrating that nation-building, in multinational 
states, has a tendency towards homogenisation at the risk of creating a situation where 
the lack of democratic institutions leads to citizens turning against the very basis of 
democracy.
The degree and extent to which the population and elites are willing to undergo 
the changes affects the success of political reform. The above sections made it obvious 
that the willingness o f the majority of Slovaks to undergo the all encompassing changes 
necessary after 1989 was limited. Very soon after 1990 the economic reforms became 
unacceptable for Slovakia, even though it is absolutely essential to acknowledge the fact 
that the situation for Slovaks - due to the type of inherited industry (heavy and 
munitions) which became obsolete - was considerably worse at the starting point than for 
the Czechs. However, the lack o f faith in the transformation began to play a role already 
before the economic reforms could take a significant hold to influence the political 
thinking, and therefore the negative reaction to economic transformation must be studied 
within the wider context o f the socio-cultural sphere.
Let us look at the election results (only the main parties) up to 1994 again. The 
jump from 1946 - 1989 indicates the period of communist one-party state and makes 
analysis of electoral behaviour obsolete.
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Party 1990 1992 1994
Public Against Violence 29.3% — —
Christian Democratic Movement 19.2 8.7 10.8
Communist Party 13.3 — —
Hungarian Parties 8.7 7.4 10.18
Movement for Democratic Slovakia — 37.3% 34.96
Party o f Democratic Left — 14.7 10.41(+other left)
Association o f Workers — — 7.34
Slovak National Party 13.9 7.9 5.4
When comparing the election results from interwar Slovakia and post-1989, a striking 
similarity appears in the pattern o f electoral behaviour: 1) 1920 and 1990 elections show 
an enthusiasm and a reform zeal, by the elites and the population (1946 is comparable) 
following a major system breakdown; 2) after the initial enthusiasm an anti-reformist, 
more authoritarian party wins and a substantial number o f votes goes to either nationally 
(minorities too), or left orientated parties; 3) the party that initiates the change gives the 
direction of the new regime, but becomes obsolete as the carrier of transformation; 4) 
the regional similarities between the interwar Hlinka’s national party and Meciar’s 
Movement for Democratic Slovakia, whereby both parties score the highest number of 
votes in ethnically pure rural areas261 - a phenomenon worth noting, because it shows 
that nationalism can be effectively mobilised without the presence of minorities. On the 
contrary, the election results in ethnically mixed region o f Eastern Slovakia (Hungarians, 
large Romany population, Rusins and ethnic Germans) show a consistent resistance to 
nationalist parties, which would suggest that the co-existence with minorities in fact 
reduces the mistrust between majority and minority262.
“61 Slovensko a jeho Regiony p.28,48,53. The detailed election results according to districts after the 
1925, 1992 and 1994 elections show a strong resemblence in voting patterns. The Central Slovakia, the 
most ethnically Slovak region, in the First Republic voted overwhelmingly for Hlinka’s national party 
and that is the region where post-1989 the populist stream HzDS/SNS was again the most successful. 
The Hungarian parties’ stronghold remains the Hungarian South (interwar the same + Communist 
party)
Eastern Slovakia is a mixed region of Slovaks, large numbers of Rusyns and Ukrainians in the most 
East comer and Hungarians around Kosice (the second largest city in Slovakia) with a large Romany 
population and some remnants of Germans. Interwar: agrarian parties +Hungarian parties. In 1992: left
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4.2.6. Modernisation of Slovakia
The explanation for the above lies in the inquiry into the pre -1989 period and explains 
better the divergence in postcommunist development between the various countries. The 
starting point is the actual end o f communism in Slovakia, which contrary to other 
countries, such as Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech lands was not preceded by a 
strong dissident movement. The opposition to the regime consisted of a small number of 
intellectuals, some Catholic activists and ex-communists, expelled from the party during 
the seventies ‘normalization’ period263, but the majority of the population during the 
1980s did not feel the need for social and political changes. This is due to the 
industrialisation of Slovakia which began late, after the Second World War, and reached 
its peak in the 1980s - thus, the standard of living was rising markedly throughout the 
communist period, a point worth noting when comparing the Czech lands where the 
process took a downward spiral long before, because urban and industrial progress 
reached its peak before the war264.
The ‘velvet revolution’ took place in Bratislava too and certainly demonstrated 
that Slovaks also had had enough of the old tired, discredited and corrupted regime, but 
somehow this did not translate into the understanding, or agreement on the depth of 
changes that lay ahead. The feeling o f insecurity in Slovakia was rising and by 1991 76% 
felt insecure about their future265, which shows that the majority o f the population did 
not feel that the communist economy needed radical changes, but was persuaded by the 
general atmosphere o f political development o f that time. The opposition to the 
communist regime did not have a wide base among the population; soon after the 
euphoria wore off and daily life became full of insecurity and frustration, the population 
turned their sympathies back to politicians who spoke the language they understood and 
who promised the continuation of the lifestyle they were used to.
Slovakia had undergone massive changes since the 1950s. The problems of 
modernisation are not specific to Slovakia, but the speed and the circumstances are.
parties (SDL/SDSS) and KDH + DS. In 1994: Left parties +KDH +DU. 1998: SDL +KDH +SOP(the 
new party of Civic Understanding). See Slovensko a Jeho Regiony” p.47-59, 103-107
263 J.Podoba ‘Ponovembrove Slovensko’ in Reflexie IV Bratislava, Spolocnost pre trvalo udrzatelny zivot 
Eurouni Press 1996 p. 100 - 106 p. 101, henceforth only J.Podoba .
264 M.Kusy ‘Slovak Exceptionalism’ p. 150
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Industrialisation under communism was radical and marked by large industrial 
enterprises, mostly heavy industry, built in a rural, very traditional setting and was not 
accompanied by equal urbanisation; huge housing estates were built in rural areas thus 
traditional ties, networks and ways of life persisted. In 1960 only 30% of the population 
lived in the cities; now, it is just above 55% of the population266, whilst 43% lives in 
localities o f less than 5000 inhabitants, so that the country was not urbanised, rather 
cities became ‘ruralised’.
Further specificity of Slovakia must be sought even further in the past, 
particularly in the assimilation policies of Hungary, discussed in the previous chapter. 
Nationalism in Slovakia is associated with rural tradition, conservatism of the church and 
large doses o f resentment267. One must not underestimate the resentment as a part of 
national consciousness; it is rooted in comparison with more developed and cultivated 
national groups, often unflattering and therefore steeped in rejection, inwardness, 
hostility towards others and the idealization of one’s nation. The creativity of such 
nationalism is quickly exhausted and directs itself often to romantic deeds and illusions, 
something that is a remaining phenomenon in Slovak political thought.
From the elimination of the Slovak upper classes and from the absence of any 
political power derives not only a national ideology, but also a complete alienation of 
people from politics, always seen as something removed from them. The pre-industrial 
traditionalism, nationalism devoid of any state-building possibility and the persistently 
undemocratic regimes (with a too short period between the wars) meant that the 
population never developed a trust in institutions and in the rule o f law, with a 
consequence that it is easily charmed by flattery and vague declarations about serving 
the nation and its ordinary people, instead of a serious future orientated political 
programme. Communism was a kind of organized social and political hypocrisy268 in 
which people learned to live with trickery and develop strong patronage networks as a
265 Slovensko a jeho Regiony p.33
~60 See also E.Mannova ed. Mestianstvo a Obcianska Spolocnost na Slovensku Bratislava, AEP 1998, 
particularly chapters by E.Mannova and J.Pasiak
“67 For the discussion about ‘ressentiment’ as an unusually powerful stimulant of national sentiment and 
collective behaviour see L.Greenfeld Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity Cambridge, Harvrd 
University Press 1992
268 T.Pichler ‘The Twisted Track of Culture and Modernization’ in Economics and Politics V 
Symposium Bratislava 1994
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result o f bureaucracy, scarcity at all levels of life and a general deformation o f social 
structure and norms.
Thus, the political tradition of Slovakia derives its rigidity from a strange mix of 
rural traditionalism and the communist modernisation experiment. It is rooted in group 
solidarity, paternalism, devoid largely o f individualism and democratic practices, thus it 
finds it difficult to adjust to the changes that transformation requires. This is not to say 
that Slovakia is incapable o f completing this process, but given the cultural and 
institutional legacy of the extended history of political domination and the consequent 
political and economic backwardness in the combination with delayed nation-building, 
Slovakia needs a much longer time to do so. In the fierce struggle for power in the 
newly open political arena, the utilisation of nationalistic demagogues proved very 
successful - it distracted people from the fundamental problems and was in tune with the 
revival of historical reminiscence that all major changes bring about.
Slovak nationalism emerged without the concomitant process of state-building, 
thus nation-building involved the development o f an ethnic population in a territorially 
demarcated zone (ethnocultural nationalism), which meant that the political thought 
centered round national identity and language - all ethnically determined. This tradition is 
of little use for building o f a modem democratic state, particularly not one which 
comprises many minorities, yet it appears that the ethnic notion o f the nation-state as a 
tool for the institutionalisation of national identity prevails in Slovakia, as the following 
section dealing with Slovak nationhood and minority policies illustrates.
4.3. NEW NATIONHOOD AND MINORITY POLICIES
A comparison of Slovakia with its Central European neighbours and in the following 
chapter with Slovenia indicates that the country faces democratisation under less 
favourable conditions then they do. The absence of historical experience with statehood 
cannot be viewed as a determining negative condition, for the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, both newly independent democracies, count among some o f the most 
successful transitions in ECE countries. There is however a crucial difference. In the 
Czech Republic the oppressive communism shared with Slovakia pre-1989, was 
compensated significantly by industrial modernisation largely completed in the 
precommunist period and the less repressed past in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These
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factors helped to create a stronger sense of nationhood and identification with the state 
following the creation of the First Republic. In Slovenia (also Hungary and Poland) a 
degree of liberalisation, however tentative, took place prior to 1989.
Whilst in other countries the independent statehood contributed to uniting the 
society, in Slovakia independence became a divisive issue. The combination o f a higher 
degree of ethnic heterogeneity with greater ethnic polarisation of society and the 
circumstances under which the new state was established contributed significantly to the 
formation of the national elite and the consequent deviation from the transition path 
followed by other comparative states. The processes o f democratisation, nation-building 
and state-building overlapped and were compressed into a very short time with a result 
that democracy and nationhood both suffered from insecurity and the sense of failure. 
The founders of the newly independent Slovakia never really elaborated the concept of 
the future state, except for the notion of a state for Slovaks on which the legitimacy of 
elites was based.
The leading party o f the ruling coalition after having brought independence, 
rather unwittingly and without the wide support of the population, proceeded to seek its 
legitimacy in the establishment o f an independent state. This particularity of Slovakia, 
where nationalist mobilization has significantly increased after independence, as it were 
justifying the fact after the event, is very damaging to finding a consensus among the 
political elites, because it suggests that only certain people deserve the right to act, or 
even argue on behalf o f the nation. The division was not merely ethnic, between Slovak 
and non-Slovak, but was further compounded by ‘good’(pro-separation) and ‘bad’ 
Slovaks (pro-federal), whereby the latter, following this logic, by not having contributed 
to the existence o f the state had no right to govern it.
The building of democracy in Slovakia faces a major challenge, that o f forging a 
workable consensus on the societal and elite level, a more coherent character o f national 
identity which involves the future of the country as much as its national past. At this 
point there is no agreement, not even on the events that could provide an anchor for this 
new redefinition o f identity; to some democrats it is the end of communism in 1989, to 
ex-communists and democrats on the Left the year 1969, which began with the federal 
Constitution of the then Czechoslovak Socialist Federal Republic; to some nationalists 
the 1939 Slovak state. Some o f the more extreme nationalists go back to the Great 
Moravian Empire, yet to other kind of nationalists and some democrats the year 1993 is
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the only beginning of the truly independent democratic Slovakia269. The formation of the 
first Czechoslovak Republic in 1918 is missing, a surprising omission, considering that 
this is when Slovakia began its existence after being called the Upper Hungary for 
centuries.
None of the people I have interviewed, including the most vehement opponents 
o f Meciar, claimed that he was a nationalist; among many criticisms addressed to his 
person, that was the one he was not accused of. Yet it was Meciar who engaged in much 
o f the nationalist rhetoric, some of it taken out o f the vocabulary of ethnic cleansing, 
when he for example suggested the exchange of population between Hungary and 
Slovakia270. Why does a politician seemingly in tune with the public express such views? 
Because nationalism fits the politics of opportunism, it finds resonance in an atmosphere 
o f instability, where the national identity has not arrived at a consensus and is therefore 
easily mobilized against opponents and where democracy is still fighting for survival 
against the poor historical legacy of belated political development.
4.3.1. The ‘Stateforming nation’ and Minorities in Slovak Politics
The difficult question of how to reconcile cultural diversity with political unity is one of 
the major themes in world politics today and an issue of heightened urgency in Slovakia, 
where the minority issue is directly linked to the continuation of the democratic 
transition. The main problem, apart from the speed in which all reforms have to take 
place in an era o f heightened communication, creating a more easily aggravated political 
scene, is the simultaneity of nation and state-building. The nation preceded the state, 
gave rise to its statehood, but was rather badly prepared for that statehood and the 
responsibilities that the ‘stateforming’ nation carries towards the minorities living within 
its territory. Moreover, the largest and the most politically active minority in Slovakia 
considers itself Hungarian. In the Slovak historical experience Hungarians are 
synonymous with the suppression of Slovak language and all things national, thus 
associated with significantly delayed nation-building process (and territorial
259 During all interviews (19 in total) in Slovakia I asked everyone; “when did Slovakia begin” and this 
was the range offered, with the majority divided between 1989 and 1993
270 See the daily press round 9th September 1997
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annexation271). What one observes are the actions of the nationalizing state, its attempts 
to homogenise national culture and redress its historical position, perceived to be weak 
compared to its neighbours.
The process thus described centers round the main question of what is the 
relation of the nation to the state. Whether the nation should adopt the civic or ethnic 
conception cannot be officially put to discussion for two reasons: firstly, Slovakia is a 
multiethnic society, more so than any other neighboring country and that fact cannot be 
changed; secondly, the joining of ‘Europe’ and all international agreements that a new 
state must sign, in order to be accepted by the international community, means that only 
a reasonably civic conception of the nation has to be adopted. Slovakia extends full 
citizenship rights to all her citizens regardless of their ethnic affiliation, so the ethnic/civic 
division does not explain the grievances o f the Hungarian minority (for it must be 
stressed that the issue o f minorities in Slovakia is, at this point in time, confined to 
Hungarians). The tension is actually about the ‘ethnicisation’272 of the political 
community, by way of reaction to the disorientation about its civic identity, following the 
dissolution of the state that embodied and inspired that civic identity. Both groups are in 
the process o f redefining their national identity; Hungarians who did not want an 
independent Slovakia and Slovaks who having established an autonomous state are 
seeking to justify it with all the consequences that the re-assertion of national identity 
brings.
If citizenship implies the membership of a political community, then in Slovakia 
one cannot speak of formal exclusion from citizenship as was the case with ethnic 
Russians in the Baltic states. It is rather an implicit and informal division between 
Slovaks, the state-forming group and the owners o f self-determining state, and ‘the 
others’, who are seen as less deserving o f control in that state. In principle the demands 
of the Hungarian minority, which constitutes the majority in Southern Slovakia, are 
based on a similar idea of self-determination (i.e. control over their region) and that is 
precisely the point o f tension - the control over the territory and the preservation of the
271 The annexation of Subcarpathian region in the Second World War marks the beginning of the Slovak 
experience with the Hungarian iredenta and the basis for the Slovak nationalist anti-Hungarian 
mobilisation. The mistrust is matched on the other side by the 1945- 48 Czechoslovak policies which 
declared Hungarians and Germans collectively guilty and led to tragic population moves and severe 
discrimination policies untill the communist takeover in 1948.
272 the term borrowed from S.Zizek ‘Multiculturalism, or the Cultural Logic of Multinational
Capitalism’ in New Left Review 225 September/ October 1997 pp.28-52 p. 42
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“immediate” identity273 and the way of life. Citizenship takes on a different meaning, not 
who should be the citizen, but what is he/she expected to do to win the trust and join in 
the rewards of the nation-state. The ‘price’ for the admission into citizenship is expected 
to be paid, usually in the form of conforming to the dominant culture. Thus, the civic or 
ethnic division is fought out by proxy, not through citizenship, but by pushing the limits 
o f  democracy and testing how many ‘goods’ it can secure for the majority. That is where 
such issues as the Language Laws, disputes about signs, territorial reforms, the control 
over budgets for cultural activities, quarrels about what language school reports should 
be written in etc. come in, all in order to distinguish the real ‘nation-builders’, the ones 
who gave the name to the new state, from other citizens.
4.3.2. Legal Status of Minorities in Slovakia274
Approximately 14% 275o f the Slovak population (5.6 million) declares themselves to be 
o f other than Slovak nationality. The most numerous is the Hungarian minority with 
nearly 11% of the population (567 300), concentrated in the South near the borders with 
Hungary. The second most numerous minority is Romany, officially recognized since 
1991(1,7% 76 000), but the estimated number is much higher and could be up to 250 
000276 , followed by the Czech minority (59 300). Other smaller minorities are Rusyns, in 
the east o f the country (approximately 30 500)277, Germans, Poles and Bulgarians; the 
remaining Jewish population declare themselves Slovak. All minorities have cultural 
associations and institutions and regular press.
As far as political representation is concerned, only the Hungarian minority is 
represented in parliament (and since 1998 in the government) which reflects their
~73 see S.Zizek ‘Multiculturalism, or the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism’ p. 42 for the 
distinction between the primary (primordial, immediate) identity and the secondary (nation-state, 
citizenship) and the tension the reassertion of the former causes in today’s world.
74 Statistics from O.Dostal ‘Men§iny’ in M.Butora P.Huncik Slovensko 1995 Suhrna Sprava o Stave 
Spolocnosti Bratislava, Nadacia Sandora Maraiho 1996 p.51-52
275 •It is estimated that the actual figure could be between 18-20%, for not all members of minorities 
claim that status.
This is a figure according to the local governemnts in 1989, which is the highest percentage of the 
Romany in any state in Europe. See A.Jurova Vyvoj Romskej Problematiky na Slovenskupo roku 1945 
Ko§ice, Goldpress Publishers 1993
There is a division between Rusyns about whether they belong to a distinct ethnic group, or 
Ukrainians (17 200 the former, 13 300 the latter), but on the whole this is the most assimilated among 
the more numerous minorities and their distinctiveness is more of a religious nature, as they belong to
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position in political life as the ‘measure’ o f the extent o f Slovak democracy. On the other 
hand, the ever increasing problems of the Romany, mainly socio-economic and racist are 
possibly o f greater urgency, but are largely ignored in politics278. There are two Romany 
political parties worth mentioning, the ROI (Romska Obcianska Iniciativa/ The Romany 
Civic Imtiative) whose representative is a member of the Government’s Council for 
Minorities, but has so far not managed to gain any influence, and the new, much more 
energetic and promising party RIS (Romska Inteligencia za Spolunazivanie/the Romany 
Intelligencia for Coexisting), which works mostly at local government level.
In September 1995 Slovakia ratified the Council o f Europe’s ‘Framework 
Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities’, including Recommendation 
1201279 which recommends the collective rights of minorities, but is not legally binding.
In an attempt to settle the old disputes with Hungary, thus making membership of the 
EU speedier, a bilateral Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation 
between the Slovak Republic and the Republic o f Hungary’, incorporating 
Recommendation 1201 was signed (Paris, March 1995), but it took a year and further 
measures to ratify the Treaty (March 1996, the Hungarian government signed June
1995). It seems that in order to pacify the more nationalistic elements in the Slovak 
parliament a declaration had to be added which rejected the notion of collective rights, 
thus implying also the impossibility of establishing autonomous self-governing regions 
based on ethnic principles, and also a law was passed on The Slovak State Language 
(November 1995, see below). Consequently, the tension between the Slovak government 
and the Hungarian minority became an integral part o f the Slovak political scene, 
particularly in the 1994-98 period. According to the Hungarian representatives, the 
language law, the territorial reforms (the change of districts in order to reduce the 
number of districts with the Hungarian majority) and the reduction in cultural subsidies
either the Greek Orthodox Church, or the Russian Orthodox Church. The dialects of the region are 
practically indistinquishable from their language.
The Romany are often a target of racist attacks from which they are not sufficiently protected by the 
police, moreover the unemployment of the Romanies is 40-50%. All in all the issue would need a serious 
attention, funding and long-term policies - no political party is willing to approach such an unpopular 
programme.
The text that most concerned the Slovak parties reads: ..’’minority shall have the right to have at their 
disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific 
historical and territorial situation...” in J.Batt The New Slovakia London, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1996 p.32
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made a mockery of the Treaty and showed “that nationalism has become the official state 
policy”280.
4.3.3. The Constitution281
The Slovak Constitution was adopted on 1 September 1992. It consists o f nine main 
parts (Hlavy). The rights o f national minorities and ethnic groups are dealt with in 
Chapter 4 (Fundamental rights and freedoms), namely articles 33 and 34, which have 
been coordinated with the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. The main points are:
art.33 • membership in any national minority or ethnic group must not be to anyone’s 
detriment
art.34 • citizens belonging to national minorities or ethnic groups are guaranteed the 
all-round development, particularly the right to develop with other members of 
the minority their culture, the right to spread and receive information in their 
mother tongue, to associate in associations based on their nationality, establish 
and maintain educational and cultural institutions. Details to be determined by 
law.
I'll in addition to the right to learn the state language, citizens belonging to 
national minorities or ethnic groups are also guaranteed under the conditions 
to be determined by law:
a) the right to be educated in their language
b) the right to use their language in official contact
c) the right to participate in solutions concerning national minorities and ethnic groups 
131 the exercise of rights by citizens of minorities... guaranteed by this 
constitution, must not lead to threats to sovereignty, nor territorial integrity of
the Slovak Republic or discrimination of other citizens in the Republic.
This constitution was a great improvement on the Constitutional Charter adopted 
following the end of communism (January 1991) by the Federal Assembly o f the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, which was meant to improve the Constitutional Act on Minorities 
from 1968, but in fact offered even fewer legal guarantees. All Hungarian MP’s walked
280
28] *nterv'ew L.Hokathe spokesman MK 17.9.1997
Ustava Slovenskej Republiky Bratislava NVK International 1992. All translation myself.
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out o f parliament, in protest, during the signing of the Constitution and it remains the 
subject o f constant criticism by some Slovak representatives and international 
organizations282.
There are two points in the articles cited above that immediately spring to
attention. Firstly, the twice repeated clause ‘to be determined by law’, which makes the
granting of these rights amendable by law. A simple majority in parliament can produce
such a change and defeat the Constitution283. Secondly, article 3 4 13/, which is concerned
with the threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Many actions of minorities (and
there is no doubt that this paragraph has been drafted with Hungarians in mind) could be
construed as threatening, even a demand for more control over their own affairs, which
is guaranteed under the above paragraph. It is an example of mistrust by the state
towards the citizens who do not belong to the national majority. The change of
Constitution is one of the pledges o f the new post-1998 government.
Having said that, the escape clauses in the Constitution would probably not have
led to such severe criticism, if they were not preceded by the preamble that set the tone
o f the document in such a blatantly pro-Slovak mode. Assuming that the purpose of the
preamble is to situate the text in the larger context, then the debate and objections it
inspired is deserved. It reads:
We, the Slovak Nation, in memory o f the political and cultural heritage o f 
our predecessors and centuries long experiences o f struggles for national
existence and stateness........ historical message o f Great M oravia.........
together with the members o f national minorities and ethnic groups living
in the territory o f the Slovak Republic,....... in the interest o f lasting
cooperation.... thus we, the citizens o f Slovak Republic..................
More so then the actual operative articles, the preamble makes a clear distinction 
between the Slovak nation and other citizens. It puts minorities, even if involved in the 
aims and interests o f the new state, explicitly into second place, and thus implicitly leaves 
no doubt as to who the ‘owners’ o f the state are and where their preeminence lies. The 
reference to Great Moravia is a particularly tactless and unnecessary reminder of the 
non-Slavic tribes, the ancestors of today’s Hungarians, whose occupation of the region 
ended the purported Slovak independence for 10 centuries.
~82 The post-1998 government is preparing the change of this Constitution
83 Interview with L.Hoka the spokesman for the SMK
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4.3.4. The Slovak State Language Law284
The law, which consists o f 13 articles, took effect from 1 January 1996 and nullified the
previous Law on the Official Language from 1990 (article 12). It is argued that by doing
this it created a legal vacuum, because the previous law granted the free use of minority
languages, also towards the administrative authorities, in communities where the
minority exceeds 20%, whereas this law makes no such claim. Instead it appears to
contain a number of ‘separate law’ referrals, a proliferation of restrictions and contrary
articles with one effect - the restriction o f the use o f “minority languages in the majority
o f social spheres”285. Similarly as in the case o f the constitution, the Hungarian minority
representatives were offended by its preamble and ‘The Justification’ document which
hardly masks the intention of ‘ethmcisation’ of the state and the ‘readjustment’ of
historical wrongs, rather than the actual law. It is important to keep in mind the fact that
in the regions where the majority o f the population consists o f minorities, a normal
situation is such that most officials, shopkeepers, doctors etc. speak the minority
language and therefore the problem of the law lies in the possible implications it carries,
rather than influencing the practicalities of daily lives.
The preamble starts off:
“The Slovak National Council, based on the fact that the Slovak language 
is the most important feature o f the uniqueness o f the Slovak nation, the 
most precious asset o f its cultural heritage, the expression o f the sovereignty 
o f the Slovak Republic and generally the general tool o f communication for 
her citizens, which on the territory of the Slovak Republic, secures their 
freedom and equality in their dignity ...”
The justification286 attached to the draft version submitted to parliament explains further 
that with the codification o f the language, “Slovak national unity was established” and 
that from the 18th century the Slovak language had to withstand the “aggressive pressure 
o f the Hungarian language”. It continues with a chronology of various laws adopted by 
the Hungarian court, from 1792 when Hungarian became a compulsory subject in every 
school, to 1907 Apponyi laws which Magyarized the last few public elementary schools.
It ends with the 1920 Constitutional law of the Republic o f Czechoslovakia that did not
Zbierka Zakonov 270/ 1995 Narodnej Rady Slovenskej Republiky z 15. November 1995 o statnom
J-yku  Slovenskej republiky - translations myself
The Slovak State Language Law and the Minorities Minority Protection Association p.33
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recognize two official languages but only one Czechoslovak language. One cannot but
conclude that this justification is not about the building of a new state and its future, but
about the revenge of the former ‘victims’ who are now in charge.
The second part adds the most questionable argument o f this law, when it says
that “Slovaks comprise the only state-forming element o f the Slovak republic”, an
argument that begs the question about the role of non-Slovaks in the new state.
However, it is the same Constitution in which “the fundamental freedoms are guaranteed
regardless o f the sex, race, colour, language, belonging to a minority.... and nobody can
suffer disadvantage due to these causes” (article 12 til). Also the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities states that:
states shall take measures where required to ensure that persons belonging 
to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality 
before the law (art.4.1)287.
The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection o f Minorities of 
which Slovakia is a signatory states that: “..any discrimination based on belonging to a 
national minority shall be prohibited” (art.4.1) and more importantly: “the parties
undertake to recognize that every person.... has the right to use freely and without
interference .... minority language, in private and in public, orally and in writing” (art. 10).
The Law Itself
art. 1/4/ “ the law does not regulate the use of the languages of national minorities... the 
use of these languages is regulated by separate laws”, 
yet the only law that so far regulated the use of minority languages (20% threshold) is 
nullified by article 12 of the same document288, 
art. 3 Use of the State Language in Official Contact:
AH the following quotations from the justification are from the Minority Protection Association as 
above as well as all excerpts from the Framework Convention
P.Thomberry UN Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities London, Minority Rights Group 1993
10.7.1999 Law on the use of minority language came into operation (Zbierka Zakonov c. 184/1999, 
published 24.7.1999). This law brought back the use of minority language in the communities exceeding 
20% members belonging to minority in official contact with authorities. The Hungarian deputies 
rejected this law in the parliament. It was signed by all Slovak parties and the signing was accompanied 
by opposition’s singing of a nationalist song known from the time of the Slovak State (R.Chmel OS/8 
August 1999).
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1 .“state agencies and organizations, organs o f territorial self-governments 
and public institutions are obliged to use the state language in exercise of 
their competencies.... proof of adequate proficiency in speaking and 
writing the state language is a condition for employment or engagement in 
other types o f work situations and is a prerequisite to specified contractual 
work for public bodies.
3. In the state language c) “are recorded all official documents (birth registers, 
m inutes,.... information intended for public dissemination), and official 
documents o f the churches intended for the public 
5. citizens prepare all written submissions to public bodies in the state 
language”.
In the justification it is remarked that the rights o f citizens to use their minority language 
is primarily regulated by the Constitution (article 34, the right to use the minority 
language in official contacts, see above), but that is contrary to point 5 of the above, 
which demands all written submissions in Slovak. Moreover, the ‘proof of adequate 
proficiency’ is a vague term, because not only does it not explain the criteria of 
‘adequate’, or who is to provide this proof, but could limit the job opportunities for 
minority members, particularly in the civil service, thus directly influence the local 
governments and take away the right “to participate in matters concerning the national 
minorities” ( art.34/2/ o f the Constitution). 
art.5 Education:
1 .’’Instruction o f the state language in all elementary and secondary schools is 
compulsory. Any language other than the state language can only be the 
language o f  instruction to the extent prescribed by separate regulations.
3.All educational documentation is written in the state language”.
The language law on education (above in a much shortened version) is justified among 
others by an explanation that “ large volumes of instructional tools from Hungary 
containing irredentist material appears in the schools of Southern Slovakia”, materials 
which “evoke nostalgia toward the former Hungary” and students are not “taught to 
respect the Slovak homeland in which they live”. This may possibly be true, but on the 
other hand this law eliminated the hitherto bilingual school reports and diplomas from 
bilingual schools, which unnecessarily increased tension in an already charged
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atmosphere between the Hungarian representatives and the government. It must be 
remarked that so far the Rusyn community, equally affected by these laws, has not made 
it an issue, which shows that at this point in time the Rusyn minority seems much more at 
ease in Slovakia than the Hungarian one. This could be explained by the fact that 
historically there are no grievances between the two communities, and that the Slovak 
government, possibly to prove the point, is more amenable to Rusyns in awarding 
subsidies. Moreover, there is no other state whose protection Rusyns seek and therefore 
they are not, unlike Hungarians, accused of damaging the international reputation of 
Slovakia, nor are they a subject of any other resentments.
The restrictions concern further the use o f minority languages in broadcasting 
(art. 5) which means that all television and other audio-visual programmes have to be 
subtitled in Slovak and that all minority broadcasts by local television stations must be 
accompanied by identical broadcasts in Slovak. Considering the time and money involved 
in subtitling and translating, the law succeeds in substantially reducing live minority 
programmes.
Another point o f contention is art.7 and 8, about Courts and Health Care 
according to which all contacts occur in the state language, but do not affect “citizens or 
foreigners unfamiliar with the state language”, in which case a mutually understandable 
language can be used. The comparison of minorities to foreigners appeared offensive and 
since all citizens have to learn Slovak at school, strictly speaking a doctor would not 
have to communicate in other than Slovak with a Slovak citizen, which would cause 
problems with the elderly in some localities. However, only strictly speaking, because in 
practice this would hardly occur.
By saying that Slovak nationhood is insecure, I also mean measures such as the 
above laws and the constitution which have as their main goal the confirmation of 
Slovakness as the preeminent identity in the state. These measures thus undermine the 
very concept o f democratic citizenship in a multiethnic state. Without excusing the 
Slovak exaltation of their ethnicity, one must keep in mind that it is a novelty in their 
history, which has been marked by the feelings o f resentment, mostly caused by their 
second class citizen status within the Austro-Hungarian empire and what they always 
considered a disadvantaged position within Czechoslovakia. The concept of ethnic
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equality and tolerance is not compelling enough to a politically inexperienced, culturally 
less acknowledged and “sociologically insecure nation”289.
As the development o f the national question in the first section indicated, the 
Slovak apprenticeship into the politics of ethnic identity has been more successful than 
with respect to civic identity. The result is a situation where their state is regarded as an 
expression of Slovak national identity, an achievement of their national consciousness. 
The consequence is that minorities, even if tolerated, are not given the incentive to feel 
more than a bare acceptance of the state, thus confirming their lack of affiliation, a 
suspicion they are already accused of - a vicious circle impeding the process o f forging 
a new political community which should be the basis o f the new state.
4.4. THE 1998 ELECTIONS AND NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR DEMOCRACY
“In December 1989, when I wrote texts for histoiy books, I had to explain to teachers 
and students what is a coalition and what is the opposition. Today these concepts are well 
understood. A certain democratic school is behind us”290.
The general elections 25-6 September 1998 and the victory of political parties claiming 
unequivocal commitment to liberal democracy, economic transformation and closer ties 
with the West, instead o f their predecessors’ at best ambivalent attitude to those goals 
signaled a turning point in the direction of Slovakia’s transition to democracy. As there is 
no historical or political inevitability for a transition to democracy to actually become 
one, these elections do not spell a consolidation of democracy in Slovakia, but they offer 
a reasonable chance for a change. As such the post-1998 period can be viewed as the 
beginning o f the ‘third transition’ in Slovakia (1990 -1993 as the first and 1994-98 as the 
second attempt) and this is where the account o f Slovakia’s political and national 
development finishes as far as this thesis is concerned.
4.4.1. Coalition of Coalitions
Jacques Rupnik, the French political analyst specialising in ECE politics, commented 
after the elections that “the next problem is the unity of the winning coalition, because
289
G.Schopflin ‘Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities in Post-Communist Europe’ in R.Caplan & J.Feffer 
Europe’s New Nationalism New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1996 p. 155
290 Historian L.Liptak in an interview in OS December 98/12 p.30
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that is a coalition of coalitions, which in themselves consist o f many different political 
streams”. He also asserted that the only way this coalition can survive the next 4 years is 
if the leaders can put aside personal and party interests in favour o f common interest, 
because the fragi le quality o f this coalition is made even more fragile by the dire 
economic situation it inherited. He further expressed the view that even if it is difficult to 
describe the political profile o f this new coalition, with its left orientation (SDL and 
SOP), he saw it as “the weakening of a national-populist orientation, which hitherto 
dominated the Slovak politics”-91. The most important parties/coalitions and election 
results were as follows (the new government coalition is indicated with asterisk * and 
explanation only in the case o f parties previously not mentioned):
HzDS - Movement for Democratic Slovakia (ex-coalition leader)
SDK - Slovak Democratic coalition. Coalition o f  five parties transformed into one party: KDH 
(Christian Democrats); DS(Democratic Party); SDSS(Social-Democrats);
SZS(Green Party); DU(Democratic Union);
SMK- Hungarian Coalition. Also an amalgam o f three parties: MKDH (Hungarian Christian 
Democrats); MOS (Hungarian Civic Party); Spoluzitie (Coexistence)
SDL- Party o f Democratic Left
SOP -Party o f Civic Understanding/ Strana Obcianskeho Porozumenia. A new party
formed 6 months prior to the elections by the Mayor o f Kosice (now President), a
party o f technocrats comprising many ex-communists with a strong message (even if a
lesser emphasis on the method) o f  political dialogue, European integration and a
transparent completion o f privatisation, social orientation in social policies and liberal in 
economy.
SNS - Slovak National Party(ex-coalition partner)
KSS - Communist party
ZRS - Association of Workers (ex-coalition partner)













1994: HzDS 34.96%; SDL 10.41; SNS 5.4; ZRS 7.34; SMK 10.18
New coalition’s parliamentary majority: 93 seats, 90(3/5) needed to achieve constitutional reform 
Turnout: 84.24%
Source: SM E  28.9.1998 Further “Kto?Preco?Ako?” Slovenske Volby ‘98 Bratislava,
IVO 1999 and V.Krivy in “Slovensko 1998-99” Bratislava, IVO 1999
4.4.2. Analysis of the Political Structure Post-1998
There are two important points worth noting about this election. First, the will to 
overthrow Meciar’s government was greater than disagreements between the coalition 
partners. Second, the HzDS despite the highest number o f votes faced opponents who if 
not united among themselves were united in hostility towards Meciar which blocked any 
possibility o f the HzDS forming a government.
Political hostility, distrust and uncertainty characterised politics in Slovakia in the 
turbulent pre-election year, in which the presidential powers were in the absence of the 
President transferred to Meciar and the President o f the parliament I.Gasparovic (also 
the vice-chairman of the HzDS). Among many incidents that seriously concerned the 
OSCE was the HzDS petition to the Supreme Court to cancel the SDK’s registration in 
order to exclude the main opposition from the elections (Constitutional Court confirmed 
their registration), the storming o f the SDK’s meeting by the police on grounds of drugs 
being sold and the gross misuse of the state television in HzDS campaign (private
152
television Markfza was also accused of the unbalanced broadcasts in favour o f the 
opposition)292.
From about 1996 the opinion polls signaled that the strongest party o f the 
government the HzDS was not getting more than 28% o f  votes, whilst the amalgamation 
of the opposition votes consistently reached over 50%, nearing what could be a majority 
in the parliament. Hence, the efforts to block the opposition through legislative methods 
followed. The first attempt to change the electoral system from a proportional to a 
combination system was introduced by the geo-administrative change of districts parallel 
to the HzDS dominance in the districts, based on an assumption that the fragmentation of 
the opposition under the new districts and the combination system would lead to their 
almost certain defeat. The smaller partners ZRS and SNS fearing the loss o f influence, 
possibly existence, radically opposed the change of electoral system, but not the geo- 
admimstrative changes which went ahead anyway293.
At that time three opposition parties, KDH, DU and the small DS formed a right- 
centre ‘blue coalition’ which declared the intention to form an electoral coalition and the 
will to cooperate with other democratic parties. In 1997, the all-party initiative (except 
the SDL) for a referendum (see above) led to a closer cooperation of all opposition 
parties including the Hungarian parties. In July 1997 the SDK was formed, whose 
strategy was to reduce the dominance of the HzDS and eliminate the possibility o f the 
loss o f votes for the smaller DS, SZS and SDSS. The first opinion polls proved the 
strategy well founded with the SDK reaching over 30%294.
The next step by the government in order to prevent the formation of coalitions 
which would affect the position of the HzDS was to change the electoral law, so that 
each party within a coalition had to reach 5% quota (May 1998, 5 months prior to the 
general election). The adoption o f this law indeed ended the formation of coalitions 
which was precisely its intention, but ironically the law which was meant to eliminate the 
main opposition blocs, the SDK and SMK, resulted in its creator’s demise.
The Hungarian parties, used to cooperation and coordination even prior to the 
change in electoral law, chose to form one party, the SMK, in which the original member
i SfCe Kr°n,ka udal°sti v roku 1998’ in Slovensko 1998-99. Also T.Waters ‘Slovak parliamentary 
elections Conflict Studies Research Centre by Ministry of Defence November 1998 pp.7-9
« ° ,an^eS re8*ons and districts reduced the number of the Hungarian representatives and the 
a e mg awarded for cultural association - the territorial reforms were severely criticised by the 
Hungarian minority representatives (Interview with their spokedsman L.Hoka 17.9.1999)
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parties lost their identity and continuity at all levels, from the grass roots to the top. The 
two main ideological streams within the Hungarian movement, the Christian-democrats 
and liberals, determined one list o f candidates according to the proportional preferences 
among their voters. The SDK chose the strategy o f one electoral party with one list of 
candidates, but the parties remained independent, they simply did not stand in elections. 
There are various reasons for this, mostly the disparate ideological orientation o f the 
member parties, the consequent fear o f loss of identity, thus membership in international 
party organisations and the personal ambitions o f well established political figures from 
the large KDH and DU. The maintenance of the individual parties’ identity is currently 
proving a great problem for the unity o f the SDK and its leader the Prime Minister 
Mikulas Dzurinda295, thus posing the greatest danger to the new government’s 
stability296.
4.4.3. New Prospects for Democracy?
Broad coalitions across the left to right political spectrum have become a feature of 
Slovak politics. The question is whether it is a sign of a maturing political system, or a 
sign of yet another critical election, in conditions o f an unstable undetermined 
democracy. It is possibly both; the elections were critical. Nevertheless the fear of 
irregular elections never materialised, the turnout was high, the outgoing government 
accepted the defeat and a strong desire for change was demonstrated by elites and 
population alike. The fundamental axis of political division in the period between 1993- 
1998 has evolved round the normative relationship to parliamentary democracy, 
constitutionalism, European integration, independence and the principles of rule o f law. 
The division was deep and compounded by the ethnic division. The current government 
resembles something of a ‘grand coalition’, in which the ideological Left-Right division 
appears less important and the ethnic cleavage is considerably weakened by the 
Hungarian presence in the government297.
294 the daily Ndrodnd Obroda 8.9.1997 HzDS 27.8% SDK 32.6%
295 •
From within the coalition there are attempts to replace Dzurinda, who is viewed as weak to head such 
a broad coalition and also from other coalition partners, who feel that “the country cannot be run by a 
man who is under constant attacks from his own party” Ndrodnd Obroda 16.8.1999
“We need first of all to stabilise the government”, says the ex-President M.Kovac in an interview for 
SME 16.8.1999.
297
G.Meseznikov ‘Volby 1998 a vyvoj systemu politickych stran’ M.Butora ed. Kto?Preco?Ako? p.45
154
Hungarian Issue
M.Duray, the founder o f the Coexistence party and one o f the most prominent 
Hungarian minority representatives, commented on the new situation by saying that: “ 
the fact that SMK has entered government as an independent party constitutes a 
historical change for which we waited for eighty years”298. The presence of the 
Hungarian SMK in the ruling coalition is not merely symbolic and hopefully will not be 
limited to the minority issues. After years of confrontation, the presence of this politically 
highly mobilised minority in the executive (three ministerial posts in the new government, 
including the vice-chairman of the government for minority issues and regional 
development) and in the legislature (vice-chairman of the Parliament and leaders of the 
parliamentary committees) must lead to a substantial change in Slovak-Hungarian 
relations.
It signals a significant move towards the elimination of the ‘Hungarian issue’ in 
Slovak politics, thus the acceptance of the multicultural character of the state and the 
importance of minority participation in democratic politics. The most important 
implication is that this change could finally remove nationalism from political life, which 
would show that nationalism is not inherent to Slovak or any other society. It would also 
demonstrate that the level of nationalist mobilisation depends on political developments 
in the state and on national elites, who can instrumentalise, reduce or even eliminate 
nationalism according to their commitment to democracy. Ethnic identities despite their 
pervasiveness are not unchanging; affiliation to the state and the strengthening of civic 
identity is a matter o f politics, and the minority-majority relationship reflects those 
politics.
On a Less Optimistic Note
There are several obstacles that the ‘third transition’ in Slovakia is facing. Firstly, the 
stability o f the current coalition SDK-SMK-SDL-SOP depends on the unity of its 
strongest member the SDK, which will be difficult to maintain, particularly due to the 
KDH’s ambition to form a modem conservative party with a broad electoral base. The 
SOP does not rely on a stable electorate, its success being rooted mostly in the
298 t\ •Post-election interviews in Domino Forum 7 5.11.1998
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popularity of its founder R.Schuster and in the fact that it entered the political scene at 
the height of pre-election turbulence when some voters became disillusioned and 
undecided. Its overall Left orientation could destabilise the current configuration towards 
the SDL-SOP-SDSS alliance. There are many possible permutations, the point of which 
is that the ruling coalition’s raison d’etre was the removal of Meciar which in itself is a 
negative programme and cannot sustain the difficult future this government is facing. The 
increase in electoral popularity o f the nationalist SNS is also notable; together with the 
still strong HzDS they are forming a very destabilizing element in the parliament299, 
under conditions o f devastated economy and 14.1% unemployment. If the lesson of the 
previous years is to be learned the democratic transition in its third stage, after having 
come to terms with minority problems is now facing a new task, that of pacification of 
the HzDS and the nationalists in order to prevent another backlash from the nationalist- 
populist forces in Slovak politics.
4.5. CONCLUSION
In the third chapter I have argued that nationalism is a part of transition, but does not 
necessarily assist the transition. Nationalism’s compatibility depends on certain 
conditions which are contingent on various processes, such as historical, political and 
national development, the mode o f attainment o f independence, the resultant elite 
formation and ethnic composition. The troubled Slovak transition as presented above 
demonstrated the validity of this claim. The underlying argument was that 
postcommunist development depends largely on the legacy of communism and the period 
before that, and that the successful transition to democracy requires the construction of a 
political community whose unity is rooted in commitment to the democratisation project 
rather than in ethnic identity.
The general motif running through the analysis o f the Slovak transition was that 
of the insecure democracy being further undermined by the tendency to seek issues of 
national unity and identity, which are both insecure, due to the developments of the 
recent and distant past. The priority given to nation-building was reinforced by political
299 In the municipal elections in December 1998 the HzDS and SNS scored highly, folowed by the KDH. 
At the visit to the SDL headquaters in May 1999 (in conversation with G.Baranyi) I was reminded of
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elites who after having secured independence rather unwittingly and without a 
convincing support o f the whole population tried to legitimise their leadership and inflate 
the legitimacy o f the state with excessive appeals to ethnic solidarity, thus excluding 
minorities and ignoring political opposition.
The interesting question deriving from the above account o f the new political 
situation after the 1998 elections is whether the change towards more democracy and 
civic integration means that nationalism has exhausted its influence on the political 
process in Slovakia. If  so, is it because the change of elites means a greater commitment 
to democracy, or because nationalism has exhausted its appeal now that processes o f the 
state-building and nation-building are felt to be completed? It would appear that 
nationalism is an indispensable element o f every democratisation process in a newly 
independent state, but only for a certain period of time, which depends on how secure 
the nation has become in its identity and in the purpose o f its state.
The above leads me to a set o f propositions to be tested against the following 
case o f Slovenia:
1) nation-building and state-building are parallel processes in newly independent 
postcommunist democracies. However, the continuation of the democratisation process 
requires that at some point nation-building retreats in favour of state-building.
2) The role of nationalism in the democratisation process is partially predetermined by 
historical and political developments concerning national recognition and identity.
3) The success o f democratisation depends further on the level o f consensus about basic 
rules; between elites and the population and between ethnic groups, thus a less polarized 
society, whether ethnically or politically starts from a more advantageous position.
that fact and told that SDL’s efforts over the next four years will concentrate on anti-HzDS campaign, in 
order to win the next elections.
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Chapter 5
NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN YUGOSLAVIA: THE 
CASE OF SLOVENIA
5.1. INTRODUCTION
Slovenia300 like other nations in Eastern and Central Europe has embarked on an 
independent course, prompted by special historical, political and cultural circumstances, 
among which the socialist past is particularly significant301. Independence, as much as it 
is possibly the most important factor in the Slovene history thus far, is accompanied by 
another all encompassing change in the socio-economic system. If ethnicity and socialism 
defined all that current Slovenia is, its boundaries, its Yugoslav past and political and 
economic heritage, much influenced by self-management socialism, its future must 
incorporate some of the attributes that made that change possible.
Slovene Independence302
Slovenia was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for centuries, which, as far as 
Slovenes, Croats and the other Slav populations were concerned, never managed to 
solve the issue o f equality of nations adequately. For that reason, when the empire 
collapsed after the First World war, the Southern Slav nations formed the State o f 
Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which after a very short existence merged with the Kingdom 
of Serbia (already including the Kingdom of Montenegro) and established the State of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - under the centralizing pressures o f Serbia soon known as 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (after King Alexander introduced a dictatorship in 1929).
30! ^ oven'a comPrises some 20 000 km2 and has a population of 2 million.
P.Klinar ‘Ethnic Conflicts in Postsocialist Societies in Europe’ in S.Devetak ed.Kleine Nationen und 
Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas Munchen, Slavica Verlag Dr.Anton Kovac 1993 p.287, 
henceforth known as Kleine Nationen..
For the history of Slovania see: J.Prunk A Brief History o f  Slovenia Ljubljana, Zalozba Grad 1996;
J.Benderly E.Kraft Independent Slovenia London, Macmillan Press 1997; L.Cohen “Broken Bonds" 
Boulder, Oxford, Westview Press 1996
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After the Second World War the Communist party of Yugoslavia, having 
successfully combined national liberation struggles with the proletarian revolution 
managed to create a federal state303. In an attempt to finally resolve the ‘national issue’ in 
the federation, each of the constitutions that followed involved a greater degree of 
autonomy for the individual republics, until finally the Constitution o f the Socialist 
Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (SFRY) of 1974 defined the federal units as states and 
acknowledged their right to self-determination. Following the process o f constitutional 
amendments to the Federal Constitution o f 1974304, which started in 1988 and reflected 
the fact that political and social developments in Slovenia had far outgrown the other 
republics, the Slovene people in The Plebiscite on the Independence and Sovereignty305 
adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia in December 1990.
Slovenian Transition
The following section on the disintegration of Yugoslavia in no way does justice to the 
complexity of its causes and the tragedy of its consequences, but will be touched upon in 
order to explain the position of Slovenia and why it viewed extrication from the 
federation as the only way to guarantee the continuation of the democratisation process 
that was ongoing from the early 1980s. It has been suggested earlier that the crucial 
point of comparison with Slovakia is precisely the reasons behind the secession - 
independence in both countries was a result o f the transition to democracy, but for 
opposed reasons - in the case of Slovakia the extrication from the Czech Republic was an 
unintended result o f the Slovak attempt to slow down the pace o f economic and political 
reforms. In both cases it appears that the federal state, as a whole, was unable to 
complete the transition in a tempo acceptable and suitable to all its constituent units, 
whether for political, cultural, historical or social reasons, but mostly due to the
Yugoslav federation and its political system were initially based on the Soviet model. The 
introduction o f ‘self-management’ in the 1950’s brought changes in the official rhetoric and ideology 
and set Yugoslavia on the separate path to the rest of the communist bloc, which ultimately led to 
various reforms in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.304 , t _ 7
The process started in 1988 and was meant to harmonise the increasing democratisation in Slovenia 
with the Federal Constitution. Among hundred amendments that the Slovene parliament adopted the 
most important were: the introduction of the political pluralism (Amendment IX) and the reconfirmation 
of the right to self-determination of the Slovene nation (Amendment X) and intensive economic and 
social reforms. See M.Zagar ‘The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia’ in D.Fink-Hafner T.Cox ed. 
Into Europe? Perspectives from Britain and Slovenia Ljubljana, Scientific Library of Faculty of Social 
Sciences 1996, henceforth Into Europe?
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combination of all o f these factors. Whilst Slovakia was not ready for the necessary 
steps, Slovenia was far ahead of the other306 republics within the former Yugoslavia
Equally, in both cases an essentially ethnic community became an inner condition 
for a political and legal community o f a modem state and entered the world o f global 
integration where there is little room for particularism, which in itself poses a number of 
dilemmas about democracy and its ability to reconcile political and cultural pluralism 
with the homogenizing tendencies o f a new state. As will become apparent Slovenia 
struggles with the above dilemma more successfully than Slovakia.
The process o f transition by its very nature throws society into a turmoil, the 
outcome of which will depend on that society’s resources. If the differences in dynamics 
o f transition and different conceptions o f democratisation have affected the continuation 
o f federation (Czechoslovak and Yugoslav), then we can also argue that these are the 
factors that will affect the continuation of democratisation too. As the postcommunist 
transitions have crystallised it appears that the only common link between them is that 
they were communist. That however means that a number o f political and socio­
economic dilemmas are shared by those countries and that the best way to identify causes 
o f varying national outcomes is the systematic comparison between them; thus, that the 
general conclusions about the process of the transition can be made only in the 
framework of comparative analysis”307. By the same token, when dealing with the 
transition o f a particular country, the awareness o f these differences is equally important.
The case o f Slovenia in this thesis will be dealt with as a very special case308 
among postcommunist transitions. That is so for the following reasons:
1) Former Yugoslavia was the most liberal among all socialist states (by liberal is meant 
the less harsh level o f repression and the ideology o f self-management, which permitted a 
limited degree of political pluralism, defined as a pluralism o f self-managing interests). It
inden!^ T  2 3  P f cemb(f  1 9 9 0  wher(%  the overwhelming majority of voters (8 8 .2 %) voted for
306 e (electoral turnout 93.2%)
region andathee°rfpI ,; f SlaVia “  absolu±elytessential to rec°gnise ‘he immensely turbulent history o f  the
influence of^hesp H ff8  ^  ^  c,vilisations> religions, languages and peoples. The
nfluence of these differences resulted m very divergent levels of economic, social, cultural and
S t a t e l y  Political developments in the different parts of the former Yugoslavia
S,oven a r - r nk ‘Cha"g 'ngiSo^'aluStructure “  Process of Transition from Socialism: the Case of 
Stom na paper prepared for the 6 8 th Annual Pacific Sociological Association meeting San Diego, 
California, April 17-20,1997 p.2, henceforth M.Hafher 1997
‘S'0 Venia’ “  HNeuhold P-Havlik A.Suppan Political and Economic Transformation in 
ast C entral Europe Boulder (USA), Summertown (UK) Westview Press 1995 p.57 henceforth 
rohtical and Economic Transformation
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was not a member o f the Soviet camp and therefore enjoyed a very particular, even 
privileged status (financed by the West) in world politics.
2) Within that already different type of communism espoused by the Yugoslav leadership 
after its break with Stalin, Slovenia was further the most liberal among the republics.
This was reflected in Slovenes feeling that they had almost achieved the ‘third way’ 
between capitalism and communism.
3) Because the independence of Slovenia and the ensuing disintegration o f Yugoslavia 
was followed by the Bosnian war, mostly seen in the light o f nationalist policies and 
ethnic conflicts (and unfortunately less in the light o f the disintegrating state o f which 
those policies and conflicts were rather the result than the cause), Slovenian 
independence and the transition to democracy are too often reduced to the realm of 
politics o f nationalism, whereby the central characteristics o f that process of 
independence are neglected in the analysis.
4) The specificity o f this transition is that its roots go back as far as the 1960s and that 
this evolutionary process of transition was endorsed and eventually led by the self­
reformed communist leadership who responded to the gradually increased pressures of 
the opposition organisations and civil movements.
It is my intention to argue that because the Slovenian transition was a gradual 
process stretching over a long period of time, in which a degree of political reconciliation 
was achieved prior to independence, the issues o f national identity, independent 
statehood and the polarisation of elites were sufficiently contained, thus less aggravating 
to the transition.
In order to justify this argument the exploration of factors most influential on the 
result must follow. These are considered to be the previous regime, the level of 
democratisation achieved prior to transition and the type of transition itself, all o f which 
are interlinked and the subject o f this chapter. The first part concentrates on the 
Yugoslav type o f communism and its main feature, socialist self-management, and how 
this affected Slovenes and their perception o f democracy. The second part explores the 
national question within the Yugoslav federation and the tension between the centralizing 
state and divergent levels o f political, economic and cultural developments in the 
republics which eventually led to the disintegration of state authority. It is argued here 
that the Yugoslav federation was disintegrating long before Slovenia and Croatia
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declared their independence. For this reason this chapter does not include the politics of 
transition to independence.
The main theme of this chapter is the tension deriving from the emphasis on the 
national/ethnic differences in the federation and the centralist ideology of one-party rule. 
The conclusion proposes that even in the federation with a strongly autonomist 
legislation for the national units, the rising national awareness, particularly in the 
combination with radically different levels of ideological and economic development will 
lead to demands for political independence.
5.2. THE SLOVENES IN YUGOSLAVIA
“ To this awareness (about the right to self-determination), belongs the 
realization that self-determination is not a self-determination o f the Slovene 
peoples as a Nation, but self-determination o f Slovenes as individuals”309.
Slovenian independence is not a romantic story o f a national movement 
reaching its goal, but rather a banal story o f Slovenes not wanting to shoot 
Albanians in Kosovo, which is what staying within the federation meant”310.
5.2.1. Democratisation of Slovene Communists - Interviews
Interviews conducted in Slovakia in order to gain an initial grasp on the current situation 
could be characterized by the difference in opinions between those interviewed. The 
plurality of views on the transition, the current regime, the nationhood and the new 
statehood was overwhelming and indicative o f the lack of consensus about the past and 
the direction the country was or should be taking, by opinion makers, academics and 
politicians alike. In contrast, the similar method employed in Slovenia showed 
surprisingly little disagreement about the appropriateness o f the separation from 
Yugoslavia, the fast and unequivocal European integration policies o f the current 
government, despite the pragmatic concerns for the country’s economy and the newly 
acquired sovereignty, and what could only be described as a general sense o f pride in
T.Hribar ‘Slovenska drzavnost’ in Nova Revija VI:57 a seminal issue of this very important journal 
around which the Slovenian intelligentsia concentrated throughout the latel980’s, dedicated to national 
program (Prispevki za Slovenski Nacionalni Program) Ljubljana 1987 p.29 All translations throughout 
are by myself.
Interview 5.5.1998 Igor Luksic, academic and the vice-chairman of the United List of Social 
Democrats party
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institutional and economic achievements so far. The issue of independence, the pivotal 
point around which the Slovak political elites formed and polarised, proved the least 
divisive in Slovenia.
The interviews confirmed the idiosyncrasy o f the Slovenian case among other
Eastern and Central European countries. The salient points could be summed up as
follows. First, an interesting combination o f left-wing orientation by almost all
interviewed, combined with a strong belief in liberalism and national identity and hardly
any rejection o f Tito’s rule, a period seen as conducive to the growth of national
awareness. Second, the positive role awarded to the ex-communist leadership (still in
power) in the democratisation process and the formation o f the national programme,
with the exception o f the representative o f the Social Democratic Party o f Slovenia, the
main opposition party which bases its platform on the removal of these people from
public life. Third, the concerns about the role o f the Catholic Church (either the rejection
of its attempts to influence the education, or the lack o f its influence). Fourth, the
agreement on the main reason for the separation as that o f Serbian centralist and
authoritarian policies personified by Milosevic and proved by the tanks o f the Yugoslav
army on the streets o f Ljubljana. Finally, most o f those interviewed claimed312 that
Slovene nationalism is the ‘right’ kind of nationalism, that is, the strong sense of
patriotism devoid of romanticism future orientated and without an overtly ethnic 
element.
The complacency was occasionally punctured by concerns about the possibility of 
the future ethnic conflicts between other ethnic groups living in Slovenia and their host 
nation, and about the maintenance of national identity and economic control for such a 
small country in the increasingly integrated European landscape. The concerns, however, 
were tempered by the recognition that there is no alternative to this process. A central 
point o f discussion related to the question o f whether independence was the logical 
culmination of the democratisation process and would have happened regardless of
3 ," A 11  interviews were conducted 21.4.-14.5.1998 in Ljubljana
One exception being I.Bemik 21.4.1998: “All is circumstantial, Slovenes are the same as everyone 
else if they were offered a state during the war as the Croats and Slovaks did, they would have behaved 
in the same way. The prime legitimacy in Slovenia is ethnic, as it is everywhere else. But, Slovenes had 
many advantages. Open borders during the socialist period and the guaranteed Yugoslav market, so that 
t e country flourished. Elite led transition which started much earlier than anywhere else and well 
developed and voiced national program, so that all nationalism had a chance to neutralize itself 
by the time the country became independent”. The ‘circumstantiality’ behind the Slovenian ‘success’ is 
part of the argument of this chapter.
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Serbian policies, or the only option left to safeguard that process given the 
circumstances. The majority of those interviewed, most o f whom participated actively in 
bringing about the reforms of the late 1980s, agreed with the latter313. One person argued 
that the process was hijacked by nationalists and therefore not the culmination of 
democratisation314. Another, maintained that Slovene communists had always been 
nationalists (unusual and possibly only comparable to Poland), going back to the 
tradition of Social Democrats o f the early century and that therefore, the reformers from 
1988 onwards, knowing well what was becoming of Yugoslavia, formed an alliance with 
nationalists and sought a significant autonomy in various proposals of a loose 
confederation. Being aware that a small nation cannot exist without lull international 
support, the declaration of independence had to be timed carefully, so as not to be seen 
as responsible for the break-down of the state315.
What can be observed in these interviews is the extent to which the previous 
regime affected the nature of the present-day Slovenia, from the rise o f national 
awareness, the Slovene social, political and economic existence, the formation of national 
programmes, the character o f transition and the timing of independence itself.
5.2.2. Yugoslav Communism
It has been implied a few times that politics in the former Yugoslavia differed 
considerably from the political system in Czechoslovakia. It therefore seems appropriate 
to question the use o f the adjective ‘postcommunist’ in connection to the Slovak as well 
as Sloveman transitions. How communist was Slovenia, considering that Yugoslavia 
enjoyed “most favoured Communist”316 state status, precisely because of the differences 
between the Warsaw Pact countries and Tito’s regime, non-aligned to the Soviet bloc, 
wavering between West and East. The system o f worker self-management, the lower 
degree o f coercion of the population, the significant degree o f liberalisation - in particular
Y o u tw l?  1(QQ8 ^ niSte!i ° fEducation 111 the last two administrations, the activist of the ex-Socialist 
it is not tin th • Independence was the culmination of democratisation, which started in 1981, but
314 T °  at indePendence was an integral part of that process at the beginning”
315 T • ' r z<™anlC’ academic(the Peace Institute) the left-wing political activist o f the 1980’s 13.5.1998
of the Vlce'Cha,rman ofthe National Assembly 1991-1994(parliament), the founder
° 6  dissident student movement in the 1970’s) 4.5.1998
1 , JnL','1Z ^;Stepan Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation Baltimore London, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press 1996 p.238
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travel, some private ownership, the possibility of study abroad, the availability of 
Western goods and media broadcasts - was seen, if not as democratic, but nevertheless 
as a form of democracy, which always held the premise that it could evolve into more 
democracy. If  the West saw it as an attempt to conform to Western liberal democratic 
values, the domestic population believed it to be their unique ‘third way’, with Slovenia 
leading the push towards more pluralism.
However, and here is the crux of the matter, Yugoslavia was not democratic. The 
fact is that Yugoslav communists never won a free election in any part o f Yugoslavia, 
nor did the regularly proclaimed sovereignty of the republics ever stop the Communist 
party from using the threat of force whenever it deemed it necessary (Croatia 1971, 
Kosovo 1981 and Slovenia 1991)317, and that it was the communist leadership of Serbia 
which resisted democratisation by the most brutal o f methods - a war (1991). The 
Yugoslav political system, despite offering its population more rights than the systems of 
other Eastern and Central European countries, was nevertheless an authoritarian system, 
merely a different type of communist regime, possibly, as often argued by Yugoslavs318 
nearer to Marxism than Stalin’s revision o f it. A semblance of democracy does not stand 
for democracy which cannot folly develop in one-party rule. The variations in the degree 
o f tolerance within a one-party state are rather a question o f ideology adopted by the 
party bureaucracy itself in order to secure the party’s hegemony than they are a question 
o f adopting “pluralist policies”319. Therefore, this study continues to view the Slovenian 
transition to democracy as a postcommunist one, whereby the distinctiveness of 
communism in Slovenia (and the former Yugoslavia) will be explored only as a 
qualitative factor o f that process.
5.2.3. The Genesis of the Yugoslav Political System
The communists’ accession to power under Josip Broz Tito after 1945 followed a 
period during the war which only served to exacerbate ethnic and political divisions 
within the country. The Croatian state (whose dominion included most o f Bosnia) openly
317
S.Ramet Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991 2nd. edition Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, Indiana University Press 1992 p.38, henceforth S.Ramet Nationalism and Federalism..
see B.Denitch The Legitimation o f  a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press 1976, henceforth B.Denitch The Legitimation o f  a Revolution
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collaborated with the German occupier and carried out the ‘final solution’ policies of 
extermination and expulsion of not only the Jews and the Romanies (and the 
communists, including many Croats, but primarily Serbs. The latter rose in self-defence 
and joined either partisans or nationalistic Chetniks, who though originally aligned 
against Germany and the fascist Axis, increasingly collaborated with the occupiers 
against the ever growing power o f the partisan army led by Tito. The war set Yugoslavs 
against each other in an unprecedented way and whilst they were massacring each other, 
in an attempt to eliminate enemies and their supporters, they were facing the Germans 
whose brutality stemmed from their general attitude towards Slavs, who similarly to the 
Jews were the intended target o f the racial theory. More Yugoslavs were killed by each 
other than by foreign soldiers3' 0, each resistance movement including the partisans 
committed atrocities and engaged in civilian massacres. What was left o f the old elites 
was disorientated, weakened and eventually destroyed by both the Nazis and by the 
participants in of the civil war (Communist-led Liberation Front vs. anticommunist 
military units) which raged simultaneously with the war against Germans.
After the Germans withdrew, the only power that seemed capable to restore 
Yugoslavia were the Communists, who in fact were the liberators (Soviet forces left after 
they helped partisans to free Belgrade), thus making the communist seizure of power a 
‘native’ revolution. Communism was not imported into Yugoslavia by the Red Army, 
nor was it brought in by the imposition of the ‘Soviet sphere o f influence’ through the 
post-war agreements between the war-time Allies as in the rest o f the Soviet camp. Even 
though the partisan army was a patriotic insurgency, the leadership had a clear political 
aim - the war o f liberation became also a war for establishment of the Communist rule, a 
task made easier by the support o f a significant part o f the population radicalized 
throughout the upheavals of the war.
It should be noted that the organizing bodies o f the partisans and the 
Communist Party were established along national lines, meant as a step “towards settling 
the national question and establishing the foundations of a fraternal community o f equal
19 For the discussion of the variations and characteristics of different types of non-democratic regimes 
see J.Linz A Stepan Problems o f  Democractic Transition and Consolidation.
320 S.PavIowitch The Improbable Survivor London, C.Hurst&Company 1988 p. 15
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and independent Yugoslav peoples”321. Of course the national issue was not settled322, 
Yugoslavia became united, but again without a national consultation. The only thing that 
the establishment o f ethnic-national institutions did was provide the lines along which the 
federation fractured half a century later. That was not the only contradiction that Tito’s 
Yugoslavia contained. It was a federation with decentralized political and party 
organisations, but with central economic planning. Attempts to reconcile, practically and 
ideologically, the contradiction between a centralized bureaucratic Marxism and an 
ethnically diverse, unevenly developed, infant federation led to the evolution of socialist 
self-management, which ultimately became another contributory factor in the collapse of 
Yugoslavia.
Initially the Federal People’s Republic o f Yugoslavia (formed on 31 January 
1946, re-named Socialist Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia in April 1963) adopted a 
Stalinist model o f central planning, rapid industrialisation and the total subordination to 
the hegemony of the Communist Party, despite some distinctions among individual 
republic s party organisations. In the late 1940’s the commitment to collectivisation and 
long term planning in Yugoslavia preceded other communist-led countries, due to the 
revolutionary ardour and Tito’s hold over his regime. The legacy of patriotism - the 
founding myth o f the Communist Party’s control - finally caused the break with the 
Soviet Union, after the latter’s growing demands for subordination to Moscow. The 
expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform (1948) not only magnified Tito’s cult 
status, but forced the Party to seek different ways o f legitimizing its position, 
mdependently of the Soviet Union323, which led to the greater involvement with the post­
colonial world, and more dependence on the economic help from the West.
5.2.4. Socialist Self-Management
Despite the regime’s early successes, the collectivisation of almost 80% of the peasant 
population proved a disaster and had to be reversed; the repressive measures o f the late 
1940s left the Party alienated whilst facing an economic crisis. In order to re-instate the
K ' B.Ferfila P.Philips ‘Nationalism, the State and Economic Restructuring: Slovenia and the Former 
Yugoslavia’ in Small States Compared: Politics o f  Norway and Slovenia Bergen (Norway), Alma Mater 
1994 p.31
For example Tito had promised Slovene partisans that they would be able to keep their own army 
with Slovenian as the commanding language, but that promise was never fulfilled.
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legitimacy of the regime which was the only thing that all Yugoslavs had in common, the 
Party (in 1952 renamed the League of Communists, LCY) decided on a radical political 
and economic project. The legitimacy was based on the idea o f ‘double autonomy’, that 
is o f working people and nations, thus a self-managing society. In theory it involved ‘de- 
etatisation’ in the economic sphere by worker self-management and decentralisation in 
territorial terms through republic and communal self-management; in practice it 
amounted to the eventual break-down of the state authority. The irony is that the 
ideology designed especially to strengthen the federation was in the end the undoing of 
it. In the words of M.Zagar, a member o f the Expert Commission on Human Rights 
responsible for the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic o f Slovenia of 1991: 
“self-management made Slovenia what it is today”324.
The principle o f breaking up the centralized structure stemmed from the 
‘withering away of the state’ theory and was presented in its most positive meaning. 
Namely, “the building up of another, different institutional system which would take over 
the performing of the functions necessary to the society, i.e. the functions which were 
formerly performed by the state”, thus “narrowing the conditions of a power being 
independent o f society”325. The theme of direct participation and worker’s control is well 
known in the socialist tradition and we can assume that Lenin’s slogan ‘all power to 
Soviets’ was in its inception based on the same idea. The real power wielded by workers 
through the instruments o f self-management would put Yugoslavia closer than other 
communist regimes to the ‘dictatorship o f proletariat’, or what Lenin called a workers’ 
state, an idea very appealing in the times of quarrel with Stalin and as a counterargument 
against criticism from orthodox Marxists.
The system of self-management was very complex and subject to many 
modifications during the four decades o f its existence. Here I shall confine myself to the 
briefest o f descriptions o f its workings and failings, and to the influence self-management 
had on the perception of democracy in Slovenia. The economic reforms began in 1950 
with the law that turned over the management o f state firms and social services to
323 M.Glenny The Balkans 1804-1999 London, Granta Books 1999 p.572- 575
324 Interview with M.Zagar 11.5.1998
3"5 R.Ratkovic ‘Socio-Political Communities in Yugoslavia - The Process of Self-Management 
Socialization of State Power’ in Socialism in Yugoslav Theory and Practice Collection of Conferences 
Beograd, International University Centre for Social Sciences 1979 p.p.l 13-119 p.l 16-118 . Henceforth
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worker’s councils326, initially more consultative than decision making bodies. Later, the 
enterprises planned their production, investment and wage administration; salaries were 
dependent on each worker’s contribution and on the success o f the enterprise as the 
whole. After 1961 workers decided how profits were to be divided within the salary fund 
and the accumulation fund, which after 1954 was owned by the enterprise. This resulted 
in the maximization of wages out o f profits, very high borrowing in order to finance 
accumulation and in the considerable decrease in the influence of the central state.
Decentralisation and ‘de-etatisation’ had contradictory results. The coordinating 
mechanisms between individual economic and political units either did not exist or were 
never established, and in their absence and in the absence of any other party institutions 
they were filled by the Communist Party327. Because the economic reforms led to 
demands for further political democracy and decentralisation o f the federal state allowed 
republics to gain more power, party rule became simply perpetuated on the lower 
territorial level and self-management remained the instrument of the Party. In 1965 the 
increased inter republic conflicts led to more reforms, that is more self-management, 
more market and further decentralisation - a period known as self-managed socialism. 
The reduced power of the federal economic authority meant that the control over the 
allocation of investments was transferred to the republics, the individual enterprises and 
banks. If we now realise that Yugoslavia had become in fact a federation of eight 
competing economies328, which together produced more than they earned, imported the 
raw materials for their industries without exploiting their own resources and borrowed 
heavily to the point when the central state had no control of the extent o f it, we can 
understand what was meant by the ‘Yugoslav disease’329.
The result was the increased power o f the establishment at local and republic 
level (the Party, banks and managers), low economic performance and conflicts between 
regions, so new reforms followed between 1971-76. As will be seen below all economic
3"6 the following section draws heavily from the B.Ferfila P.Philips ‘Nationalism, the State and 
Economic Restructuring’ in Small States Compared
327 1 was reminded by Prof.Rizman that due to the developments described above, it was not incidental 
that possibly the first call for democratisation and political pluralism in the post-1948 communist world 
came from the member of Tito’s ‘triumvirate’ M.Djilas The New Class London, Thames and Hudson 
1958, who was imprisoned for many years. The other member was Slovene E.Kardelj of whom more 
below (M.Glenny The Balkans p.587).
328 Republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia; autonomous 
provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo.
329 Smal States Compared p.33
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reforms were matched by reforms in nationalities policies and led to the ever increased 
autonomy of the republics. This final stage in the evolution of self-management (called 
‘contractual socialism’) was double -layered. At the political level representative 
democracy was replaced by a complex system of delegational direct democracy and 
multi-chamber legislature at local, republic and federal levels. At the economic level it 
involved a further break down of enterprises into smaller units, each of which 
represented an integral part of work activity. The whole enterprise became thus a form of 
associated labour o f two or more smaller units set up under the self-management 
agreement. The enterprises which shared production or other interests also could 
associate under those agreements into ‘composite organizations o f associated labour’.
The idea behind this was to give the workers, down to the smallest unit, more control 
over decision-making and also, to replace the hardship caused by the market with more 
‘self-management agreement’, so that all matters could be resolve through negotiation 
and agreement. Moreover, the public services were organized into self-managing 
‘communities of interest’ whose main task was to provide a direct link between the 
suppliers and the users o f the public services. The ‘withered away’ state reached at least 
in theory, the highest point of autonomy of workers and citizens, realising the 
democratisation of economic decision making and the autonomy of nations and 
provinces.
However, the party thus divided into republic organisations controlled the 
selection process o f delegates and became practically unconstrained in determining 
economic policy, due to the latest reforms becoming even more sheltered from the logic 
of the market. The state lost all control over monetary policy, which led to a rapid 
monetary expansion and uncontrolled inflation, exacerbated by the foreign debt (20 
billion $ US in 1980, the time of slowing economies world-wide). The foreign 
borrowing, much increased during the last two years o f Tito’s life330, when he was in 
grave health and obviously dying, was used to quell ethnic unrest in disadvantaged 
regions in the time of political uncertainty. By 1989 inflation had risen to 3000% and the 
Yugoslav political and economic system was in severe crisis.
330 Tito died 4.5.1980
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5.2.5. The System of Self-management in Slovene Experience331
In the Slovenian Public Opinion survey about the evaluation of the implementation of 
self-management (1978-1986) in response to the question: “is the situation better today, 
about the same, or worse than five years ago?”, the ‘better’ answer decreased from 
80.1% in 1978 to 18.8% in 1986, which would indicate that Slovenia had lost faith in the 
system of self-management. However, the idea of self-management remains well thought 
o f among the majority o f the Slovene population - in 1995 two-thirds o f the public 
viewed it as a well conceived idea which was not put into practice effectively332 . Despite 
the fact that Slovenes wholeheartedly supported the destruction o f the system and reject 
its reinstitution, there is some logic in the positive evaluation, beside the fact that the 
founding theoretician and ideologue of the Yugoslav self-management system was 
Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene still considered an important figure in national mythology.
Historically there are various concepts of self-management, the Paris Commune, 
the Israeli kibbutz, the early workers councils in Soviet Russia and diverse forms of 
participation in industrial management in Western Europe spring to mind. The 
distinguishing characteristic of the Yugoslav system is that unlike others it was imposed 
from above, thus its ideological function of legitimising the rule o f the Communist Party 
became paramount. When in the later years the Party was faced with the choice between 
liberalisation of the economy and political pluralisation which evolved out of the system, 
the Party chose to combat these tendencies by reconstituting self-management (1974) as 
primarily an ideological project in order to preserve the existing power relations. The 
authors, in particular Kardelj, emphasized corporatism in the form of ‘interest 
communities’333; the ‘pluralism of self-management interests’, a concept which stood for 
controlled pluralism; a delegate system with some elements o f direct democracy and the 
increased autonomy of the republics334. The rhetoric however did not correspond with
All statistics from M.Hafher-Fink ‘(Trans)formation of the Idea of Self-Management:Slovenian 
Perspectives’ Paper prepared for the 5th Conference of the International Society for the Study of 
European Ideas 19-24 August 1996, Utrecht, Netherlands. Hence forth ‘Transformation of the Idea of 
Self-management’
the longitudinal research project Slovenian Public Opinion has been ongoing since 1968 and covers a 
representative sample o f adult residents of Slovenia. The project is conducted by the Centre for Public 
Opinion and Mass Media Research o f the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana, led by Niko To§.
See below for the discussion of Slovene neo-corporatism and the utilisation of that concept to this day 
as an integral part of the political system.
‘Transformation of the Idea of Self-management’ p.4
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practice and the concepts were not applied in reality, so that the highest levels of 
governing bodies were composed exclusively of the LCY members.
Slovenes took self-management seriously (in 1980 45% o f the respondents asked 
about self-management responded that ‘workers decide about everything themselves’; 
we decide together; everybody has an influence on decisions) and linked it to democracy 
(in the 1982 survey 68.5% agreed that ‘self-management enables the exercise of human 
freedoms and creativity’). At the same time Slovenes became critical of the situation in 
Yugoslavia and believed that the power o f the state should be strengthened (in 1986 
61.1% of respondents in Slovenia agreed that: ‘a strong arm that knows what it wants 
would be of more use to our society than all the slogans about self-management’), which 
is surprising considering that Slovenes were the champions of de-centralization and the 
freedom of individual335.
It may therefore be legitimately concluded that Slovenes considered the system of 
self-management a failure as implemented by the LCY, not as an idea336, and that the 
introduction of a multiparty system at the beginning of the 1990s (and ensuing 
independence) was the realisation of certain ideas, such as individual freedom, the 
participation of the majority of the population in decision-making and pluralism that 
Slovenes believed self-management contained. This explains why whilst rejecting the 
system that embodied self-management, the idea is still valued positively. The importance 
of participation and the freedom o f choice remain the defining characteristics of Slovene 
political thinking and were at the heart of the transition to democracy. Considering that a 
high level of public participation in decision-making process and a great degree of 
pluralism were achieved under the system of self-management, however limited, this 
meant that a certain level o f democratisation, higher than in other postcommunist 
countries, was achieved prior to transition to pluralist democracy. More importantly, the 
Slovene public was also more aware o f what participation and pluralism entailed, and
35 Survey June 1986-87 (Class, Structure o f Contemporaiy Yugoslav Society, ToS 1989) about attitudes 
towards the state 73% agree that ‘respect for individual freedom is more important than any state 
interest’ (Serbia 57%, Croatia 66%, Macedonia 45.7%, Bosnia Herzegovina 64.4%, Montenegro 61%, 
Kosovo 63.2%, Vojvodina 63%)
This would correspond with the general disenchantment with LCY. In 1988 apparently only 4% of 
the respondents in the survey believed that the Communist Party has society at interest, whilst in 1990 
this figure increased to 37% - the reason for this being a methodological mistake - in 1988 the question 
referred to LCY, whilst in 1990 to LCS(League of Communists Slovenia); In discussion with M.Hafher- 
Fink, the author of the above article , 1.5.1998.
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equally aware o f the limits that the Yugoslav federation imposed on the continuation of 
the democratisation process.
The reason lay in the system itself. The dichotomy between rhetoric and the 
reality, similar to other communist regimes, caused the accumulation of economic and 
political problems under whose weight the state was collapsing. The supporting pillars - 
Tito, the nations and their will to unite, and the ideology - on which the federation was 
resting, were either no longer there or lost their credibility. The increased threat of 
disintegration led to an increased pressure for centralisation, for which it was too late. 
The devolution of power to the republics, resentment towards Belgrade and the already 
achieved democratisation, certainly in Slovenia and Croatia, combined with the divergent 
levels o f economic and political development, could not be reversed. The nationality 
policy of the Yugoslav federation had an unintended effect (similar to the USSR) - 
nations turned to their own policies without regard for the federation.
5.3. THE NATIONAL QUESTION, FEDERALISM AND THE 
DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA
‘The irony o f  history today is, that the measures whose political goal without 
question was to guard totalitarianism, unwittingly created legal and political 
conditions for Slovenia as an independent state”337.
Yugoslavia’s most important, long-lasting and most influential characteristic is probably 
that it is a multinational community”338, in the words of an expert on the political system 
in Yugoslavia in 1979. This statement is somewhat poignant today, when a word ‘long- 
lasting’ brings into one’s mind the tragic consequences of the disintegration o f that 
multinational community. The same author concluded his paper about the specificity of 
the Yugoslav federation, which having grown up on the theory and practice o f the self- 
managing society cannot be included in the classic type of federations and 
confederations339, by saying that:
S.Zizek ’Tretja pot med univerzalismom in fundamentalizmom’ in D.Rupel ed. Slovenska Smer 
Ljubljana Cankarjeva Zalozba 1996 p.95
D.Bilandzic ‘History and Current Dimensions of Inter-Nationality Relations in Yugoslavia’ in 
Socialism in Yugoslav Theory and Practice p.p. 129-142 p. 129
In essence there are only three political organisations of states. Confederalism, of which the best and 
most enduring example is Switzerland - under this arrangement member units retain absolute 
sovereignty over their territories (even the form of governments can vaiy) and coordinate their foreign 
policy. Unitarism rejects any division of power and concentrates all authority in one central government.
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As long as social development is based on the principles o f  what is known as state 
socialism, the affirmation o f  the republics and provinces, i.e., the affirmation o f  the 
national being within the multi-national community, has no ideological or political 
legitimacy”340.
Having a nationality policy meant that Yugoslavs considered the multiethnic composition 
of their state a potential problem341 and therefore the involvement of the Communist 
Party in that sphere was considered legitimate. The federal system with a wide degree of 
autonomy given to the republics had to be designed so that it could be justified by the 
ruling ideology and Yugoslavs claimed to have solved the ‘national question’ by defusing 
and containing nationalism through the political system based on mutual accommodation 
and cooperation. If  the communists believed in this conception of their state, by the 
1970s it was obvious that interrepublic conflicts had not ceased and the Party had to 
move to a more plausible interpretation, which emphasized self-management socialism 
and the right of nations to create states on their own or enter into a community with 
other states. According to one of the ideologues of the Party,
the nation is a creative factor o f  the state. Yugoslav republics are the expression o f  the 
realisation o f  the right to self-determination o f  the Yugoslav nations, while the Yugoslav 
federation was the result o f  their freely expressed will to be united into the common state”342.
Surely, this concept of the federation would allow for the national question to be
resolved in the future. Socialism, bom in dialectics and ever forward-looking, considered
bemg on the ‘right track’ sufficient. Had Yugoslavs succeeded, and the Kosovo riots of
1981 showed that even the most tentative assertions about the success of nationality
policies were losing credibility, their model would have been worth emulating, for it
suggested that Yugoslavia had created a political organisation able to contain nationalist
mobilisation. Moreover, it would have suggested that only a certain type of socialism
would provide the conditions for inter ethnic harmony. To Yugoslavs the “working class
Federalism, known since the American Federal State 1787, seeks a compromise between an unitary 
arrangement and safeguarding of differences, may it be cultural, linguistic and religious; long tradition 
of self-rule; geographical boundaries (rivers, mountains etc. which could cause communications and 
transport impediments); difference in economic interests (one region more industrialised, the other 
mainly agrarian). It must be said that Yugoslavia contained all those differences. Federalism in our time 
involves cooperation between units and the federal government and more importantly the cooperation 
between the federal units themselves, the so-called cooperative federalism. See S.Ramet Nationalism and 
Federalism in Yugoslavia... p.61-62
34i ^•®'landz*c *n Socialism in Yugoslav Theory and Practice p. 142.
Czechoslovakia for example did not have a federation untill 1968, but the establishement of it must 
be seen more in the light o f ‘divide and rule’ after the Soviet invasion, when the more pro-Soviet 
Slovakia could be used against the ‘dissident’ Czechs.
R.Ratkovic in Socialism in Yugoslav Theory and Practice p.l 15
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was still national”343, as opposed to the much-quoted dictum of Marx and Engels that 
‘the worker has no country’, which indeed could be open to different interpretations. It 
could be either, as Soviets claimed, an illustration that nationalism and internationalism 
are contradictory, or a protest against the exclusion of the ‘worker’ from the privileges 
o f the full membership o f the nation344, when all the power is wielded by the exploitative 
middle classes.
5.3.1. Nationalities
Nationality seen as an important factor in the consciousness o f the working class comes 
very near to the Austro-Marxists’ ideas, mainly Karl Renner and Otto Bauer345. Writing 
at the turn of the century in Vienna they sought to resolve the dilemma of socialists in the 
Empire - the continuation o f the Empire, rife with nationalist tensions, and the 
continuation of socialist politics, uninterrupted by those tensions. The solution was the 
distinction between nation as a ‘spiritual and cultural community’ (Renner) with the 
emphasis on language, and the state which would guarantee the cultural autonomy for 
peoples ‘bound into community o f character by a common destiny’(Bauer). To the 
Austro-Marxists national consciousness was primarily a matter o f culture, which would 
thus be satisfied by cultural autonomy, whilst the potentially disintegrative administrative 
and political autonomy would be left to a supranational state. The bourgeoisie then could 
not hide behind the national antagonisms and manipulate working and peasant classes.
Particularly in Slovenia (and Croatia) the idea of intertwined nationalism and 
communism into one theme (national communists) goes back to the tradition of Social 
Democracy of the beginning o f the century and the strong influence of Austro-Marxists 
on that movement346. In 1909 at the conference of the Slovene Social Democratic Party 
one o f the most important guests was K.Renner, who expressed a vision that a united 
Yugoslav nation would “easily become a powerful member in the chain of socialist
343 Stipe Suvar, a Yugoslav party ideologue, cited in S.Ramet Nationalism and Federalism...p.42
344 S.Ramet Nationalism and Federalism., p.42
j t5 See: P.Goode and T.Bottomore Austro-Marxism Oxford, Clarendon Press 1978 and M.E.Blum The 
Austro-Marxism 1890-1918 Lexington KY, University of Kentucky 1985 and J.Schwarzmantel 
Socialism and the Idea o f  the Nation New York, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991
346 Interview with Lev Kreft, academic, the ex-vice-chairman of the National Assembly (1992-1996) and 
a dissident in the 1960’s) 4.5.1998
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nations”347. The Social-Democratic movement in Slovenia was inspired by Ivan Cankar,
(a leading figure in Slovene national history, a role shared with France Preseren, the poet
o f the 1848 revolutions and the author o f what is now the Slovene national anthem), who
claimed that the struggle for social demands is “nearly identical with national struggle”
and that the “Slovene nation is a nation o f proletariat”. This claim was supported by the
fact that the majority of the workforce (100 000 at that time) in Slovenia were Slovenes,
whilst money was foreign (90%)348. Cankar’s ideas about the Slovene nation in
connection to Yugoslavia are noteworthy in view of events that followed and show him
to be a visionary. He saw Yugoslavia as a purely political decision and rejected all
notions o f a “united Yugoslav nation consisting of three ‘tribes’”, Slovenes, Serbs and
Croats, popular at that time among many intellectuals349. He noted:
“by blood we are brothers; by language we are cousins, by culture, which is the fruit o f  
the separate upbringing, there, we are more foreign to one another, than one o f  our Upper 
Carniolan peasants to a Tyrolean....”350.
Therefore, the state that such culturally diverse people would form would have to be a
federal republic, if the people so wished, and would have to reflect the ethnic, social,
economic and cultural differences. In 1913 Cankar was convinced that “such a settlement
of the Yugoslav question” would be “a utopia”, but nevertheless he maintained that
“utopias have a peculiar way of coming true”351. Our concern here is more with utopias
when they stop coming true, which they also have a way of doing.
5.3.2. Federalism
The early critique (1946) o f centralism was directed at the economic policies, particularly 
on the part o f the Slovene political elites. The policies intended to modernize and 
industrialize insisted on “generous and active” 352 support by the more industrialized 
regions for those less developed areas. Slovenia as the most industrialized region had in 
this sense special obligations to the rest o f Yugoslavia. The public debate on centralism
347 M.Zver 100 Let Social-Demokracije Ljubljana, Veda d.o.o. 1996 p.32.
348 M.Zver 100 Let Social-Demokracije p.33
349 Similar movement as ‘Czechoslovakism’(see chapter 4).
350 M.Zver 100 Let Social-Demokracije p.37
351 P.Vodopivec ‘Seven Decades of Unconfronted Incongruities: The Slovenes and Yugoslavia’ in 
J.Benderly E.Kraft Independent Slovenia Origins, Movements, Prospects London, MacMillan Press 
1997 p.25. Henceforth P.Vodopivec in Independent Slovenia
352 P.Vodopivec in Independent Slovenia p.36
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and the national question, after being initially suppressed in the 1950s, soon showed that 
the pre-war prejudices and national concerns were not overcome. It was Edvard 
Kardelj , who was to remain on the forefront of the Party’s ideology and constitutional 
policies till his death in 1979, who acknowledged the continuing relevance of the national 
issues, but saw them as the “remnants o f bourgeois nationalism”, combined with the 
uneven development o f the regions within Yugoslavia and the bureaucratic-centralist 
tendencies at the top. In his belief, the dilemma of Yugoslavia was to be tackled by 
socialist forces which would acknowledge the equal rights o f all its peoples and thus 
provide foundations for ‘patriotic consciousness’354.
Post-war Yugoslavia was not just one idea, that o f uniting Southern Slavs in one
state, but became many ideas and it would be misleading to blame ideas alone,
particularly with the luxury of hindsight, for the destruction of Yugoslavia; the execution
of those ideas and the concrete policies they inspired is a more likely culprit. Whilst it is
reasonable to criticize the Communist regime in 1945 for not having resolved the
national polarisation left by the previous Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but merely bury it
under slogans in the hope that they would come true, it is unreasonable in the extreme to
blame the Communists for instigating ethnic antagonisms of the later years355. The newly
formed state, traumatized by the war and isolated from the West by its regime and from
the East by the split with Moscow, had to find its own way of remaining Communist,
open to the West and modernising. There was not much time to debate the relationships
among nations, besides, the consequences o f the war did calm nationalist passions for a
while. Thus, a well-functioning cooperative federation and system of self-management,
as explained in 1971 by Kardelj, involves:
... a socialist, self-managing community o f  nations, which to a great extent introduces 
simultaneously an essentially new category in interethnic relations. The independence 
o f  nations in such a community grows greater than in classic federations, but at the same 
time the processes o f  integration are open wide in all areas where the common interest 
o f  the nations and working people is made manifest and where the conditions for equality 
are assured356.
Such a concept covered nearly all options. Federalism could be a step in the right 
direction to aid socialist development in the multiethnic state, in the process of
For a more detailed account of Kardelj’s version of Marxism see extract from his book “Democracy 
and Socialism” reprinted in D.McLellan Marxism Essential Writings Oxford, Oxford University Press 
1988
P.Vodopivec in Independent Slovenia p.37
P.Vodopivec in Independent Slovenia p.26
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‘withering away’ o f both the state and the nations. Should national consciousness not 
dissolve into a larger group consciousness then the federation would assume permanence 
in a decentralized state. In any case, the system would do away with nationalism. No 
amount of rhetoric could however stop the incessant wheel o f transformation that the 
system had unwittingly built into its own mechanisms of functioning.
The focal arena o f interrepublic cooperation (and controversies) was the Federal 
Assembly - Skupscina, in particular the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, described 
as “the highest organ o f the government within the framework of the rights and 
responsibilities o f the federation”357. The role o f this body was significantly enhanced 
with every constitution. Whilst in 1946 (called the Chamber o f Nationalities), it had no 
decision-making power, in 1953, consistent with the ideology of the centralized state that 
would eventually disappear, it was replaced by the Federal Chamber and the Chamber of 
Producers. The 1963 Constitution, reflecting the struggles between the rising nationalist 
and the centralist forces, gave the Chamber (this time round called the Chamber of 
Delegates of the Republics and the Provinces) the basic responsibility for legislation. In 
1967 Kosovo and Vojvodina became represented by their own delegations, rather than 
through the Serbian one. By 1971 the agreement o f the federal units was necessary 
before Skupscina could pass any all-Yugoslav social or economic plans. According to the 
1974 Constitution, the Chamber with the assent o f republican and provincial assemblies 
passed laws, such as: a) social plan; b) monetary and foreign trade policy, including the 
fund for the rapid development of the underdeveloped regions; c) international 
agreements, that would require alterations in the regional legislations; d) agreement on 
federal funds. Autonomously it determined expenditures on national defence and state 
security, mediated in conflicts o f jurisdiction between federal, republican and provincial 
organs and approved the extension of mandates o f delegates in Skupscina. The delegates 
were chosen by the republican and provincial assemblies and kept their seats at those 
bodies whilst they were serving at the centre. In practice each delegation functioned as a 
‘bloc’ and adhered to policies determined at the home base, i.e. the republic or the 
province. Whilst each delegation could propose new legislation, each piece of legislation 
required the unanimity o f votes, which led to lengthy negotiations and the formation of
356 S.Ramet Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia p.63
The 1974 Constitution art.282 S.Ramet Nationalism and Federalism p.65. The brief description of 
the workigs of the federation in this paragraph is taken from the same publication and the interviews.
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alliances. In that sense the federation did rely on the cooperation between federal units, 
and the Chamber provided the arena for national concerns to be voiced and resolved.
The strong and unified position o f federal units was replicated in the second 
house o f the Yugoslav Assembly, the less effective Federal Chamber, which consisted of 
the representatives o f self-managing and socio-political organisations, but carried out its 
decisions by majority voting, whilst each delegation wanted to veto any undesired 
decision. Finally, the system created a state presidency, which after Tito’s death 
functioned as the executive (one delegate and vote per federal unit) and rotated annually 
in the ‘president of presidency’; again the delegates were elected by their federal units to 
which they were responsible. In fact, not even the executive head of an already 
complicated apparatus presented the common vision for the common state. In 1990 
Milosevic, having reduced Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo to mere satellites, held 
four out o f eight votes in the presidency and could thus block any decision, which was 
not the reason why Yugoslavia ceased to function, but a symptom of what it had 
become.
5.3.3. The rise of nationalism
The interests of the federation were more often than not subordinated to the interests of 
the republics and the provinces, which indeed wielded considerable power and behaved 
according to their own national interests. There were many reasons for the ‘national’ 
character o f each unit’s leadership. The Party itself was organized along national, or 
ethnic lines. In 1969 the central committee of the Party was abolished and the unity of 
the Party relied almost exclusively on the personality o f Tito. Moreover, each of the 
eight party organisations held its own congress, scheduled before the LCY congresses 
and indicating that the national organisations did more than merely approve the policies.
In 1990 the LCS (the League o f Communists o f Slovenia) seceded from the LCY 
(immediately followed by the Croats), renamed itself the Party o f Democratic Renewal 
and abrogated all obligations, including the financial ones to the LCY. By then the LCY 
was in an advanced state o f decay, accelerated by the fusion of the Serbian Communists 
with the local ‘Socialist Alliance’ and the subsequent election of Slobodan Milosevic as
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their leader358. The real decision-making emanated from the regions rather than from the 
centre, whereby all conflicts deriving from the incredible diversity o f the periphery were 
translated into ‘nationally relevant conflicts of interests’359, for the lack of any other 
category in which they could be expressed in a ideologically uniform communist system. 
Despite the external decentralisation the Party continued to function in a hierarchical and 
centralist manner, revealing the inconsistency between the national and political concept 
o f Yugoslavia.
The social, economic and political problems led to national antagonisms which 
the Party was incapable o f resolving. Meanwhile the huge foreign debt crippled the 
country and the Party called for each republic to help to pay regardless of how much of 
the debt each republic had incurred. This measure constituted a great burden for the 
successful export-orientated Slovenia (and Croatia), and became a source of loudly 
voiced discontent in those republics.
When discussing the collapse of Yugoslavia, it is paramount that the economic 
considerations are not overshadowed by ethnic and political considerations too 
overwhelmingly, for it would distort the fact that nationalism is usually an answer, a 
symptom of a development, which we must concede is, if not rooted in economy, 
certainly in tandem with it360. The deep social and political crisis o f the early 1980’s was 
a result of Tito’s death, the rise o f oil prices and the tightening of the world’s 
economy361, to all o f which Yugoslavia could no longer find an answer - the adaptation 
and reevaluation of Marxism had exhausted the whole repertoire and could not find a 
new direction. This time radical economic reform would have to be accompanied by 
political reform, o f a much deeper character than a cosmetic reformulation of the long 
rehearsed phrases. It would have required a separation o f political and economic powers, 
but politics did not allow for such changes.
358 At the same time Milosevic was securing his position with the Yugoslav army (JNA), until then the 
last defender of the Yugoslav idea.
The expression is borrowed from M.Hroch who used it as an explanation for the rise of nationalist 
movements in the 19th century Central Europe, where the absolutist opression did not allow for more 
developed political discourse or argument, so that it became easier to articulate social problems in 
national categories. It is my belief that the analogy between the multinational Habsburg Empire and the 
multinational Yugoslavia can be made on many levels and therefore the use of the expression is justified. 
See M.Hroch ‘From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation’ in New Left Review 198 
March/April 1993 p.p.3-20.
For the discussion of nationalism and economic developments see T.Naim ‘Modern Janus’ in New 
Left Review 94 November/December 1975 p.p.3-31
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Long before the political disintegration the country stopped functioning as an 
economically viable whole. Republics printed their own money, taxes were not collected, 
the republics engaged in autarkic economic policies to the detriment o f the federation 
and built up their own systems. In the mid-eighties the party tried to restore its dwindling 
authority by calling for more centralisation in the educational, scientific and cultural 
fields which were very sensitive issues for Slovenia.
Belgrade and Ljubljana had less and less in common, each claiming defensive 
nationalism, the former preaching a strong Yugoslavia ( or rather strong Serbia in a 
strong Yugoslavia), the latter rejecting its eternal role o f an autonomous minority. The 
split between the centralist Serbian camp and the more autonomist Slovenia-led one, 
already manifested in the Kosovo riots in 1981, became deeper. Not for the first time in 
modem history the answer to the political and economic crisis became nationalism. This 
spelled an inevitable disintegration of the state in which all differences, whether they 
were the cultural, economic, structural, political or ideological, were linked to 
national/territorial frameworks, but in which nationalism and democracy were both 
denied.
Miha Kovac, the editor o f the Socialist Youth Alliance oppositional journal 
Mladinai62(l9$$), explained that to understand the evolution of the political and cultural 
life in Slovenia, referred to as the ‘Slovenian spring’, one must go back to the 1970s. The 
emergence of a nationalist current within a broader context of a mass movement in 
Croatia was used as a pretext not just to crush nationalists themselves, but also to 
suppress the student movements and the liberal wing of the party who tried at that time 
to establish a market economy and liberalize political life, firstly in Croatia and later 
everywhere else. In Kovac’s words:
361 J.Mencinger ‘The Costs and Benefits of Secession’ in D.Fink-Hafher J.Robbins Making a New 
Nation: The Formation o f  Slovenia Aldershot, Dartmouth 1997
362 Ln the 1980’s new ideological currents, searching for answers to ever more apparent political and 
economic crisis in Yugoslavia gathered round various new journals. The so-called structuralists 
(influenced by Michal Foucault, Jaques Lacan etc.) produced the journal ‘Problemi’; the Marxist - 
orientated political economists’ journal ‘Casopis za kritiko znamosti’; the traditional intellectuals who 
saw themselves as defenders of the Slovene nation and its cultural heritage wrote for what became a very 
influential journal in voicing ‘national’ issues ‘Nova Revija’ and ‘Mladina’ which embraced the young 
socialists and the alternative cultural scene and disagreed with either dissident, or national orientations.
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A s the democratic upsurge ended, the nationalisms or local interests o f  Yugoslavia’s 
six republics and two autonomous provinces became a kind o f  surrogate for all other 
political identities. You could be active within the existing political structure only on 
the basis o f  defending the interests o f  your republic or province.... Thus, the system 
which had supposedly emerged through the defeat o f  Croat and other nationalisms 
turned out to be itself most conducive to nationalism. Nationalism is produced within 
the very structure o f  the Yugoslav system, its main root cause being the lack o f  
institutionalized democracy.363
Kovac continues by saying that:
because o f  the nature o f  the Yugoslav system, there is a tendency for any democratic 
or universal demand to become particularized, ‘nationalized’, as it enters the political 
stage, so that the struggle among different republican and provincial bureaucracies soon 
becomes translated into a struggle between different ‘natural and authentic’ national 
interests. Hence, the conflict between the Slovene and Serbian party leaderships, for 
example, leaves the global structure o f  society unchanged364.
The bureaucracy, the League of Communists, was exactly that, a League, not a 
monolithic apparatus of power, but a “web made up of different national factions which - 
however resounding their clashes may appear - are never in a truly antagonistic 
relationship to one another”365. Retrospectively Kovac was wrong when he said that. As 
transpired later, the Slovene leadership embraced reforms and became very antagonistic 
to the Serbian leadership, but he was absolutely right claiming that “without 
democratisation, there is no future for Yugoslavia”.366 The consequence was that the 
regime’s transformation could only proceed as a part of the national struggle for 
independence367. Independence or secession from a multinational federation is often the 
only way to make a clear political statement about the intended direction of political 
developments and how to differentiate one’s republic from others. Slovakia distanced 
itself from the Czech Republic because its conception of the democratisation process was 
too different and Slovenia, equally so, by declaring its independence distanced itself from 
Serbian politics for ever. Kucan after he became the President in the first multi-party 
elections (1990) and talked of “Slovenia’s right to self-determination in a non-disruptive 
manner”, stated that:...” in a way the election results are a demonstration of the criticism 
of Serbia”368.
363M.Kovac ‘The Slovene Spring’ in New Left Review 171 September/October 1988 p.p. 115-128 p. 115
364 M.Kovac as above p. 119
365 M.Kovac as above p. 119
366 M.Kovac as above p. 127
367 D.Fink-Hafner ‘The Disintegration of Yugoslavia’ in Canadaian Slavonic Papers XXXVII:3-4 
September/December 1995 p.p.339 - 352 p.344
368 cited in L.Cohen Broken Bonds Boulder, Oxford, Westview Press 1993 p.94
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5.4. CONCLUSION
The main reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia were rather paradoxical.
1) The measures taken to guarantee the cultural differences created a federation along 
national/ethnic lines with a strong autonomist legislation for the republics and provinces, 
which nevertheless saw the cultural autonomy as a substitute for a political one. The 
more classical theories o f nationalism tell us that there is a certain trajectory of national 
awareness and that the rising awareness, particularly in combination with the divergent 
levels of development, which can be translated into national conflicts, will lead to 
demands for political independence369.
2) The strong emphasis on the differences was in constant tension with centralist 
ideology, which was never comfortable with the nationalities issue. The system 
considered nationalism an enemy, it linked the Party to the integrity of the state, so that 
to be anti-Party was equated with the nationalist movement. Such indiscriminate use of 
nationalist labels in combination with the growing power o f federal elites induced many 
anti-Party activities to be labeled as nationalist movements. When the Party and the state 
it represented lost the affiliation of the greater part o f the populations, in the multi-party 
elections in 1990, which preceded all-Yugoslav elections, all opposition forces to the 
Party presented themselves as democratizing national movements370.
3) Drastically different levels o f development, ideologically on elite levels and 
economically at the federal level and within the federal units led to a situation which 
could not be brought to a final resolution within one-party rule. By the late 1980’s 
certainly in Slovenia the ‘peoples’ democracy was no longer perceived as democracy as
369 See M.Hroch ‘National Self-determination from a Historic Perspective in Canadian Slavonic Papers 
37:4 September/December 1995 p.p.283-300, the same author in the above mentioned ‘From National 
Movements to the Fully-Formed Nation’ in New Left Review 198 and T.Naim ‘The Modern Janus’ New 
Left Review 94 November/December 1975 p.3-31
For the relevance o f electoral sequences, that is, all-union elections prior to or after the regional 
elections as a way of dissolving or constructing all-union identity in the country facing stateness 
problem, see J.Linz and A.Stepan ‘Political Identities and Electoral Sequences’ in Daedalus 121:2 
Spring 1992 p.p. 123-139 The authors explain, taking Spain, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as 
examples, that if all-union elections are held first (Spain), there are strong incentives for political 
activists to create all-union parties, and all-union agendas which can make or break the multinational 
polity. In the case of Yugoslavia I would say that the republican elections were only a contributory factor 
to the final stage o f the disintegration that was in an advanced state anyway. The Czecho-Slovak split 
does not fit this model, because the all-state elections brought the victory to parties with a strong
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Tine Hribar stated in a seminal issue o f Nova Revija: “people’s democracy, thus people’s 
government is not authority o f people as such, but the authority o f the proletariat, in the 
forefront o f which is the Party. Therefore, people’s authority, as strictly people’s 
democracy, actually does not mean anything else, but democracy in which the Party took 
the possession of authority”371.
‘national’ emphasis which then proceded to press constitutional issues till the break-up, which was elite- 
led.
37lT.Hribar as above in Nova Revija VI:57 p.21 This corresponds with the view of Kardelj, when he 
defends Yugoslavia’s deviation from the orthodox model of Marxism:”..even though some of the state 
functions are being cast off in favour of Socialist self-management, state power is still an indispensable 
instrument of maintaining the system.... for workers could not exercise their leading role, unless they 
have a leading role in the system of government... including the specific and leading role of the League 




INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN SLOVENIA
6.1. INTRODUCTION
“Nation is a historical creation not an invention”372.
Slovenia’s independent status might have been bom out o f a nationalist endeavour, but 
true independence is more than autonomy of a particular nation. It is the independence to 
choose the institutional and social values of a new modern state opened to the advanced 
world. As for the role o f nationalism in this process, the following case study of Slovenia 
suggests that the tension between nationalism and democracy can be managed 
successfully. There is no doubt that Slovenia, with a place in the first wave o f the EU’s 
expansion to the East, a pragmatic governing coalition of the two main political 
adversaries able to adjust their different interests, and the high standard of the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and protection of ethnic minorities, can be assessed as 
a successful transition to democracy. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that 
the present achievements could be eroded or that expectations of the regime’s continuity 
are unrealistic373.
Having discussed the concept and the character of the Yugoslav federation and 
the general conflicts and problems that led to its disintegration, I have tried to portray the 
starting position from which Slovenia embarked on the course of independence and 
democracy. The narrative o f events prior to actual independence which follows in the 
first part o f this chapter, will provide the basis for the main issue of this chapter, which is 
the exploration of the type o f transition and the relationship between nationalism and 
democracy within that process, with the purpose of drawing some general conclusions.
The discussion in the second part, based on the view that in Slovenia the 
continuation o f democratisation became a national project, concentrates on the structure
372 M.Kucan, the President of Slovenia in an interview with the above title in Kolaps 5 March 1998 
p.p.34-39
This in reference to “ the term democratic consolidation should refer to expectations of regime 
continuity” A.Schedler ‘What is Democratic Consolidation’ in Journal o f  Democracy 9:2 April 1998
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o f the political system. The thread of the argument is that the transition in Slovenia 
rested on a broad consensus about vital issues of national interest and commitment to 
democracy, thus that the processes of transition and independence were not subjected to 
pursuits o f various alternatives374. Proceeding on this assumption, the third part will look 
at the relationship between nationalism and democracy from the Slovene perspective and 
will address itself to the issue o f national identity and the crucial link between legitimacy 
and nationalism in democratisation processes. One of the safest methods to measure the 
progress of democratisation and judge the role o f nationalism in that process is to look at 
the position of minorities. Thus, the chapter finishes with the constitutional protection of 
minorities, which in Slovenia, unlike in Slovakia can withstand the strictest o f scrutinies. 
The conclusion, whilst assessing the role of the previous regime on transition and the 
role o f nationalism in the democratisation process, will argue that in Slovenia both have 
been relatively positive. Nationalism and democracy formed a complementary dynamic 
and therefore were conducive to each other’s aspirations. The transition process, 
however tentative, having been ongoing for some time prior to the end of communism 
rested on a wide support of the population and nationalism reinforced it.
p.p. 91-105.p. 103. In my opinion, despite the expected continuity of democracy in Slovenia, such a 
claim would be too enthusiastic and unrealistic.
74 The real external threat posed by Serbia must not be underestimated, for it contributed to the unity of 
Slovene population and minimised differences among elites. The point made to me by Prof. Rizman.
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6.2. FROM DEFENCE OF DEMOCRACY TO DEFENCE OF THE NATION:
1987-1991375
“We demand the right to self-determination, the right to democracy and 
independence which has already been granted to other European nations.
We are able to constitute our own state, with all the attributes that belong 
to a democratic and open society. We legally confirmed this on June 25th 
with our Declaration o f  Independence. Alas, many lives have been sacrificed 
for independence in the past few days”376.
“The Slovenes cannot simply advance from subnational to the transnational level. 
They cannot skip the national level without endangering their ethnic identity. 
Transnational processes do not take place directly, they are conditioned nationally. 
Only a sovereign nation can give up a part o f its sovereignty in a sovereign way, 
and transfer to a transnational community”377.
The previous chapter showed Slovenia as an increasingly disillusioned and uncomfortable 
partner in the Yugoslav federation, seeking its own way, parallel to the increasing 
economic and political malaise of the federation. From Slovenia’s perspective, to 
continue the status quo was tantamount to “national suicide”378 for various reasons. The 
federation was destroying the Slovenian economy and showing less and less regard for 
Slovenian culture and constitutional arrangements; moreover, the Slovene leaders were 
repeatedly unsuccessful in influencing the federal government to bring about meaninglul 
changes. As sketched above the federal government became a ‘squabbling shop’, where
375 This period in the Slovene histoiy is often described as the ‘Slovene spring’. All kinds of phrases to 
describe this period appear in the publications, all of which try to portray the trajectory of the 
transformation in Slovenia. For example: ‘from ethnos to demos’, (F.Medved ‘A path towards the 
cartography of Slovene national identity’ in Razprave in Gradivo 29-30 p.p. 177-210 p. 193); ‘From the 
Party to a Party’ (T.Mastnak ‘From Social Movements to National Sovereignty’ in J.Benderly E.Kraft 
Independent Slovenia p. 103); ‘European Rather than Balkan National State’ (D.Rupel in the same 
publication)
376 Slovene Writer’s Association in an Appeal for International Recognition of the Independent State of 
Slovenia, written under siege (Yugoslav Army occupied Ljubljana 26.6.1991) 2 July 1991, published by 
Nova Revija Special Edition ‘The Case of Slovenia’ Ljubljana, July 1991
Asterisk refers to the distinction in the Slovene language between words ‘nacija’ - nation having its 
own state, and ‘narod’ which does not imply the same (narod-cultural nation, nacija - political nation, 
see P.Alter). Since English does not have two different words for these two different notions, the text 
indicates the former, ‘nacija’, with ‘nation*’. During the time of independence struggle the difference 
between those two words was very important. In the often mentioned 1987 issue of the same journal 
‘Prispevki za Slovenski nacionalni program‘also note the use o f ‘nacija’. V.Hribar ‘The Slovenes and 
European Transnationality’ in the same (as above) special edition of Nova Revija
J.Seroka ‘The political future of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and the critical years, 1989-91’ in 
Canadian Review o f Studies in Nationalism XIX, 1 -2 1992 pp. 151 -160 p. 156
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deals for each republic were brokered (this is if they bothered to tell the centre of the full 
extent o f the deals they brokered elsewhere) and where decentralisation had gone so far 
that the implementation of any reforms, or, what by the late 1980’s were mostly the 
recovery packages, became immobilized by the calculations o f the alliances formed and 
enforced.
All the supposed achievements o f self-management, presented as the most 
advanced economic system, became undermined by the 20 billion US $ external debt. 
Claims that workers had complete power over the distribution o f surplus proved to be 
false as well - most enterprises no longer produced any surplus. If the founding myth of 
Yugoslavia and the Party was the ‘external enemy’, whether Moscow, or previously the 
expansionist West, Italy taking Trieste, Bulgaria concerning Macedonia etc., therefore 
justifying unity which implied the Serbian patronage over the small nations, the public 
opinion polls (1991) in Slovenia revealed that the perceived external threat came now 
from Serbia379. Let us look at some more opinion surveys to illustrate the mood in 
Slovenia in the late 1980’s380. To the question of whether Yugoslav republics should 
have greater autonomy in the future, 59.1% of the responses were positive (1987), whilst 
52.9% believed that Slovenia’s development opportunities would increase outside 
Yugoslavia. 58.5% (1988) saw the industrialized Western countries as the most 
important region to cooperate with regarding future economic, cultural and political 
developments (Eastern Europeans 1.7%, other Yugoslav republics 18.4%), and 68.3% of 
respondents would personally be prepared to work harder in order to contribute to 
Slovenia’s independence (1990).
It must be stressed that the initiation of democratic changes in Slovenia was not 
expressed in nationalist language381. The need for change did not constitute a struggle 
against authoritarian power in the republic (the last decade was relatively prosperous and 
in political terms relatively tolerant), but was argued in the terms o f ‘democracy’, ‘human 
rights’, ‘Europe’ and ‘freedom’. Only when Belgrade threatened to stop Slovenia in its 
march toward fuller democracy did the demand for self-determination and integration 
into Europe become accompanied by more extreme nationalist claims. The road from
379 Z.Mlinar ‘Autonomy and (Dis)integration in Post-socialist Transformations’ in J.Subrt N.ToS
Crossroads o f  Transition Praha, Philosophy Faculty of Charles University 1995 p.33-37 
80 Data from I.Bernik. B.Malnar, N.To§ ‘Slovenian Political Culture: Paradoxes of Democratization’ 
in D.Fink-Hafher J.Robbins Making a New Nation.The Formation o f Slovenia Aldershot Dartmouth 
1997
188
defence of democracy to the defence of the nation was marked by a few important 
milestones, o f which the first one must be considered the victory of the liberal wing of 
the League of Communists o f Slovenia (LCS) over the party conservatives in expelling 
the latter from the leadership (spring 1987). A new leadership headed by Milan Kucan 
began to refashion the politics o f Slovenia.
6.2.1. Democratisation as National Project
Here it is impossible not to mention the development of social movements in Slovenia in 
the first half of the eighties, which actually initiated the democratisation process, 
divorced from the Party, but to which the Party eventually responded. Social movement 
in Slovenia started with punk - a youth subculture, which managed to inspire the young 
intellectuals who lined up behind the movement and opposed the police violence 
proposed as the means o f dealing with this social problem. The League of Socialist 
Youth also decided to follow its social base, rather than blindly follow the party line and 
the police. There is nothing unusual about that in a democratic system, but in a basically 
undemocratic one this is a “democratic breakthrough”382. The political parties that 
appeared in the late 1980 started off as social movements; pacifists, environmentalists, 
antimilitarists, feminists, gays and ‘new spiritualists’, together with punk, formed what 
was called in Slovenia the ‘alternative scene’. Their high intellectual profile and an 
unusually developed sense for media contributed to the formation o f a new political 
culture with a distinctive message. This was civil society, but opposed to the self- 
managerial version which, in the final analysis, was aimed at overcoming the distinction 
between state and society. The Slovene leadership for a while ignored the popularity of 
social movements383, but eventually was unable to resist the developing process. It 
uniquely put itself at the forefront o f this new democratic national project - the LCY in 
its criticism of developments in Slovenia used ‘Slovene’ and ‘national’ as identical to
381 R.Rizman ‘Slovenia’ Political and Economic Transformation in East Central Europe p.58 
T.Mastnak ‘From Social Movements to National Sovereignty’ in J.Benderly E.Kraft Independent 
Slovenia p.94 For a more theoretical discussion o f ‘civil society’ generally and in Slovenia particularly
see A.Bibic G.Graziano “C m / Society, Political Society, Democracy” Ljubljana, Slovenian Political
Science Association 1994 
J The crude simplification here of this important facet of developments in Slovenia at that time is due 
to the fact that the subject is too encompassing and in itself would require a separate thesis. However, I 
do not think that the deeper exploration of civil society in Slovenia would change the basic line of 
inquiry in this chapter.
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anti-Yugoslav. This was not without justification, one might add, but thus exonerating
the socialist system from criticism and shifting the emphasis from reform to nationalism.
In 1986 the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences produced under the
leadership of Dobrica Cosic (who in 1992 became the president of the new much
diminished Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising only Serbia and Montenegro) a
memorandum which complained about the unjust position o f Serbs within the federation
and contributed considerably to the nationalist defence of the Serbian nation. It touched
every nerve: Kosovo - “the remnants o f the Serbian nation are leaving their homes, faced
with terror”; Serbian pride; the countless deaths of countless Serbs - “except for the time
under the Independent State o f Croatia, the Serbs in Croatia have never been jeopardized
as they are today” - and for what, asked the Memorandum. For “being run by
committees and apparatchiks”; whilst Kosovo was demanding autonomy, Serbia after
fighting for its independence over centuries “was not allowed to have its own state”384.
The powerful historical nationalism was invigorated with a new element, a
possible repetition of the genocide. Of course, the Memorandum of a handful of
intellectuals did not cause Serbian society to descend into the murderous nationalism
they were later accused of, but it did allow for the type of language to emerge which
later found resonance with politicians, particularly Milosevic. Politics o f language are
often one of the issues that nationalism is concerned with, yet maybe we should pay more
attention to the language o f politics that nationalism engenders. This is exemplified by
Milosevic in the speech he made to Serbs in Kosovo, who in fear of increasingly unhappy
Albanians were emigrating in growing numbers, in April 1987:
“.. You should stay here, both for your ancestors and your descendants.
Otherwise you would shame your ancestors and disappoint your descendants.
But I do not suggest that you stay here suffering.... On the contrary!.... Yugoslavia 
does not exist without Kosovo!.. Yugoslavia and Serbia are not going to give up 
Kosovo”!385
In view of such rhetoric, the statement above “we (Slovenes) did not want to shoot 
Albanians in Kosovo” makes sense and in combination with “if this so-called political 
pluralism is used as another term to supplant Yugoslavia and socialism, then we in Serbia 
are against it” (Milosevic 1989)386, self-determination becomes the only option.
,84 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences cited in T. Judah ‘The Serbs:The Sweet 
and Rotten Smell of History’ in Daedalus 126:3 Summer 1997 p.p.23-45 p.38-9
385 as above p.40
86 L.Cohen Broken Bonds p.79
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To compensate for the lack o f statehood, Slovenes have produced, for the size of 
the country, a formidable quantity o f cultural institutions and literary publications, which 
throughout the 1980’s became a forum for political opposition. A very important role in 
this was played by the journal Nova Revija, whose progress charted the political 
developments within Yugoslavia. After the publication of the ''Contributions for the 
Slovene National Programme’ (February 1987), the leadership o f the LCS issued a 
statement that the authors should not to be prosecuted, merely politically rejected - this 
was a step towards the break with Belgrade. The federal public prosecutor asked the 
Slovene prosecutor (one of the Slovene amendments to the federal constitution required 
it) to start legal proceedings against Nova Revija, which the prosecutor after consultation 
with Kucan rejected, and instead opened an ‘all-Slovene’ critical discussion of the journal
• 387and fired the two responsible editors .
The crucial controversy was of a military nature and of the greatest consequence 
for the mobilisation of the Slovene public. In May and June 1988, the police arrested 
Janez Jansa and David Tasic, two young journalists of the increasingly popular 
countercultural journal Mladina (Youth) and their editor Franci Zavrl, whilst at the same 
time the military police arrested the army officer Ivan Borstner - the charge being the 
betrayal of military secrets with the intention of publishing them. Earlier in May, Mladina 
had published well documented evidence that the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was 
preparing to arrest a large number of Slovenian liberals, thus trying to end the 
democratisation process. The public was outraged by the trial. Firstly, the civilians were 
tried by a military court in peacetime, kept isolated for a month and a half and denied 
civilian defenders. Moreover, the trial was conducted in the Serbo-Croat language in a 
court located in Slovenia, which was in contradiction with the Slovene Constitution 
(although it was a routine practice in the army). Kucan in a strong speech accused the 
military and reassured the Party and the Slovene public that he stood for national as well 
as class interests. He also disclosed that indeed the Military Council discussed the
387 One of them being D.Rupel, the author of the article this section draws on and who later became the 
foreign minister of the first post-communist government. D.Rupel ‘Slovenia’s Shift from Balkans to 
Central Europe’ in Independent Slovenia. The other sources for this chronology of events are: 
P.Vodopivec as above and T.Mastnak ‘From Social Movements to National Sovereignty in the same 
publication.
R.Rizman as above; S.Ramet ‘Democratization in Slovenia - the second stage’ in K.Dawisha B.Parrot 
Politics, Power and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 1997; S.Ramet ‘Slovenia’s Road to Democracy’ in S.Ramet L.Adamovich Beyond 
Yugoslavia Boulder, Oxford, Westview Press 1995
191
possibility of intervention in Slovenia388. The intervention was planned in case the police 
could not handle the civil unrest, which it was said was developing under the leadership 
of young journalists and academics. This was a situation that the legal Slovene leadership 
was if not inciting, then certainly tolerating. The minutes of the meeting in Belgrade 
where Kucan criticized the possible implications of such a document (i.e. prosecution of 
dissidents) appeared in Ljubljana and the police arrested the four men who were 
presumed to be responsible for the dissemination of the minutes.
There were daily vigils outside the court and on June 22nd, some 
40 000 people took part in a demonstration in Ljubljana. The four men were found 
guilty and arrested and the public became convinced that the federation was an 
impediment to the democratisation process in Slovenia. The support for this process was 
not dampened by the trial, on the contrary, the commitment deepened.
In response to the trial a Committee for the Protection o f Janez Jansa389 formed, 
but within days renamed itself the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and 
proceeded with issuing bulletins and collected a protest petition signed by 100 000 
people and thousands of small organisations. Slovene civil society, already considerably 
robust throughout the 1980’s, was transforming itself to take the form of independent 
political parties. In the few months following the trial a number of parties were formed: 
Social Democratic Alliance, a Slovenian Democratic Union, a Christian Socialist 
Movement, a Green party and the Slovenian Peasant Union. Existing organisations such 
as the League of Socialist Youth o f Slovenia (later renamed Liberal Party) and the 
Socialist Alliance of Working People, previously affiliated to the LCS, became new 
independent parties.
The society’s pluralisation was driven initially by cultural and political motives, 
but the desired transformation of the regime, presumed in danger from the system 
identified with Serbia, changed the push for democracy into a national struggle. The 
Slovene Farmers’ Union, the Slovene Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Union 
of Slovenia, the Greens o f Slovenia, the Slovene Christian Democrats and Liberal Party 
formed a coalition called Demos (Democraticna Opozicija/  Democratic Opposition of
j88 D.Rupel as above p. 189
389 the hero of the trial and still a controversial political figure in Slovenia, the leader of the main 
opposition party, the populist Social Democracy Slovenia of which more later.
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Slovenia) that won the first multi-party elections in April 1990. Its platform was a proper 
parliamentary system and an independent national state.
The Communist party wisely embraced the changes and in March 1989 published 
a Programme for Renewal, which abandoned one-party rule, jettisoned the communist 
doctrine of a ‘single and eternal truth’ and called for political pluralism. In January 1990 
the Slovene delegation led by Milan Kucan, whose role in the transition of Slovenia 
cannot be overestimated, walked out o f the Yugoslav Party Congress, renamed itself the 
Party of Democratic Renewal and became one of the parties in the first freely-elected 
Slovene government in May 1990. From there on the evolution of Slovenia into a 
democratic and independent state was as calm and devoted to the rule of law as was its 
evolution from a communist state to a democratizing one. Had it not been for the war 
which broke out after the Declaration of Independence, the whole process would have 
probably taken place unnoticed.
The interesting facet o f this process remains that throughout the year 1990, 
Slovenia (and Croatia) still advocated a confederal solution and even in 1991, after the 
plebiscite which authorized independence (December 1990), the Slovene representatives 
took part in the Yugoslav consultations about the future coexistence of the republics. 
Whether this commitment to confederation stemmed from political shrewdness, intended 
to abate criticism from the international community so as not to be seen as the 
‘statebreakers’, but as victims of the authoritarian state390, as was intimated to me in 
some interviews, or indeed as a serious attempt to sway Yugoslavia to a different way, as 
I was regularly told whilst in Slovenia, remains an unanswered question. It is however 
my belief that 1990 was the crucial year in Slovene national awareness, a point o f no 
return to anything less than full sovereignty391. Slovenia in the spring of 1991 prepared 
for independence and started printing its own money (after it appeared that Serbia had 
‘borrowed’ one billion $ from the National Bank). According to D.Rupel on June 21
390 Here note the difference with Slovakia, always perceived as the responsible party for the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia.
391 Prior to the Referendum on Independence (December 1990, a landslide for independence) the 
Slovenian Assembly had amended and annulled a considerable number (some 100) o f federal laws in 
economy, politics and defence. For the drafting of the Slovene Constitution see M.Zagar ‘ The 
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia’ in Into Europe? There is no doubt that some key personalities 
of that time were thinking about independence since at least 1989, as recalled by S.Ramet in the above 
mentioned ‘Democratization in Slovenia’ in K.Dawisha B.Parrott Politics, Power and the Struggle for 
Democracy in South-East Europe: D.Rupel in an interview with the author September 1989 sometime 
in the not so distant future, Slovenia will become an independent state” p. 196
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James Baker flew to Ljubljana to warn Kucan and himself against any one-sided moves. 
On June 25, the Slovene parliament declared independence and on 26 June 1991 the 
Yugoslav People’s Army attacked the border posts and Ljubljana airport. After the 
hectic diplomatic activity between the EU, the CSCE and the US, at the beginning ot 
which the international community tried to reverse the Slovenian decision, Slovenia 
received international recognition and joined the UN 22 May 1992.
6.3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN SLOVENIA
Political Parties in Slovenia (the first abbreviation stands for its latest name)
LDS - Liberal Democratic Party (ex Socialist Youth)/ Liberalna demokracija 
Slovenije, a coalition o f  Socialist Alliance o f  Working People, Socialist 
Party, Democratic party and the ecological wing o f  the Greens 
SKD - Christian Democractic Party/Slovenski krscanski demokrati 
ZLSD -SDP originally, Party o f Democratic Renewal (ex-Communists), just before
the elections in 1992 renamed Associated List o f  Social Democrats/ Zdruzena 
lista socialnih demokratov (steps out o f  government coalition before the 1996 
elections)
SLS - SKZ (1992) originally Slovenian Farmer’s Association, since second 
elections Slovenian People’s Party/Slovenska ludska stranka 
ZS - Green Party/Zelena stranka. In 1992 the party split and all deputies joined LDS 
SDS - SDZS or SDSS Social Democratic Party o f  Slovenia/ Social
demokratska stranka Slovenije (steps out o f  governing coalition in 1994)
SDZ - was Slovenian Democratic Union/ Slovenska demokraticna zveza (splinter 
group forms DS)
SNS - Slovenian National Party/Slovenska nacionalna stranka (1990, when the 
majority o f  deputies have joined other parties)
DS - Democratic party/ Demokraticna stranka. In 1994 most o f  deputies joined LDS 
DeSUS - Democratic Party o f  Retired People/ Demokraticna stranka upokojencev 
Slovenije
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6.3.1.The Role of Political Culture in Democratisation
The Slovene political tradition similarly to that of Slovakia has evolved without the 
tradition of independent statehood and with little tradition o f independent political parties 
competing freely in an open system. Comparable to other ECE countries it had 
undergone industrialisation, urbanisation, mass education and other aspects of 
modernisation under socialism, which meant a considerable retardation in the 
modernisation of the political sphere. Whatever the differences between particular 
socialist systems, they all in various degrees o f severity curtailed the freedom, whether of 
association, individual or the liberty o f the political sphere. Even an apparent pluralist 
diversity of organisations and interest communities in the self-managing quasi- 
participatory democracy o f the former Yugoslavia ultimately served the interest of the 
ruling party as the central mediating body between the citizens and the state.
This incongruity in the modernisation o f the society between technological and 
educational advance and the political sphere has many consequences for the 
democratisation process. One of these is that politics is often viewed as something that 
‘the others do’ and ordinary person’s interests are not served by it adequately. This 
created a political culture lacking in participation and faith in political decision-making, 
precisely at the time when the advancement o f the democratisation process requires a 
more ‘democratic’ attitude towards politics. The debate about the political culture in 
ECE at present is actually concerned with the (in)congruence between the 
democratisation o f the political system and transformation of political culture, thus 
attempts to assess how the experiences o f the past influence the present attitudes 
towards democracy, its stability and resilience in face of a crisis, or to what extent the 
public would resist populist appeals. The idea is clearly articulated by Lipset, when he 
argues that:
“the success o f  democracy in these (i.e.post-socialist countries) depends largely 
on their populations’ ability to adapt to freedom, to break away from their former 
views on the role o f  the state and their willingness to accept the cyclical nature 
o f the free market, and o f  course, on successful economic performance
Slovakia did not show a great promise on that score393 and it would appear that
Slovenes’ opinion of politics is equally poor. To the following four questions, politics is
392 cited in I.Bemik B.Malnar N.Tos ‘Slovenian Political Culture: Paradox of Democratisation’ D.Fink- 
Hafher J.Robbins Making a New Nat ion: The Formation o f Slovenia p.57
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a struggle for power’; ‘politics is a quest for common good’; ‘politics is a battle for 
supremacy between special interests’ and ‘politics is a dirty business that honest people 
avoid’ the positive answers were respectively 78.7%, 27.9, 69 and 60%394. There are 
two ways of evaluating such dissatisfaction with politics (a situation recognised in well- 
established Western democracies too). Either it is harmful, particularly in newly 
independent democracies which are in the process o f constructing a new national and 
political identity, mostly because indifference and resignation can be at times ‘woken up’ 
by radicalism and populism, as was the case o f Slovakia (in the West see political 
extremism in e.g. Austria, France, Italy). Or, a more optimistic view which sees the 
relatively low expectations the public has of the regime and its elites as an acceptance of 
the system with all its defects, thus expressing a pragmatic approach to politics. The high 
turnout at all elections (see table below) suggests that the public accepts its responsibility 
in the construction of the existing order, even if the only motivation is often to vote out 
the incumbent parties.
The Slovene political scene is not devoid of nationalist and extreme parties395, 
mostly SNS396, running on a strictly nationalist and xenophobic ticket. The SDS 
determines its position on the Left side o f the political spectrum, but by focusing on the 
most severe criticism of the former regime (some of whose political leaders are still in 
power) and consistently pointing to ‘scandals o f transition’397 and calling for the active 
role o f the Church in the state education it approaches the voters from the Right. The 
political scene is polarised practically in half between the ‘Left’ and the ‘Right’ (see table 
below) with the largest party the Liberal Democractic Party (LDS) to the left of the 
centre, but still less individualistically orientated than its Western counterparts. As the list 
o f parties and their changing names and allegiances indicates, the Slovenian transition to
393 •
in 1995 55% of respondents answered ‘no’ to the question: “Do you understand what is going on in 
our politics?” and 61% believed that current political parties in Slovakia are not a sufficient guarantee 
for democratic politics. Focus ‘Current Problems of Slovakia’ Bratislava, Centre for Social and Market 
Analysis 1995
A.Bibic ‘Slovenian Public Opinion on Politics’ in F.Plasser A.Pribersky Political Culture in East 
Central Europe p.62
395 r  . .
For ‘Radical Right Politics in Slovenia’ see R.Rizman in the unpublished essay with the same title, 
Ljubljana 1996
‘the only party which cares about Slovenians’ with anti-foreigners, pro-workers slogans, e.g. ‘We 
will not give our forests to foreigners and the Church’(Slovene National Party is unusually in the region 
opposed to the Catholic Church, the position of national and Catholic party is in Slovenia taken by the 
Social Democratic Party). See the Party manifesto from the last 1996 elections.
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democracy has not been particularly smooth. However, it has proceeded with less 
turbulence and less alienation from the West than in Slovakia; the populist leaders and 
overt nationalist mobilisation have so far not become characteristics of Slovene politics.
•  •  •  •  398
After a short account o f the evolution of the political system and coalition building , I 
shall suggest some answers as to what has gone right in the Slovene transition with a 
further elaboration on it below and in the conclusion o f the thesis.
6.3.2. Historical Legacy399
After losing their independent state in the Middle Ages Slovenes became a part of the 
Austrian Empire. They did not have national autonomy, but had a written language 
codified in the 16th Century and a strong sense of ethnic and cultural identity, quite 
separate from their neighbours. In the second half of the 19th century, the small Slovene 
nation was divided into 6 administrative districts, of which the biggest (Camiolia) with 
the Slovene majority in the Assembly was something of a ‘Slovene parliament’. The 
powers of the Assembly were limited and despite the representation in the all-Austrian 
parliament in Vienna (24 deputies), Slovenes in the Austro-Hungarian Empire failed to 
realise the main objective o f their 1848 national programme - the unification of all 
Slovene territories under one representative body.
After the First World War, the vulnerable Slovenes having lost large parts of their 
territory to Italy joined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia 1929) 
and found themselves in a centralised state where after 1929 the parliament was 
abolished and replaced by the authoritarian rule of the King. In the Second World War 
Slovenia was occupied and divided between Germany, Italy and Hungary. The Slovenian
397 meaning the privatisation, the presence of ex-communists in the government, the possible return of 
foreigners through the repatriation of the land etc. Interview with Milan Zver, a prominent member of 
the party 11.5.1998
398 based on D.Zajc ‘Parliament of Slovenia - Democratic Pluralism and Forming of Coalitions’ and 
S.Kropivnik ‘Voting Behaviour in Slovenia’ and I.Luksic ‘Social Partnership in Slovenia’ S.Kropivnik 
I.LukSic D.Zajc ed. Conflict and Consensus Third Regional Conference of the Central European 
Political Science Association Bled (Slovenia) November 1996, published by Slovenian Political Science 
Association Ljubljana 1997; R.Rizman as above; Interviews with F.Adam, A.KraSovec, I.LukSic and 
D.Zajc May 1998 Ljubljana
399 J.Prunk A Brief History o f  Slovenia Ljubljana, Zalozba Grad 1996
400 Ancient state of Karantanija, the story of which is now often recalled for its ritual in which the free 
people transmitted their sovereignty to the ruler (by the French historian Jean Bodin described as 
‘without comparison in the world[1576]) and which, it is said, inspired Thomas Jefferson in the drafting 
of the American Declaration of Independence as the contract between the ‘people’ and the sovereign.
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resistance under the leadership of the Communist Party joined the federal Yugoslavia 
dominated by Belgrade and all hopes (from 1943, after the capitulation of Italy there was 
a kind of Slovene parliament in operation) for a substantial autonomy (currency, army, 
political parties etc.) were dashed.
The philosophy and the workings of the system of self-management were 
described in the earlier section of this chapter, but important in this context is the 
functioning of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (the Slovene Parliament). 
Slovenia’s political system was a combination of one-party rule and an assembly style ol 
self-management system, organised in a complex way from locally elected delegates from 
units o f ‘associated labour’ (workers, the Chamber o f Associated Labour), 
representatives of local communities (the Chamber of Communes) and representatives 
from five officially recognised socio-political organisations (the Socio-Political Chamber, 
the War Veterans, Trade Unions, the League of Communists, the Socialist Alliance of 
Working People and the Socialist Youth). In spite of delegates being elected at the work 
place or local communities, the Assembly was not exactly a parliament for one main 
reason - the decisions at the top level remained directed by the interest of one single 
Communist party. Nevertheless, the experience of representation and community 
interests cannot be underestimated in the Slovene political system which has retained 
some of the socialist self-management character.
The new Constitution (December 1991)401, declared Slovenia to be a ‘social state 
governed by the rule of law (Art.2.) and ‘the state of all its citizens based on the 
permanent and inalienable right of Slovenian people to self-determination’ (Art.3). Large 
sections of the Constitution (Art. 14-66) are dedicated to the protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms (Art. 15, guarantees personal dignity and liberty, Art. 19-21 
secures the participation in political life, voting rights are defined by Art.42-44, the rights 
of children in Art.53-56). The unusual aspect o f this Constitution are practically 
unchanged welfare rights o f the previous regime (the right to social security and health 
care Art.50-51, the rights o f children and obligations of parents Art. 53-56), including 
the guaranteed freedom to work and the state’s responsibility to create opportunities to 
work (Art.66).
401 Constitution o f the Republic o f  Slovenia (Ustava 1991), Casopisni Zavod Uradni List Republike 
Slovenije Ljubljana 1993
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The corporatist character of Slovenia, the tradition of which is not rooted only in 
the self-management system, but goes further back to the last century’s cooperatives of 
farmers and artisans, strongly supported by the Church402, is now encompassed in the 
political system. In the Slovene parliament, in addition to the main chamber, the National 
Assembly (Drzavni zbor, 90 popularly elected representatives of all people) which makes 
laws and decisions, there is a non-political second chamber, the National Council 
(Drzavni svet) composed of 40 deputies, o f which 18 represent interest organisations, 
such as trade unions, nurses, physicians, employers, universities, agriculture, tradesmen 
etc., and 22 local communities. Despite its limited powers (it proposes laws, it can 
require a referendum and it can propose new laws for a further reconsideration before 
their adoption by the National Assembly), the National Council reflects strong ties 
between ‘civil society’ and the political system, inherited from the time of self­
management and the beginnings of democratisation in the 1980s and has undeniably 
given the new democratic institutions a distinctive character, comparable more to
j  • 403
Scandinavian countries or the N etherlands than to  other post-com m unist dem ocracies 
The consociational elem ents o f  the C onstitution e.g . the permanent seats lor minorities in 
the N ational A ssem bly are discussed  b elow , as are the distinctive ‘pillars’ in the S lovene
society in the table below.
6.3.3. Election Results and Coalitions Formation
The transition to democracy in Slovenia, just as in all post-communist countries, must be 
considered in the context of general crisis of the communist regimes, but with special 
characteristics, apart from the national independence which it shares with other newly 
independent states. First, there was hardly any continuation of political parties from the 
interwar period (with possible exception of the SDS, claiming its origins in the Social
402 There is a long tradition of Slovene political thought rooted in the protection of the community, 
traditionally associated with the Catholic Church (in the absence of aristocracy and political ct.zenry 
the Church came to represent the society, mostly peasantry), such as the movement Krekovstvo,he 
peasant cooperatives 19th century and the idea of popular self-government of.Andrej Gosar (193CIs). 
The concept of corporatism was farther developed within socialist ideology by E.Karielj, ■** 
notion is that o f society as one living body, in which each organ is equally 'mportant tothehealh  
whole. For corporatism as the main feature ofthe Slovene political culture see I.LukSic Political 
Culture in Slovenia’ in Political Culture in East Central Europe
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Democratic Party from the beginning of the century), which is in great contrast to 
Slovakia. Second, one can point to the ruling Communist party elite’s transformation 
whilst still in the position of power and its continued support for reforms. Third, since 
the collapse o f Demos, the coalition o f all new democratic parties which won the first 
free elections within Yugoslavia and could be compared to the Czech Civic Forum and 
Solidamost, we can observe ‘grand coalition’ governments (parties o f very different 
political ideas) in Slovene politics.
The first such coalition emerged from the 1992 elections: Associated List of 
Social Democrats (the former Communist Party, reformed into the Party of Democratic 
Renewal), Liberal Democratic party, the conservative Christian Democrats and the 
smaller Social Democratic Party404. By the time of the 1996 elections, the political scene 
in Slovenia had lost its ‘centre’. The Christian Democrats, previously interested in 
coalition with Liberal Democrats, but not receiving enough cooperation from them (the 
issue of religion being the crucial point of disagreement, with Liberal Democrats firmly 
behind separation o f Church and the state) had joined the People’s Party and Social 
Democrats forming the so-called ‘Spring parties’ and committing themselves to join only 
the coalition where these parties would be in the majority, assuming that that would be 
the election result, whilst all other significant parties were considered more ‘left’.
The November 1996 elections split the electorate in half: ‘Spring parties’ got 
nearly 50% of vote (45 seats) and all others including the two permanent minority’s seats 
also 45 seats. The Liberal Democrats retained their position as the strongest party (25 
seats, 27%) and in the absence of the more leftist Associated List (who had lost many 
older voters to the Party o f Retired People) they are now the Left party in the governing 
coalition. The governing coalition comprises further the conservative SLS and the small 
DeSUS (a party without a particular ideology, more an interest group and a balancing 
party in the government, not expected to last beyond this electoral period). The forming 
o f this government was a lengthy negotiation which took till February 1997. The result is 
a coalition o f the two main political adversaries, a centre-left/conservative coalition.
403 Another facet of the Slovene political system worth noting is that political parties (developed mostly 
out of interest organisations and deemed to defend functional interests - retired people, farmers, etc) are 
provided for by public funds.
404 Social Democratic Party stepped down after its leader, the controversial Janez Jan5a, the hero of the 
above mentioned trial and the Minister of Defence was dismissed, which marked the beginning of the 
anti-establishment campaign by this party and its strongly oppositional character.
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Considering the divergent interests these parties represent it must be viewed as an 
achievement and a sign o f politically maturing and stable system.
Table 1.
Position of the parties:
left right405
DeSUS/ZLSD/ SNS LDS DS SKD/SLS/SDS
Table 2.






405 Based on the paper: I.Luksic ‘Slovenia:Segmented Society, Consociational Democracy and 
Corporatism’ London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 21.4.1999. J.Markovic ‘Levicarski 
Conservativizem’ F.Adam ed. Volitve in Politika po Slovensko Ljubljana, Zaloznik 1993
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Table 3. Election results
Party 1990 1992 1996 1996 (seats)
LDS 14 .5 % * ....... 23.5* 27.1* 25*
SKD 13.0* 14.5* 9.6 10
ZLSD (SDP) 17.3* 13.6* 9.0 9
SLS (LS-SKZ) 12.6* 8.7 19.4* 19*
ZS 8.8* 3.7 — —
SDS (SDZS, SDSS)+ 7.1* 3.3* 16.1 16
SDZ 9.5* — — —
SNS — 10.0 3.2 4
DS — 5.0 — —









Turnout 83% 86% 74%
* coalition formation
— quorum 2.5% not reached (new quorum 3%)
+ SDS steps out of coalition in 1994
Sources: D.Zajc ‘Parliament of Slovenia - Democratic Pluralism and Forming of Coalitions’ 
D.Fink-Hafner ‘Development of a Party System’406 
Notes relevant to the election results:
1990: within Yugoslavia, 3-cameral parliament 240 deputies. The ruling coalition DEMOS - 47 seats 
(coalition Christian Democrats, Farmer’s Union, Greens, Democratic Alliance, Social Democrats and 
Craftsmen’s party, also called ‘spring’ parties) fell apart in 1991 (the other two main parties the ex- 
communist ‘Renewal’ Party -14 seats and the Liberals-11), the early elections were called for 1992. 
1992: changes to two National Assembly 90 and National Council 40 
Only 4 parties (LDS, SKD, ZLSD, SLS) have got large shares of votes at all three elections.
406 Respectively in Conflict and Consensus and D.Fink-Hafner J. Robbins Making a New Nation: The 
Formation o f Slovenia
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The government407
The government is formed by PR system. It is composed of the Prime Minister, proposed by the 
President after the consultation with leaders of the parliamentary committees and may be deposed 
by a vote of no confidence by the ministers; vice-versa, the Prime Minister can propose a 
confidence vote in the government. The President is a representative function with limited powers, 
elected directly in general elections for a term of 5 years (2 terms maximum), but nominates the 
Prime Minister and dissolves the National Assembly and calls new elections in case there is no 
candidate for Prime Minister with enough votes. The judiciary as the third section of the 
government is entirely separate from the executive and legislative sections of the government - 
judges do not hold any other governmental or party position, whilst the Constitutional Court, 
besides the judgement upon the validity of legislation mediates in disputes between all state 
bodies.
Personalities
The Prime Minister is Janez Drnovsek (LDS).
The President of the National Assembly is Janez Podobnik (People’s Party, the second largest, 
conservative and a rather populist party)
The main opposition (‘spring’parties’), is led by the Social Democratic party - SDS’ leader 
Janez Jansa who moved his platform from a strongly nationalist in 1992 to an anti-communist, 
thus anti-establishment, and is accompanied by the Christian Democrats trying to bring the 
Catholic Church into political and educational prominence and the Slovene National Party with a 
mixture of the right wing, anti-foreigners, pro-working class rhetoric.
Presidential elections 1997
Milan Kucan 55.5 % (non-partisan, suspended membership in the Party of Democratic Renewal, 
ex- leader of LCS, President of the presidency in 1990, President of Slovenia 1992, 1997)
Janez Podobnik 18.93 (People’s party)
Jozef Bernik 9,5 (Social Democracts and Christian Democrats)
Turnout 68.6 %
6.3.4. The Politics of Transition: Analysis of the Slovene Case
The above has shown the evolution o f the Slovene political system from the initiation of 
democracy and independence to the present. The question to ask is why the Slovene
407 Based on interviews with A.Krasovec, political analyst Faculty of Social Sciences Ljubljana; 
A.KraSovec ‘Parlamentami deli strank vs.centralni deli strank’ Teorija in Praksa let.34 6/1997 p.p.919- 
933
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transition, despite its obvious problems and similarities with Slovakia, has been more 
successful. The proposition here is that the main reasons are the politically more mature 
electorate and national elites due to a more participatory system prior to the transition, 
more consensus on the issues of independence, and the less divisive ethnically determined 
composition of the society.
The interrelation between democratisation and nation-building and state-building 
has been discussed in the earlier chapters, but in this context it must be repeated that in 
Slovenia the former has been ongoing longer than the latter, which gave the 
democratisation process a less ‘revolutionary’ character. Despite the former communists’ 
victory in the 1990 elections, the self-reforming leadership was forced into opposition to 
the communist regime due to the impossibility o f reforming further within the Yugoslav 
federation. This meant that the redefinition of the Slovene position within Yugoslavia 
became inevitable. Once the independence option became accepted by all major political 
actors, nationalism ceased to be a divisive political issue among political elites (and their 
supporters), and the political agenda could shift to internal problems, the economy, the 
establishment o f democratic institutions, European integration408 etc. Moreover and very 
importantly, the ethnic composition o f Slovene society and the history of ethnic relations 
within it did not lead to the formation of ethnically based parties. The minority groups in 
Slovenia did not oppose the break-away of Slovenia from the federation and had little 
reason to expect any change in their position for either historical or political reasons. All 
in all the democratisation process did not become absorbed in the issues o f the nation and 
this enabled the differentiation of the political parties to proceed along a path more 
compatible with the democratisation process and the promotion of international relations 
instead of preoccupation with inter-nationalities relations within the state itself.
It is argued that the role nationalism plays in the democratisation process is 
contingent on other processes: the pace of democratisation which influences the 
formation o f national elites, the degree of consensus concerning independent statehood 
(in the newly independent democracies), on the historically predetermined level of 
political development (political culture), which contributes in a greater or lesser degree 
to the legitimation of the transition, and on the ethnic structure o f the society which 
affects majority- minority relations. It can also be argued that all of those elements were
408 1.Bemik ‘Slovenian political culture’ in Making a New Nation: Formation o f  Slovenia
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more compatible with the democratisation process in Slovenia than they were in 
Slovakia.
6.4. NATIONHOOD AND DEMOCRACY IN SLOVENIAN TRANSITION
6.4.1. Transition: Slovenian Perspective
The introduction to this chapter stated that the specificity of the Slovenian transition lies 
in the fact that it was a gradual process, which was endorsed and eventually led by the 
self-reformed communist leadership which responded to the gradually increasing 
pressures o f the opposition organisations and civil movements. The preceding account of 
the initiation of democracy in Slovenia suggests that there were significant differences 
from the Slovak case. However ‘homegrown’ the transition in Slovenia was, it is unlikely 
that it would have happened, at that time, without the fall of the Berlin Wall, which 
removed the last ideological barrier between the East and the West. It demolished 
whatever was left of the faith in the communist system (certainly for the time being), and 
made the desire to join ‘Europe’, in this sense more o f a political than geographical 
meaning, attainable for the first time since 1945. The possibility o f attainment makes the 
formalisation of demands easier and the goals clearer.
Thus all postcommunist transitions, whether they preceded the attainment of 
independence (as in Slovenia), were contemporaneous with independence (ex-Soviet 
republics), resulted in independence (Slovakia), or in unification (East Germany) share 
the same aspect, that is the unraveling of state power and the reassertion of the national 
question in response to a totally new set of circumstances. Such an historically 
unprecedented situation, in some cases more revolutionary than in others, warrants a 
review of all set ideas about the conduct o f nations in determining the course of their 
future. Therefore any discussion about developing democracy in the newly formed states 
cannot sidestep nationalism and its evident role in the transition process.
Transitions in postcommunist states - whether the Slovenian one with a headstart 
on the others, or in the established states, such as Hungary and Poland - became national 
projects. Where the project involved the establishment o f independent statehood , thus 
at the same time the reconfiguration of borders, nationalism naturally became a more 
prominent force. The relations between individuals, the nation, the ethnic groups and the
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state had to be reconceptualised and that is the ‘space’ within which nationalism 
operates. Whether the result is compatible with democracy or not, whether it took 
NATO bombing to stop the Serbian nationalist onslaught on Kosovo, or whether 
nationalist sentiments have declined in Slovakia depends on how those relations are 
construed. In any case the reconstruction of states and redistribution of power in the 
postcommunist transitions have been accompanied by nationalism. Why this was not the 
case with other transitions from other authoritarian regimes is quite another story, which 
would involve a systematic comparison between them. Spain and Slovenia spring to mind 
immediately, as the partially ‘regime initiated transitions’409, but then the case of Spain 
with its complex ethnic structure would possibly be more relevant to Slovakia, whilst in 
all cases it is important to realise the very different international circumstances of the 
Southern European transitions and postcommunist ones.
The argument presented in the case o f Slovenia in comparison to Slovakia is 
twofold. Firstly, the transition in Slovenia, starting with liberalisation410 of the communist 
system from below, progressively moving towards the issues o f human rights, 
participation, accountability and pluralism, eventually embraced and initiated by the 
leadership itself. It thus rested on greater legitimacy, by having had enough time to 
reconcile societal and elite differences about the form and the pace of transition. 
Secondly, secession became the guarantor o f the continuity and the pace of 
democratisation, thus giving nationalism a more positive role in that process and 
removing its relevance once independence was achieved. In Slovakia, where minimal 
liberalization took place prior to the change o f the regime, the population was largely 
unprepared for the transition and its consequences, which allowed a section of the 
political elite to make the decision about independence, thus filling the gaps in legitimacy 
with nationalism long after independence.
409 J.Linz A.Stepan added importantly: ’’although under the pressure of society” in Problems o f  
Democratic Transition and Consolidation p. 88 Interestingly, both Slovenia and Spain’s overthrow of the 
regime took place 10 years after the leaders death.
410 there is a difference between democratisation and liberalisation. The latter can occur in essentially 
non-democratic system and involves, as in the above case, the greater freedom for the formations of 
associations, the lesser censorship o f the media and more open criticism of the regime, the better 
treatment of prisoners, the more tolerant approach to opposition, artistic freedoms, more open borders 
etc. The former is much more a political concept, which simply put means that the ruling ideology and 
therefore the control of government can be contested in elections. Democratic transition clearly refers to 
democratisation, not merely liberalisation.
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6.4.2. Legitimacy of Transition
What we are exploring is the question o f how nationalism relates to the transition to 
democracy and under which circumstances is nationalism less or more compatible with 
the democratisation process. The key to the answer seems to be the legitimacy of the 
unfolding democratisation process. The first thing to say about legitimacy is that it is a 
hazy concept. Meciar’s legitimacy to govern did not rest on the efficacy of his 
government, but on the belief by a significant segment of society that it was the best 
possible choice at a given time411. The fact that people kill and get killed on behalf of a 
regime or a nation, illustrates that legitimacy has less to do with justice and morality and 
more with beliefs412 and achieved power and authority (power and authority are not 
interchangeable, but that is another discussion as is the legitimacy of means by which 
those are achieved and maintained).
Legitimacy as used here corresponds with commitment, consent, recognition, 
appropriateness and the authority to act on behalf of others, whereby it is a sum of all 
those elements. Thus, legitimacy requires the recognition that a state and its governing 
regime are appropriate internally (and externally) and that the overwhelming majority of 
the population consents to the authority o f the government. Most former communist 
regimes have failed to achieve this, including Yugoslavia, despite the experiment with 
self-management as an alternative to political democracy - at this point in history, almost 
uncontested as the most legitimate political system. If we consider the difficulties and 
insecurities that the transition to democracy brings, it is obvious that legitimacy is a 
driving force o f the transition and that the progress o f transition in new democracies 
depends on its attainment. The correlation is symmetrical - the more legitimate the 
democratic change is, the more likely it is to succeed.
The preceding sections showed that Slovenia found itself at the point where 
democratic reforms could not continue within the existing constitutional arrangements 
and thus national self-determination became the only way forward. The communist 
leadership in order to stay in power had to share it with other parties and uniquely, it did 
not just step down, it transformed itself. Instead of being in the forefront of the Party it
411 J.Linz ‘Transitions to Democracy’ in The Washington Quarterly 13:3 Summer 1990 p.p.143- 164 
p. 147
412 D.Beetham The Legitimation o f Power London, MacMillan 1991 p. 10 see mainly chapters 1,5, 8
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was now in the forefront o f the nation 413- much the same as with the Serbian leadership, 
and in response to the nationalist platform Serbia assumed. The motivation however was 
very different. Serbia was seeking the maintenance of an unified federal structure under 
their hegemony, not democracy. Accusing Slovenia (and Croatia) of unconstitutional 
secessionist tendencies, it increased the motives of those countries to dissociate 
themselves from a structure which no longer served them well; moreover, the 
dissociation became the declaration of the difference and the intention for the future.
The Slovene leadership was in tune with the newly redefined identity in search of 
a new destiny which could be fulfilled only by further democratisation and independence. 
Its legitimacy stemmed from its responsive and systematic support for the cause chosen 
by the vast majority of the population. The population had been supportive of a 
protracted process o f reforms and discussion driven by issues of democracy, rather than 
nationalism. Slovenia had always seen itself as a small nation afraid of losing its ethnic 
identity and perceived its role as a mediator for minorities within the federation. It 
defined its identity against Serbia and one of the ways to do so was to defend the cause 
of Kosovo. Whilst I did not detect any guilt among Slovenes about the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, there was nevertheless regularly expressed sadness for Kosovo, left to the 
mercy of Serbia without allies. Ethnicity was not a primary issue in largely homogenous 
Slovenia, national independence stood for further democratisation, and the agenda was 
filled with autonomy, authority, power and the legitimacy of democratic institutions, the 
crafting and exercise of those needed also an autonomous territory.
Nationalism, ethnicity (and religion for that matter) can only be exploited when 
there is a rift in society on those issues. At the present time, when politics have stabilized 
and political parties have to create a sharper profile of identification against domestic 
rather than external opposition, the so-called ‘Spring parties’ campaign more on the issue 
of national identity, religion and ethnicity than they did at the time when independence 
encompassed all o f those issues against external pressures. It appears that in Slovenia 
nationalism in the beginning o f the transition added to the legitimacy o f democratic
413 According to the data collected by annual opinion surveys conducted on representative samples of the 
Slovenian population by the Institute for Public Opinion and Mass Media Research at the Faculty of 
Social Sciences in Ljubljana headed by Niko Tos in 1990 74.6% believed that the Slovenian Communist 
Party was more in accordance with the interest of the people than a few years ago (41.7% in 1989;
26.4% in 1988) In I.Bemik B.Malnar ‘Ethism, Nationalism and State-Building: the Case of Slovenia’ 
Paper prepared for presentation at the Congress of the International Political Association, Seoul, August 
1997 Appendix 1. Henceforth I.Bemik ‘Ethism, Nationalism...
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change, instead o f exploiting the new enlarged political arena by seeking alternatives to 
that process.
Nationalism can adjust the pace and the direction of transition - in Slovakia its 
role was more negative, it slowed the process down and brought more radicalism into 
politics. Then again in Slovakia neither democratisation, nor national independence 
enjoyed the legitimacy they did in Slovenia. The already complicated relationship 
between nationalism, democratisation and legitimacy was exacerbated by the polarisation 
o f society, which ran precisely along those lines - the affiliation with the federal partner 
that pursued a different form of transition and the presence of the large minority opposed 
to Slovak national independence.
6.4.3. The Role of Nationalism in Democratisation Process
The mobilizing potential of nationalism is rooted in the simplicity and immediacy of the 
appeal it makes to ‘the nation’, and this ability is easily made an instrument o f any 
political purpose and largely explains the negative view of nationalism. Enough has been 
written about the negative side o f nationalism, yet nearly all authors on Slovenia agree 
that nationalism had a positive function there, that “it was instrumental in creating a 
relatively broad consensus on vital national interests”414 and that
it is obvious that the basic sources o f  the awakened Slovenian nationalism 
should be sought in the tendencies to set up a political nation and to build a 
nation-state, as the two necessary frameworks for more rapid comprehensive 
modernisation processes”415.
In the opening of the first chapter, which dealt with the rise o f nationalism in the
postcommunist Eastern/Central Europe generally, I mentioned an essay by Ghia Nodia,
which states that “democracy never exists without nationalism”416 and argued that the
evident link between democracy and nationalism cannot be confused with their
compatibility. On the other hand the issue of compatibility in the ‘up and running’
democratic system is a different question from that how compatible nationalism is at the
inception o f democracy. It is my belief that a newly emerging democracy combined with
4141.Bemik ‘Ethism, Nationalism... p.l 1
P.Klinar ’Ethnic Conflicts in Postsocialist Societies in Europe. The Role of Small Nations in These 
Relations and Circumstances: the Case of Yugoslavia and Slovenia’ in S.Devetak ed.K/eine Nationen
und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas p.2 84 
G.Nodia as above p.4
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a new statehood cannot be compared to a more mature democracy, or a new system in a 
long-established state.
Nationalism in Slovenia at the time of the self-determination era must be viewed 
as a strong force moving the changes forward with the population acting as its agent. 
Obviously there would have been some manipulation by elites and by the media (and not 
to forget the actual political events that took place, such as the trial o f Jansa), but to a 
much lesser extent than we have seen in Slovakia. If anything, the legitimacy of the 
political elite derived partially from the response to what was happening among the 
people, which is the reason why some activists o f that time claim that the leading 
reformers allied with nationalists. But what if ‘nationalists’ were democrats too? The 
point is that, and here I take up Nodia’s argument, nationalism does not exclude the 
possibility of democracy. When nationalism is blamed for the break-up of Yugoslavia, it 
is because it led to a war, which is not the same as Slovenia becoming independent, 
without border disputes and without ethnic mobilisation against minorities within its 
territory, or elsewhere.
Everything said about legitimacy above indicates that government can be 
legitimate only by the will of the people it governs, which is the principle of popular 
sovereignty and at the heart o f democracy. Neither can happen without the establishment 
o f a political unit, which does not necessarily have to come into existence through 
nationalism (see the formation of Czechoslovakia), except that historically, even if not 
inevitably, it usually does. Nationalism engenders nations417, Gellner tells us in another 
context (industrialisation and modernisation) and postcommunism means a 
modernisation of another kind - catching up with what is perceived to be more advanced. 
This is why democratisation and the quest for national independence often come as one 
package - called self-determination, we, the ‘nation’, decide. What happens to 
nationalism after it has fulfilled its role in sustaining this difficult enterprise depends on 
how legitimate this enterprise was in the first place and how the balance between 
nationalism and democracy lies in the new state, which nationalism thus helped to bring 
into existence.
The criticism of nationalism is rooted in its intolerance o f an individual cause and 
the preference for the ‘collective’, from which there is only a small step to ‘the tyranny of
417 E.Gellner Nations and Nationalism Oxford, Blackwell 1983 p.55
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the majority’ and political values confused with cultural, racial and other values devoid of 
universal norms of liberal democracy (which is o f course what we are talking about). 
Slovenia demonstrated that at a certain time in the nation’s development the individual 
cause can be identical with that of community. It is not intrinsic to nationalism which 
seeks its own state to demand the exclusion o f other national groups, it is however one 
o f nationalism’s traits to suggest exclusion, if it will benefit its cause. This is the other 
side o f nationalism, which indeed seems to balance on the edge between social cohesion 
and political solidarity, and ethnic cohesion used to build political solidarity.
Due to the regular appearance o f the latter kind and the challenge it poses to 
democracy, the debate about the theoretical compatibility of the two concepts has been 
dominated by the negative influence o f nationalism on anything to do with democracy.
Yet, we may have to concede that nationalism is a part o f the democratic process with 
better or worse consequences for the process itself, and even that depends on too many 
variables and is imbued with a strong normative element. Whether the Slovene 
nationalism at the time of transition was good, or less good ‘ethnic’ (for that changes, in 
1848 Slovenes had a different conception of what their nationalism was to achieve), was 
at that time less relevant; an ethnic community, with a number o f cooperating minorities, 
became a political nation418. When we are told that Slovene nationalism is the right kind, 
civic, future orientated, pragmatic, devoid o f romanticism419, it means that a 
predominantly ethnic nation has made an unreserved commitment to liberal democracy; 
the character o f nationalism thus shifted the emphasis, in accordance with the goals and 
aspirations o f the nation. Ethnicity is not by definition undemocratic or conllictual, it is 
the uncertainty about how it forms the relationship with the state that can lead to 
undemocratic or conflictual ethnic policies.
Postcommunism is synonymous with one prefix - re - revival, restoration, 
reidentification etc. Thus, forging the new out o f what there was, neglected or 
interrupted and therefore nationalist) can mean many things; it could be democratic,
418 Slovenia is often said to be practically ethnically homogenous, which is far from the truth. As all 
states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire it comprises o f many minorities, however small.
Officially recognised are two - Hungarian and Italian in total 0.59% of the population. However, during 
the Yugoslav period many immigrants from other republics settled in Slovenia, mostly for economic 
reasons. At least further 10% of the population is of that origin. Then they are some other very small 
communities (Romany, Germans, Austrians, Albanians etc.) and people o f ‘undetermined’ ethnic 
origins. According to the 1991 data 87.84% of the population is ethnically Slovene (Ethnic Minorities in 
Slovenia Institute for Ethnic Studies Ljubljana 1994)
419 Lev Kreft - interview 4.5.1998 and M.Zagar - interview 11.5.1998
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more socialist, less authoritarian, more liberal, even fascist. What it can hardly be is a 
transition without being national, which makes nationalism a difficult, but necessary 
partner of postcommunist transitions to democracy. Nationalism, in a way similar to 
legitimacy, drives the transition: it can add to its legitimacy, just as much as it can 
minimize it, it can speed it up or slow it down, therefore, its role is regulatory. However, 
the final direction democratisation takes depends much more on the level o f commitment 
to democracy than on the level o f nationalism.
6.5. ETHNIC POLICY OF SLOVENIA
The issues o f nationality, citizenship and the protection o f ethnic minorities are some of 
the central themes in the process of transition of Central and Eastern European countries. 
Not only because it is often for the first time that these have to be formulated in fully 
independent conditions under democratic principles, but also because they determine the 
level of democratic credentials and the standing o f the country in the international 
community. Ethnic policies have two dimensions: external and internal, and both 
condition their formulation420. In its internal dimension the ethnic policy which the state 
adopts is an index of the democratic development o f modern society, and it is important 
to add that the number o f ethnic groups or the size o f ethnic minorities should not be the 
determining factor. Of course it is easier to offer a high level o f protection to small 
minority(ies), but in the long run, tolerance is a question of education and the perception 
o f its importance for democracy. Intolerance permitted against one group can soon 
change its targets - as such it is always detrimental to social and political stability and 
pluralism, without which there is little democracy.
The external dimension has two aspects. Firstly, the less positive one, which is 
the use o f ethnic policy towards a certain minority (or immigrant community) in bilateral 
negotiations with neighbouring countries. The principle o f reciprocity holds a political 
value and functions as political leverage, even if the moral value of such political 
bargaining is questionable. Secondly, despite the ethnic policy being considered an 
internal affair o f each state, in the increasingly global world the international community
420 M.Zagar ‘Nationality, protection of ethnic minorities and transition to democracy: the case of 
Slovenia’ in Teorija in Praksa 32:3-4 March-April 1995 pp.243-254 p.250
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can demand the implementation of certain standards in the exchange for admission to 
international organizations and monetary programmes.
Slovenia had traditionally a good record on the protection of minorities, already 
within Yugoslavia and was often cited as the best example o f the Yugoslav system, in 
which the protection of minorities did not count among its many problems. The 1991 
Constitution followed this positive tradition and tried to translate it into a new social 
situation. Slovenia is a full member o f the Council o f Europe, it signed the European 
Charter on Human Rights, it has signed and ratified the European Convention on Human 
Rights including all Additional Protocols. The Slovenian Parliament adopted the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and as an internal measure the 
Law on Self-governing Ethnic Communities. In addition, Slovenia is a member of IMF, 
World Bank, GATT, NATO’s Partnership for Peace and finally, it has been accepted as a 
future member o f the EU in the first round o f its enlargement into the East (June 1998). 
So, how is all that international recognition reflected in the ethnic policy of Slovenia, or 
the question could be posed the other way round, what kind of ethnic policy leads to 
such international approval? Whichever way, it can be argued with certainty that ethnic 
policies influence international recognition directly, which in turn reinforces the 
commitment to democratisation internally, thus that there is an explicit link between 
ethnic policy and the transition to democracy.
6.5.1. Citizenship
The first consideration in the Slovene case is the status o f the immigrant population from 
other Yugoslav republics, which constituted 10% o f the population. According to Article 
39 o f the Law on Citizenship (Uradni List RS N o.1/1991) everybody who had citizenship 
o f SFRY (every Yugoslav citizen had double citizenship, federal and republic, so that 
everybody who acquired a republic citizenship automatically had also federal Yugoslav 
citizenship) became a citizen o f the Republic of Slovenia. Article 40 of the same Law 
provided a special procedure for the granting of citizenship to every citizen of former 
Yugoslavia, who actually resided in the territory of Slovenia on the day of Plebiscite 
(23.12.1990), and who applied for Slovene citizenship within six months after the 
adoption ofthis law (25.6.1991). Some 170 000 people became Slovene citizens under 
this article 40. Their application could be refused if they had actively participated in the
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aggression against Slovenia (as a member o f JNA in the ‘Ten Days War’). After the 6 
months period everyone could apply for citizenship by naturalisation on the basis of 
general conditions (Article 10), which are not particularly easy or difficult, but similar to 
other laws on citizenship in other states421. The result of the referendum showed that 
immigrants voted for the independence o f their new country o f residence, which 
increased the vote by an extra 10% (88,2%, turnout 93%). The commitment to Slovene 
independence by the immigrant population does not have to be sought in ideology, most 
o f them voted for a better life, which was what brought them to Slovenia in the first 
place.
6.5.2. Ethnic Minorities422
A minority is (according to the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning National Minorities and their 
Members) “a group of persons in a state who a) reside on the territory of that state and 
are citizens thereof, b) maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state, c) 
display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic characteristics, d) are 
sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest o f  the population of 
that state or of a region of that state, e) are motivated by a concern to preserve their 
culture, their traditions, their religion or their language”423. Minority rights should 
therefore assure the existence and development o f ethnic minorities, their distinct
1 There are 4 ways to acquire Slovene citizenship: 1 - ius sanguinis (birth and blood, at least one of the 
parents to be Slovene); 2- ius soli (bom in Slovenia); 3- international agreement; 4 - naturalisation (18 
years of age, 10 years of residence, 5 permanent, permanent employment, no longer than 1 year of 
imprisonment, should be able to communicate in Slovene, dual citizenship to be avoided etc.. All in all 
citizenship laws of all countries are restrictive. The greatest problems are encountered by refugees, at 
this time still some 17 000 whose status is covered by The Law on Temporary Protection, which hinges 
on always the dubious concept of evaluation o f the circumstances in the country o f origin and the 
possibility o f return - particularly problematic after the Bosnian war.
~ The following draws on Constitution o f  the Republic o f Slovenia Ljubljana, Casopisni Zavod Uradni 
List Republike Slovenije 1993; Ethnic Minorities in Slovenia Ljubljana Institute for Ethnic Studies 
Information Bureau Government o f the republic of Slovenia 1994; The Law on Temporary Protection 
Ljubljana, Peace Institute 1998; M.Zagar ‘Nationality, Protection of Ethnic Minorities and Transition to 
Democracy: The case o f Slovenia I and II, in Teorija in Praksa 32:1-2 Januaryl995 pp.88-95 and 32:3-4 
March 1995 p.p.243-254; R.J66 ‘Slovenes in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovenia: Ethnic and State 
Identity’ in Ethnic and Racial Studies 14:1 January 1991 p.p. 100-106. Forthwith known only by the 
name of the author or the publication and the page.
423 M.Zagar p. 244
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language, culture and identity, establishment and functioning of their own organizations, 
and their participation in the process o f decision-making within the political system.
Before I move to the special rights for minorities in Slovenia a remark about the 
distinction between ethnic minority, autochthonous minority and immigrant community is 
in order. Generally, following international law, national constitutions, already more 
often than not reluctant to admit to ethnic pluralism and extend special legal 
arrangements for ethnic minorities, guarantee the legal protection only to traditional 
ethnic minorities. These are defined as a minority which is a part of a certain nation-state, 
but as a specific group due to specific historical and political developments lives outside 
the border of its nation-state, in autochthonous settlements in the nation-state o f their 
citizenship. Immigrants are another story altogether and there is practically no legal 
protection for these communities. Even if they came to the country o f their new 
residence two or three generations ago, often they have no citizenship rights and remain 
in the legal vacuum of foreigners in residence with basic human rights that belong to any 
person. If an immigrant becomes a citizen, then he or she has all political rights and in 
theory can thus influence decisions important to their immigrant community.
Following a very common practice, the Constitution of Slovenia guarantees 
special rights and protection only to those autochthonous ethnic communities424 who 
have traditionally lived in a specific territory, which are the Hungarian and Italian 
minority. Concerning the role o f the state in the protection of ethnic communities, the 
Constitution (rather uniquely in the region) adopted the ‘positive concept of protection 
o f ethnic minorities and their members’, which in practice means an active role o f the 
state, an obligation to act and to assure the realization o f individual and collective rights. 
The words ‘collective rights’ are significant - it is the recognition o f the duality of the 
rights o f ethnic minorities, whereby collective rights belong to ethnic minorities as 
distinct communities and as individual rights to every member o f a certain ethnic 
community. Concerning their nature, some of the rights are realized mostly as collective 
rights, while others are realized mostly as individual425. The state’s role in the protection 
of minorities is covered by Article 5 in the Constitution, which also defines Slovenia’s
424 The Constitution uses strictly term ‘ethnic community’, not ‘ethnic minority’ in order to avoid the 
possible negative connotations of the term minority.
425 For example: the right to be educated in minority language belongs to individual and collective rights 
simultaneously; the establishment o f an appropriate educational system is a collective right of a certain
215
active role in attending to the welfare o f Slovene minorities in neighbouring countries 
and in promoting their contacts with the homeland. In addition: “Slovenians not holding 
Slovenian citizenship shall enjoy special rights and privileges in Slovenia”, the extent of 
which shall be determined by statute.
The official language o f Slovenia is Slovenian (Article 11). In those areas where 
Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities reside, the official language is also Italian or 
Hungarian. The main provisions regarding protection and rights o f ethnic communities 
are located in Part II o f the Constitution under “Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms”. Besides the general provision of “equality before the law” (Article 14), there 
is the guarantee o f equal human rights, irrespective o f national origin, race, language, 
religion, political or other beliefs, financial status etc. “Each person shall be entitled to 
freely identify with his national grouping, to foster and give expression to his culture and 
to use his own language” (Article 61). Each person has the right to use their own 
language and script in official proceedings (Article 62) and the Constitution prohibits 
(Article 63) “all incitement to ethnic, racial, religious or other discrimination” and the 
inflaming of intolerance.
In addition to the basic human rights, belonging to each citizen, the Constitution 
guarantees special rights to the Hungarian and Italian minorities. The most important of 
those (Article 64 and fiirther elaborated in various laws) are:
a) the right to the use of their native language - in the mixed areas Slovene, Hungarian 
and Italian are equal and all public services are bilingual; b) the free use of national 
symbols; c) the right to establish autonomous institutions; d) the right to foster the 
development o f their own culture and the right to be informed in their own language; e) 
the right to education and schooling in their own language and to become familiar with 
the history and culture o f their mother country; f) the right to cooperation with the 
nation of their homeland and very importantly, g) the right to direct representation in the 
National Assembly (Article 80 - two seats permanently reserved for the Hungarian and 
Italian deputies, elected by their local authorities in the Slovene Parliament).
It should be emphasized that all these right are: 1) irrespective of the number of 
minority members, 2) that the state is obliged to support financially and morally the 
implementation of these rights; 3) that the Constitution provides a minority veto (Article
minority, whilst giving the possibility to attend a bi-lingual school in the language of minority is an 
individual right of every member of a certain minority.
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64) in the process of decision-making within the political system, that is, any legislation 
which exclusively affects the Hungarian and Italian communities, “may not be enacted 
without the consent” of their representatives. As far as education of members of the 
above minorities is concerned, it is based on two different models: the Italian minority 
attends monolingual schools, while the Hungarian minority attends bilingual schools with 
Slovene pupils. The curricula o f these schools differ from other schools in that they teach 
both the minority and Slovene language and pay special attention to familiarizing the 
pupils with the culture and history o f their native country in order to maintain their ethnic 
identity. The common goal o f these measures is to establish bilingualism, also by the 
majority population, so that the generations that grow up in these mixed areas do not 
have communication problems. This provides for a better understanding and more active 
coexistence.
Slovenia recognizes also Romany/Gypsies as an autochthonous ethnic community 
(Article 65), consisting approximately 2300 people), although they have no ‘mother* 
state to exercise the special connection with, nor to be protected by. Despite being given 
the status and special rights by the Constitution (an improvement on other Constitutions 
in the region), these rights “shall be such as are determined by statute” - they are still not 
in operation. The representation o f the Romany community is made more difficult by the 
specific situation in which they live; their communities are usually very small and 
dispersed, there is little sense o f a common identity, made worse by the traditional lack 
of education. The problem of education is exacerbated by the lack of teachers who speak 
their language and by the fact that the children are usually socialized in a different way, 
which is not always compatible with the one in schools.
It would appear that in treatment o f minorities it is important to allow dual 
culture and affiliation and accept plural loyalties426. The evidence from Slovenia shows 
that civic and ethnic identity are not always in conflict and that narrower smaller ethnic 
community (in this region usually based on language) and the larger civic attachment can 
satisfy basic human needs. Understanding this is of particular importance in East Central 
Europe, where many people live in the sphere of influence of two cultures. Rejection of 





I have concluded the chapter on Slovakia with a set o f propositions to be tested against 
the following case o f Slovenia and these were:
1) nation-building and state-building are parallel processes in newly independent 
postcommunist democracies. However, the continuation o f the democratisation process 
requires that at some point nation-building recedes in favour o f state-building.
2) The role of nationalism in the democratisation process is partially predetermined by 
historical and political developments concerning national recognition, identity and 
political tradition.
3) The success o f democratisation depends further on the level o f consensus; between 
elites and the population and between ethnic groups, thus a less polarized society, 
whether ethnically or politically starts from a more advantageous position.
The evidence from Slovenia points to that:
1) Slovenia’s national consciousness at the time of independence was much more 
developed than in Slovakia. The reasons are numerous; firstly as a consequence of the 
different development within the Austro-Hungarian empire and secondly, as a 
consequence of different national policies within Yugoslavia and the special position of 
Slovenia within that already different communist system. As a result the Slovene nation- 
building process was ongoing and maturing throughout the communist period, 
culminating in independence, which gave the state-building a more prominent role in the 
democratisation process.
2)Political participation and a degree of democratic awareness existed in Slovenia prior 
to the collapse o f Yugoslavia and the initiation of democracy. The more lenient type of 
communism allowed for reforms from above and the pressures from below to be 
coordinated over a longer period of time, thus more consensus was reached on all issues 
concerning the nation and democracy. Here more radical elements in the Slovene 
political scene could be neutralised before they could aggravate the transition. Unlike in 
Slovakia, the communist period cannot be viewed negatively for the political, economic 
and national development o f Slovenia.
3)The transition from communism, which was a kind of partial (or deformed) 
modernisation to a modern state, participating fully in the economic and political
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integration in Europe, became a national project, the completion of which was only 
possible by secession from Yugoslavia. Nationalism and democratisation thus sought the 
same goals - political independence and national recognition. In the Slovene case 
nationalism and democracy were not only conducive to each others’ aspirations, they 
became dependent on each other, which gave democracy high legitimacy and nationalism 
reinforced it.
It is obvious that the relationship between nationalism and democracy formed a 
complementary dynamic throughout Slovenia at the beginning of the transition process, 
the situation aided by historically predetermined positive conditions, among which were 
ethnic harmony, a strongly developed sense of national identity, a politically more aware 
population and lastly, but very importantly the unequivocal commitment to 
democratisation above all other issues. This however does not mean that Slovenia is not 
susceptible to an increase in nationalist mobilisation, or a certain stagnation in the 
democratisation process, both still fluid as in all ECE countries.
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Chapter 7
NEW DEMOCRACIES IN POST- COLD WAR EUROPE
7.1. INTRODUCTION
Much of the traditional discussion about the relationship between nationalism and 
democracy deals with the nation and the state, with the borders o f the state constituting 
the limits within which this relationship is played out. The following chapter enlarges the 
field and turns its attention to the international environment, beyond the Cold War 
generally and to new democracies in particular. It explores how international relations 
and integration shape nationalism and democratisation in the newly independent states of 
Eastern/Central Europe.
The previous chapters have pointed to some conclusions about democratisation 
and nationalism, which could be summarized as follows: a) postcommunist states o f the 
region differed greatly already under communism and their divergence under 
democratisation has increased; b) the transition to democracy is not a linear process, but 
can be reversed. The success, stagnation or failure o f the democratisation process depend 
largely on domestic conditions which in postcommunist states can generally be 
characterised by a limited experience of democratic politics combined with relatively high 
intensity o f nationalist sentiments; c) if formal democracy (fair and free elections) is not 
backed up by more substantive institutional and constitutional mechanisms which are 
able to curb majority nationalism and offer substantial provisions for minorities, the 
democratisation process is likely to be arrested by the rise o f nationalist sentiments 
among all ethnic groups within the state.
It appears that the relationship between democracy and nationalism in the newly 
independent postcommunist states is locked in a paradox of inevitability. Both processes 
are simultaneous, promoting each other and posing a challenge to one another. The most 
challenging task o f democratisation is to withstand the pressures from nationalism, which 
democratisation itself called into prominence. National self-determination, minority rights 
and identity are the key elements o f the contest, whilst democratisation policies seek is
220
the creation of an all- inclusive, culturally tolerant and politically united community. This 
task can be achieved only if nation-building policies include tolerance and pluralism 
among their aims. The argument o f this chapter is that the current international 
environment is a close partner in this relationship, and it is suggested, for better rather 
than for worse.
This chapter concentrates on the nation and the state in a world where both are 
increasingly enmeshed in either overlapping or mutually exclusive coexistence required 
by various internationally accepted norms, accords and arrangements, willingly or 
because non-participation is not a feasible option. Moreover, it is argued that sovereignty 
is no longer the ultimate accolade for a nation, for national recognition by the 
international community involves more than independence. It requires the ability to 
relinquish part o f sovereignty to transnational organisations, and this means a significant 
redefinition o f what was a classical aim of nationalism. The key elements ot nation- 
building, the national identity and the subsequent role of the state are thus expected to 
expand their meaning and include supranationality, difference and the expanded horizon 
o f the state on board. The following discussion starts with the end of the Cold War and 
outlines agendas, dilemmas and the chances o f states in a global world and the resulting 
character of nationalism. The final part explores the main theme of the thesis, the 
relationship between nationalism, democratisation and international environment through 
the case studies of Slovak and Slovene foreign policy-making since independence. The 
conclusion will emphasize the difficulty o f the transition to democracy in a newly 
independent state that faces a multitude of tasks, often contradictory, but always under a 
close scrutiny of the international community. Finally, it is suggested that international 
relations and integration, for all their possible reverse effects, including a nationalistic 
backlash, shape the relationship between democracy and nationalism in favour o f the 
former.
7.2. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NEW AGENDA FOR NEW 
DEMOCRACIES
The much-debated issue in international relations remains the extent to which external 
factors influence domestic developments, which is not the same debate as the one about 
how low on the list of the electorate’s priorities he the issues o f foreign policy. However,
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no politician in a democratic state can risk ignoring public opinion in matters o f the 
state’s standing and functioning within the international system. The system itself 
reverberates with the echo of major systemic changes that are often brought about by a 
change in domestic policy of one important unit. The ‘Prague Spring’ o f 1968 failed to 
loosen the hold o f the Soviet Union over Eastern/Central Europe, but the violence with 
which the status quo had to be reinstated showed a glimmer of the weakness of such an 
artificial division o f the world. The ‘limited sovereignty’ of the Brezhnev doctrine which 
sent the tanks into the former Czechoslovakia did not change the world, but the 
denunciation of the doctrine by Gorbachev did. There could be little doubt that ‘the 
Gorbachev effect’427 linked the changes in the Soviet Union to the developments in 
Eastern Europe, though ‘the effect’ was more what the USSR did not do than what it 
did in connection to the surrounding countries. The end of the Cold War was therefore 
not an agreement about a new world order, but a withdrawal o f one major player from 
the Cold War order, thus a tacit admission of radical changes.
The radicalism of this situation, however, is paradoxical. Firstly, there is the 
notion that the end o f the Cold War means an unstable and insecure world. The absence 
of one major threat is replaced by a multitude of threats, from various less controllable 
sources. This is rather strange considering that the ‘safety’ o f the Cold War was rooted 
in an ideological division of the world, backed up by an arms race of frightening 
proportions at a very high human cost, and that ‘the only one threat’ was a nuclear 
one428. There are further assertions about the ‘safety’ o f the Cold War429, such as that 
there were fewer armed conflicts and certainly less o f that murderous nationalism, which 
have by now become a standard assessment o f the previous era and are a witness to the 
selectiveness o f human memory and the creation of myths.
This is not the place to list the wars and conflicts o f the 1945-1989 period, but 
mentioning Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, the Middle East, possibly indicates where this
427 T.Niklasson ‘The external dimension’ in G.Pridham T.Vanhanen Democratization in Eastern
Europe London, New York, Routledge 1994 p.216
This is a topic of security studies, some examples : J.Gaddis ‘The Long Peace’ in International 
Security 10:4 Spring 1986 p.p.99- 142; P.Latawski ‘Central and Eastern Europe:Exporting Instability?’ 
RUS1 Journal 140:4 August 1995 p.p.28-33; A.Munro ‘A New World Disorder? RUSI Journal 140:1 
February 1995; R.Keohane J.Nye S.Hoffinann After the Cold War Cambridge, London Harvard 
University Press 1993; J.Mearsheimer ‘Back to the Future’ International Security 15:1 Spring 1990 
p.p.5-56; the same author ‘The false Promise o f International Institutions’ International Security 19:3 
Winter 1994/95 p.p.5-49
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argument, were it be elaborated upon, would lead - to the conclusion that the wars o f the 
Cold War were fought by proxy in the periphery. The dismantling of the Soviet Union 
has cost fewer lives than the dismantling of other European empires following the 
Second World War and possibly even fewer than the withdrawal of the British from 
India, whilst the expectations o f the ethnic conflicts in the ex-Soviet Union have far 
exceeded the reality. Whilst on the subject related to nationalism and self-determination 
of the peoples, Bosnia and Kosovo loom large, but they are not a symbol of our time, 
they are a lesson we have not learned, blinded by that other myth that under the Cold 
War conditions nationalism died.
Had it died it could not have been revived as quickly and as vigorously as it was; 
the point is that the conflicts were labeled differently and that we have come to associate 
nationalism strictly with fragmentation and instability, instead of equally closely related 
self-determination and democratisation. The fragmentation of the empires at the end of 
the First World War was a celebration of the self-determination doctrine, yet much of its 
implementation was regretted later, for the principle itself, as lofty as it is, was never 
meant to guarantee peace. The end of the colonial era was as much in the name of 
national liberation and self-determination as is the revived nationalism in the post­
communist world. There is an important extra dimension to this wave of nationalism - it 
carries strong tendencies towards integration (EU,NATO). Many nationalist leaders have 
claimed (whether with conviction or for mobilizing purposes), that only “a sovereign 
nation can give up a part o f its sovereignty in a sovereign way, and transfer it to a 
transnational community”430, and in similar vein, “that the establishment o f the state 
means that all its citizens can directly participate in European and world integration' 431. 
The other type o f ethnic reassertion, also prevalent in the post-Cold War context, seeks 
the way back to traditional societies. This form of ethnic politics is more a result of fast 
technological, cultural and political advance in the modern world, when some societies, 
unable to adapt to the rapid pace of modernisation, political or technological, feel 
disenfranchised and turn inwards (e.g. some Islamic countries).
429 The following paragraph was inspired by an excellent article by K.Booth ‘Human Wrongs and 
International Relations’ International Affairs 71:1 Winter 1995 p.p. 103-126
430 V.Hribar ‘The Slovenes and European Transnationality’ Nova RevijaW1:57 1987 see chapter 3 p.29
431 V.Meciar 1.1.1993, cited in M.Lesko ‘Pribeh diskvalifikacie favorita’ Slovensko v Sedej Zone 
Bratislava IVO 1998 p. 16
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Secondly, the new order was actually an acceptance o f the existing order, by the 
previously resisting side of the ideological barrier. The radical change applied, so it 
seems, only to the East, whilst the West remained at worst unchanged and at best 
challenged. The change for the West is that capitalism as a system no longer needs any 
justification432. It has proved more resilient and economically sustainable than the other 
(communist) system, and its compatibility with liberal democracy means that there is a 
certain exhaustion of political alternatives433. The fact that some 30 % of the world s 
work force is unemployed, that a large part of the world is politically marginalised, that 
there is a detectable sentiment of uncertainty and impending crisis is a part of the 
sophisticated, but largely ineffective (as solutions to these problems go) debate about 
postmodemity as the only critical debate of the new world order.
As the division, by implication the alignment, of the Cold War encompassed the 
whole world, its end automatically spelled the advent of a new global politics which 
without doubt changed all domestic perspectives in ECE . The changes were already 
ongoing and linked to the lack of legitimacy of the existing regimes, basing their control 
on support from Moscow. Therefore the combination of the internal democratizing 
dynamic and the abandonment o f the authoritarian leaderships of ECE made the 
explosion of democracy come earlier than it would have happened - it could be argued 
that in some cases, e.g. Slovakia, it came too early.
The meaning of democracy, as the will o f the people, would suggest that the 
timing of the inception o f democratisation is always right. However, the slogans at the 
student demonstrations in Bratislava in November 1989 “If  not now, when? are more 
indicative o f desperation than of preparedness, of the spirit o f the time rather than a 
considered choice, and of a movement concentrated in the large cities inspired by the 
events, rather than a country-wide movement relying on the support o f the population at 
large. As the case study o f Slovakia illustrated, the country was not prepared for the 
consequences of such a dramatic change of direction, a direction not chosen, but given 
by the constitutional arrangements within the federal state and external pressures.
432 See also L.Diamond and M.Plattner The Global Resurgence o f Democracy Baltimore, London The 
Johns Hopkins University Press 1996 in the introduction: “democracy has been left with no serious 
geopolitical or ideological rivals”.
433 A view particularly passionately defended by F.Fukuyama, see chapter 2
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7.2.1. The New Agenda
The new agenda for the countries o f the region, thus plunged into the new 
world order, suddenly and without guidance, became very complex. While the West 
struggles with the redefinition of the role o f the state in the era of global economy, 
political integration and a militarily insecure world system, and with the construction of 
national identities which would reflect the fast changes and movements of people and 
goods, then the new democracies face a double struggle. The insecurities about the role 
of the state, a general condition shared globally, is in the new states compounded by the 
fact that the state, discredited by the previous regime, has now an important role to play 
in the transition to the new system of political democracy. This is the only acceptable 
system in the new order, regardless o f how prepared these countries were for it, and the 
transition also involves a process o f economic reform and securing national and minority 
rights.
When the struggle for national independence - either in an attempt to speed up 
the transition (Slovenia), or slow it down in order to catch a breath, or even as a way for 
the outgoing elites to remain in power a little longer (Slovakia on the last two counts) - 
led to independence, the new states are facing a multitude of challenges where each 
challenge is exacerbated by the other. The agenda is full and often contradictory. It 
involves: a) nationalizing and homogenizing and anchoring one’s national identity 
through old myths revamped for the new conditions, whilst implementing the universal 
rights and protection o f minorities; b) catching up with the ‘history’, that is forming a 
nation and joining the world as an equal and independent state, at the same time as the 
historical project o f modernity - whose main achievement was the nation-state - has 
apparently ‘ended’ and the relevance o f the nation-state is being questioned, thus being 
given little time to make that national ‘history’; c) seeking recognition by the 
international community under closer scrutiny than any old states were ever subjected to, 
and conforming to the rules o f international law inspired by countries with a much longer 
tradition of doing so. d) finding a niche for national economies in the extremely 
competitive and technologically advanced world. This brings the realisation that 
democracy does not necessarily secure economic benefits, which promoted the desire for
434 S.Gill ‘Gramsci, Modernity and Globalization’, paper delivered at BISA Conference 15-17 December
1997 Leeds p.6
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the changes by many. Contemporary reality may also involve reluctant acceptance of the 
fact that democracy, certainly in the early stages, leads to a greater inequality than in 
previous regime.
These are mammoth tasks and I would like to contend at the outset that 
pessimistic assessments of the postcommunist transitions, however valid in some cases, 
at certain times, should take this into consideration. Eastern/Central Europe was never 
meant to be a monolithic bloc (except maybe in a geographic description) and after the 
end o f the Cold War studying the region as a bloc has become obsolete. Postcommunism 
defines an agenda435, but the order in which the items on this agenda are dealt with varies 
with each country. The assessment o f the progress should therefore be more appreciative 
o f the progress achieved in each individual country, rather than critical ot the time scale
in which this ambitious agenda is fulfilled.
The challenge for a new state is thus how to harmonize its own view of itself and 
its desired international image with an identity accorded to it by the international 
community. The question how this discrepancy between the two shapes nationalism and 
democracy is the question this chapter will try to answer. It is argued here that more 
encouragement on the part of the international community produces better results and 
that exclusion is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The transition has pushed the new states 
towards the West, but such orientation only confirmed their peripheral position, which is 
hardly conducive to self-esteem. Recognition was a way out o f the dysfunctional system, 
and therefore the most important rationale behind the establishment o f the new states 
was emancipation based on national identity. However, the harmonisation of the 
‘national’ and internationally imposed free market and democracy has in nearly all cases 
proved difficult - the external influences and expectations and internal expectations do 
not always meet. The international community expects political stability as a precondition 
for integration, yet the instability o f societies in transition is exacerbated further by the 
fact that the agenda of international relations is not designed to meet the most urgent 
needs of societies in transition - on the contrary the transitional societies are having to 
adapt by bringing more transformation into already changing societies.
435 “It (postcommunism) connotes both clear direction and a fixed destination” M.Mandelbauxn ed. 
Postcommunism A Council on Foreign Relations Book 1966 p.2
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7.3. THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE NEW DEMOCRACIES: SOME 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ‘GLOBAL’
A central feature o f the modem global era is the tension between centripetal tendencies 
of the global market and regional integration on the one hand and, on the other, 
centrifugal forces o f many different identities and cultures forced into coexistence by 
these globalizing and integrative processes and reinforced by the universal acceptance of 
democracy and human rights. The ‘age of rights’436, cultural diversity and globalisation 
might at times not accommodate one another, but connections that form between them 
make clear that there is a limit to state-centricism in international politics. This fact gives 
our times another character trait - a redefinition - o f the role of state, nationalism and 
democracy, and that is where the next sections of this chapter turn to.
7.3.1. Globalisation
The first thing to mention about globalisation is that it carries an aura of inevitability 
with it437. A state can perhaps decide on the degree to which it wishes to be globalised, 
but not whether it is being globalised - it is a process so all encompassing that everything 
is swept away by it. Not joining in means impoverishment and isolation, whilst joining in 
is an exercise in unpredictability. So, globalisation is the main characteristic of this new 
world order, feared and revered at the same time. There are broadly three views on 
globalisation.
a) we are talking about a true global world (“that is the creation of genuinely global 
markets in which locational and institutional - and therefore national - constraints no 
longer matter”)438, in which according to the new globalist orthodoxy states are 
becoming powerless, empty vessels carrying symbolic flags, as it were;
b) globalisation is merely the internationalizing of economies, made much more visible 
by communication. States are seen as the instigators o f the whole process, taking control 
whenever necessary as the only authority in charge of the national economy and
436 A Agh The Politics o f  Central Europe London, Sage 1998 p. 8
437 Globalization is the “intractable fate of the world” Z.Bauman Globalization The Human 
Consequences C a m b r i d g e ,  Polity Press 1998 p.l
438 L. Weiss ‘Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State New Left Review 225 
September/October 1997 p.p.3-26 p.4
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therefore well capable o f adapting to the global world439. In this case not much has 
changed, history has seen a high degree of economic interdependence before, even if the 
scale is enlarged. This view sees the modem nation-state embedded in a very dynamic 
economic and inter-state system, its essential characteristic being adaptation, so that the 
relevance of the nation-state will increase rather than decline,
c) globalisation means a redefinition o f sovereignty and the role o f the nation-state, 
which is neither declining, nor is wholly empowered, but is engaged in a balancing act 
between remaining indispensable as the ultimate source o f legitimacy, but at the same 
time somewhat impotent to take complete charge o f certain developments, which 
exceed the boundaries o f territory and sovereignty. Apart from the two issues o f the 
economy and environment, possibly the two most internationalised ones, these 
developments are often connected to the phenomenon of identity and to society. The 
agenda of governmental debates and intergovernmental collaboration and conflicts is 
weighty with issues such as regional autonomy, cultural autonomy, federalism, the forms 
o f political representation, human rights, religious freedom, immigration, etc., forces 
previously seen as less relevant and too ephemeral to undermine the ‘realist view of 
states440. The questions about modem political community, democracy, ethnicity etc. are 
left wide open to rethinking441, as is the extent of the control that the nation-state can or 
should cover, by which I mean that the external boundaries of the state’s competence 
might be fixed, but the barriers of internal competencies are blurred and might even 
transgress the external boundaries.
This last c) option is the one, I wish to argue, is the realistic picture of 
globalisation - the state, still a part o f an anarchical system of states remains the bearer of 
sovereignty and autonomy, but faces political constraints from the international system, 
therefore its sovereignty and autonomy are redefined, but only to a degree that the state 
chooses to be constrained. We see the difficulties the international community has in
439 For this view see L. Weiss The Myth o f  the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era 
Cambridge, Polity Press 1998
440 This discussion is often the subject of the new concept in international relations referred to as 
‘societal security’(separate from state security, but parallel and broadening the agenda of security from 
survival of the state to the survival of the society as equally relevant) see: O. Weawer B.Buzan 
M.Kelstrup P.Lemaitre Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe London, Pinter 
Publishers 1993
441 For this more open-ended view see: A.McGrew ‘A Global Society?’ in S.Hall D.Held T.McGrew 
Modernity and Its Futures Oxford, Polity Press in Association with the Open University 1992
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constraining some rogue states, e.g. Iraq and Serbia, when only the politics of ‘other 
means’, that is the threat o f force are effective442.
7.3.2. The World of Universal Principles
“..a constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals and 
states coexisting in an external relationship o f  mutual influences, may be 
regarded as citizens o f  a universal state o f  mankind”443,
‘  The Rule o f the People * as the Global Ideology
If  democracy is to become a truly global ideology, the task is to pursue it in such a way 
that the national and international and their mutual penetration are interconnected. This is 
not new; Kant already saw the state in the context o f the ‘society o f states’. The first half 
of this century and the ensuing Cold War confirmed the ‘realist’ view of international 
relations444, but if international relations theory is to account for the interconnectedness 
o f states, it has to seek out the ‘liberal idealist’ tradition445, which involves sensibility and 
compromise to external developments. Simply stated, it means that there cannot be an 
account o f a democratic state without an examination of its limctioning in the 
international community, as there cannot be an account of a global system without a 
consideration for a democratic state. Democracy and the international system have 
become intimately connected and the distinction between internal and external affairs is 
being increasingly eroded.
This erosion emerged firstly from the inability of states to control the economic, 
political, cultural and security interconnectedness o f the global system; secondly, from 
regional organisations which change the nature and dynamics o f national politics; and 
thirdly from different cultural groups, movements and nationalisms which question the 
state’s legitimacy as the sole representative o f their interests446. Democracy has to come 
to terms with this unfolding process and that has led some scholars to seek a new 
framework of democratic institutions and procedures, such as, for example, a model of
442 This is not to say that the decision not to cooperate is simply a bad behaviour, for obviously it is a 
result of a complex domestic situation which exploits anti-Western sentiments in order to legitimize 
itself but that is another argument.
443 1.Kant ‘Perpetual Peace’ Political Writings 2nd edition Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1991 
p. 98-9
444 For classic realist school of thought see H.Morgenthau (particularly Politics Among Nations), for a 
more updated neostructuralist approach K. Waltz (The Theory o f  International Politics 1979)
445 See J.Rosenau (Domestic Sources o f  Foreign Policy 1967, The Scientific Study o f Foreign Policy 
\91 \)
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cosmopolitan democracy447. This is not the place to discuss potential or workability of 
this paradigm, which would require, in the first place, an establishment o f an international 
democratic polity, thus the possibility o f political participation across borders and across 
political communities, as well as the creation o f effective mechanisms to enact and 
enforce these different procedures and legal arrangements stemming from them. The UN 
and the European Parliament could possibly serve as examples from which to begin the
inquiry into such mechanisms.
The most formidable obstacle to the realisation of cosmopolitan community 
comes from identity, ethnic or national, and its increasingly important role in politics, 
parallel to the globalisation of the idea of self-determination and democracy. The 
interpretation of political and civil rights leads to a different interpretation of identity, any 
community based on a global identity would expect ethnic and national identity to 
become very immediate and subordinate to the more important identity, that o f a citizen 
of a “universal state o f mankind” (Kant). Building on Kant’s thought and complementing 
the idea of cosmopolitan democracy is the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship . This is 
a different citizenship from what we know: it is divorced from the territorially based 
nation-state, it is abstract and not rooted in rights and duties attached to national self- 
determination, but attached to the largest moral community - the world. It aspires to 
higher moral considerations and obligations to the rest o f humanity, something that the 
nation-state with its emphasis on its own citizens often neglects. Both theoretical 
concepts are an attempt to conceptualize democracy in such a way that it reflects the 
new global order and the evidently changed role o f nation-states. The overwhelming 
argument for both, at this point in history rather ambitious concepts, is not their 
feasibility, but their moral dimension and the fact that in the world that can change as fast 
as the last decade showed “what is ambitious today might be feasible tomorrow
The ‘Policing’ o f the Global System Through International Law, International 
Organizations and Collective Security Organizations.
Noteworthy in this context are the European Commission on Human Rights, the Council 
of Europe (commitment to democracy a precondition of membership), the European
446 D.Held Democracy and the Global Order Cambridge, Polity Press 1995 p.267
441 Democracy and the Global Order p.267 __
448 A.Linklater ‘Cosmopolitan Citizenship’ Citizenship Studies 2:1 February 1998 p.p. - p.
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Court o f  Human Rights, which if implemented, overrides the state’s law, similar, if less 
effective, are the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rights. Further, one can refer to the OSCE (CSCE until 1995) 
which in the fields o f ‘human dimension’ has abandoned non-interference in the internal 
affairs o f the state (Helsinki Conference 1992, paragraph 8) and also to the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), which seeks a global partnership 
in order to conserve, protect and restore the integrity o f the earth’s ecosystem.
International organisations have taken over an array of transnational activities 
(mostly trade) and constitute examples of the interpenetration between domestic and 
foreign policy. The prime example is the European Union, which more than any other 
organisation imposes its own laws on member states. It must be noted that the prestige 
o f the European Union is such that membership has become a benchmark by which the 
state o f democracy in the new democracies o f ECE is viewed and the ‘return’ to Europe 
acknowledged, or not. Thus, the competition for admission often adds antagonism to the 
already historically complicated relationships between nations of the region. It could be 
argued that one of the unintended byproducts o f the EU’s promotion of democracy is an 
increased nationalism and decreased cooperation among states that otherwise would rely 
more on each other. The successful Central European states are so preoccupied with 
being seen as Western that the Visegrad group practically ceased to function as a 
regional organisation, mainly due to the contest about who could join Europe first (the 
Czech Republic in particular did not want to be delayed by the others, should the EU 
view the group as one ‘team’ entry)450, whilst Slovenia’s foreign policy seems to be 
directed mostly towards its Western borders.
The disjuncture between the autonomy of the state and the global system is 
characterised by the security organisations, which greatly constrain the military and 
strategic concerns o f the member states. NATO is the most desired among the ex- 
Warsaw Pact countries who have all been incorporated in the Partnership for Peace, 
which is something o f a ‘waiting room’ and the ‘training camp’ for the real thing. 
Security in international relations is a negative concept, for all security regimes, whether 
the balance of power, concert, collective security, the deterrence principle, all are based,
449 Democracy and the Global Order p.285
450 A.Agh The Politics o f  Central Europe p.218
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implicitly or explicitly, on the competition among contending parties - the greater 
security o f one implies a higher degree of insecurity of the other (‘security dilemma’ )•
The Linkage Democracy - Security.
Considering that the Security Council has passed some 300 resolutions between 1990
1995 (695 in the period 1945-1990), crisis prevention, it could be argued, must be more 
o f a answer to the new world order than security organisations. Bosnia, Somalia (and 
Kosovo) illustrate in sobering fashion the limitations of those institutions. The other 
points to consider are that inaction in Bosnia not only made Milosevic a temporary 
celebrity among nationalist forces (which indirectly led to the Kosovo crisis), but also 
lowered considerably the threshold of civilisation and brought international law and
morality into question452.
‘Democratic peace’453 (enlargement), as the replacement of the U.S. Cold War 
strategy o f ‘containment’, is not a theory, but a proposition that democracies do not fight 
each other. This links the spread o f democracy to security and is based on two strands: a) 
institutional constraints and the restraining effects of public opinion in a democratic 
state’s domestic political structure; b) democratic norms and culture account for the 
absence of war between democratic states. The Partnership for Peace is an example of 
this Wilsonian tradition of spreading democracy under the auspices of NA TO. If 
democratic culture would have the effect ascribed to it, then democracies would be on 
peaceful terms with all states, regardless o f their system, and if policy-makers were so 
sensitive to the human and material cost o f war then the same would apply about going 
to war with non-democratic states. As for public opinion, in 1914 public opinion in 
France and Britain embraced war. During the Falklands War the British public showed 
itself rather enthusiastic for the war (fought elsewhere), whilst on the other hand the 
public was not consulted much at the beginning of the Bosnian crisis, when the Western
451 See:N.J. Wheeler K.Booth ‘Security Dilemma’ in J.Baylis N.Rengger Dilemmas o f World 
Politics:International Issues in Changing World Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992
452 M Khan ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Crisis of the Post-Cold War International System in East 
European Politics an d Societies 9:3 Fall 1995 p.p.459-498 For the discussion about the morality of 
international politics see K.Booth ‘Human Wrongs and International Relations’ as above
453 For the most extensive literary review on this subject see: S.Chan ‘In Search of Democratic Peace.
special issue International Security 19:2 Fall 1994, especially C.Layne Kant or Cant: The ^ o f  the 
Democratic Peace’ p.p.5-49. Also J.Gowa ‘Democratic States and International Disputes International
Organizations 49:3 Summer 1995 p.p.511-522
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governments were reluctant to act. It would seem that ‘democratic peace’ is based more 
on wishful thinking than fact, although wishful thinking might be considered a promising 
start in the new world order. Possibly a more reasonable claim is that states engaged in 
conflicts are more likely to have authoritarian governments, which brings us nearer to 
why the universality o f democratic principles could be linked to security and not only in 
ex-communist countries.
Universal Principles and Idiosyncratic Conflicts.
We live in the world of two ‘imagined communities’ - the nation and the ‘imagined 
community’ o f the ‘global village’, brought nearer by the globalizing effect of modem 
communications, thus producing cultural globalisation, similarly to the ‘print 
capitalism’454 in the 18th century which drew people together despite the spatial 
separation and assisted in the formation of national identity. Such a process, by offering 
access to information about places which may not otherwise be accessed or experienced 
by individuals or groups, will, so the theory goes, erode the traditional, ethnic and 
national identities in favour of an even larger identity - belonging to the world. Such 
claims are, however, premature, despite some issues, such as human rights and the 
environment, which do support a new ‘global perspective’.
National and ethnic identities are deeply rooted in myths and history imagined, 
told, construed and real (ethnohistories); they are hardly going to be stamped out by the 
global culture, should such a thing come into existence and even then it would take such 
a long time that the relevance for contemporary politics is doubtful. As the situation is, 
the bringing of peoples and nations together, their cooperation and development may 
enhance mutual understanding, possibly respect, but at the same time it leads to the 
accentuation o f differences - which equally may not have happened otherwise. Being 
confronted daily with the difference and mostly conflicts (for such is the way of reporting 
the news) in far away places does not necessarily remove distance, on the contrary it 
could make ‘the local’ seem more endangered, therefore in need of more protection. 
Confrontation leads to relativisation of one’s values, which on the whole is civilizing, but 
does not necessarily inspire the breaking down o f cultural barriers - in fact it appears to
454 See B. Anderson Imagined Communities London, Verso 1983 (p.40)
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contribute to the fragmentation of cultures455. These cultures are a result of memories, 
local ways of thinking, customs and norms that grew out o f the necessities of local 
struggles, or out of reinterpreted histories and retold stories. No such culture has or can 
easily emerge from universal history, even if it was in the making. What seems more 
apparent is that the plurality of meanings and references persists and global awareness 
struggles to grow out o f the soil made thick with such deep roots.
This is by no means a defence of the primordialist approach to nationalism456, but 
rather an attempt to concede that no matter how ‘constructed’, ‘imagined’ and false 
national and ethnic identities might be, we have no others with which to make 
comparisons. By this I mean that there is a limit to this argument about the ‘falsity’ of 
national identity, and ironically it is actually an argument that nationalists are partial to. 
Our formative experiences, our childhood and everything that frames our initial 
memories are wrapped up with the language, tradition and customs o f the place of our 
initial active experience of belonging. That does not mean that our allegiance is 
unshakable or that ethnic identity is written in blood and is not an artifact, but its 
importance should not be dismissed. All experience with nationalism shows that a 
disregard for ethnic identity, and usually it is the identity of others, on the basis that it is 
not a real thing, has led to an increase in nationalist mobilisation, not to its decrease.
Of course, identity invented once can be reinvented, in fact identity is prone to 
reinvention and the nation is a constant production of inventions . Ideas and symbols 
are produced and reproduced as circumstances require, but whilst this happens within a 
group, there is little universality about it. The most we can aspire to is that each 
reinvention takes on board something universal and less culturally rooted. But for that to 
emerge the circumstances under which the reinvention takes place ought to be less 
stressful than they usually are when a nation feels compelled to appeal to its identity - 
paradoxically, a search for identity is usually a sign of some crisis, or at the very least a
455 S.Huntington in the following: ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ and ‘The West Unique, Not Universal 
Foreign Affairs, 72:3 Summer 1993 p.p.22-49 and 75:6 November/December 1996 p.p.28-46
respectively , ,
456For which see the work o f A.D.Smith, best reviewed A.Smith Nationalism and Modernism London, 
Routledge 1998. Also J.Armstrong Nations before Nationalism Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982 .
457 See: G.Hosking G.Schopflin ed. Myths and Nationhood London, Macmillan 1997; E.Hobsbawm 
T.Ranger ed.The Invention o f Tradition New York, Cambridge University Press 1983; For the relevance 
of myths in the politics of ECE see G.Gyani ’Political Uses o f Tradition in Postcommunist East Central 
Europe’ Social Research 60:4 Winter ‘93 p.p.893-913
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need for rearrangement. The ‘reinvention’ that takes place, particularly in new states, is 
usually an answer to the pursuit o f recognition in need of reassertion, the process of a 
self-searching nature, reaching into the past in order to explain the present and show a 
way forward, thus a process given to self-possession and self-glorification, rather than 
self-criticism and enlarged horizons. The aspiration to universal principles is problematic 
not because we cannot agree on the principles, but because the application faces 
idiosyncratic problems, thus we live in a world o f universal principles and idiosyncratic 
conflicts.
7.4. NATIONALISM IN THE NEW STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
7.4.1. Sovereignty and Transnationality
Nationalist mobilisation in Eastern/Central Europe is a result of the reconfiguration of 
states on the basis o f nationalism in pursuit of self-determination. Viewed this way the 
process seems less archaic and more a part of European history458, even if somewhat 
delayed and inconvenient. Self-determination was not invented by the postcommunist 
leaders and not even by Wilson, but was an acknowledgment o f a certain historical 
phenomenon bound up with principles o f progress. Nationalism should be reproached as 
a way of thinking, as a method o f gaining power, whether national or political, but we 
must also accept that national self-determination serves to redress the balance which 
seemed unjust. As a principle self-determination is closely tied to nationalism and is likely 
to create more tension and produce more invention and injustice in the future, just as it 
has often done in the past. It would seem that historical developments459 take their 
course, indifferent to the historical lessons learned by others. In that way the new states 
of ECE are truly ‘returning’ to Europe and as such, despite all the problems and 
setbacks, the process is a positive one.
458 M.Hroch ‘ National Self-Determination from a Historic Perspective4 in Canadian Slavonic Papers 
37: 4 September/December 1995 p.p.283-300
459 For an attempt to give self-determination a more contemporary treatment and link it to democracy, 
human rights, autonomy and history see R.Rizman ‘Theoretical Mapping of Self-determination’ 
Carnijev Zbornik A Festschrift for Ludvik Cami Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences Ljubljana
1998
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There is however a crucial difference between the ‘old’ sovereignty-seeking 
nationalism and the ‘new’ nationalism in the region which is an answer to the major 
systemic change. The goal o f nationalism has always been more recognition and more 
rights, leading to the assumption that the final goal o f nationalism should be the 
establishment o f a sovereign state. The situation has changed. Firstly, it is now 
universally acknowledged that a nation (culture) and the state (polity) do not have to be 
congruent460, moreover with a universal recognition of diversity, nearly all states are 
‘multicultural’ to a greater or a lesser degree. Nationalism is not always state-seeking, 
the interplay of various nationalisms, the homogenizing pressure o f a new state, the 
minority nationalisms seeking various forms of autonomy and regional cooperation all 
take place post-independence and are a part of domestic politics. The international 
community faces a difficult task to balance the support for legitimate claims of 
minorities, whilst on the other hand, it has to condemn aggressive nationalism of the 
majority, all in the name of democratisation. Secondly, the newly gained national 
sovereignty has to be given up, partially, but almost immediately in the name of the 
ultimate national recognition - European integration. Exchanging absolute sovereignty 
for transnationality has become an integral part o f democratisation. This gives rise to the 
paradox that sovereignty, crucial as it is in nationalist discourse, has become a necessary 
stage on the way to integration. This is difficult for all countries, but it pays to keep in 
mind that the newly independent postcommunist states have just liberated themselves 
from one integration, that o f the Soviet Empire and the enforced internationalism of 
communism where they were also expected to give up sovereignty, and in some cases 
more than partially (Warsaw Pact). This indicates why the notion of integration is often 
not acted upon as enthusiastically as it is proclaimed by political elites and why it is 
accompanied by exaggerated national rhetoric often in order to reaffirm the newly 
achieved status461.
460 R.Brubaker ’Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism’ in J.Hall The State o f  the 
Nation Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1998 p.294
461 e.g. Prime Minister Meciar, after the European Parliament expressed once more the concern about 
Slovak democracy (16.10.1995) reminded the EU that Slovakia is a sovereign state and should be treated 




Nationalism cannot be understood, nor can we come to grips with its assumed 
opposition to the ‘international’ dimension, if we are preoccupied with the identity it 
creates, instead of understanding the specific “identity of nationalism . Nationalism is 
not like any other historical or contemporary form of collective allegiance. It is not its 
‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ character, it is not its future mission, or its traditionalism - it is all of 
those at once - and nowhere is it as evident as in the new states in the transition to 
democracy. Nationalism is not an easily solved issue with multiple potential, in which 
national elites and their own population clash across different ideological groups, the 
national policies chosen by the electorate conflict with the best interests of the state 
externally and internally and this is before one tackles the problem of preferential 
treatment by dominant nationals towards minorities and minorities’ own nationalism. 
Depending on the viewpoint and the given situation, the one and the same nationalism 
embodies respectable and contemptible values at the same time and thus has an edge on 
other types o f political identity - an unwelcome fact at the time when national identity 
should be just one of the available identities and preferably not politicized. The Western 
Europeans are having a hard time in readjusting their political identities within the 
context o f the EU too.
The nation and its state have to review the strategies adopted through 
nationalism, because the externally imposed criticism is impartial and nationalism has to 
five up to demands of the world where approval by the international community is 
crucial. The question is not just about limits to sovereignty, but about the international 
arena in which states are attributed a place depending on how they behave. International 
isolation is a poor reward for the stubborn insistence on national identity and sovereignty 
(e.g.Serbia and less dramatically Slovakia). The legal recognition of the state might be a 
necessary condition for the state’s existence (not for its creation), but for the further 
development what matters is another type o f recognition, less legalistic, less national and 
more rooted in international approval, which is what guarantees the investment from 
abroad, the educational, technological and cultural exchanges and successful diplomatic 
relations.
462 U.Hedetoft ‘The Nation-state meets the world:National Identities in the Context of Transnationlity 
and Cultural Globalisation’ paper prepared for BISA 15-17 December 1997 p.5
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Nationalism offers little by way of this kind of recognition and it could be argued 
that in the contemporary world nationalism’s influence over the matters o f the state is 
limited to the time of the state’s creation. So, nationalist sentiments bruised by the 
erosion of their control over the state, might become very defensive and protective of 
culture, last remaining bastion. This might be the reason why nationalisms of our time are 
so culturally rooted, generally and in ECE particularly. One way to look at it is that 
culture is not divorced from social and political institutions, that institutions bring 
different arrangements, different cost-and-benefit calculations, different values which 
legitimize different attitudes. In the long term, institutions change the context within 
which politics take place and the political salience of nationalism can diminish. I 
emphasize long term, because if developing political culture is not divorced from 
institutions, the establishment o f those institutions is also in response to the context of 
the society in which the process takes place. Simply stated, if democratisation and 
nationalism are tied together, they both contribute to the international position of their 
state, but not in equal measures - too much national assertion can become an obstacle to 
the international aspect o f democratisation.
By 1992 the civic Czechoslovak identity no longer answered the demands for 
‘recognition’ o f Slovakia, and the latest redefinition of Slovak national identity became 
much narrower, not only in geographic terms. The motivation was not democracy, but 
the recognition of Slovakia as a ‘nation’ and a compensation for perceived injustices of 
the past. Discontent goaded by the political elite with all to gain and little to lose in both 
republics, led to independence which was an unexpected, but by no means a tragic result. 
There was nevertheless a price to pay - the isolation of the country from its neighbours, 
the costs to the economy, and the loss o f many years o f democratic development. The 
political elites, in a society with a low reservoir o f political arguments and a rather 
simplistic vision of how to conduct politics, and who conducts it, managed to convince a 
large majority o f the population that nationalism was democratisation and thus, the quest 
for international recognition turned out to lead to less recognition in the end.
238
7.4.3. National identity and International Relations
The above indicates that national identity translates into international relations, thus that 
national identity affects the making of foreign policy463 and those decisions bounce back 
and influence domestic politics. My contention is that there is a strong link between the 
ideological ambiance within the state, its foreign policy, the external reaction to it and the 
reflection of the latter inside the state. Foreign policy, it is said, is a highly pragmatic 
activity rooted in a rational assessment o f clearly defined national interests. As such it is 
conducted by professionals and a small number o f them at that.
However, that is only a part o f the story. Were it true, Slovak leadership would 
not have chosen independence in 1992, it would not have lost 6 years of its independent 
existence alienating itself from Europe and the rest o f the region and now, after having 
come out of this diversion, Jan Camogursky, the leader of the leading party of the 
winning democratic coalition would not have chosen the Russian Federation as his first 
foreign visit464. In order to understand the dynamics of foreign policy formation, it is 
important to understand how the identity of the polity has evolved, that is how the state 
perceives itself, its past and the future and its role in the international environment. An 
implicit argument here is that national identity constitutes a very important force behind 
the formation of foreign policy, because it is through national identity that “the 
parameters of what a polity considers its national interests at home and abroad are 
defined”465.
This is further dependent on who carries the responsibility for the ideological and 
intellectual reproduction of the ‘story of the nation’. Even if there is a correlation 
between national identity and the resulting political leadership, it would be too simplistic 
to claim that ‘the people’ are the sole carriers o f national identity. Objectivity is the aim 
of politics, but national identity is one side o f politics that is susceptible to interpretation 
and thus manipulation o f what is said to be a ‘collective’ memory. ‘Memory of the 
nation’ is highly selective and its emphasis shifts according to who selects and who draws
463 This is based on I.Prizel National Identity and Foreign Policy Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 1998, which is to my knowledge the only work of this kind.
464 The leader of the KDH, the most conservative party among the new governing coalition parties, has 
visited Russia which met with a severe criticism at home and abroad, particularly because he is known to 
harbour a vision of a greater Slavic and Christian (Catholic and Orthodox Church) cooperation. See 
daily press, but mainly Domino Forum 7:51-2 24.12.1998
465 I.Prizel p. 14
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conclusions. It should be no surprise that in new democracies, when one adds the fierce 
political struggle, the novelty of nationhood and the responsibility for a new sovereign 
state, national identity suffers from the worst misinterpretations, and leads to 
miscalculations in foreign policy. Meciar’s administration claimed a conspiracy o f the 
Western powers and neighbouring states, namely Hungary, against Slovakia’s entry into 
NATO and EU, thus exploiting the existing fears o f a small nation never in control of its 
destiny. The Slovene elites on the basis o f the same fear have pursued international and 
regional integration even prior to independence466, whilst the new Slovak administration 
has immediately embarked on a ‘salvage operation’ to recover lost ground, if not for the 
purposes of NATO, than at least for an earlier reassessment467by the EU. The identity of 
a small newly-independent Central European nation with a similar history and similar 
fears can be told from many different angles.
All through this thesis it has been stressed that nationalism and the issues of 
national identity are not a particularity o f new postcommunist states, but it has also been 
made clear that one of the characteristics o f these states is the pervasiveness of 
nationalism in political life. The fact o f a recent independence and thus the remnants of a 
particularly high levels o f nationalist mobilization aside, these societies’ history is marked 
by continuous changes, political, geographical and ideological, whereby nothing 
remained constant for long enough to offer some binding tissue - except nationalism. 
Therefore, the nascent states’ foreign policy formation involves a stronger element of 
national identity, mostly defined in ethnic terms, than foreign policy of established states.
However, observation of the political dynamics in the EU, which at this point in 
history still consists only of established states, seems to contradict this claim. The most 
reluctant members appear to be Denmark (not other Scandinavian countries) and Britain 
(not Scotland) - a small state and what could be described as a middle power with a 
reputation of a great power. On the other hand there are enthusiastic small Benelux 
countries and other big states - France, Germany, Spain. We can see that the perception 
of national identity and in particular the articulation o f dangers and national interests are
466 Slovene parliament adopted various Laws of Foreign Affairs to make signing of international treaties 
easier see B.Bucar ‘Slovenia’ H.Neuhold P.Havlik A.Suppan Political and Economic Transformation in 
Eastern Central Europe Boulder, Westview Press 1995
467 The Vienna summit (11-12 December 1998) decided to wait till December 1999 with a further 
reassessment of Slovakia’s entry into the EU, but the new Prime Minister has announced that the new 
government will do what it can to get the reassessment moved to an earlier date in the spring 1999. See 
The Slovak Spectator 4:32
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subject to many factors, such as the fear o f war, the fear o f invasion, the notion of 
absolute and inalienable sovereignty, the economic benefits, the regional cooperation, the 
ethnic composition and the level o f decentralization, and not least the political elites and 
their involvement468. The union of established, developed and democratic states struggles 
with the national identities o f its units and is not devoid o f nationalist mobilisation. 
Nevertheless, two remarks about national identity are true for all states. Firstly, the 
identity o f the polity is not dissimilar to the identity of an individual, as it helps to define 
values and particularly the priority in which these are ranked. Secondly, the identity of 
the polity changes, usually inspired by crisis, external or internal469, self image reacts to 
changed circumstances and aspirations reflect new needs.
7.5 NATIONAL IDENTITY, DEMOCRATISATION AND INTEGRATION: 
SLOVAKIA AND SLOVENIA COMPARED
“....The commission concludes that: Slovenia presents the characteristics of a 
democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for the protection of minorities; Slovenia can be regarded as a functioning 
market economy and should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market 
within the Union... In the light of these considerations, the Commission recommends 
that negotiations for accession should be opened with Slovenia.”
...”In the light of these elements470,although the institutional framework responds 
to the needs of parliamentary democracy, the situation is unsatisfactory both in 
terms of the stability of the institutions and of the extent to which they are rooted 
in political life. In the light of these considerations, the Commission concludes 
that Slovakia does not fulfill in a satisfying manner the political conditions set 
out by the European Council, because of the instability of Slovakia’s institutions ...
This situation is so much more regrettable since Slovakia could satisfy the economic 
criteria and is firmly committed to take the acquis,...471
The above statements issued by the European Union show two countries, one aim and 
two results - Slovakia’s integration, just as its democratisation process was waiting for
Drawn from D.Beetham & Ch.Lord Legitimacy and the European Union London, New York, 
Longman 1998 p. 47-55
469 I.Prizel p.2
The text under the heading ‘Political Criteria’ is preceeded by “problems in respect of the criteria 
defined by the European Council in Copenhagen, i.e.: government does not sufficiently respect powers 
devolved by the constitution to other bodies and disregards the opposition; the tension between the 
President and the government; the disregard for the Constitutional Court; the use made by government 
of police and the treatment of the Hungarian minority.
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an review. The aim of the following section is to explore the link between nationalism, 
democratisation and integration generally whilst the focus o f analysis will be on Slovakia 
as the more illustrative case of this relationship. I shall point out differences with 
Slovenia which in the time-frame of this thesis contributed to what is hoped to be a 
temporary disqualification o f Slovakia from the European integration. Slovenia to its 
great disappointment472 failed to secure the candidature in the first wave of NATO’s 
eastern enlargement, just as Slovakia did, with a difference that Slovakia had not 
expected it, despite the pretense of Meciar’s government (see chapter 4, the 
referendum).
7.5.1. New Democracies and Integration
‘Europe’ in the context o f postcommunist integration carries a heavy political weight and 
is of enormous significance as a test of the stability and the success of the transition, and 
as a symbol of the state’s acceptance among the world’s developed nations. The 
normative and political element o f the integration is o f course matched by the practical 
considerations, the economic benefits, and in the case of NATO membership, military 
security. The underlying factors and problems surrounding the integration into Euro- 
Atlantic structures for all postcommunist states could be summed up as follows:
1) as a way of final extrication from the ‘East’, the ‘West’ became the overall aim and 
often a legitimation of the new regime;
2) the disintegration and the destabilisation o f the existing Eastern markets led to the 
search for new markets;
3) the complexity o f interstate and interethnic relations increased after the end of the 
Cold War, thus the new ways of regulating economy and society through integrative 
processes became very compelling;
471 Agenda 2000 Summary and conclusions of the opinions of Commission concerning the Applications 
for Membership of the EU by the candidate countries Strasbourg 15 July 1997
472 1.Vajgl (State Secretary, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs), whilst makmg a case forSbven^m clusion  in 
NATO suggested that Slovenia’s good record and the lack of involvement m conflicts couM be a 
disadvantage in relative terms”.... and a reason why S lo v e n e s  not been taken m o the flrst wave of 
eastern enlargement in ‘Slovenia and NATO’ Rusi Journal - une p.p.
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4) with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and all security frameworks within the former 
federal states, the new democracies are faced with military inferiority and no security 
‘shelter’473.
7.5.2. Slovakia and Slovenia - Differences
Within Slovakia and Slovenia, the absence of independent statehood meant that all 
notions of identity and collective memory were related through literature and history, 
which is how political consensus has mostly been influenced and developed. In both 
countries this tradition is still detectable in the unusually high involvement o f authors, 
historians and academics in political debates and all collective consciousness-forming 
platforms. It thus stands to reason that the change o f political elite brings about a change 
in the intellectual elite which in turn bring subtle changes to how national identity and 
collective memories are articulated. Slovakia with its rather dramatic transition process is 
a good example. The official line concerning issues of the former Czechoslovakia and its 
disintegration, neighbouring Hungary, the importance, potentiality and most importantly, 
the mode of attainment o f integration, all o f which bear relevance to foreign policy 
formation, changes with each administration.
Slovenia suffers less from shifts in foreign policy orientation having had a longer 
time to decide on the direction of its state and generally being less divided on the issues 
o f collective memory, due to its longer nation-building process, and having established a 
better international reputation as a result. If both countries can date the beginning of then- 
national aspirations to 1848, politically more autonomous Slovenia has always sought 
some form of statehood within a multinational entity (Austro-Hungarian Empire, first 
Yugoslavia 1918-1941; the second Yugoslavia 1945-1991), whilst Slovakia has been 
much more involved in seeking a full national independence and more resentful o f its 
political status within Czechoslovakia474.
As the previous chapter showed, in Slovenia the idea of independence from the 
very moment of its inception was in the name o f democracy and European integration -
473 A.Grizold ‘Slovenia and European Security Integration’ D.Fink-Hafner T.Cox Into Europe? 
Ljubljana, Scientific Library o f Faculty of Social Sciences 1996
474 The fact well exemplified by I.Bavcar (Slovene Minister for Europe), when he says that Slovenia can 
manage ‘federal Europe’, for “federal experience - we are used to it” Slovene Study Day SSEES, London 
21.4.1999
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that was the national project. Moreover, the strong Western orientation marked 
Slovenia’s foreign policy for more than a decade and it is frequently stressed that 
Slovenia is not ‘returning to Europe’, the borders have been open for decades. The 
willingness to cooperate in order to secure its political position in the European arena 
was not a part of domestic political struggle, but seen by all political actors as the only 
viable option for the country. The level o f consensus among the political parties on the 
issues o f integration and thus foreign policy decisions is almost paradoxical475, 
considering the strong party competition in domestic affairs. Even the most nationalist 
SNS in its last party programme mentions Slovenia (frilly independent) in European 
structures as the first point476. The same applies to the general public. The majority o f the 
population is in favour o f the EU, though it is not true that the public is not critical, but it 
is pragmatic477, which is not dissimilar to the public opinion in the member states - it is 
critical, but on the whole nobody wishes to abandon membership.
Some statistics478 whilst contradicting the apparent openness o f Slovenes, show 
this enthusiasm for the EU. The main identity appears to be overwhelmingly national and 
local (city, district 65.4%, Slovenia the same, European identity 12.4% ). Membership in 
the EU is considered beneficial for democracy by 74.3% of those surveyed, for security 
by 82.2%, economy by 72.4% (immigrants increase criminality 66.7%, the non-Slovenes 
should not have important positions in public life 50.5%), Slovenia would benefit by the 
membership in the EU 93.7%. Nationalism seems to have been conducive to the 
formation of independent Slovenia and the establishment o f democracy, but Slovenes are 
susceptible to xenophobia as much as all other nations, whilst at the same time the 
inclusion in the larger community seems to be valued very highly. A point worth noting is 
that these figures show how important official rhetoric is, because any encouragement of 
the existing latent anti-foreigners feelings can lead to an openly nationalistic rhetoric 
which in turn endangers the international reputation o f the state and can reduce the 
chances o f European integration. The most sensitive issue in Slovene integration was the
475 1.Brinar ‘Slovenia: From Yugoslavia to the European Union’ in K.Henderson Back to Europe 
London, UCL Press 1999 p.252. For political parties programmes and Europe see A.Bibic ‘Slovenia’s 
Political Society Before the Challenges of Europeanisation’ in Into Europe as above
476 ‘Povzetek Programa SNS’ 1996
477 The government itself tries to lower the expectations, purposely, to avoid the backlash of 
disappointment. In conversation with S. Gaber, the Minister of Education 8.5.1998
478 These are yet unpublished results o f surveys commissioned by the government to the University of 
Ljubljana N.ToS Tnformiranost in StaliSca Ciljnih Skupin v Sloveniji o Evropski Uniji in Slovenskem 
Priblizevanju EU’ 23.12.1997 pog.gt. 121/97
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liberalisation of real estate within the EU (see Europe Agreement 10.6.1996). 70.2% of 
the population agreed that foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Slovenia, the 
reason being the size of the country and the fear o f loss o f control, the historical 
experience from the war etc., an issue from which some political parties (SDS and SNS) 
gained much political capital479, but since 1998 the Agreement has been ratified by the 
parliament, because there was “no alternative” despite the issue of the liberalisation of 
real estate being still seen as “too high a price” for integration480.
In Slovakia, on the other hand, the simultaneous democratisation and 
independence processes highlighted the lack of consensus about the final conception of 
nationhood and statehood. Whilst Slovenes were able to co-opt nationalism and 
whatever degree of democratic tradition was inherited from self-management 
communism and a historically less repressed position into a positive force, Slovakia 
descended into ‘solving the history’. The absence of democratic traditions, the 
resentments o f the past, the lack of experience in dealing with the international 
community as an independent state and not in the least its communist legacy 
overwhelmed democratisation481. In contrast to Slovenia foreign policy became a 
prisoner of domestic politics, which apart from the difficulties that Slovakia encountered 
with postcommunist development, became submerged in personal conflicts among 
politicians and the preoccupation with ‘Slovak’ issues. All divisions in society were 
instrumentalised as part o f the domestic political conflict, including the integration into 
European structures482, as the following illustrates.
7.5.3. Foreign Policy Failure: Slovakia
“N o power in the world could exclude Slovakia from the first group o f
candidates for membership o f  NATO; Slovakia has disqualified itself’483
479 Financial Times Survey Slovenia 28.4.1997
480 I.Bavcar ‘Slovene Study Day’ as above
481 For the discussion about how different historical experiences lead to different political institutions see 
M.Carpenter ‘Slovakia and the Triumph ofNationalist Populism’ Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 30:2 1997 p.p.205-220
482 For Slovakia’s integration see also K.Henderson ‘Slovakia and the Democratic Criteria for EU 
Accession’ in K Henderson Back to Europe London, UCL Press 1999
483 M.Lesko ‘Pribeh Seba diskvalifikacie favorita’ in M.Butora F.Sebej ed. Slovensko v Sedej Zone? 
Bratislava, Institut pre verejne otazky 1998 p. 15 (henceforth, Slovensko v sedej zone p.) All translations 
by myself
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The first point to make about the international position of Slovakia is that it appears to 
be back where it started in 1993. The debate surrounding the process of independence in 
1992/3 could be divided into three strands and their validity depends on where Slovakia 
stands at the moment484. One position taken, mostly by intellectuals and some federalist 
politicians, argued that Slovak independence would endanger not only the geopolitical 
stability in Central Europe, but more importantly Slovak democracy and that these 
arguments outweighed the right to self-determination. Obviously, strongly nationalist 
politicians and intellectuals were vehemently opposed to such considerations and saw no 
danger that was great enough to outweigh the prestige and the logic of independence.
The third and weighty argument, espoused by the majority of nationalists and more 
cynical democrats, admitted the dangers to democracy, but thought it a price worth 
paying for independence. Thus, Slovakia embarked on a six year intensive course in 
political turmoil, and optimists can argue that precisely this experience is the best 
guarantee against future authoritarianism. It is an appealing argument to which I would 
like to add that a sympathetic and constructive approach more than a strictly critical one 
from the EU would be more likely to ensure such desirable outcome.
If independence-seekers claimed that Slovakia could not miss the historical 
moment when Europe is prepared to respect the break up of states, as Slovaks, Croats 
and Slovenes can affirm, the federalists claimed that Slovakia could not miss the 
historical moment when Europe opened its arms and would embrace new democracies. 
Out of these two historical chances Slovakia chose the first one. Considering the delay in 
admitting even such success stories among new democracies as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia into the EU485, the federalist position appears less 
persuasive now. Europe has changed - after the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia, it 
no longer likes secession and the embrace is somewhat reluctant too486. If  Slovakia 
manages to get into EU in the first wave487, which is looking increasingly more
484 M.Simecka‘Cena za oneskorenu demokraciu’ in Domino 7:51-52 p.2
485 At the Amsterdam summit in June 1997 it was decided that the negotiations about the full
m em b ersh ip  o f  th o se  fou r c o u n tr ie s  w o u ld  b eg in  in  1998.
486 For the criticism of the EU and its lack of committment to ECE entries see A B ^ a ¥ r v x T h e  
International Politics o f  East Central Europe Manchester, Manchester mversity es* ,. .
487 The estimated date for the first entries could be as late as 2005 (the earliest 2002)
I.Bavcar, the Slovene Minister for Europe at the Slovene Studies Day Schoo o av 
European Studies London, 21.4.1999
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realistic488, then all has ended well. If not, the big question about the price for 
independence will remain unanswered. So, where did foreign policy fail during those 
intervening six years? The answer is - at home.
Slovakia in Post-Cold War Central Europe
Czecho-Slovakia (which was the official name o f the country in 1992) was the only 
multi-national state in postcommunist Europe, which was able to split in a civilized and 
peaceful way, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia received international recognition 
for this. The fact that Slovakia declared itself to be a successor o f Czechoslovakia rather 
than the Slovak State was important for its relatively rapid international recognition. This 
was also helped by the Declaration of the National Council o f the Slovak Republic that it 
would unambiguously accept the principles regulating international relations, to 
contribute to the process o f disarmament and ensure the applications o f human rights and 
the rights o f minorities. Slovakia achieved the same international status and position as 
her immediate neighbours, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, with a much longer 
tradition of foreign policy and independent statehood in the latter two cases.
Slovak elites try to compensate for the lack of statehood by claiming a thousand- 
year struggle for independence. Yet, even if the legality o f the split cannot be doubted, 
the absence of a referendum, thus the will of citizens, will always put a question mark on 
the legitimacy of Czech and Slovak independence. It can be argued that the 
dissatisfaction with the federal state did not translate directly into the identification with a 
new one (as all opinion polls demonstrated) and that similar to the democratisation 
process the new state lacked direction and inner conviction489. If  there is one assumption 
about a pre-condition for successful foreign policy making, it must be a clear answer to 
‘who we are’ and ‘where do we want to belong’. It would not be far from the truth to 
argue that the inability to answer these questions with sufficient conviction has hindered 
not only the Slovak democracy, but is also responsible for the foreign policy failures. The 
adherence to Western democracy and efforts to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic
488 There is “substantially different attitude towards Slovakia” since the last elections and particularly 
since R.Schuster’s presidency, see visits by the German President, Hillary Clinton, the Prime Minister’s 
negotiations with the NATO resulting in Slovakia’s inclusion in Member Action Plan for the Alliance 
(not binding, more a period of adaptation for the conditions of the future membership) Zbornik SIM$ 
1/1999 Bratislava 28.4.1999
489 A.Duleba Foreign Policy o f  the Slovak Republic Starting Points, Present situation and Prospects 
Bratislava, Slovak Foreign Policy Association 1998 p.5 Henceforth, A.Duleba p.
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structures have been repeatedly declared, but if there was a serious intention the actions 
did not support these aims.
The political decision about the enlargement of the EU was taken at the 
Copenhagen summit in 1993, in 1994 NATO adopted the programme Partnership for 
Peace and in 1997 Russia, by signing the Founding Act with NATO, de iure accepted the 
process o f its former allies joining NATO - the bipolar world finally ended. The Treaty of 
Maastricht (February 1992, in force November 1993) committed all members of the EU 
to coordinate their foreign (and security) policies, whilst the majority of the EU member 
states are organized in the Western European Union (WEU), or in NATO, which 
effectively ties up all the countries of Europe into NATO, or EU490, including neutral 
ones, as neutrality lost its economic and political justification.
Slovakia is a member o f both the NATO’s Partnership for Peace (February 
1994) and the EU’s associate member (October 1993). In addition, it participates in 
OSCE (January 1993) and is a member of the Council of Europe (June 1993). The basic 
conditions for EU enlargement (Essen 1994) are: a) political stability, stability of 
democratic institutions, recognition o f human rights and the rights of minorities; b) a 
functioning market economy, including the ability to withstand the economic competition 
within the Union; c) the ability to undertake all duties (political, economic and monetary) 
resulting from the membership491. All of this means that perhaps never before in the 
history of Slovakia (and all new states in ECE) has foreign policy been the subject of the 
country’s free will and choice and never before did it depend so much on internal 
politics. This makes the current international position of Slovakia “so much more 
regrettable since Slovakia could satisfy the economic criteria”492 for the admission, the 
failure hitherto clearly rooted in domestic politics.
Conditions and Limitations
There are some factors that contributed to the exclusion of Slovakia, which are not 
directly linked to governmental decisions, but as remnants o f the past are a limiting factor 
in political development. The most important in this context are the absence of
490 for example: Norway is not a member of the EU, but a member of the NATO, Switzerland is a 
member of the NATO, Ireland is not a member of NATO, but the EU, which means that the provisions 
of the Maastricht apply.
491 A.Duleba p. 19
492 see the above Agenda 200 the assessment by the EU
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independent statehood and the nature of the previous regime. Many limitations to a 
successful conduct o f international affairs derive precisely from these factors.
No tradition o f statehood means a lack o f well trained diplomats, a handicap 
exacerbated by conflicts about who was suitable to represent the new Slovakia. Few of 
those Slovak diplomats who previously represented the Czecho-Slovak federation were 
deemed suitable to represent the new state, whose new elite based its legitimacy on 
‘purely’ Slovak interests. This highlights the lack of understanding that the diplomatic 
service should not be reduced to merely serve as the extension of the centre, but that 
diplomats requires experience, contacts and understanding of the international 
environment. In the tradition of the previous regime, diplomatic posts were given, often 
as a reward for favours rendered, to the people close to the government. The instability 
and weakness o f the new state institutions in postcommunist countries is magnified by 
the attitude of the new elite, which considers itself in charge of the state and has as little 
respect for those institutions as the population has an understanding of them. Slovenia is 
exceptional in several respects: having been relatively free and advanced it had a pool of 
well travelled politicians to chose from; the nature of the Yugoslav federation was such 
that Slovenia negotiated many bilateral treaties directly, which compensated for the lack 
of experience in independent statecraft; the orientation of the foreign policy was from the 
beginning of independent Slovenia unambiguously Western, so that the objectives were 
clearer.
Another limitation of a new statehood is the population which has no interest in 
international affairs and very little information about how these should be conducted.
The lack of interest is a result o f being previously deprived o f opportunities to come into 
contact with foreign cultures, particularly the West. The number o f people who traveled 
abroad and speak foreign languages is still very small in contrast to Slovenia, where 
English is a part o f national school curriculum from the age of 10. All research shows 
that the people with more active foreign experience are more interested in foreign affairs 
and have more confidence in the international integration of their country493.
The general lack o f ‘foreign experience’ does not mean that the international 
position of Slovakia is o f no interest to the general public. On the contrary - 54% of 
respondents in 1997 expressed concern about Slovakia’s failure to make the first
493 Slovensko v Sedej Zone p. 168
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'Eastern’ wave of the EU, and 47% felt embarrassed at their country’s international 
position494. Nationalism here cuts both ways: embarrassment can lead to resentment as 
much as it can inspire a remedial action, providing the political leadership does not, in 
order to maintain its position, resort to a strategy of blaming others. Meciar in a meeting 
with an assistant to Madeleine Albright said that “we will keep trying to get into NATO, 
but we know that we will not succeed, because the USA and Russia have agreed on 
this”495. As for the EU, the ex- Prime Minister intimated that the representatives o f the 
European parliament are more interested in Slovak industries than in politics and 
continued: “if I am to tell you the truth... if we were to sell all our factories as they have 
done in the surrounding countries, we would be the best democrats in the world”496.
The most limiting factor to the successful integration for Slovakia has been the 
passivity of the public, which can be explained as a general postcommunist condition. In 
Slovakia this was exacerbated by an unclear vision about where the state was or should 
be heading, possibly best exemplified by another statement of Meciar: “ if the West does 
not accept us, we will turn to the East”497. Initially, the symbol of communism’s defeat in 
Slovakia and everywhere else became the integration into the developed democratic 
world, but very soon the path became Uttered with obstacles bequeathed by the past and 
gained in the present, and the ruling elites were claiming that Slovakia was “making its 
own democracy, derived from the state’s national past”498, and therefore became an 
“object o f international conspiracy”499.
Making its own democracy involved such undemocratic practices that in the 
period between November 1994 and October 1995 Slovakia received three diplomatic 
demarches500. Neither the EU, nor NATO did possibly expect that this would be the time 
when the Prime Minister would choose to visit Moscow and seek a customs union with 
Russia, because, as he put it, “Slovakia will not stand in front of the EU or NATO as a
494 Slovensko v Sedej Zone p. 168
Slovenska Republika 14.4.1997 - this is the only newspaper in Slovakia that can be described as 
strongly nationalistic, devoid of any criticism of the Meciar’s governing coalition
496 Slovenska Republika 1.7.1997
497 Slovensko v Sedej Zone p. 179
498 Slovenska Republika 24.7.1997
499 Slovenska Republika 27.7. 1997
The first one concerned with the removal of all opposition from the parliamentary posts and 
replacement of all media executives with government’s supporters (November 1994), the second one 
concerning the government’s actions against the President and the third one, from the USA, also 
concerned with “the growing intolerance towards the opposition, the political atmosphere of fear and the 
opaqueness of privatization”
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pupil in front of a teacher”501. What one observes in those statements is a certain 
intransigence, a cheap flattery disguised as dignity, all designed to camouflage 
incompetence and unwillingness.
Judging by the 1997 and 1998 polls it is clear that the public, inspired by the 
vehement criticism from independent journalists, began to understand that Slovakia’s 
exclusion was directly linked to the domestic scene and not to some anti-Slovak 
conspiracy as the government argued. 55% of respondents saw the government as 
directly responsible and 48% did not think that their country had met the criteria for 
integration ( between 31-39% still saw the West, the opposition and the EU as the 
reason) and 43% (April 1998) did not know where the country was heading . After six 
years of independence, during which the dominating force in Slovakia’s politics was the 
populist HzDS assisted by the nationalist SNS, the faith that this was a government that 
would bring about the integration of Slovakia into the democratic West was diminishing 
rapidly. Whilst not wishing to argue that the foreign policy was the reason for Meciar s 
government’s defeat, it has most definitely contributed to the questioning oi its true 
intentions and the direction Slovakia was taking.
7.5.4. Challenges and Key Elements of Foreign Policy: Slovakia and Slovenia
Slovenia has been for some time basking in the light of international approval, having 
emerged from the collapse of Yugoslavia as the most prosperous of the ECE states with 
an exceptionally good record on human rights and the political fast track reforms. The 
challenge now is twofold. The first concern is to remain on this track, whilst it is not the 
stability of democratic institutions that is an issue, but the completion of the institutional 
framework for an integrated market economy. The second challenge is the 
transformation of national identity from the one formed as a successful and separate part 
of a larger state to national identity o f an independent small state, now comparing itself 
to other more developed states, not to the ex-Yugoslav republics. Connected to this is 
that the main achievements o f Slovenia, its independence and the European integration 
were not achieved by the current opposition (since the gradual nature o f the Slovene 
transition meant that there was hardly any change in political elites). Consequently their
501 Slovensko v Sedej Zone p. 3 9
502 Slovensko v Sedej Zone p. 181
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platform is more nationalist one, wrapped up with the blame of the leadership’s 
negligence of national issues, thus Slovenia is not completely safe from the dangers of 
nationalism. The smallness o f the country, which in the past was an advantage in creating 
consensus, can prove a disadvantage - it is very sensitive and vulnerable to any 
disturbance, whilst agitation can spread quickly503.
Slovenia s only difficult neighbour is Italy which is, however, its second largest 
economic partner after Germany. The problems concern the protection o f Slovene 
minority in Italy, which does not match the provisions guaranteed to the Italian minority 
in Slovenia, and the claims for compensation for expropriated Italian properties in 
territory ceded to Yugoslavia after the Second World War (similar to the Czech-German 
relations). The relations with the Southern neighbour, Croatia, are good despite some 
complications concerning unresolved issues o f division of the property previously shared 
in the former Yugoslavia, a situation very similar to the Czech-Slovak ‘who owes what 
to whom after the split. Relations with Austria suffer slightly from historical resentments 
and a certain fear o f ‘Germanisation’, whilst the relations with Hungary are excellent for 
there are no historical resentments between the two countries, nor current minority 
issues to be resolved.
The challenge for Slovakia is much more encompassing, at home and abroad.
With Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic having entered NATO in February 1999 
and being the first candidates for the EU, the definition of Central Europe will change 
and Slovakia, should it remain excluded, will find itself in a new group of Central/
Eastern European countries, together with Ukraine, Rumania and Bulgaria. Not only 
does this not fit the country’s geographical, economic, historical and cultural position, 
but the implication that Slovakia, in contrast to her neighbours, needs a much longer time 
to catch up with democratisation is damaging to her chances for the European 
integration.
Good relations with neighbours are paramount for Slovakia’s future, when it is 
surrounded (94% of the borders) by members o f the EU - Austria, Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech Republic. The key foreign policy partners for the future o f Slovakia are 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, historically both a source of national resentment. The 
treatment o f the Hungarian minority, particularly in view of the fact that Hungary will be
Interviews: M.Zagar, S. Gaber, F.Adam and A.Krasovec May-June 1998
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fully integrated, becomes an important issue at home and abroad. The slightest escalation 
o f conflict is unacceptable to NATO and the EU, whilst it must be said that the positive 
side o f this is that Hungarian political elites will also be restrained in their concerns 
beyond their borders. An illustration is the strong Western criticism of the declaration by 
the Hungarian premier G.Hom that being a member o f the Alliance will enable Hungary 
to deal with minority issues in other countries more resolutely504.
Today the Czech Republic is the most important commercial partner of Slovakia 
(31% of exports) and it will be a tremendous challenge for both to maintain this level of 
mutual trade once the Czech Republic becomes a member o f the EU and its customs 
union with Slovakia will have to cease. Czecho - Slovak relations will have to overcome 
the historical animosities and the trauma of the disintegration of the common state, and it 
is up to Slovakia to somehow coordinate its political and economic development with 
that of the Czech Republic. In sum, the cooperation between Hungary, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic needs significant improvement. The connection with internal Slovak 
politics gives these relations a complex character and requires a whole new 
interpretation o f national interests far exceeding questions of national sentiments 
attached to the past.
The new government is facing a double challenge. It has to prove that Slovakia is 
safe from undemocratic practices whilst removing the political and economic debris of 
the last six years. To integrate into the EU in the late 1990s Europe is not an easy task - 
the union is battling with its own direction and the reluctance of some of its existing 
members, and therefore is less enthusiastic and more suspicious o f new democracies. The 
domestic scene is impatient for quick results, the winners having removed the main 
obstacle, the previous administration, are faced with their own differences, whilst the 
defeated, still much in evidence, are waiting for an opportunity. Should that opportunity 
arise, it is very likely that foreign policy will return to its position subordinate to 
domestic conflicts, because political elites are crucial for the interpretation of national 
identity and its translation into foreign policy making. Therefore, the relationship 
between nationalism, national identity, democracy and foreign policy finds a true 





In the decade since the fall of communism in ECE the countries of the region and the 
West were so involved in overcoming the past and forging the new Europe that we have 
nearly forgotten the devastation, economic, political and social that was communism’s 
bequest to those countries. The transformation of these spheres led to the fourth 
challenge - secession, thus independence and nation-building and the general rise in 
nationalism.
As was argued above the relationship between democracy and nationalism in the 
newly independent postcommunist states is something o f a paradox, for all challenges 
they pose to one another are matched by the inevitability and simultaneity of their 
coexistence. National self-determination, minority rights and national identity are 
juxtaposed to the creation o f an all inclusive, culturally tolerant and politically united 
community. The relationship is further compounded by the international environment.
This chapter portrayed the nation and the state in the highly interdependent 
world, not only economically, but politically, the global world in which the distinction 
between internal and external affairs is being increasingly eroded. This bears relevance to 
the democratisation process in the sense that its meaning includes an integration process, 
but, it is more demanding on nationalism - its ultimate achievement is not merely the 
recognition of its state as sovereign, but the ability to relinquish some of that sovereignty 
to transnational organisations.
The examination o f the dynamic between national identity, democracy and 
nationalism in the newly independent democracies and their efforts to integrate into the 
existing international structures, sharpened the differences between them and emphasized 
the importance o f consensus about integration in domestic politics. In the contest 
between nationalism and democracy, nationalism easily becomes a challenge when the 
commitment to the latter is in any doubt - the same applies for integration. Consequently,
I would like to assert that on balance, international integration by promoting 
transparency and compliance with democratic procedures and norms is conducive to the 
development of a more democratic political culture, which in the final analysis must 
reflect the state’s international position. The process is not linear, the interference of the
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international context at times unleashes a backlash from the national, and the whole 
process resembles rather a two-step-forward-one-step-back dance than a slow march 
forward.
Despite clear evidence that some states have performed below expectations (i.e. 
Slovakia), the overall assessment should be a positive one. It must take into account that 
the tasks facing the newly independent democracies o f ECE were staggering, whilst 
expectations were too high and often not backed up by more than the rhetoric ot good 
intent - something both sides tend to be guilty of.
255
Chapter 8
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: POSTCOMMUNISM, 
NATIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE INTEGRATION
In this thesis I have sought to offer an exploration o f the relationship between 
nationalism and democracy on the theoretical level generally and more specifically, in the 
transition from communism to democracy in the Eastern/Central European states. The 
subject matter had two concerns: 1) the fall o f communism and the subsequent 
establishment o f new states brought into sharp focus both ideologies, nationalism and 
democracy as two salient features o f the political landscape in the region; 2) divergent 
outcomes and different patterns in which these transitions evolved. This second point, 
particularly with the view of choices given to national and minority issues served as an 
initial inspiration for this thesis. Among many possible approaches towards the 
explanation of the difference in the achieved stage of that transition, I chose the 
‘nationalism-democracy’ approach. Whilst I do not wish to claim that there is a direct 
correlation between the progress or stagnation of a particular transition to democracy 
and the corresponding nationalism, this thesis has shown the relevance of this approach.
The Unpredictability of Nationalism
The major themes running through the thesis were postcommunism, nationalism, 
democratisation and the link between them. One of the aims of the thesis has been to 
generate an explanation of democratisation processes in the newly independent states 
that could be applicable to other countries in a similar situation. At the outset I would 
like to say that all conclusions drawn from the above cases are based on reflections on 
what has happened. Hence, suggestions projected from these conclusions cannot account 
for contingencies, such as a new crisis in the international environment, economic crisis 
or unexpected radical changes in the domestic scene.
The very nature o f nationalism, underlying its political manifestations, is its 
rootedness in the psychological attachment to ‘the nation’, and thus, the capacity to 
influence group behaviour. If the events o f the last decade can tell us anything important
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about the behaviour of states and nations in the turmoil of collapsing states and 
ideological frameworks, it is that nationalism is easily mobilised, for when it comes to 
emotional commitment, nationalism at this point of history is practically unrivaled as a 
form of collective allegiance. I have attempted to view nationalism objectively, given the 
evident legitimising, emancipating and energising role it has played in the liberation of 
ECE countries from communism. However placing nationalism on a par with democracy 
for the manifest role it has played in the process and for the sake of a political analysis 
should not detract from the fact that in the relationship between nationalism and 
democracy, the former enjoys the emotional upper hand and thus, remains an 
unpredictable phenomenon.
Postcommunism and Nationalism
Postcommunism is associated with a rapid economic and social transformation, based on 
the premise o f democracy, human rights and European integration. The loss of lives over 
the last eight years in the Balkans tarnished the promise of democracy and reduced the 
initial expectations o f the ‘revolutionary’ year 1989 to more realistic proportions, by 
bringing to the fore one unexpected facet o f these transformations - nationalism and its 
dangers. Yet the Balkans are not a characterisation of postcommumsm, but a sign of a 
disintegrating federation whose ideological basis for existence was removed and replaced 
by different aims sought by its various constituent units. In that sense Serbian nationalism 
was not an exemplification of change, but rather an example of resistance to the changes 
desired by others. This point illustrates the double-edged character of nationalism - it can 
be an instrument o f change as much as it can be an impediment to change.
The second point worth noting in connection to postcommunism is that 
nationalism was not its cause, but sprung into action once it became clear that 
communism had exhausted its power by which it imposed its legitimacy. This is not to 
argue the rights or wrongs of communist ideology, but to assert that communism as a 
system operating in the ECE countries camouflaged the lack of legitimacy and conviction 
by rhetoric and coercion, a method eventually proved to have been of limited duration.
Hence the question here was not why postcommunism and why democracy, but 
firstly what makes post communism such a fertile ground for nationalism and secondly, 
on a more theoretical level what makes democracy and nationalism both complementary 
and also conflicting in their relationship and thirdly, given that this is the case, how can
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the conflictual side o f this relationship be minimised so that the more complementary 
facets become more enhanced. This last point was the subject o f this thesis and remains a 
continuing problem for all democratisation processes.
The first chapter proposed five factors considered relevant to the question why 
nationalism became a logical conclusion to the fall of communism and a feature of 
postcommunism. These were: the ‘ancient hatred’ theory; the inadvertent and deformed 
nation-building under communism; nationalism as a ‘replacement ideology, the 
manipulatory role o f elites in postcommunism; and conflicts between minorities and 
majorities intensified by the role o f ‘external’ homelands. It appeared that all of those 
propositions bore relevance to the salience of nationalism in varying degrees.
The underlying argument however was that it is a certain type of nationalism 
which concerned us here and the type of politics that it engenders. The challenge to 
democracy comes from ethnic politics, which involves necessarily the promotion and 
seeking of preferential treatment for the dominant ethnic group within the state, or a 
pursuit of more recognition by a minority, usually in response to the former. Ethnic 
politics are usually a response to some external challenge. It can be a reaction of a nation 
that perceives itself neglected by history or by another nation and is now in a position to 
rectify the past, it can be a minority responding to aggressive nation-building policies of 
the majority, or pre-empting such a process, it could be a nation in a multinational state 
attempting to redistribute control over the state, it could be an ethnically homogenous 
society looking for an imaginary enemy - or any other variation o f the above. The root of 
ethnic politics is always attached to ethnic or national identity and its (re)assertion, in 
order to assert or readjust the national position, whether for reasons of insecurity or 
superiority (cultural, numerical, economic, political), o f which Slovakia and Slovenia 
were good examples.
Assessment of ‘Salience of Nationalism ’  Hypotheses
Looking at the table below and the three national issues discussed at length throughout 
the thesis, the Czecho-Slovak split, the Slovak-Hungarian relationship and Slovene 
independence, we could argue that the above suggests that considering the number ol 
propositions applicable to the Slovak case, in comparison to Slovenia, explains the higher 
prominence of ethnic politics in Slovakia. This however does not say which of those 
hypotheses has a stronger potential and under which circumstances (which in itself would
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be a worthwhile project for further investigation, with an aim to contribute to theories 
for the prevention of ethnic conflicts). The nationalist phenomenon is inspired by a 
multiplicity of factors, which also suggests the large range of possibilities towards the 






















Given that history cannot be undone and that reflection of the past and conclusions 
drawn from that past are an integral part o f national myths, the ‘ancient hatred’ 
hypothesis is potent, but only to the extent to which it is exploited and, as I have argued, 
the success o f ethnic mobilisation on the historical issues depends more on 
contemporary factors than on ‘ancient ones’. Postcommunism affected societies in such 
an all-encompassing way that no identity, whether the state, the individual or the nation 
remained intact; hence the issue of identity and its redefinition in accordance with new 
aspirations, aims and traumas became a logical accompaniment of postcommunism. The 
manipulation by elites which can and did substantially increase the levels of conflict is 
based on the premise that there is at least one point o f dissatisfaction, recognised by the 
majority o f the members o f a given group. That then means as has been argued above 
that the influence of political elites can operate also in the opposite direction, towards the 
minimising of ethnic politics, as indicated by the change of political scene in Slovakia 
after the last general elections.
In the context o f present politics in the region the interplay between minorities 
and majorities exercises a considerable influence on domestic and foreign politics and is
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potentially an explosive issue. However, even if the existence of minorities constitutes a 
permanent feature within a state, the perception o f the minority vis-a-vis the majority and 
the state and vice-versa is not fixed, but changes in response to the political 
developments within the state, more precisely according to how the state and its 
dominant nation views the minority(ies). The true nature o f democratic politics is a 
mutual accommodation within a multiethnic state, whilst the aim should be the 
establishment o f a political community with a collective identity attached to the state.
This does not necessarily mean a replacement o f ethnic identity by a civic one, but the 
removal o f ethnicity as a conflictual issue from the top of the domestic political agenda. 
Slovakia (and prior Czechoslovakia ) initially failed this test o f democracy which proved 
damaging to Slovakia’s transition and integration process.
Democratisation and Nationalism
If none of the above is conclusive, but all merely contributory, there must be one 
overwhelming reason for the manifest prominence of nationalism in postcommunist 
societies. Here it is claimed to be democratisation itself. For all the complexity 
surrounding the relationship between nationalism and democracy, the connection 
between them is rather easily summed up. Democracy needs the state, for a clearly 
defined political unit is a prerequisite for the exercise of democracy; the nation also needs 
a state in order to secure its recognition and exert control over the destiny of the nation, 
thus inevitably it seeks to appropriate as much control over the state as it can muster - 
thus, statehood and nationhood come together and the link is even tighter when the new 
state is forming and democracy is being established.
The well known dictum that “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which 
holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner) applies as 
much as other definitions o f nationalism as a movement for unity, autonomy and identity 
of the national group (Smith), to name but two of the most used ones. These however 
are definitions o f classical nationalism and tell only a part of the story which is now being 
played out. One reason is obvious, the political unit is usually not ‘national’, in the sense 
that in most cases not one nation can call it its own, despite the nationalist leaders’ 
pretensions to the contrary. Consequently, more than one unity and one identity are 
seeking autonomy, which thus must be curtailed, even before international organisations 
have been considered.
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Between the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Nationalism
So, what is the nature of postcommunist nationalism, implying nationalism during the 
period of communism’s collapse and the initial transition to democracy? My suggestion 
is that it is a specific type of nationalism which combines all elements of classical 19th 
century nationalism with entirely new features, previously not associated with 
nationalism, but rather with internationalism.
The systemic change which produced the transformation of the political, social 
and economic spheres has also produced a need for a deeper legitimacy than a new 
political order. The change challenged not only the regimes, but the states, their 
foundations and their very boundaries, the challenge that the existing multinational states 
could not withstand. Democracy came with new national aspirations and those 
aspirations questioned not only the boundaries, but the very contents of those boundaries 
and a kind of second round of nationalist endeavour took hold; the first round was 
national liberation from communism in which ethnic identity was secondary to 
democracy, but this pro-democracy solidarity did not last to the second round.
Once the main obstacle, the old communist regime was dismantled, the flow of 
changes gathered momentum to bring up another force - national identity. Nations in 
possession of states were re-stating their relationships with neighbours and minorities, 
nations that lost their states were reclaiming them, whilst nations that were ‘half way’ 
through with a limited sovereignty of a federal republic saw an opportunity to as it were 
finish ‘the job’ history has deprived them of. The calculation of costs and benefits, and 
the historical ties, were pushed aside in the name of a democracy that had hardly been 
bom. What however was bom were new sovereign states, in which democracy, state and 
the nation were all establishing themselves and seeking to legitimise their existence via 
each other; minorities, also in the process o f reassessing their new identity, were left 
fighting not to get forgotten in the great battle for the nation-state and its legitimacy.
Postcommunist transitions of the newly independent states should, from another 
point o f view, less absorbed in the economy and the establishment of the democratic 
procedures, be defined as synchronisation of two major historical processes, nation- 
building and state-building, which here are in an unprecedented way compressed into one 
process - the democratisation process. Clearly, seeking a comparison with other 
democratisation processes from other authoritarian regimes does not do justice to the 
enormity of the task, nor to the understanding of that process, whose specificity is a twin
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project - political transformation accompanied by national independence under the 
conditions o f double insecurity. The question about the role o f nationalism in the 
democratisation process lies at the junction where these processes meet and is defined by 
the levels o f political development at that moment.
Postcommunist nationalism is linked to democracy in an almost old-fashioned 
‘revolutionary’ way, similar to the year 1848, which is a paradox, considering the often 
used adjective ‘new’. Another ‘old’ element of this contemporary postcommunist 
nationalism is the ethnic thrust o f it, the reason for which is to be found on two levels. 
First, the novelty o f the ethnic nation establishing the state and second, the abandonment 
o f the previous civic identity in favour o f the ethnic one.
However, there is a crucial difference with the ‘old nationalism’. A truly new trait 
in nationalism’s character is that ‘new’ postcommunist nationalism has moved its goal 
posts - from national sovereignty to international integration. The recognition of the 
nation has since the 19th century assumed a new dimension in the form of the acceptance 
among the developed democratic nations who are secure enough in their democracy and 
nationhood to relinquish some of their sovereignty in the name of the larger community, 
in this case Europe. If the synchronisation of the nation-building and state-building 
appeared a difficult task, this added dimension puts the whole process into another realm 
altogether. To secure nationhood in the conditions o f having just achieved it, to secure 
democracy when there was very little time for it to sink its roots into the society deep 
enough not to be swayed by various challenges, at the same time as complying with rules 
and regulations put into practice by long established states and democracies seems 
almost an unfair proposition. Yet, at the time of writing 10 postcommunist 
Eastern/Central European states, among them such difficult cases o f transition as 
Slovakia and Rumania have been accepted for the negotiations about the admission to 
the European Union, which can only be described as an achievement.
The Final Reflection on the Role o f Nationalism in the Democratisation Process 
This contradicts the accusations o f regression and anachronism addressed to 
postcommunist nationalism and asks another important question about the 
unpredictability o f nationalism. If Slovak nationalism can wane and turn the comer 
towards European integration, then perhaps all nationalisms can. It has brought my 
argument a full circle, from stating its dangers to the main argument of the thesis that
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nationalism does not operate independently and hence its role in the democratisation 
process depends on the evolving dynamics between many variables within the state.
The case studies concentrated mainly on the following factors: the level of 
national consciousness and satisfaction, the historical factors, the ethnic composition and 
harmony, the political, economic and cultural development prior to independence, but 
more importantly the political development during the transition and the formation of 
elites, equally importantly the mode of attainment of independence and lastly, the 
international environment. All o f those factors have been dealt with at length in the 
previous chapters.
The omission of the mode o f transition from this list is worth a comment and 
possibly criticism. However, as much as the gradual transition in Slovenia has been the 
main argument for the success of the Slovene transition in comparison to the less 
successful Slovak case, the mode o f transition shared by the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia produced nevertheless contrasting transition processes, with the Czech case 
resembling Slovenia rather than Slovakia. This says something about the level of national 
confidence, the political tradition and the conviction about democracy rather than about 
the mode of transition and the severity of the previous regime. It also says a great deal 
about different conclusions the nation and its leaders draw from the past.
It appears that the further one moves away from postcommunism, the more the 
other facets of that society’s existence come to the fore. The importance ol the 
graduality o f the Slovene transition lies not in the actual moment of the collapse ol the 
previous regime, but in the length of time it allowed for the negotiations about the luturc 
direction of the state prior to the final departure from communism and the federation. In 
fact Slovenia in terms of political development had left the federation long before the 
question o f independence became a paramount issue - in Slovenia democratisation took 
precedence and national independence followed from it.
Slovakia, on the other hand illustrated the accumulation of negative conditions 
for the process o f democratisation: injured and halted nation-building prior to 
c o mmunism leading to a fascist regime during the Second World War, the pitfalls of the 
communist modernisation and ultimately a sudden democratisation bestowed on the 
nation unprepared for it and undecided about its future direction. The consequent 
independence and problems with the Hungarian minority were a reflection of a society 
insecure in both democracy and nationhood. Nationalism in Slovakia illustrated all the
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hallmarks of postcommunist nationalism as described above, including the fact that it 
appeared to have been of a temporary nature.
It could be argued that the impending exclusion from ‘Europe’ touched the 
national identity which this time came out o f its preoccupation with the past in order to 
join other ECE countries. It could also be argued that nationalism has played out its role 
in that democratisation process, it did provide a political unit, it redressed some historical 
injustice, clearly important to a large part o f the population and now has nothing else to 
offer. Whichever way, nationalism is a device, it relies on a legitimacy it enjoys by virtue 
o f a psychological attachment to the nation it claims to serve and protect and thus is an 
accompaniment to great changes, which it can speed-up or obstruct, depending on its 
nation’s aspirations. It is those aspirations that change, depending on the politics of the 
time and so does the role o f nationalism. As much as it can be mobilised, it can be 
reduced, possibly even eliminated and this is where democracy - its sometimes partner, 
sometimes challenger - comes to play an even a larger role.
Paradoxically, the undisputed global belief in democracy and in the ‘imagined 
community o f the world’ has so far failed to diminish the relevance of the ‘imagined 
community’ o f the nation, which leads me to conclude that firstly, nationalism for the 
foreseeable future has to be accepted as a permanent feature o f our world, because 
democracy and identity are intimately linked, and secondly that the remedy for the 
‘narrowness’, thus the exclusiveness and defiance of nationalism, has to be sought in 






Narodna Obroda 8.9.1997; 6.10.1997; 16.8.1999
Slovenska Republika 21.6.1995 ;10-20.9.1997
Sme 6.9.1997 ; 13.9. 1997; 2.10.1997; 3&10.10.1997;
28.9.1998; 5.11.1998;16.8.1999; 14.10.1999 
The Slovak Spectator 21.12.1998 - 10.1.1998 
OS/8 August 1999
Slovak Circle in Great Britain Bulletin 6 May 1997 
Delo 4.5.1998 - 13.5.1998
Documents:
Zbierka Zakonov 270/1995 Narodnej Slovenskej Rady
Agenda 2000 The Opinions of the European Commission on the Applications for 
Accession European Commission Strasbourg July 1997 
Agenda 2000 Volume 1: For a Stronger and Wider Union Doc/97/6 European
Commission Strasbourg 
Agenda 2000 Volume 2 The Challenge o f Enlargement Doc/97/6 July 1997 European
Commission Brussels 
Accession Partmership Slovakia European Commission Brussels 
K.Borchardt ‘The ABC o f Community Law’ Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities Luxembourg 
‘Constitution of the Republic o f Republike Slovenije’ Ljubljana, Casopisni Zavod 
Uradni List Republike Slovenije 1993 
‘Ethnic Minorities in Slovenia’ Ljubljana, Institute for Ethnic Studies Information 
Bureau Government o f the Republic o f Slovenia 1994 
‘White Paper on Education in the Republic of Slovenia’ Ljubljana, Ministry of 
Education and Sport September 1996
265
‘Ustava Slovenskej Republiky’ Bratislava, NVK International 1992 
‘Verejny Audit Volebnych Programov Politickych Stran’ Bratislava, Nadacia 
F.A.Hayeka September 1998
A.Duleba Vyskumne Centrum Slovenskej Spolocnosti pre Zahranicnu Politiku: 
Program Strany Madarskej Koalicie (1998)
Program Slovenskej Narodnej Strany (1994 & 1998)
N.Tos Tnformiranost in Stalisca Ciljnih Skupin v Sloveniji o Evropski Unii in




Program Slovenskej Narodnej Strany (Pracovny navrh) 1994 
Volebny Program Zdruzenia robotnikov Slovenska 
“HzDS do toho...” Bratislava 1994
Magyar Keresztenydemokrata Mozgalom Program schvaleny na 1 .kongrese MKDH
‘Pokoj a istota’ Madarska Obcianska Strana 1994
Koalicia Spolocna Volba 9. September 1994
‘Ide o vela. Ide o Slovensko.’ Demokraticka Unia Slovenska 1994
Volebny program politickeho hnutia Spoluzitia Volby 1994
Memorandum Slovenskej Demokratickej Koah'cie 30.Augusta 1997 v Martine
Slovenia
Commandments o f the Associated List 1996 
Slovenija 2000 Volilni Program Liberalne Demokracije Slovenije 
SDSS Politicni Program Socialdemokratska Stranka Slovenije Maj 1995 
Program SKD 1994
SNS Za Tiste, Ki Imamo Slovenijo Radi 1996 
Program Slovenska Ljudska Stranka 1996 
Socialdemokratski Program za Slovenijo Zdruzena Lista 1996
266
Interviews in Slovakia August - October 1997 and May 1999
S.Bajanik Vicepresident o f Matica Slovenska
Z.Butorova Political analyst Institute for Public Question
A.Duleba Political analyst Research Centre o f the Slovak
Foreign Policy Association
L.Fogas MP and Vice Chairman of The Party of Democratic
Left
M.Gajdos Historian Slovak Academy o f Science
E.Gal Director Institute of Judaism Slovak Academy of
Science
L.Hoka Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement -
Secretary o f the Central Commitee
P.Huncik Sandor Marai Foundation
A.Jurova Historian Slovak Academy o f Science
D.Kovac Director Institute of History Slovak Academy o f Science
G.Meseznikov Director Institute for Public Questions
S.Mihalikova Associate Professor Department o f Politics
Comenius University
F.Novosad Senior editor Parlamentny Kurier
V.Palko MP Christian Democratic Movement - spokesman
T.Pichler Director Institute of Philisophy Slovak Academy of
Science
J.Podoba Institute o f Ethnology Slovak Academy of Science
D.Slobodmk MP Movement for Democratic Slovakia - chairman
government committee for Foreign Affairs
P.Weiss MP the Vice Chairman of The Party of Democratic
Left
P.Zajac Publicist
M.Zemko Presidential Office Director Domestic Policy
Department








Faculty o f Social Sciences (Sociology) University of 
Ljubljana
Faculty o f Social Sciences (Sociology) University of 
Ljubljana
Faculty of Social Sciences (Politics) University of 
Ljubljana
Minister of Education Liberal Democratic Party 
Faculty of Social Sciences (Centre for Public Opinion) 
University o f Ljubljana
Vice-Chairman Associated List o f Social Democrats 










Lev Kreft Faculty o f Philosophy University of Ljubljana/Vice- 
Presidentof the National Assembly 1991 -1994 
Peace Institute Ljubljana 
Faculty o f Philosophy University o f Ljubljana 
Director Centre for Public Opinion University 
o f Ljubljana
Faculty o f Social Sciences (Sociology) University of 
Ljubljana
Institute for Ethnic Studies Ljubljana
Faculty o f Social Sciences (Politics) University of
Ljubljana
Vice-President of the Committee for Local Self- 




A.Agh The Politics o f  Central Europe London, Sage 1998
F.Adam ed. Volitve in Politika po  Slovensko Ljubljana, Zaloznik 19993
F.Adam G.Tomc ed. Small Societies in Transition: The Case o f  Slovenia Ljubljana, 
Faculty o f social Sciences 1994 
P. Alter Nationalism 2nd.ed. London, Edward Arnold 1994
B. Anderson Imagined Communities London, Verso 1983 
T.Garton Ash The Magic Lantern New York, Random House 1990 
T.Garton Ash The Uses o f  Adeversity New York, Vintage 1990
V.Bacova Historickd Pamat a Identita Kosice, Spolocenskovedny Ustav SAV 1996 
J.Baylis N.Rengger Dilemmas o f  World Politics international Issues in Changing 
World Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992 
Z.Bauman Globalization The Human Consequences Cambridge, Polity Press 1998 
D.Beetham fCBoyle Introducing Democracy:80 Questions and Answers Cambridge, 
Polity Press 1995
D.Beetham Ch.Lord Legitimacy and the European Union London, New York, 
Longman 1998
D.Beetham The Legitimation o f  Power London, MacMillan 1991 
CH.Bennett Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse Causes, Course and Consequences 
London, Hurst&Company 1995 
J.Benderly E.Kraft Independent Slovenia Origins, Movements, Prospects London, 
Macmillan Press 1997 
K.von Beyme Transitions to Democracy in Eastern Europe London, New York, 
Macmillan Press 1996
A.Bibic G.Graziano Civil Society, Political Society, Democracy Ljubljana, Political 
Science Association 1994 
R.Blackbum ed. After the Fall London, Verso 1991
A.Bozoki Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe Central European University
268
Press 1999
J.Breuilly Nationalism and the State Manchester, Manchester University Press 1982 
R.Brubaker Nationalism Reframed Nationhood and the National question in the New 
Europe Cambridge, University Press 1996 
S.R.Bollerup Ch.Christensen Nationalism in Eastern Europe London, Macmillan Press
1997
B.Bucar S.Kuhle Small States Compared: Politics o f  Norway and Slovenia Bergen 
(Norway), Alma Mater 1994 
J.Bugajski Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe Armonk, London M.E.Sharpe 1995 
Z.Butorova Slovensko 1996 Bratislava, Institut pre Verejne Otazky 1997 
M.Butora P.Hunclk Slovensko 1995 Bratislava, Nadacia Sandora Maraiho 1996 
M.Butora F.Sebej ed. Slovensko v Sedej Zone Bratislava, Institut pre verejne otazky
1998
R.Caplan and J.Feffer ed. Europe’s New Nationalism States and Minorities in 
Conflict Oxford,Oxford University Press 1996 
R.Chmel ed. Slovenska Otazka v 20.storoci Bratislava, Kalligram 1997 
L.J. Cohen Broken Bonds Boulder, Oxford, Westview Press 1993 
W.Connor Ethnonationalism Princeton, Princeton University Press 1994 
W.Connor The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy Princeton, 
Princeton University Press 1984 
R.Dahl Dilemmas o f  Pluralist Democracy New Haven, Yale University Press 1982
A.Dallin and G.Lapidus ed. The Soviet System in Crisis Oxford, Westview Press 1991 
K.Dawisha B.Parrot Politics, Power and the Struggle fo r Democracy in South-East
Europe Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997
B.Denitch The Legitimation o f  a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case New Haven London, 
Yale University Press 1976
S.Devetak ed. Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umhruch Europas 
Miinchen, Slavica Verlag Dr.Anton Kovac 1993 
L.Diamond ed. Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries Boulder, 
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1993 
L.Diamond and M.F.Plattner Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy 
Baltimore, London The Johns Hopkins University Press 1994 
M.Djilas The New Class London, Thames and Hudson 1958 
J.Dunn Democracy the Unfinished Journey Oxford, Oxford University Press 1992 
A.Duleba Foreign Policy o f  the Slovak Republic Bratislava, Slovak Foreign Policy 
Association 1998
J.Elster, C.Olfe, U.Preuss Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1998 
M.J.Esman Ethnic Conflict in Western World Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1977 
D.Fink-Hafner T.Cox ed. Into Europe? Perspectives from Britain and Slovenia 
Ljubljana, Scientific Library o f Faculty o f Social Sciences 1996
D.Fink-Hafner J.Robbins Making a New Nation: The Formation o f  Slovenia 
Aldershot, Dartmouth 1997
F.Fukuyama The End o f  History and the Last Man New York, Free Press 1992
F.Gal P.Fric P.Huncik C.Lord “Madarska Mensina na Slovensku ” Bratislava,
National Endowment for Democracy in Washington &Nadacia Sandor Marai 
1993
E.Gellner Nations and Nationalism Oxford, Blackwell 1983
E.Gellner Postmodernism, Reason and Religion London, Routledge 1992
269
E.Gellner G.Ionescu Populism its Meanings and National Characteristics London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1969 
M.Glenny The Rebirth o f  History London, Penguin Books 1990 
M.Glenny The Balkans 1804-1999 London, Granta Books 1999 
P.Goode T.Bottomore Austro-Marxism Oxford, Clarendon Press 1978 
L.Greenfeld Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity Cambridge, London, Harvard 
University Press 1992 
M.Guibemeau Nationalisms Cambridge, Polity Press 1996 
J.Hall ed. The State o f  the Nation Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1998 
S.Hall D.Held T.McGrew Modernity and its Futures Cambridge Polity Press in 
Association with The Open University 1996 
M.Haller and R.Richter Toward a European Nation? New York, M.E.Sharpe 1994 
V.Havel Living in Truth London, Faber and Faber 1989 
D.Held ed. Prospects fo r  Democracy Cambridge, Polity Press 1993 
K.Henderson Back to Europe London, UCL Press 1999 
D. Held Democracy and the Global Order Cambridge, Polity Press 1997
G.Herb D.Kaplan Nested Identities Boulder, New York, Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers 1998 
P.Hockenos Free to Hate London, New York Routledge 1993 
D.Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict London, Berkeley, Los Angeles, University 
o f California Press 1985 
M.Hroch The Social Preconditions o f  National Revival in Europe Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 1985 
S.Huntington The Third Wave Norman OK, University o f Oklahoma Press 1993 
J.Hutchinson Modern Nationalism London, Fontana Press 1994 
J.Hutchinson & A.D.Smith Ethnicity Oxford, Oxford University Press 1996 
J.Hutchinson & A.D.Smith Nationalism Oxford, Oxford University Press 1994 
A.Hyde-Pryce The International Politics o f  East/Central Europe London, Sage 1999 
M.Ignatieff Blood and Belonging London, Vintage 1994 
AJurova Vyvoj Romskej Problematiky na Slovensku po  Roku 1945 Kosice,
Goldpress Publishers 1993 
Ch.Joppke Immigration and the Nation-State Oxford, Oxford University Press 1999 
I.Kamenec Tragedia Politika, Knaza a Cloveka Bratislava, Archa 1998 
I.Kant Political Writings 2nd edition Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1991 
RKeohane J.Nye S.Hoffinann After the Cold War Cambridge, London, Harvard 
University Press 1993 
D.Kovac Slovaci & Cesi Bratislava, AEP 1997 
V.Krivy Slovensko a Jeho Regiony Bratislava, Nadacia Media 1996 
M.Kun Prague Spring Prague Fall Budapest, Akademiai Kiado 1999 
Ch.Kupchan Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe London, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press 1995 
P.Latawski ed. Contemporary Nationalism in East Central Europe London, 
Macmillan 1995
J.J.Linz and A. Stepan Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
Baltimore, London The Johns Hopkins University Press 1996 
L.Liptak Slovensko v 20.storoci Bratislava, Kalligram 1998
D.McLellan Marxism Oxford, Oxford University Press 1988
M.Mandelbaum ed. Postcommunism New York, Council on Foreign Relations Books
1996
270
E.Mannova Mestianstvo a Obcianska Spolocnost na Slovensku 1900-1989 Bratislava, 
AEP 1998
G.Meseznikov ed. Slovakia Parliamentary elections 1994 Bratislava, Slovak 
Political Science Association 1995
J.S.Mill On Liberty and Other Essays Oxford, Oxford University Press 1991
D.Miller On Nationality Oxford, Oxford Clarendon Press 1995 p. 82 
A.Motyl ed. The Post-Soviet Nations New York, Columbia Press 1992
D.P.Moynihan Pandemonium Oxford, Oxford University Press 1993 
J.Musil ed. The End o f  Czechoslovakia Budapest, Central European University Press
1995
H.Neuhold P.Havlik A.Suppan Political and Economic Transformation in East 
Central Europe Boulder, Summertown, Westview Press 1995
C.Offe Modernity and the State Cambridge, Polity Press 1996 
S.Pavlowitch The Improbable Survivor London, C.Hurst&Company 1988 
S.Periwal Notions o f  Nationalism Budapest, Central European University Press 1995
F.Plasser A.Pribersky Political Culture in East Central Europe Aldershot, Brookfield, 
Ashgate Publishing 1996
G.Pridham T.Vanhanen Democratization in Eastern Europe London, New York, 
Routledge 1994
I.Prizel National Identity and Foreign Policy Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
1998
J.Prunk A Brief History o f  Slovenia Ljubljana, Zalozba Grad 1996 
A.Przeworski Sustainable Democracy Cambridge, New York Cambridge University 
Press 1995
S.Ramet 2nd edition Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991 
Bloomington and Indianopolis, Indiana University Press 1992 
S.Ramet L.Adamovich Beyond Yugoslavia Boulder, Oxford, Westview Press 1995 
R.Rizman Studies on Ethnonationalism Ljubljana, Krt 1991 
R.Rizman Izzivi Odprte Druzbe Ljubljana, Liberalna Akademija 1997 
J.Rothschild Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework New York, Columbia University 
Press 1981
D.Rupel ed. Slovenska Smer Ljubljana, Cankarjeva Zalozba 1996 
J.J.Schwarzmantel The Age o f  Ideology London, Macmillan 1997 
J.J.Schwarzmantel Socialism and the Idea o f  the Nation Hemel Hempstead, Harvester
Wheatsheaf 1991
C.Skalnik Leff National Conflict in Czechoslovakia Princeton, Princeton University 
Press 1988
C.Skalnik Leff The Czech and Slovak Republics Boulder, Oxford, Westview Press 
1997
A.D.Smith Theories o f  Nationalism London, Duckworth 1971 
Socialism in Yugoslav Theory and Practice Collection of Conferences Beograd, 
University o f Beograd 1974 
L.Sorensen L.Eliason ed. Forward to the Past? Aarhus, Aarhus University Press
1997
P.Subrt N.Tos Crossroads o f  Transition Praha, Faculty of Charles University 1995 
P.Sugar ed. Eastern European Nationalism in the 20th Century Washington, The 
American University Press 1995 
S.Szomolanyi ed. Slovensko:Problemy Konsolidacie Demokracie Bratislava,
Slovenske Zdruzenie pre Politicke Vedy Nadacia Friedricha Eberta 1997
271
N.Svob Dokic Medunarodni Polozaj Novih Europskih Zemalja Zagreb, IRMO 1994 
A.de Tocqueville Democracy in America New York, Anchor Books 1969 
J.Tulchin B.Romero The Consolidation o f  Democracy in Latin America London,
Lynne Rienner 1995 
K. Waltz Theory o f  International Politics Reading, Adison Wesley 1979
O.Waever B.Buzan M.Kelstrup and P.Lamaitre Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe London, Pinter Publishers 1993
E.Weber Peasants into Frenchmen.The modernization o f Rural France 1870-1914 
Stanford, Stanford University Press 1976 
L. Weiss The Myth o f  the Powerless State: Governing Economy in the Global Eta
Cambridge, Polity Press 1998 
K.Williams The Prague Spring and its Aftermath:Czechoslovak Politics 1968-70 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997
D.Zajc S.Kropivnik I.Luksic Conflict and Consensus Ljubljana, Political Science
Association 1996 
M.Zver 100 Let Social-Demokracije Ljubljana, Veda d.o.o. 1996
Academic Journals and Conference Papers:
R.Asmus F.Larrabee ‘Nato and Have-Nots’ Foreign Affairs 75:6 November/ 
December 1996 p.p. 13-21 
T.Garton Ash ‘Cry the Dismembered Country’ New York Times Review
January 14 1999 p.p.29-33 
I.Banac ‘The Fearful Asymmetry of the War:The Causes and Consequences of 
Yugoslavia’s Demise’ Daedalus 121 spring 1992 p.p. 141-173 
I.Banac ‘Political Change and National Diversity’ Daedalus Winter 1990
p.p.141-159 „  .
J.Batt Hew Slovakia Discussion Paper The Royal Institute o f Internal,onal Affairs
D .Beeth™ ‘Conditions for Democratic Consolidation’ Review o f  African Political
Economy 60 p.p. 157-172 
I.Berlin ‘The Bent Twig: A Note o n  Nationalism’ Foreign Affairs 51:1 October
1972 p.p.l 1-31 ^
I Bernik B.Molnar ‘Ethism, Nationalism and State-Building: The case of Slovenia 
Paper prepared for presentationat the Congress of the International Political
Association, Seoul, August 1997 
M.Beissinger ‘How Nationalism Spread: Eastern Europe Adrift the, Tides and Cycles 
of Nationalist Contention’ Social Research 63:1 Spring 1996 p.p.97-146 
A.Benhke ‘Citizenship, Nationhood and the Production of Political Space
Citizenship Studies 1:2 July 1997 p.p. 243-265 ^
I.Bicanic ‘The Economic Causes o f New State Formation During Transition East 
European Politics and Societies 9:1 Winter 1995 p.p 2-21 
J.Bowen ‘The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict’ Journal o f  Democracy 7 A  October
1996 p.p.3-15
KBooth ‘Human Wrongs and International Relations’ International Affairs 71:1 
Winter 1995 p.p. 103-126
272
R.Brubaker ‘National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External Homelands in the 
New Europe’ Daedalus 121 Spring 1992 p.pl07-132 
V.Bunce ‘Comparing East and South’ Journal o f  Democracy 6:3 July 1995 
p.p.87-99
V.Bunce ‘Should Transitologists be Grounded?’ Slavic Review 54:1 Spring 1995 
p .p .l l l-  127
M.Butorova and Z.Butorova ‘Slovakia: The identity Challenges of the Newly Born 
State’Social Research 60:4 Winter 1993 p.p.705-736 
Z.Butorova ‘Premyslene “ano” Zaniku CSFR’ Sociologicky Casopis XXIX: 1 1993 
p.p.88-103
M. Carpenter ‘Slovakia and the Triumph of National Populism’ Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 30:2 1997 p.p.205-220 
S.Chan ‘In Search of Democratic Peace:Problems and Promise’ Mershon 
International Studies Review 41:1 May 1997 p.p.59-91 
W.Connor ‘Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?’ World Politics 24:3 April 1972 
p.p.319-355
W.Connor ‘Beyond Reason: the Nature of the Ethnonational Bond’ Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 16:3 July 1993 p.p.373 - 388 
D.Druckner ‘Nationalism, Patriotism, and the Group Loyalty Mershon International 
Studies Review 38 1994 p.p.43-68
D.Fink-Hafher ‘The Disintegration o f Yugoslavia’ Canadian Slavonic Papers 
XXXVII: 3-4 September/December 1995 p.p.339-352
F.Fukuyama ‘The end o f History?’ National Interest Summer 1989 p.p.3-18
J.Gaddis ‘The Long PeaceInternational Security 10:4 Spring 1986 p.p.99-142 
K.T.Gaubatz ‘Kant, Democracy and History’ Journal o f  Democracy 7:4 October 
1996 p.p. 136-151
L.Greenfeld ‘Nationalism and Modernity Social Research 63:1 Spring 1996 
p.p.4-40
S.Gill ‘Gramsci, Modernity and Globalization’ paper delivered at BIS A Conference 
15-17 December 1997 Leeds
G.Gyani ‘Political Uses o f Tradition in Post-Commnunist Eastern and Central Europe' 
Social Research 60:4 Winter 1993 p.p.893-913
M.Hafher-Fink ‘Changing Social Structure in the Process of Transition from 
Socialism: The case of Slovenia’ paper prepared for the 68th Annual 
Pacific Sociological Association meeting April 17-20 1997 San Diego, 
California
M.Hafiier-Fink ‘(Trans)formation of the Idea of Self-management Slovenian
Perspectives’ paper prepared for the 5th Conference of the International 
Society for the Study o f European ideas, August 19-24 1996 Utrecht
E.Harris ‘The Slovak Question at the End of the Twentieth Century: National Identity, 
Political Culture and Democratisation’ Carnijev Zbornik Faculty of Arts in 
Ljubljana 1998 p.p.376-394
E.Harris ‘Nacionalizmus a Demokratizacny Proces’ OS November 99/11 p.p.42-47
E.Harris ‘Assessing the Compatibility Between Nationalism and Democracy in
Postcommunist Societies: Some Perspectives from Slovakia and Slovenia’ 
Slovak Sociological Review 31:6 Fall 1999 p.p.587-602 
P.Hasner ‘Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism’ Survival 35:2 Summer 1993 
p.p.49-65
E.Hobsbawm ‘Language, Culture and National Identity’ Social Research 63:4
273
Winter 1996 p.p. 1065-1079 
U.Hedetoft ‘The Nation-State Meets the World: National Identities in the Context of 
Transnationality and Cultural Globalisation’ paper prepared for BIS A 
Conference 15-17 December 1997 Leeds University 
S.Holmes ‘Liberalism for the World of Ethnic Passions and Decaying States’
Social Research 61:3 Fall 1994 p.p.600-601 
T.Hribar ‘Slovenska Drzavnost’ Nova Revija VI:57 special issue Prispevki za 
Slovenski Nacionalni program 1987 p.p.3-29 
V.Hribar ‘The Slovenes and European Transnationality’ in the same issue p.p.33-36 
M.Hroch‘From National Movements to the Fully-Formed Nation’ New Left Review 
198 March/April 1993 p.p.3-20 
M.Hroch ‘National Self-Determination from a Historic Perspective’ Canadian 
Slavonic Papers 37:4 September/ December 1995 p.p.283-300 
S.Huntington ‘The Clash o f Civilizations?’Fore/gw Affairs 72:3 Summer 1993 
p.p.22-49
S.Huntington ‘The West Unique, Not Universal’Fore/g« Affairs 75:6 November/
December 1996 p.p.28-46
C.Isaac ‘The Meanings o f 1989’ Social Research 63:2 Summer 1996 p.p.291-344 
R.J00 ‘Slovenes in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovenia: Ethnic and State Identity'
Ethnic and Racial Studies 14:1 January 1991 p.p.100-106 
T. Judah ‘The Serbs:The Sweet and Rotten Smell of History’ Daedalus 126:3 
Summer 1997 p.p.23-45 
L.Jurik ‘Co sme chceli oslavovat’ Nove Slovo VII:37 12/9/1997 
M.Kaldor and I.Vejvoda ‘Democratization in East Central European Countries’ 
International Affairs 73:1 January 1997 p.p.59-83 
J.Kiss ‘Beyond the Nation State’Social Research 63:1 Spring 1995 
p.p.191-245
M.Khan ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Crisis o f the Post-Cold War International 
System’ East European Politics and Societies 9:3 fall 1995 p.p.459-498
D.Kovac ‘Nacionalizmus 19. a 20. Storocia’ Historicky Casopis 45:1 1997 p.p.
77-90
M.Kovac ‘The Slovene Spring’ New Left Review 171 September/October 1988 
p.p.l 15-128
M.Kucan ‘Narod je Zgodovinska Tvorba in ne Izmislek’ Kolaps 5 March 1998 
p.p.34-39
C.Layne ‘Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace’ International Security
19:2 Fall 1994 p.p.5-49 
A.Leibich ‘Nations, States, Minorities: Why is Eastern Europe Different’? Dissent 
Summer 1995 p.p.307-313
A.Linklater ‘Cosmopolitan Citizenship’ Citizenship Studies 2:1 February 1998
p.p.23-43
J.Linz ‘Transitions to Democracy’ The Washington Quaterly 13:3 Summer 1990 
p.p.143-164
L.Liptak ‘Okruhly stokPhenom en Durica‘A>zY/Aor a Kontext 2:3 1997 p.p.4-23
C.S.Maier ’Democracy and its Discontents’ Foreign Affairs 73:4 July/August 1994 
p.p.48-65
P.Manent ‘Democracy Without Nations?’ Journal o f  Democracy April 1997 
p.p.92-102
M.Mann ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political
274
Cleansing’ New Left Review 235 May/June 1999 p.p. 18-45
D.Matic ‘Understanding the Role o f Nationalism in ‘New Democracies” Collegium 
Antiologicum 23:1 p.p.231-247 
J.Mearsheimer ‘Back to the Future’ International Security 15:1 Spring 1990 p.p. 
5-56
J.Mearsheimer ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ International 
Security 19:3 Winter 1994/95 p.p.5-49
F.Medved ‘A Path Towards Carthography o f Slovene National Identity’ Razprave 
in Gradivo 29-30 Ljubljana Institut za narodnostna Vprasanja 1994-5 
p.p. 177-210
S.Mihalikova ‘Narodne Symboly Slovenskej Statnosti’ Political Review 2 October 
1996 p.p.53-70
J.Musil ‘Czechoslovakia in the Middle o f Transition’ Daedalus 121 Spring 1992 
p.p. 175-195
T.Nairn ‘The Modern Janus’ New Left Review 94 November/December 1975 
p.p.3-31
D.Nelson ‘Democracy, Markets and Security in Eastern Europe’ Survival 35:2 
Summer 1993 p.p. 156-171 p. 162
G.Nodia ‘How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?’ Journal o f  Democracy 
October 1996 p.p. 15-29
C.Offe ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design?’ Social Research 58:4 Winter 1991 
p.p.865-892
P.Pithart ‘Intellectuals in Politics:Double Dissent in the past Double Disappointment 
Today’ Social Research 60:4 Winter 1993 p.p.751-761 
P.Pithart ‘The Division of Czechoslovakia: A Preliminary Balance Sheet for the End 
of a Respectable Country’ Canadian Slavonic Papers 37:3-4 September 
December 1995 p.p.321-338
B.Posen ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’ Survival 35:1 Spring 1993 
p.p.27-47
A.Przeworski, M.Alvarez, J.Cheibub, L.Limongi ‘What Makes Democracies Endure’ 
Journal o f  Democracy 7:1 January 1996 p.p.39-55 
J.G.Ruggie ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’ International Organizations 47:1 Winter 1993 p.p. 139-174 
J.Rupnik ‘The Reawakening o f European Nationalism’ Social Research 63:1 Spring 
1996 p.p.41-75
J.Rupnik ‘The Postcommunist Divide’ Journal o f  Democracy 10:1 January 1999 
p.p.57- 63
D.Rustow ‘Transition to Democracy’ Comparative Politics 2:3 April 1970 
p.p.337-363
S.Saideman ‘The Dual Dynamics of Disintegration: Ethnic Politics and Security 
Dilemmas in Eastern Europe’ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 2:1 Spring
1996 p.p. 18-43
G.Sartori ‘How Far Can Free Government Travel?’ Journal o f  Democracy 6:3 
July 1995 p.p. 101-111 
A.Schedler ‘What is Democratic Consolidation’ Journal o f  Democracy 9:2 April
1998 p.p.91-103
J.Seroka ‘The Political Future o f Yugoslavia: Nationalism and the Critical Years . 
1989-1991’ Canadian Review o f  Studies in Nationalism XIX: 1-2 1992# 
p.p. 151-160
275
P.Schmitter ‘Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy Journal o f  Democracy 5.2
April 1994 p.p.57-74
G.Schopflin ‘The Problems of Democratic Construction’ Daedalus 123:3 
Summer 1994 p.p. 127-141
J.Siklova ‘What Did We Lose’ Social Research 63:2 Summer 1996 p.p.531-464
H.Gordon Skilling ‘Czechs and Slovaks’ International Journal LIII:1 Winter 1997-8 
p.p.73-94
Slovene Writers Association Special ‘The Case of Slovenia’edition Nova Revija 
July 1991
A.D.Smith ‘The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism’ Survival 35:1 Spring 1993 
p.p48-63
D.Schnapper ‘beyond the opposition:’civic’ nation versus ‘ethnic’ nation’
The ASENBulletinU  Autumn/ Winter 1996/97 p.p.4-8 
A.Smolar ‘Revolutionary Spectacle and Peaceful Transition’ Social Research 63:2
Summer 1996 p.p. 439-449 
J.Snyder ‘Nationalism and the Crisis o f the Post-Soviet State’ Survival 35:1 Spring
1993 p.p. 5-27
R.Suny ‘The Revenge of the Past: Socialism and Ethnic Conflict in I ranscaucasia 
New Left Review 184 November/December 1990 p.p.3-37 
P.Taguieff ‘Political Science confronts Populism:From a Conceptual Mirage to a 
Real Problem’Telos 103 Spring 1995 p.p.9-45 
V.Tismaneanu ‘Reassessing the Revolutions of 1989’ Journal od Democracy 10:1
January 1999 p.p.69-73 
S.Meiklejohn Terry ‘Thinking About Post-Communist Transitions: How Different Are
They?’ Slavic Review 52:2 Summer 1993 p.p.333-337 
P.Thomberry “UN Declaration on the Rights o f  Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities ” London Minority Rights
Group 1993 „ . ,
K.Verdery ‘Nationalism and National Sentiments in Post-socialist Romania Slavic
Review 5:2 Summer 1993 p.p 179-203 
K.Verdery ‘Nationalism, Postsocialism and Space in Eastern Europe’ Social 
Research 63:1 Spring 1996 p.p.77-95 
M.Walzer ‘The New Tribalism’ Dissent 39 Spring 1992 p.p. 164-171 
L. Weiss ‘Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State’ New Left Review 225
September/October 1997 p.p.3-26 
M.Urban ‘The politics o f Identity in Russia’s Postcommunist Transition: The nation
Against Itself Slavic Review 53:3 Fall 1994 p.p.733-765 
O.Yiftachel ‘Nation-Building and Social Division of Space’ Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics 4:3 33-58
O.Yiftachel ‘Nation-building or Ethnic Fragmentation? Frontier Settlement and 
Collective Identities in Israel’ Space & Polity 1:2 1997 p.p. 149-169 
M.Zagar ‘Nationality, Protection of Minorities and Transition to Democracy: the Case 
of Slovenia’ I and II Teorija in Praksa 32:1-2 January 1995 p.p.88-95 and 
32:3-4 March-April 1995 p.p.243-25 
P.Zajac ‘Tento stat nefunguje’ OS June 97/6 . . . ,
V.Zaslavsky ‘Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies
Daedalus 121 Spring 1992 p.p.97-121 
S.Zizek ‘Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism New 
Left Review 225 September/October 1997 p.p.28-52
